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U.S. Seeks Deadline for Making Additional Protocol a Condition for Nuclear Access By Joe Fiorill WASHINGTON — The United States is seeking by the end of next year to make countries’ access to nuclear materials conditional on their acceptance of enhanced international inspections, the U.S. State Department’s policy planning director said last night at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. “The Additional Protocol must be made a condition of nuclear supply by the end of next year,” Mitchell Reiss said in a dinnertime defense of U.S. nonproliferation policy. The protocol, now in force in 58 countries, allows for more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections than are afforded by the standard safeguards agreements that governments maintain with the U.N. nuclear watchdog. Although the agency has stressed the desirability of universal acceptance of the document, it has set no deadlines for the effort. A source familiar with the watchdog agency’s work said the body has no power to implement a constraint such as the one Reiss discussed. The source said the Nuclear Suppliers Group could be the forum for such a move but that even there, its passage would be unlikely. In related remarks, Reiss said the suppliers’ group should deny uranium-enrichment and reprocessing technology to all countries except those that already have full-scale, functioning plants that use such equipment. At the same time, he said, countries that forgo enrichment and reprocessing should be guaranteed reliable access to nuclear-reactor fuel. Reiss called for criminalizing WMD trafficking, helping needy countries dispose of prohibited and surplus weapons and materials, sharing WMD information among countries, stepping up international interdiction efforts, strengthening international bodies and bolstering export and border controls. In each case, Reiss cast the United States in the lead role. Asked by a conference attendee about allegedly lagging U.S. efforts to disarm, however, he rejected any “direct correlation” between maintenance of U.S. nuclear forces and other countries’ WMD ambitions. Mainly in response to participants’ questions, the official touched on several problems of current interest. He said the United States supports European efforts to negotiate a resolution to Iran’s alleged pursuit of a nuclear bomb, adding that Washington does not oppose Iran’s right to civilian nuclear facilities. Iran’s Russian-built Bushehr reactor, he said, poses no problem as long as Moscow provides the fuel and takes it back when spent. “I don’t think we’ve ever objected to that,” Reiss said. Regarding North Korea’s avowed nuclear “deterrent” and the six-country talks that are endeavoring to address it, Reiss expressed “frustration” that “the focus always appears to be on the United States” rather than on Pyongyang’s conduct. The United States has refused direct talks with North Korea and rebuffed the country’s bids for economic and other benefits in exchange for progress on the nuclear front. “We are hopeful,” said Reiss, “that the North Koreans can show a little bit more realism, a little bit more flexibility. … We have a model that we’re following, and it’s the Libya model.” Following years of painstaking negotiations, Libya last year announced it was ending its hidden WMD programs and has now begun to emerge from international isolation and to enjoy economic rewards.
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