|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
British Dossier on Prewar Iraqi WMD Efforts Failed to Contain Sufficient Caveats, Inquiry Finds By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — A 2002 British dossier on Iraq’s alleged WMD efforts did not contain sufficient caveats on the quality of the intelligence upon which the document’s assessments were based, according to a report released today on the British inquiry into intelligence used to support the invasion (see GSN, July 9). “We conclude that, if intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in public debate in future, those doing so must be careful to explain its uses and limitations,” the inquiry said in its report. The inquiry found, though, “no evidence” that the British government deliberately exaggerated available intelligence to bolster the case for war. In addition, no evidence was found that British intelligence analysts were pressured to come to certain conclusions. British Prime Minister Tony Blair today praised the report for its “balanced judgments.” He also said that the report shows that the government had not sought to deceive the British public to justify war. “I only hope that now … people will not disrespect the other’s point of view but will accept that those that agree and those that disagree with the war in Iraq, hold their views not because they are warmongers on the one hand or closet supporters of [former Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein] on the other, but because of a genuine difference of judgment as to the right thing to have done,” Blair said in a statement. “There was no conspiracy. There was no impropriety,” he added. While saying that he took “full responsibility” for the mistakes listed in the report, Blair also defended his decision to join the United States in invading Iraq. “I cannot honestly say I believe getting rid of Saddam was a mistake at all. Iraq, the region, the wider world is a better and safer place without Saddam,” he said. Opposition spokesman Michael Howard, though, criticized Blair for failing to include caveats made in intelligence reports in his public statements on the alleged threat posed by Iraq. “I hope that we will not face another war in the foreseeable future. But if we did and this prime minister identified the threat, would the country believe him?” Howard said in a statement. “The issue is the prime minister’s credibility. The question he must ask himself is does he have any credibility left?” Howard added. In its report, the inquiry said the British government’s belief in 2002 that stronger action was needed to enforce Iraqi WMD disarmament obligations was not based on new intelligence developments, and that there was no new intelligence at the time to indicate that Iraq posed more of an immediate concern than the activities of some other countries. While saying that it was still too early to determine conclusively whether prewar Iraq possessed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, the inquiry concluded that: * prior to last year’s invasion, Iraq had the “strategic intention” of relaunching its nuclear weapons program once U.N. weapons inspections were relaxed and international sanctions were lifted; * Iraq was conducting illicit research and procurement activities to maintain its WMD capabilities; * Iraq was developing ballistic missiles that violated U.N-mandated restrictions on range and payload capabilities; but * Iraq also did not possess “significant, if any” biological and chemical weapons stockpiles fit for use. According to the report, the inquiry was “impressed by the quality” of British intelligence assessments of prewar Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. While finding that intelligence assessments of prewar Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons efforts were “less assured,” the inquiry noted the “inherent difficulties” in assessing such efforts, such as the relative ease of keeping them secret through the use of dual-use technologies. The results of the British inquiry into prewar intelligence on Iraq was less critical than the results of a yearlong review conducted by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Iraq. In a report released last week, the Senate intelligence panel found that most of the assessments made by U.S. intelligence either exaggerated or were not supported by available information (see GSN, July 12). The British inquiry criticized the human sources used by British intelligence to gather information on prewar Iraq’s WMD efforts, noting that some of the sources may have been asked to report on areas beyond their expertise and that too much faith was placed in information obtained from untested sources. The inquiry also found that weaknesses in human intelligence gathering were not caused by an over-reliance on Iraqi defectors as sources. In the United States, the Bush administration has come under heavy criticism for using information provided by Iraqi defectors made available by the Iraqi National Congress who were found to have provided false information.
| ||||||||||
Back to top
