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Western Nations Should Buy Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Reduce Proliferation Risk, Experts Say By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — The United States and other Western nations should seek to reduce nuclear proliferation risks by purchasing and disposing of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, according to a paper by two U.S. nuclear weapons experts published in the spring edition of the U.S. Naval War College Review (see GSN, May 27). Russia possesses anywhere from 3,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons, which are intended for battlefield use and generally have smaller yields than strategic nuclear weapons, experts say. Citing ongoing security concerns at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites, experts have warned that terrorists seeking to acquire nuclear arms may seek to steal or purchase tactical weapons. The nuclear weapons range from artillery shells to landmines to missile-launched warheads, according to the Council for a Livable World. To help reduce that proliferation threat, Timothy Miller and Jeffrey Larsen, senior analysts at U.S. defense contractor Science Applications International Corp (SAIC), have proposed that Western nations enter into a “cash for kilotons” agreement with Russia to purchase and dismantle tactical nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia already have a similar agreement in place with the Megatons to Megawatts effort, which seeks to eliminate 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium removed from Russian strategic nuclear weapons. Under the 20-year program, which was launched in 1994, Russia converts material removed from its nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium, which is then purchased by the U.S. Enrichment Corp. for sale as civilian nuclear plant fuel (see GSN, June 17). Miller and Larsen’s proposal calls for both the United States and Russia to fully inform each other about the size and details of their tactical nuclear weapons arsenals, which would probably need to be verified by taking a joint inventory, and to then decide which weapons are in excess of national security needs. A group of Western nations would then negotiate with Russia the price of each weapon based on a “per-kiloton-of-warhead” basis. Miller and Larsen proposed making the NATO-Russia Council responsible for the financial arrangements. The council, acting as an executive committee for the effort, would establish an initial price per unit yield for various classes of weapons, which would serve as the basis for later negotiations for final prices, according to the paper. While the overall costs of purchasing Russian tactical weapons would probably run into the billions of dollars, such payments could be spread out over a multiyear period, Miller and Larsen wrote, adding that the weapons to be dismantled would have to be transferred immediately. The experts also proposed that Russia could be offered debt forgiveness, instead of money, for each weapon. In their paper, Miller and Larsen called for “tight time constraints” on the purchase price negotiations. They proposed that the countries involved should set a timetable for negotiations, and if they are not completed under that schedule, the entire process should stop and price penalties be put into effect based on which parties were responsible for the delay. Once Russian tactical weapons were purchased, according to Miller and Larsen, they would be “immediately” secured and dismantled. In their paper, the two experts proposed that the International Atomic Energy Agency be given the role of custodian for the purchased weapons and responsibility for operating a facility in Russia to demilitarize the weapons and to blend down any highly enriched uranium they contain. “We believe that a neutral third party, one that would not pose a military threat to either side, would enhance mutual confidence in a way that is critical to removing suspicion,” Miller and Larsen wrote. Mary Beth Nikitin of the Center for Strategic and International Studies last week questioned IAEA involvement, noting the success that the United States and Russia have had in bilaterally carrying out the Megatons to Megawatts agreement. Once converted to low-enriched uranium, the material formerly contained in the purchased weapons could be converted to civilian nuclear power plant fuel and distributed among those countries involved in the project or sold into international nuclear fuel markets, according to Miller and Larsen. To help prevent a glut of new fuel from entering the market, they proposed that the agreement’s executive committee govern the rate of fuel conversion and the sale of fuel. Other nonproliferation experts were divided on assessing the likelihood of Russia and the United States adopting Miller and Larsen’s proposal. Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said earlier this week that the proposal would be useful to gain “momentum” on tackling the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. According to Gottemoeller, proposals to purchase Russian tactical weapons stretch back to the late 1980s, but at that time there was little support within the U.S. Congress to fund a direct buyout. However, she added that the successes achieved by the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which works to dispose of and secure former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and related materials, might have helped to change the attitudes of U.S. lawmakers. In Russia, though, the proposal is likely to run into more opposition for a variety of reasons, according to experts. Russia would likely be less interested in direct financial compensation alone in exchange for tactical nuclear weapons due to the improving state of its economy and reduced concerns over the security of its nuclear arsenal, said Mike Jasinski of the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security. In addition, according to Jasinski, Russia views the possibility of a future arms control agreement on tactical nuclear weapons as a “bargaining chip” with which to obtain concessions from the United States on other issues, such as missile defense and U.S. plans to study new low-yield nuclear weapons (see GSN, April 22). “There is a long list of issues that create as much concern and apprehension in Moscow as the TNW [tactical nuclear weapons] issue does in Washington. Therefore, in my view, any proposal aiming at addressing the Russian TNW issue will also have to do something about alleviating Russian concerns,” Jasinski said in a written response to Global Security Newswire. Russia’s continued concerns regarding NATO could also prevent any agreement on reducing tactical nuclear weapons, said Nikolai Sokov of the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He said last week that Russia was unlikely to address the issue until questions of NATO’s future intentions toward Moscow and the current technological and numerical imbalance between Russian forces and those of the alliance were resolved (see GSN, April 7). “If Americans are concerned about Russian NSNW [nonstrategic nuclear weapons], why worry? Russian intentions are as benign as those of NATO. I think the relationship as a whole must change if Russia is to change its current stance,” Sokov said in a written response to GSN. Gottemoeller said the Russian military views its tactical nuclear arsenal as the “ultimate insurance policy” for its weakened conventional forces. She added, though, that she did not see this as an “insurmountable barrier” to reaching a future agreement.
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