|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
British Intelligence Rushed to Support Decision to Invade Iraq, Leading to Errors, Inquiry Set to Find
An inquiry into British prewar intelligence on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction is expected to find that errors were made as a result of British intelligence working quickly to justify a government decision to invade, the Financial Times reported yesterday (see GSN, July 8). The inquiry report, set to be released next week, is expected to find flaws in the way British intelligence delivered, assessed and publicly presented intelligence information, according to the Times. British intelligence had previously seen other countries such as Libya and Iran as more immediate threats than Iraq, according to the report. However, once a decision was made by the British government to support the U.S. invasion, intelligence services had to work quickly to gather more information on Iraq, leading to errors, the report states. The report is expected, though, to refrain from criticizing British government and intelligence officials, the Times reported (Fidler/Huband, Financial Times, July 8). Meanwhile, former chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix told the inquiry that U.S. and British intelligence on prewar Iraq was inaccurate and that both governments did a poor job in analyzing the information they received, according to the Financial Times. “My belief is that intelligence failed and it was presented in a way that did not have sufficient caveats and which politicians were prepared to believe,” Blix said. “There was a lack of critical thinking on WMD, and government shares the responsibility with intelligence,” he added (Jimmy Burns, Financial Times, July 8).
| ||||||||||
Back to top
