Uzbekistan Returns Reactor Fuel to Russia in Latest U.S.-Funded Mission

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department announced yesterday the successful repatriation from Uzbekistan of more than 10 kilograms of Russian-origin nuclear fuel, including material that could be used in a crude nuclear weapon (see GSN, Aug. 13).

In a Sept. 9 secret mission, 11 kilograms of enriched uranium fuel was transported from the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, near the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, to a secured facility in the Russian city of Dmitrovgrad, where it will be blended down to low enriched uranium. Of the 11 kilograms of material, about 3 kilograms consisted of highly enriched uranium, Energy Department spokeswoman Jeanne Lopatto said today.

The United States funded the mission and provided technical experts to help monitor the loading of the material into Russian-supplied transportation canisters. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspectors were also present to observe the loading of the material, which was then airlifted under guard out of Uzbekistan, according to the Energy Department. Uzbekistan provided security and transportation for the material from the institute to the airport near Tashkent, Lopatto said.

“The recovery, return and eventual elimination of this highly enriched uranium are an important milestone in our campaign to reduce this dangerous material worldwide,” U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in a press statement.  “It was only with the strong cooperation of the Uzbeks and Russians that we were able to successfully complete this important international security mission.”

Lopatto said that while the United States has long intended to aid the repatriation of Russian-origin reactor fuel from Uzbekistan, the mission took on an increased priority due to recent terrorist activity in the region. Concerns over Islamic militant activity in Uzbekistan has made the security of nuclear material there a source of concern for “some time,” said Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Uzbekistan is home to an Islamic militant group known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda.

Some experts warned today, though, that large quantities of Russian-origin irradiated material are still present at the Uzbek site pending the completion of a Russian environmental review, which is legally needed there before the material can be returned. Matthew Bunn of Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom said that the material at the site is no longer “self-protecting,” meaning that the material is no longer so radioactive that it would injure anyone who handled it.

“Most of the proliferation risks the site had in late August, it still has,” Bunn said.

Even so, “getting even a few kilograms of HEU out of this location is a good thing,” he said, also noting the terrorist threat in Uzbekistan.

The fuel was originally supplied to Uzbekistan by Russia for use in a 10-megawatt research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics, which the IAEA has described as the largest such facility in Central Asia. Uzbekistan has agreed to convert the reactor to use low enriched uranium as fuel, according to the U.S. Energy Department.

The one-day mission was conducted via the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative — an effort launched in May to help prevent terrorists from obtaining fresh and spent research reactor fuel, which could be used to develop crude nuclear or radiological weapons (see GSN, May 26).  Under the initiative, the United States plans work with Russia to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh highly enriched uranium fuel by the end of 2005 and accelerate and complete the return of all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010 (see GSN, May 27). The United States also plans to work through the GTRI to complete the repatriation of all U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel under an existing U.S. program from locations around the world within a decade, and to convert research reactors around the world to use low enriched uranium fuel.

Over the past year, according to the Energy Department, the United States has aided in the repatriation of almost 50 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from sites in Bulgaria, Libya and Romania (see GSN, July 21).

This weekend, the United States and Russia are scheduled to hold a conference on the Global Threat Reduction Initiative at IAEA headquarters in Vienna.

While praising the successful repatriation, Nuclear Threat Initiative Co-Chairman Sam Nunn said yesterday that next week’s scheduled conference would provide an opportunity to increase international support for such efforts to secure vulnerable HEU supplies around the world.

“This is a strong step in the right direction, but we are not working as fast as we can or as fast as we must,” said Nunn. “We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.”

In 2002, NTI helped to fund the repatriation of weapon-grade material from a facility in Yugoslavia to Russia (see GSN, Aug. 23, 2002)

Regarding future nuclear material repatriation efforts, Gottemoeller said that Russian-origin material at site in Sofny, Belarus was a source of concern. As for U.S.-origin fuel, she stressed the need to remove material provided to a research reactor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: Sam Nunn is chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.  NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

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