|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
Radiological Weapons: Georgia Wraps Up Search for Radiological Sources By Bryan Bender Georgian officials, in completing an intensive search operation this month sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, are confident they have identified most of the radioactive strontium, cesium, cobalt and other radiological sources located in Georgian territory under the government’s control. One continuing concern, however, is the worrisome number of radiological sources located at a primate research facility in the northern Abkhazia region of the country, which is seeking independence and has been largely inaccessible to Georgian and international authorities during the past decade. Still, President Eduard Shevardnadze’s government says Georgia’s highly publicized experience in locating and securing orphaned radiological materials should be seen as a test case for other former Soviet republics and nations across the globe as they come to grips with growing threats of catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of radiological materials (see GSN, June 25). Search Mission Ending At a former Soviet military base here near the border with Azerbaijan, Georgian authorities — along with experts from IAEA, the United States, France, Turkey and India — will by the end of this month complete a nationwide search that began in June to find orphaned radiological sources left behind by Soviet armed forces. With the help of two mobile, multichannel radiation analyzers provided by Germany and India, as well as handheld radiation detectors operated by IAEA-trained Georgians, the multinational team today made a final sweep of this abandoned base, named Vaziani, where the Soviet Union once deployed nuclear weapons. While the team only gathered low-level radiation readings today, to date more than 225 sources containing radiological materials have been found in Georgia as part of three search missions. Among the sources found were six highly radioactive thermal nuclide generators that used strontium to provide Soviet forces with power in remote areas and to operate communications devices, said Andrei Chupov, program management officer at the IAEA who oversees technical cooperation in Europe, Latin America and West Asia. Cesium sources, widely used in calibration devices, have also been found, in addition to cesium chloride that was used in agricultural experiments, he said. Both materials were identified during earlier searches at this sprawling base, which remains littered with abandoned radiation suits, rocket fins and what appear to be aerial bombs rotting in a watery ditch. According to Zuran Tavartkiladze, Georgia’s first deputy minister of environment, only 15 percent of the country has been searched, but he noted that an estimated 80 percent of the most populated areas are now considered free of radiological threats, which in several recent cases resulted in harmful exposures in rural communities. An estimated 90 percent of the area inside the four Soviet military bases that were located in Georgia has also been searched, officials said. In addition to public safety, however, the recovery of the materials has been deemed critically important by the IAEA to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring radiological materials that could be used to construct a radiation dispersal device. The United States has reported suspected terrorist plans to disperse radiological materials through a conventional explosion (see GSN, Sept. 3). “This is a transit country and we do not want problems for other countries,” Tavartkiladze said in an interview in his Tbilisi office yesterday. Indeed, in 1999 and 2000 Georgian officials seized 3 kilograms of low-enriched uranium that had been passing through Georgia en route to Turkey, officials said. The material is now stored at the Center of Applied Research for the Atomic Energy Commission outside of Tbilisi, where Georgia had its only nuclear reactor before it was decommissioned in 1999. The 40 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel for that reactor has been removed for safe storage to the United Kingdom. Single Storage Facility for Radiological Sources Needed The hundreds of radiological sources that have been recovered in Georgia with IAEA technical assistance and $125,000 of U.S. seed money — now kept in various storage facilities whose locations cannot be reported due to security concerns — must be kept secure for years to come, Tavartkiladze said. As a result, Georgia is seeking to build a central storage facility in the western part of the country as soon as possible, the minister said. The proposal is awaiting presidential approval, which is expected soon, officials said. Georgia, however, lacks the resources to fund the project and to ensure adequate security at such a facility. “We don’t have the money to build this facility,” Tavartkiladze said. “We hope [the IAEA and the international community] will find some money for it.” He added that it is the government’s desire that the recovered strontium, considered the most dangerous of the orphaned sources, be transferred to Russia for safe keeping, something the government is currently trying to negotiate with Moscow. Other Radiological Sources Remain Out of Reach Despite the apparent success in locating the orphaned sources in Georgia, authorities acknowledge that there remain other radiological sources in areas of the country that are not under central control. Moreover, the search missions may have missed other materials that could still pose an environmental hazard, or be attractive targets to terrorists seeking to build a so-called dirty bomb. The main concern involves orphaned sources located in the breakaway region of Abkhazia, where the primate research facility, in Sukhumi, houses cesium sources and is controlled by separatists. Georgian, U.S. and IAEA officials visited the facility in April and continue to try to reach a breakthrough with rebels so the materials can be recovered and properly stored or disposed of. The facility’s security is considered wholly inadequate. “It is a very dangerous situation with sources in the research institute,” Tavartkiladze said. “Storage conditions are not in accordance with international standards.” There may be even more worrisome materials in Abkhazia, according to other officials, possibly including uranium located at the Institute of Physics, also in Sukhumi. For example, in 1994 Russian authorities seized a variety of materials and isotopes, including 2 kilograms of uranium, plutonium and other transuranium sources, according to Russian press reports. The material was suspected of coming from the institute. Lerry Meshki, head of the Environment Ministry’s nuclear and radiation service, telephoned the head of the Abkhazia physics facility today at the request of Global Security Newswire. He reported that the director denied that any materials were taken from the institute. “I don’t really know the whole story,” Meshki acknowledged. Tavartkiladze, the environment minister, added, “We have more problems in Abkhazia because we don’t control it.” Moreover, Georgian officials admit that their searches for orphaned sources could very well have missed some of the radioactive materials. Vast tracts of the country have not been searched, particularly in the mountains and in scarcely populated areas because it is too costly. At the same time, Russia — considered to retain ownership of the materials — has been unwilling or unable to provide Georgia and international authorities with data on how many sources may have been left behind or where. “The Russians say they do not have documents,” Tavartkiladze said. “They said they now have no information, but they said they would give us anything they find.” With such a lack of data, he said, “We do not know where to search.” Other obstacles could be hampering the search mission. Some of the Georgian personnel operating handheld detection devices today said they did not cover all of their assigned territory because small arms fire heard in the vicinity — said to be U.S. special forces training Georgian military units on the other side of a mountain — made them fearful of proceeding further. The Georgia Model? Nevertheless, Georgian officials believe their experience over the past months could provide many useful lessons for other former Soviet republics as well as nations across the globe seeking to clean up orphaned sources or otherwise secure dangerous radiological materials. Tavartkiladze, who just returned from two weeks of training at Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, said his U.S. counterparts believe “we have good cooperation and are a good example for others.” He said that many orphaned sources likely exist in other former Soviet states. “We are not unique,” he said. “We have been more open. That is why we have found more sources.” IAEA assistance “has been very effective,” added Shukuri Abramidze, director of the Center of Applied Research for the Atomic Energy Commission, where the decommissioned research reactor is located. “We have realized some projects, such as searching for radiological sources,” said Abramidze, who also worked as the chief Soviet nuclear physicist in Iraq from 1979 to 1980. “They have helped us to do everything.” While Georgia is considered a prime example of the benefit of international cooperation in securing nuclear and radiological materials and knowledge, officials also assert that there is much more work to do here before its nuclear and radiological house is in order. “This is only 10 percent of our activity in Georgia, said the IAEA’s Chupov.
| ||||||||||
Back to top
