Friday, November 15, 2002

U.S. Response:  Abraham Outlines 10 Principles for Nuclear, Radiological Security

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham yesterday recommitted the Bush administration to plans by the Group of Eight economic powers to allocate at least $20 billion to cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union during the next decade and outlined “10 principles” to enhance the protection of nuclear and radiological materials worldwide (see GSN, Oct. 11).

“The Bush administration is fully committed to this agenda, and I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we bring to it,” Abraham said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

“Indeed, this is a challenge shared by all civilized nations of the world, and certainly [U.S.] President [George] Bush’s leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us,” he said.  “It was a commitment taken very seriously throughout our administration and is reflected prominently in our recently published national security strategy,” Abraham said.

His remarks came as nonproliferation experts in attendance and others raise questions about the seriousness of the pledge and contend that progress has been minimal.  While the United States has said it will provide $10 billion and the United Kingdom and Germany have also promised resources, the ultimate commitment of the G-8 countries remains uncertain nearly six months after the original proposal. The other participants, France, Russia, Japan and Canada, have not announced any formal financial commitments.

Bush administration officials expressed hope last month that G-8 projects could get underway by the early next year, but so far little groundwork has been laid and experts predict little progress is likely before the next G-8 summit scheduled for June.

Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative, told the conference in a later speech that “by then, we should expect to see them turn principles into a clear set of priorities, to establish a timeline to guide their work based on a risk-based analysis of the threats, and to dramatically increase funding to reflect the risk that catastrophic terrorism presents to the health, economy and security of every nation.”

Even in Washington, the largest donor, G-8 related efforts have been slow moving. For example, Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, recently told Global Security Newswire that his agency — which is responsible for overseeing much of the U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union and is expected to help other donor nations navigate through the Russian bureaucracy — has yet to be asked to play a role in coordinating the G-8 effort.

“The policy community hasn’t figured that out yet,” Younger said Oct. 31.

Abraham assured the audience, however, that “the United States is already working with our G-8 partners to identify ways to carry out the ambitious goals the global partnership has established.”

“But it should concern us that this announcement [back in June] received almost no attention, Nunn added.  “We must hold them to their words and their declaration … We are well past the time where we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction … It’s not just a question of direction; it’s a matter of speed.  We’re not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must.”

10 Principles

Meanwhile, Abraham outlined “10 Principles” he says must underpin U.S. and international efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapon materials and technology as well as radiological sources that could be used to build a radiation dispersal device, or dirty bomb. 

“Addressing the nonproliferation question is among the most serious responsibilities I have as energy secretary,” Abraham said.  “In nearly two years in office, I’ve organized my thoughts into 10 principles for nuclear and radiological security.”  They include:

*         The threat continues to evolve.  During the past decade the proliferation threat has focused primarily on rogue states, while the international community must now address the threats posed by terrorists “with the unblinking commitment” to cause mass casualties.

*         The margin of error is small. “Even a little success in smuggling or theft can have a great impact,” Abraham said.  “Terrorists or rogue states do not need exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials to achieve their ends.  Based on International Atomic Energy Agency calculations, only a relatively small amount of highly enriched uranium could be enough for a nuclear explosive device.  And if the goal is to build a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb, the amount can be even less, depending on the material used.”

*         The problem demands a broad array of responses.  Given that securing nuclear and radiological materials is a multifaceted problem, nonproliferation mechanisms need to run the gamut, including improving physical security, consolidating material into fewer storage locations, down-blending HEU or burning plutonium, and halting the production of excess nuclear material. 

*         There are good reasons to focus on Russia.  U.S. nonproliferation efforts have focused on the former Soviet Union, and rightly so, according to Abraham.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union left 40,000 nuclear weapons and over 1,000 metric tons of nuclear materials.  “We’ve paid so much attention to Russia because that is where the material is,” he said.

*         This is a worldwide problem demanding international solutions.  “The international cooperation that was demonstrated in the recent effort at the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia, where enough nuclear material for more than two nuclear weapons was removed, was exemplary,” according to Abraham (see GSN, Aug. 23).  He said that there are 17 other facilities like Vinca that need to be addressed.  Other examples of international cooperation include recent efforts to remove radiological material from the Republic of Georgia and security improvements made at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez in Ukraine (see GSN, Oct. 23).

*         The potential misuse of radiological sources needs to be addressed. “This is an urgent problem and we need to treat it as such,” he said.  Abraham and IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei announced plans Wednesday, along with Russia, to sponsor an international conference in March in Vienna to specifically address radiological threats (see GSN, Nov. 14).

*         The IAEA’s contribution is invaluable.  “But the IAEA needs resources to do its job,” Abraham stressed.  “The United States will continue to support the IAEA strongly, because it is foolhardy to do otherwise.  I urge all others to do the same” (see GSN, Sept. 25).

*         Materials security is ultimately a national responsibility.  While international cooperation is critical, Abraham said that nations with nuclear or radiological materials on their territory must take a leading role in securing them.  “One point that I cannot stress too much is that responsibility for progress falls on each individual member of the international community.”

*         This is a long-term effort.  The effort to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers does not lend itself to any quick fixes.  In fact, solutions must “stand the test of time” for “however long it takes to achieve success,” Abraham said.

*         Success is possible.  “Working together we can make the world safer,” he said.  “We owe our people, our children, and their children, nothing less.”  He concluded, “I have no illusions that such a day is around the corner.  But I do believe that through cooperation and determination, it is eventually attainable.”

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]