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Citing Poor Security, Analysts Question U.S.-Russian Program to Transfer Dangerous Uranium to Russia
The case of alleged Russian uranium thief Alexander Tyulyakov has highlighted the dangers posed by poor security at Russian nuclear facilities and the potential risks of a U.S.-Russian program to place more highly enriched uranium under Russian protection, the San Francisco Chronicle reported yesterday. Tyulyakov, deputy director of the state-owned firm responsible for operating Russia’s nuclear-powered icebreakers, was arrested in August following a sting operation in which he allegedly tried to sell enriched uranium to undercover authorities. More than 6 pounds of enriched uranium were confiscated from his car and residences, according to the Chronicle (see GSN, Sept. 4). “This is the first documented case of theft involving the senior management of a facility handling such material,” said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard University nuclear nonproliferation expert. “This is particularly worrisome, as thefts involving senior managers are among the hardest for any security system to prevent,” he added. Charged with stealing, possessing and attempting to sell radioactive materials, Tyulyakov is expected to hear the verdict from his trial today, the Chronicle reported. Some nuclear analysts and environmentalists have argued that the Tyulyakov case shows Russia is not ready to implement a recently announced U.S.-Russian plan to recover Soviet-supplied highly enriched uranium from nuclear research reactors in 17 nations (see GSN, Nov. 7). Under the plan, the United States would fund the transfer of the fuel back to Russia, where the weapon-usable material would be stored in two facilities at Novosibirsk and Dmitrovgrad. While these sites have received security upgrades with U.S. cooperative threat reduction funds, some analysts have questioned the wisdom of adding more material to their inventory. “They can’t bring all this stuff to Russia without upping the threat of terrorists getting hold of it,” said Charles Digges, an analyst at the Norwegian environmental group Bellona. Digges said the stolen material in the Tyulyakov case was taken from a facility that had already received U.S.-funded security improvements. “Sensors, fences, radiation detectors, weight machines, surveillance — I can’t emphasize too much that the comprehensive upgrades are only as good as the people who operate them,” he said. “If they don’t turn them on in the morning, someone can leave with nuclear materials of some kind. If the guy in charge wants to steal nuclear materials, he can easily do it,” he added. A Russian activist concurred. “The U.S. thinks Russia is more under their (political) control compared to Serbia, Romania and Uzbekistan. I doubt that very much,” said Vladimir Slivyak, head of the Moscow environmental group Ecodefense. Slivyak was referring to previous research reactor fuel-recovery missions in Serbia (see GSN, Aug. 23, 2002) and Romania (see GSN, Sept. 22) as well as an expected operation in Uzbekistan (see GSN, Jan. 3). “The reality is that material in Russia is as unsafe as it would be in Serbia or Romania,” he said. Other experts and officials, however, said that moving the uranium reactor fuel to Russian facilities with imperfect security was nevertheless preferable to allowing the fuel to remain where it is. Third World research reactors with highly enriched uranium fuel are considered by many experts to be among the most vulnerable to terrorist efforts to acquire nuclear materials, the Chronicle reported. “The concerns here are not the quantity of the material, it’s the quality and the portability,” said Laura Holgate of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, which supports the transfer effort. Bunn echoed concerns about the security of nuclear materials where they are currently located. “With some of these reactors, you’re talking about backpack-sized packages of material. You can move it in a pickup truck,” he said. U.S. and Russian officials also backed the recovery plan. “These are high-security facilities. No one can get in. They are properly guarded,” said Nikolai Shingaryov, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry. A U.S. Energy Department official also said that Russian facilities would secure the reactor fuel better than the sites where the fuel is now kept. “We’re pretty confident,” said Paul Longsworth, deputy administrator of the department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (Badkhen/Sternfold, San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 23). [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]
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