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U.S. Considers Extending “Takeback” Policy of Spent Fuel From Foreign Research Reactors By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — The U.S. Energy Department is considering whether to extend a policy of accepting spent nuclear fuel from certain foreign research reactors — a move that some experts said could affect U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts (see GSN, Oct. 23). The U.S. “takeback” policy allows foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin uranium fuel to return the spent fuel to the United States for storage and disposal in exchange for those reactors agreeing to shut down or convert to use low-enriched uranium. Reactors that can convert to low-enriched uranium fuel but choose to continue using highly enriched fuel are not eligible to ship their spent fuel to the United States. The current arrangement, intended to reduce the risk of terrorists or others acquiring weapon-grade uranium, is set to expire after 2009. Last week, representatives from the Foreign Research Reactor Group (FRRG), which represents 12 European research reactors, met with Energy Department officials in Washington to discuss extending the takeback policy. While a spokesman for the group said last week that the department appears ready to approve the policy’s extension, the department has said that a decision on whether to do so has not yet been made. Nongovernmental proliferation experts appear to disagree on whether the extending the policy would help or hinder nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Some experts support extending the takeback policy, saying nations would be more likely to convert their research reactors to use less proliferation-sensitive fuel if the United States promised to accept the reactors’ spent fuel. Others have argued, however, that extending the policy would actually reduce incentives for research reactor operators to convert to using low-enriched uranium fuel in the near future. The takeback policy, which was created in 1996, originated out of the 1950s “Atoms for Peace” effort, through which the United States promised to provide nuclear technology to countries that agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons. One component of the atoms-for-peace effort was the provision of nuclear research reactors and the highly enriched uranium fuel needed to power them. In 1964, the United State implemented the “Off-Site Fuels Policy,” under which foreign research reactors would eventually return the spent fuel to the United States for storage and disposal. In the late 1970s, the United States initiated the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, which seeks to convert foreign research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium fuel (see GSN, Sept. 27, 2002). According to a 1996 Energy Department document, many foreign research reactors agreed to participate in the RERTR program on the condition that the United States would continue to accept spent fuel through the Off-Site Fuels Policy, which expired in 1988. In 1996, the United States agreed to adopt a new takeback policy to resume the return of U.S.-origin spent fuel from foreign research reactors. According to the Energy document, the purpose of the new policy was “to support the broad United States’ nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy calling for the reduction and eventual elimination of the use of highly enriched (weapons-grade) uranium in civil commerce worldwide.” Under the 1996 policy, the United States agreed to accept 22,700 spent-fuel elements loaded into research reactors during a 10-year period, effectively ending the policy in 2006. Reactor operators were given 13 years, until 2009, to ship spent fuel to allow for the material to cool enough to be safely transported. The fuel eligible to be returned included spent HEU and LEU from research reactors that had converted to LEU fuel use or were doing so when the policy went into effect, as well as HEU and LEU fuel from reactors that agreed to convert to LEU use once it became technically feasible. The takeback policy is funded by a charge to “high-income-economy countries,” with the United States covering the full cost of the return of spent fuel from the other countries involved in the policy, according to the Energy Department document. According to Matthew Bunn, senior research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the takeback policy was originally set for a 10-year period in the belief that by 2006 new types of reactor fuels would have been developed, enabling all U.S.-supplied reactors that used HEU fuel to convert to LEU use. Furthermore, the program envisioned that by 2006, reactor operators could make their own arrangements to manage spent fuel supplies, such as through reprocessing, Bunn said in a written response to Global Security Newswire. “The foreign research reactor operators must be prepared to implement their own arrangements for disposition of their spent nuclear fuel after the policy expires,” says the 1996 department document. The Energy Department now appears set, though, to extend the takeback policy beyond 2006, FRRG spokesman Jack Edlow said during a press conference last week. He added that questions still remain as to how the policy would be extended. “It’s the how and why that’s the important part,” Edlow said. “We have not found any opposition to this,” he added. The FRRG is “extremely pleased” that the department appears willing to extend the takeback policy, Edlow said, adding that such an extension was “vital” to the research reactor industry. Edlow said that within the Energy Department there is a “broader view” of the foreign research reactor community and of the nonproliferation benefits of the takeback policy, which resulted in departmental support for the policy’s extension. In addition, the State Department, which helped to prepare the 1996 policy, is also “extremely supportive” of extending it, Edlow said. An Energy Department spokesman said, though, that a final decision on extending the takeback policy has not yet been reached. The department is “open to the potential expansion” of the effort, the spokesman said. ImpactsIf the department chooses not to extend the takeback policy, foreign research reactors that converted to LEU use through the RERTR program may be left with quantities of spent fuel they are unable to manage, according to some experts. Edwin Lyman, senior staff scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists, said that the LEU fuel used by many of the converted reactors cannot be reprocessed, resulting in a need for those reactors to continue to ship spent fuel to the United States. While work is being conducted to develop new types of LEU fuel that can be reprocessed, such efforts have suffered long delays, he said. Bunn said that many of the research reactors that converted to using the type of LEU fuel that cannot be reprocessed easily, known as uranium silicide, are required by national regulations to have spent fuel management plans in place. If the reactors cannot send back the spent uranium silicide fuel to the United States while new types of fuel are developed, they could be forced to shut down “as a result of heeding our advice,” he said. Other the other hand, extending the takeback policy could hinder efforts to convert the U.S.-supplied remaining research reactors that use HEU fuel. By extending the policy, the United States could lose the ability to pressure the estimated 130 reactors that still use HEU fuel to quickly convert to LEU use, Bunn said today. “Some reactors are planning to insert LEU five minutes before the end of the deadline,” he said. Bunn suggested that the policy could be expanded only for those reactors that have already converted to LEU use and for those for which there is not yet suitable LEU fuel. Edlow disagreed, however, that policy’s expansion would result in long-term delays by research reactors in converting to LEU fuel, noting that the reactors had to agree to do so to initially participate in the takeback policy. In addition, an end to the takeback policy could result in the United States losing the ability to pressure research reactors to convert to LEU use, according to Bill Hoehn, director of the Washington office of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. Hoehn said the reactor operators faced with no U.S. support for disposing of their spent fuel, might simply choose to continue operating as they have in the past and to buy their fuel from non-U.S. suppliers, such as Russia. The Energy Department’s decision on whether to extend the takeback policy could also affect efforts to persuade Russia to accept Russian-origin spent fuel from foreign research reactors (see GSN, Nov. 24). On Tuesday, Edlow said that extending the takeback policy would set “the proper standard” for Russia to increase its own efforts to recover spent fuel from Russian-supplied reactors. Lyman said that if the Energy Department chose not to extend the takeback policy, Russia might use that decision to as a rationale for continuing to stall in its own efforts. If Russia were to do so, however, it would be a “hypocritical, political move,” he said, noting that the United States has already brought back most of the HEU fuel it distributed. In addition, Lyman also said that a blanket extension of the takeback policy might not be needed because of the ability of some nuclear countries, such as Germany, to manage their own spent fuel situations. Instead, a case-by-case approach could be adopted, modeled on the limited shipments made during the 1998-1996 period after “urgent relief” assessments were completed, he said. A “carefully crafted expansion … would be in the interest of nonproliferation,” Bunn said.
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