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GAO Criticizes U.S. Supervision of Nuclear Power Plant Security By Mike Nartker The NRC supervises nuclear plant security through an annual inspection program and periodic “force-on-force” exercises that test how plant security forces respond to simulated terrorist attacks. The GAO found, however, that several aspects of the NRC security inspection program reduced the commission’s effectiveness in overseeing plant security, according to the report. The report says congressional auditors found that NRC security inspectors often used a process that “minimized the significance” of discovered security problems by labeling them as “noncited violations” if they were not a frequent problem or if the violation did not have immediate adverse consequences. Noncited violations, according to the report, do not require a written response from the plant operator and do not require the commission to verify later that the problem has been corrected. As an example of a noncited violation, the report describes a situation at one plant where guards failed to physically search individuals after metal detectors had detected metal objects in their clothing. The individuals were then allowed unescorted access through the plant’s protected area, the report says. “By making extensive use of noncited violations for serious problems, NRC may overstate the level of security at a power plant and reduce the likelihood that needed improvements are made,” the report says. In addition, the GAO also found several flaws in the force-on-force exercises. For example, more personnel were used to defend plants during the exercises then normally would have been on duty, the report says. It also says that simulated terrorists were not trained in actual terrorist tactics and that unrealistic weapons, such as rubber guns, were used during the exercises instead of those that would better simulate actual gunfire. Responding the report in an attached letter, NRC Chairman Nils Diaz said the GAO failed to take into account “significant changes” made to the security inspection program following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The annual inspections and force-on-force exercises were suspended in 2001 to redesign them taking into account the heightened terrorist threat, according to the report. It says that five force-on-force exercises have been conducted so far this year through a pilot evaluation program, and that annual inspections are set to resume in 2004. In his letter, Diaz defended the commission’s use of noncited violations, saying it helps to create “an environment that fosters licensee self-identification and correction of problems, an important organizational behavior the NRC encourages.” The commission requires that a sampling of the corrective actions undertaken to fix such violations be later reviewed during subsequent inspections, Diaz wrote. Yesterday’s report was requested by Representatives John Dingell (D-Mich.), the top Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Committee; and Edward Markey (D-Mass.). In a statement released yesterday, Markey criticized the NRC for its lax oversight of security at nuclear power plants, which he called “facilities that are at the very top of al-Qaeda’s list for future attacks.” “It is stunning that the NRC still isn’t assuring the safety of the millions of Americans who live near the 104 licensed nuclear reactors two years after the attacks of September 11,” said Markey, who has often been a critic of the U.S. nuclear industry and the NRC.
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