Officials Dispute Whether Iraq Had an Active Biological Weapons Program By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The interim report released last week by investigator David Kay says investigators have so far found no evidence of active Iraqi nuclear or chemical weapons programs, but a debate has ensued on whether the report indicates that Iraq was conducting a biological research and development program just before the U.S.-led invasion in March (see GSN, Oct. 3)...Full Story

Iran Agrees to Disclose Some Nuclear Information, but Refuses to Recognize IAEA Deadline Iran agreed this weekend to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with information on the origin of some of its uranium enrichment technology, but Tehran does not consider itself bound by an Oct. 31 agency deadline, according to reports (see GSN, Oct. 3)...Full Story

Central Asian Countries Pose Proliferation Risks, Have Helped Strengthen Nonproliferation Agreements, Experts Say By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire BOSTON — The five countries that make up the Central Asian region pose significant proliferation risks, but have worked to improve international nonproliferation efforts, experts said yesterday during a panel held at Harvard University...Full Story

	Monday, October 6, 2003

Central Asian Countries Pose Proliferation Risks, Have Helped Strengthen Nonproliferation Agreements, Experts Say By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire BOSTON — The five countries that make up the Central Asian region pose significant proliferation risks, but have worked to improve international nonproliferation efforts, experts said yesterday during a panel held at Harvard University. The risks coming from the five Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — are generated by the remnants of the vast former Soviet WMD programs, according to experts. Since gaining their independence, however, the five have undertaken several actions, such as working to create a regional nuclear weapon-free zone, that help to strengthen international nonproliferation regimes. One of the most significant proliferation risks in Central Asia stems from the former Soviet biological weapons program, which used the region for production and testing of such weapons, said Togzhan Kassenova of the Institute for Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom. For example, stockpiles of dangerous pathogens remain on Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea — pathogens that could be transferred to the mainland across the shrinking sea by animals or scrap metal scavengers, she said (see GSN, Jan. 9). While Uzbekistan has made progress in decontaminating its section of the island, the Kazakh section still remains contaminated, Kassenova said. The United States is helping to fund the cleanup of the island through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In addition, poor security at research facilities throughout Central Asia and the “brain drain” of biological scientists in the region also pose biological proliferation risks, Kassenova said. She also said the region is a natural home for several types of pathogens that could be used for weapons purposes, such as anthrax and hemorrhagic fevers. Terrorists could also work within Central Asia to obtain nuclear weapons-related materials or other radiological materials that could be used in a crude “dirty bomb,” according to Kassenova. For example, there are tens of thousands of “orphaned” radioactive sources throughout the region, which were used during the Soviet era for industrial and medical purposes and in agricultural experiments to extend growing seasons by warming the soil, Kassenova said (see GSN, Oct. 23, 2002). To help illustrate the problem, she said that a 1992 survey in Kazakhstan compiled an inventory of about 100,000 registered radioactive sources. Currently, however, only about half of those sources are still registered — a loss of about 50,000 sources, she said, adding that Kazakhstan was having the most success of the countries in the region in accounting for radioactive sources. The legacy of the Soviet chemical weapons program also remains a proliferation risk in Central Asia, Kassenova said. For example, she said U.S. forces stationed at an Uzbek military base in June 2002 detected the presence of chemical weapons agents — an incident that illustrated how remnants of the Soviet chemical weapons program persist in the region, she said (see GSN, June 24, 2002). In addition, the porous borders in the region could also make it a transit point for the smuggling of Russian chemical weapons, Kassenova said. During yesterday’s panel, Wendin Davis Smith of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University also complained that a lack of information on Soviet-era WMD programs helped to contribute to the WMD proliferation risks in Central Asia. Russia has continued to withhold information on Soviet WMD efforts from both the Central Asian states themselves and from nongovernmental organizations working in the region on nonproliferation issues, she said.  Aiding Nonproliferation Efforts While posing WMD proliferation risks, the five Central Asian states have also helped to strengthen international nonproliferation regimes, said Mariya Kravkova of Booz Allen Hamilton Energy Practice in Washington. For example, after gaining independence the Central Asian countries joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states, Kravkova said. In addition, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have signed Additional Protocols to their International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements, which gives the agency the authority to conduct more intrusive inspections, she said. Kravkova added that Kazakhstan is close to signing the Additional Protocol as well. In addition to joining the NPT, the Central Asian states have helped to strengthen international nuclear nonproliferation efforts through their work to create a Central Asian nuclear weapons-free zone, Kravkova said. The five Central Asian states were scheduled to meet in Uzbekistan last month to continue their efforts to establish the zone (see GSN, July 22). The zone, when created, will help enhance the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, she said, because it borders on two regions of proliferation concern — the Middle East and South Asia — and by the fact that it will be the first such zone in the Northern Hemisphere. Kravkova also said that two of the five Central Asian countries have also joined the Biological Weapons Convention. Not all the countries in the region have been able to join that treaty, however, because a lack of information on facilities would put them in noncompliance if they were to do so, she said. Back to top       Wilson Says He Believes Identity Leak Has Endangered His Wife By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Former U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson said yesterday that he believed his wife had been endangered by the leak of her identity and CIA status (see GSN, Oct. 3). The outing of Wilson’s wife as a CIA operative became public soon after he published a commentary in the New York Times criticizing some of the intelligence used by the White House to justify going to war with Iraq. Last week, the Justice Department investigating the leak. During an appearance yesterday on CBS’s Face the Nation, Wilson said he was concerned that the leak may have placed his wife in physical danger. “In recent weeks, of course there has been this furor over the referral to the Justice Department and there have been a number of other people who have come out and suggested that perhaps this does make her a target. We of course as a consequence of that have begun to rethink our own security posture,” Wilson said. According to Wilson, a former CIA operative has said that Wilson’s wife “was probably the single highest target of any possible terrorist organization or intelligence service that might want to do damage.” Wilson said that the Bush administration has so far declined to provide security to his wife. “Nobody has offered security from the government, although my wife is a long-standing U.S. government employee,” he said. “I would hope that the government was thinking its way through whether or not they wanted my wife exposed to any potential threat,” Wilson said. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) also said yesterday that, if Wilson’s wife was in any kind of danger, then the Bush administration should provide her with security. “If there is the least possibility, the most remote possibility of her life being in danger then the government owes that person protection security,” Hagel said on Face the Nation. Wilson also said yesterday that his wife’s career had been affected by the leak. “My wife’s career will certainly change as a consequence of this, but my wife is a star in her business,” Wilson said on NBC’s Meet the Press. “I have every expectation that her culture will embrace her and that she will continue to be a productive national security officer. But clearly her responsibilities will have to change as a consequence of this,” he said. During his appearance on Face the Nation, Wilson suggested that the White House engineered the leak of his wife’s identity to intimidate others from criticizing the administration’s justifications for war with Iraq. In his New York Times column, Wilson described a visit he made to Niger last year to investigate claims that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium there — claims that he found to be improbable. “It was clear to me that they had leaked my wife’s name for a reason. The only reason that I could think of that was logical was to discourage others who might want to come out and speak more openly about their concerns about the manipulation of intelligence. Keep them from doing so.  The message to them would’ve been, if you do what Wilson did we’ll do to your family what we’ve done to Wilson and his family,” Wilson said. Wilson also said yesterday, however, that he did not believe U.S. President George W. Bush himself was involved in the leak. “The president would never have condoned or been a party to anything like this,” he said. Justice Department Investigation Meanwhile, White House press secretary Scott McClellan said Friday that the Justice Department had sent the White House a request for certain types of material as part of its investigation into the leak. The request is being sent to all White House staff, he said during a White House press briefing. The White House plans to fully comply with the new request, McClellan said. “The president has directed everyone to cooperate fully with the Department of Justice. We want to get to the bottom of this, the sooner the better,” he said. Late last week, however, Democrats continued their calls for the appointment of a special counsel to oversee the leak investigation. During a press conference Thursday, Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) formally called on Attorney General John Ashcroft to recuse himself from the investigation. He noted the ties between Ashcroft and senior administration officials, as well as those between senior Justice Department staff who advise Ashcroft and the White House, the Republican National Committee and the Bush presidential campaign.  For example, according to Schumer, acting Deputy Attorney General Robert McCallum was inducted along with Bush into the Skull and Bones student society at Yale University in 1968. In addition, Solicitor General Ted Olson served as lead counsel for Bush during the 2002 Florida presidential election recount, Schumer said. “The bottom line is that the attorney general is so inextricably locked up with the people he’s investigating, he can’t do a fair job. It’s basically impossible.  And so special counsel is the best way to go until he decides that he should be recused — plain and simple,” Schumer said. The White House Thursday, however, rejected Schumer’s call for Ashcroft to step down from the investigation. “I would remind you that the career Justice Department officials are the ones who are leading this investigation. These are individuals with fast experience and are in the best position to get to the bottom of this. The Justice Department wants to get to the bottom of this,” McClellan said. While defending Ashcroft’s objectivity, Hagel yesterday suggested that a special counsel might be needed to be appointed some time in the future. “If a special prosecutor [or] special counsel might be warranted sometime in the future, that option is there. Right now, I think we should let the system play out the way it is and find out some answers,” Hagel said on Face the Nation. Novak Defends Himself In addition yesterday, Robert Novak, the columnist who published Wilson’s wife’s name and CIA status in mid-July, defended his actions and denied that he was part of a coordinated effort to reveal Wilson’s wife’s identity. During an appearance on Meet the Press, Novak said he did not believe that White House officials had attempted to intentionally leak Wilson’s wife’s identity to him. “I have been a plantee in this town for over 40 years. I know when somebody is trying to plant a story,” Novak said. “This thing came up almost off handedly in the course of a very long conversation with a senior official about many things,” he said. Novak also said that the purpose of his column had been to examine Wilson’s credentials for his trip to Niger. “I thought that it was very strange that the mission … should be done by a diplomat with no experience in counterproliferation, who was regarded as a critic of the war, and really had no experience at the agency,” Novak said. “So in interviewing a senior administration official on a number of other subjects, I asked him if he could explain why, and he said, ‘Well, his wife works in the counterproliferation section at the CIA, and that she suggested it, his mission.’ And it was given to me as an off-hand manner and by a person who is not, as I wrote in the column — not a partisan gunslinger by any means,” Novak said. Novak yesterday refused to comment on Justice’s investigation into leak, including whether the department had contacted him. “My lawyers asked me not to talk about the investigation at all,” he said. Back to top       Blair Knew Iraq Was Not a WMD Threat, Former Official Says Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has said he believes Prime Minister Tony Blair knew shortly before Operation Iraqi Freedom that Iraq probably did not possess usable weapons of mass destruction, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 30). In excerpts from Cook’s diary published yesterday in the London Sunday Times, the former leader of the House of Commons described a conversation he had with Blair on March 5, two weeks before the war, according to AP. Cook wrote that he had asked Blair if he was concerned that Iraq would use chemical weapon against British troops. Cook wrote that Blair had said, “Yes, but all the effort he has had to put into concealment makes it difficult for him to assemble them quickly for use.” Cook also wrote in his diary that his conversation with Blair disturbed him because it suggested that the decision to go to war was not based on the result of U.N. weapons inspections and because Blair had not attempted to counter Cook’s claims that Iraq did not possess long-range weapons of mass destruction. Blair’s office has rejected Cook’s claims, AP reported. “The idea that the prime minister ever said that [former Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein didn’t have weapons of mass destruction is absurd,” a Blair spokesman said. “His views have been consistent throughout, both publicly and privately, as his cabinet colleagues know,” the spokesman said (Michael McDonough, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Oct. 5). Cook’s diary excerpts could add to Blair’s political woes, according to BBC News.  Cook’s comments, along with the recent report from the Iraq Survey Group saying no weapons of mass destruction have yet been found in Iraq, could “make for a torrid autumn for the prime minister,” said Menzies Campbell, foreign affairs spokesman for the Liberal Democrat Party. “If these allegations are true they are explosive,” Campbell said. Former British Culture Secretary Chris Smith agreed that Cook’s diary excerpts could damage Blair politically. “If he [Blair] keeps on insisting, without any sort of qualification at all, that he was right all along and we did the right thing and we haven’t learnt any lessons from what we now know, then I fear that the electoral water is going to continue to be very choppy for him,” Smith said (BBC News, Oct. 5). Iraqi Scientists Attacked After Cooperating With United States Meanwhile, two Iraqi weapons scientists were attacked after talking with U.S. officials involved in the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported yesterday. Chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay said Friday that one Iraqi scientist who cooperated with the Iraq Survey Group was killed in an apparent assassination. A second scientist who cooperated was seriously injured in a separate attack, Kay said (Larry Kaplow, Cox/Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Oct. 5). Back to top

Iran Agrees to Disclose Some Nuclear Information, but Refuses to Recognize IAEA Deadline Iran agreed this weekend to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with information on the origin of some of its uranium enrichment technology, but Tehran does not consider itself bound by an Oct. 31 agency deadline, according to reports (see GSN, Oct. 3). “This date of Oct. 31 is not a criteria for us, because we have not accepted this resolution,” said Iranian IAEA representative Ali Akbar Salehi. “We will continue to cooperate with the IAEA and will try to make it so that the answers to outstanding issues will be given as quickly as possible,” he added. Senior IAEA officials are currently in Tehran urging Iranian leaders to adopt the Additional Protocol to Iran’s nuclear safeguards agreement, which would allow more intrusive monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities.  “Up to now, everything is going well,” Salehi said of the discussions (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Oct. 5). “The train has started to move, and we have agreed to push the train to move faster,” Salehi said. “The two sides reached total agreement,” he added. Tehran has agreed to provide the agency with a list of imported nuclear equipment that Iranian officials say was exposed to uranium before Iran received it, the Associated Press reported. IAEA inspectors have twice discovered evidence of enriched uranium in Iran, but Tehran claims the traces were already present when Iran acquired the equipment (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Chicago Tribune, Oct. 5). “We will give them (the IAEA) a list of the items and we will show them where they were stored because they were stored in a number of places,” Salehi said. It was not clear, however, if IAEA officials would be told where the nuclear equipment originated. “These are items which were not bought officially, they were bought through intermediaries and it is not possible to trace intermediaries,” according to Salehi (Paul Hughes, Reuters/Wired News, Oct. 6). IAEA Deputy Director General Pierre Goldschmidt, the most senior official on the trip, returned to Vienna recently as the first phase of the talks concluded but other agency officials remain in Tehran to continue the meetings (Jim Muir, BBC News, Oct. 4). Back to top       North Korea Resumes Reactor Construction North Korea has restarted construction of a 50-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, the South Korean newspaper Choson Ilbo reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 3). Construction on the reactor had been suspended after 1994 Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang, but South Korean and U.S. intelligence sources in September reported trucks, personnel and equipment traveling to the reactor site, according to a diplomatic source in Seoul. North Korea recently claimed to have extracted plutonium from 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods that had been irradiated in a five-megawatt reactor and stored since 1994. If the larger reactor comes on line, it could produce 50 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for 10 nuclear weapons, experts said. “The U.S. intelligence authorities tentatively assess that North Korea’s reconstruction of the 50-megawatt nuclear reactor does not constitute an ‘imminent threat,’” the diplomatic source said, adding that “it will take some time to remove rust and do other things to resume the construction, which has been suspended for 10 years” (Kwon Kyong-pok, Choson Ilbo/BBC Monitoring, Oct. 5). KEDO Reactor Program Likely to Be Suspended Meanwhile, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization will probably suspend construction on two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea, according to the KEDO’s top official. KEDO is run by South Korea, Japan, the United States and the European Union, with a $1.4 billion investment to date. “All four governments have worked mightily to find consensus where it exists, but it isn’t always there,” said KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman. “Suspension is something that I expect the governments eventually to decide to do,” he said, adding, “It makes a lot of sense given all of the uncertainties” (Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 6). Back to top       Indian Establishes Redundant Nuclear Command-And-Control Centers India’s nuclear command-and-control structure includes alternate command centers, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 22). “We have established more than one (nuclear control) nerve center,” he said. Any country armed with nuclear weapons has to establish a credible “second-strike” capability and nuclear command centers, Fernandes said. “India as a declared nuclear weapons state has been on this job from day one,” he said. India has also worked to protect governmental centers, such as Parliament, from attack, Fernandes said. “All necessary steps to provide these vital places protection have been taken,” he said (Dhar/Chatterjee, Press Trust of India/Rediff.com, Oct. 6). Back to top       U.S. Nuclear Power Plant to Begin Tritium Production A civilian nuclear power plant in Tennessee is scheduled this month to begin producing tritium, a hydrogen isotope used in nuclear weapons, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Oct. 9, 2002). Since early last month, Tennessee Valley authority workers have been installing tritium-producing fuel rods into the Watts Bar nuclear reactor during refueling, AP reported. The plant is scheduled to resume operation this month. TVA is set to receive about $10 million per year to produce up to 3 kilograms of tritium each year over the next 40 years, TVA Chairman Glenn McCullough said, adding that TVA will not make a profit through the agreement. “TVA is committed to a safe, secure nation,” McCullough said. “And the production of tritium will enhance national security,” he said. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.), however, have tried to block tritium production at the Watts Bar plant, according to AP. They had argued that using a civilian nuclear facility to produce weapons components destroyed the nonproliferation principle of “separation between atoms for peace and atoms for war” (Duncan Mansfield, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Oct. 6). Back to top       U.S. Energy Bill Provision Could Ease HEU Export Restrictions A provision in the Energy Policy Act of 2003, currently being debated within the U.S. Congress, would eliminate U.S. restrictions on the export of weapon-grade uranium to five countries for medical isotope production, the Washington Post reported Saturday (see GSN, April 2). Currently, the United States can only export weapon-grade uranium to isotope manufacturers who have pledged to eventually use low-enriched uranium, according to the Post. The energy act provision, however, would allow two isotope manufacturers based in Missouri and Canada to indefinitely continue to receive weapon-grade uranium. The provision was placed into the energy bill at the request of Senator Christopher Bond (R-Mo.) and Representative Richard Burr (R-N.C.) after lobbying by Mallinckrodt Inc., based in St. Louis, and MDS Nordion, based in Canada, congressional aides said. While both Bond and Burr have received campaign donations from supporters of the provision, their aides have said such donations had no effect on their sponsorship, the Post reported. “Current law may soon force cancer patients to pay much more for, and may even interrupt supply of, nuclear medicines,” said a memorandum circulated by Bond. The provision has come under fire, however, from a large array of opponents, according to the Post. In a letter to Congress, representatives of eight nuclear policy and arms control groups, two former Nuclear Regulatory Commission commissioners and a member of the Defense Policy Board criticized the provision.  Experts have warned that, while the export of weapons-grade uranium to Canada poses little proliferation risk, the provision could encourage other countries to continue to use such material in their medical isotope production. “I’m worried about the terrorist threat everywhere. If we make an exception for Canada, then Russia can make an exception in Vietnam or Germany,” said Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nonproliferation Project (R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, Oct. 4). Back to top       Putin’s ICBM Announcement Not Aggressive, Defense Minister Says Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has said that President Vladimir Putin’s recent announcement that Russia possesses a reserve supply of SS-19 ICBMs was not meant to be aggressive, ITAR-Tass reported yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 24). Putin’s announcement “refutes rumors about Russia’s nuclear missiles being in a critical condition, or that they are antiquated and their guidance systems make them a threat to ourselves,” Ivanov said. “I can’t see anything aggressive in the president’s announcement that Russia has such missiles,” he said (ITAR-Tass/BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Oct. 5). Back to top

Officials Dispute Whether Iraq Had an Active Biological Weapons Program By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The interim report released last week by investigator David Kay says investigators have so far found no evidence of active Iraqi nuclear or chemical weapons programs, but a debate has ensued on whether the report indicates that Iraq was conducting a biological research and development program just before the U.S.-led invasion in March (see GSN, Oct. 3). In a publicly released summary of his report, Kay says no biological weapons or evidence of biological weapons production has yet been found by the Iraq Survey Group, the U.S.-led team he coordinates. Investigators did find, however, a number of biological weapons “activities,” including a vial containing a “reference strain” of botulinum, alleged research on biological weapons-“applicable” agents, and concealment efforts. All of that, Kay said, suggested a “compartmentalized” version of Iraq’s former program that involved maintaining “smaller” capabilities that could be reactivated for quick production. Statements by administration officials appeared to indicate a view that Kay’s evidence showed that ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had recently pursued a biological weapons program. “In other words, he’s hiding his programs,” President George W. Bush said Friday citing the Kay report. “David Kay is finding programs, even specific ones like the ones to develop new biological agents,” State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said during a press briefing last Friday. Boucher said the Iraqi botulinum was a “weapon of mass destruction.” Secretary of State Colin Powell also appeared to support that view, asking reporters rhetorically on Friday whether “vials of botulinum should constitute a weapon of mass destruction?” Evidence Suggested No Program An independent expert and a senior senator, however, have argued that Kay’s evidence does not show that Iraq had an active biological weapons program in the run-up to this year’s war. “There’s no evidence that the weapons program was restarted in the nuclear area, that it was restarted in the biological area, [or] that the units were ready for chemical warfare,” said Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich), in a comment broadcast on Fox News Sunday. Former U.N. weapons inspector Raymond Zilinskas, currently with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, supported that view. “My feeling was that they certainly had the potential in terms of human resources and dual-use equipment, and they also had the cultures in vials that could be opened any time and be propagated, but that they had no actual biological weapons at all,” he said. “I would judge it at the level of keeping a basic capability that, should the need arise, could be activated in the future,” he said. Kay’s statement said Iraq had been using substitute agents for biological weapons agents in research: “R&D work that paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents.” Kay, for his part, appeared to discount the possibility that the discovered botulinum strain was part of an active biological weapons program. He said in a conference call with reporters Friday that an Iraqi scientist had been storing the vial in his refrigerator since 1993, the Associated Press reported. Reference strains ostensibly are retained for use in identifying unidentified agents. A Dormant Program Milton Leitenberg, a professor and arms control expert at the University of Maryland, on the other hand said the evidence Kay has produced did indicate a biological weapon program was underway, though a “little” one. “I don’t think you can say those things [Kay described] aren’t part of a program. Every one of them is a material breach.  There shouldn’t have been a pathogen in a refrigerator. There shouldn’t have been any equipment in a mosque. There shouldn’t have been those two dozen or 20 laboratories in the Iraqi intelligence service,” Leitenberg said. Leitenberg said, though, Kay’s statement should have provided greater detail about the contents of those laboratories. David Franz, vice president of the Southern Research Institute’s Chemical and Biological Defense Division, said Iraq would not necessarily have needed extensive biological facilities to have a program that could pose a threat. “What you need for a biological terrorism program, which was what I was more concerned about during the war, as opposed to a biological warfare program is quite different,” he said. “They could have hurt us with what [Kay] has found so far, in biology,” he said. Prior to this year’s U.S. invasion of Iraq, Bush administration officials had cited Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and programs as justification for the use of force. Kay’s report says no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons have been found yet, but indicates that more than 100 ammunition sites that might contain hidden unconventional weapons remained uninvestigated. Kay’s statement, released by the Central Intelligence Agency following closed-door congressional testimony last Friday, said Iraqi capabilities could be used to quickly produce weapons. “All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents,” Kay said. Back to top

Iraq Paid North Korea $10 Million in Failed Missile Deal, Kay Says Prewar Iraq paid North Korea $10 million for ballistic missile technologies, but the deal was never carried out, chief U.S. weapons inspector David Kay said Friday (see GSN, Oct. 3). According to Kay, who heads the Iraq Survey Group searching for evidence of alleged Iraqi WMD programs, Iraq began negotiations with North Korea for missile assistance in 1999, with such cooperation continuing through last year. Under the terms of their agreement, North Korea was to provide Iraq with missile technology for the 1,300-kilometer Nodong ballistic missile and other nonmissile-related prohibited technologies, Kay said. While Iraq forwarded North Korea $10 million to hold up its side of the deal, U.S. pressure on North Korea prevented Pyongyang from delivering the technologies, according to Kay. “In late 2002, the North Koreans came to the Iraqis as a result of the Iraqis inquiring ‘Where is the stuff we paid for?’ and the North Koreans said, ‘Sorry, there’s so much U.S. attention on us that we cannot deliver it,’” Kay said. At that point, Iraq demanded its money back, Kay said. “And when Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced, the North Koreans were still refusing to give the $10 million back,” he said. The failed deal was “a lesson in negotiating with the North Koreans that the Iraqis found out the hard way,” Kay said. “Money in advance may not come your way if there is nondelivery on a contract,” he said (Gertz/Dinan, Washington Times, Oct. 4). Back to top

Former Defense Official Pans U.S. Missile Defense Plan The Bush administration’s plan to field a national missile defense system by September 2004 has “lowered the bar on the acceptable standards for an effective military system,” a former top U.S. Defense Department official wrote last week in Arms Control Today (see GSN, Sept. 25). The Missile Defense Agency failed a missile intercept test only six days before President George W. Bush announced his goal for fielding the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System, according to Philip Coyle, former assistant defense secretary for test and evaluation and currently a senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information. Agency officials were surprised by Bush’s announcement and immediately shifted their priorities from developing an effective missile defense to establishing the necessary facilities in Alaska and California, Coyle wrote. Coyle harshly criticized the decision to field the program before it completes the usual battery of testing. The system “has not shown that it can hit anything other than missiles whose trajectory and targets have been preprogrammed by missile defense contractors to eliminate the surprise or uncertainty of battle. … The Pentagon’s current missile defense plan marks a radical shift from a half-century of military testing carried out under Republican and Democratic administrations alike,” Coyle wrote. “For the GMD system to work in 2004, it requires the MDA getting advance notice from the enemy — say, North Korea,” he added. Coyle said that his criticisms are not politically motivated, but rather a reaction to an unorthodox and ineffective procurement strategy. “A choice must be made: [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld can either meet a political imperative by October 2004 or build a missile defense system that works. But the technical and operational challenges of an effective missile defense system are such that the Pentagon cannot do both,” according to Coyle (Philip Coyle, Arms Control Today, October 2003). Meanwhile, Pentagon officials said they have planned as many as nine missile defense tests before the GMD system is deployed in 2004. “There are six to nine planned Ballistic Missile Defense System flight tests, which include Missile Defense Agency-conducted tests, as well as one PAC-3, conducted by the Army, and one Arrow conducted by [the] Israeli Ministry of Defense,” an MDA official said. Two GMD booster tests, Integrated Flight Tests 13A and 13B, are scheduled to take place this fall. The Pentagon has planned IFT 13C to be a radar test. The next scheduled intercept test is IFT 14, which could happen in late winter or spring, according to Coyle. “Five tests are on the docket, but dates are subject to change,” a U.S. defense official said. Matt Martin, assistant director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, agreed with Coyle’s pessimistic view of the testing schedule. “It’s looking awfully tight,” he said (Randy Barrett, Space News, Oct. 6). Back to top       U.S. Northern Commander Praises Missile Defense Airship Concept A senior U.S. defense official last week praised the High-Altitude Airship and described the program as the “most exciting” cruise missile defense system on the table, Defense Week reported today (see GSN, Sept. 30). Air Force Gen. Ralph Eberhart, commander of the U.S. Northern Command, said Thursday that he was at first skeptical about using airships for missile defense, but he has learned more about the idea and has grown to like it. Although they could one day be supplanted by satellites, according to Eberhart, the airships offer a viable interim method of detecting small, fast and low-flying cruise missiles. Under the current concept, the airships would be about 500 feet long and 160 feet in diameter, 25 times larger than the blimps seen at athletic events, Defense Week reported. Hovering at 65,000 feet, the airships would be able to cover a large expanse of territory and provide missile defense systems with a longer warning time, Eberhart said (Donnelly/Laurenzo, Defense Week, Oct. 6). The Air Force Research Laboratory is also planning to demonstrate a mirror that would be attached to the airship and used to relay ground-based lasers toward over-the-horizon targets (see GSN, July 25). Pentagon planners have budgeted about $30 million over three years to complete the demonstration, Space & Missile reported (Space & Missile, Oct. 6).   Back to top

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