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Security Staff Improvements Needed at Russian Nuclear Sites, Study Finds By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — Efforts to heighten security at Russian nuclear sites should place an emphasis on improving site personnel, rather than only on physical protection measures, according to a report released this week by a U.S. think tank (see GSN, Oct. 29). The University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security study calls for the development of an improved “security culture” among Russian nuclear site personnel and officials to better recognize the threat posed by terrorists seeking to steal Russian nuclear weapons and materials. To date, though, billions of dollars have been spent instead on hardware-based security measures, such as the installation of new fencing and alarm systems, the report says. “Hardware by itself does not produce security; people do,” it says. The report paints a bleak picture of the security culture at most Russian nuclear sites, citing incidents such as guards ignoring alarms and midlevel managers disabling security systems. Among the factors cited for the problems are “poor management and motivation,” increased corruption and other lingering negative effects of Russia’s rocky post-Soviet transition, and the poor enforcement of poorly written nuclear security-related regulations. The report also partially attributes poor security at Russian nuclear sites to several cultural factors lingering from the Soviet era, such as lack of personal responsibility stemming from the collectivism of the communist system and a “scapegoat mentality” that refuses to see systematic flaws. There has long been concern over the vulnerability of Russian nuclear warheads and materials to theft and diversion. Russian officials have often stated, though, that their sites are secure. In September, Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency Director Alexander Rumyantsev reportedly claimed that over the past 25 years, thieves had only been able to obtain “tens of grams” of weapon-grade materials and that the missing material had since been recovered (see GSN, Sept. 16). There are signs, though, that recent terrorist attacks within Russia have “really shook people up” regarding the need for improved security, said Matthew Bunn, senior research associate at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He noted Moscow’s move to increase guards at some Russian nuclear facilities following an attack on a school in the southern town of Beslan in September. One of the priorities, Bunn said, is the need to counter a sense of “complacency” among Russian nuclear site personnel. “Ninety-nine percent of nuclear security personnel will not see a real attack at their facility,” he said. Bunn was one of several experts who reviewed the report before it was released. Among the report’s recommendations to improve the security culture in Russia is a call for Moscow to spend more of its own resources on security improvements, rather than having other nations supply the funding. Such a move, the report says, “would send a positive signal to the personnel who operate these sites.” The report also calls for increased training for senior site managers, which could include simulations. Bunn said this week that such training should “grab you in the gut,” noting a training program for U.S. Navy personnel that includes being required to listen to a recording for several minutes of a disabled submarine being crushed underwater. In addition, improved personnel incentive systems are needed to help attract young and well-educated Russians to work at nuclear sites, the report says. It also recommends increased independent monitoring.
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