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GAO Calls for Increased Effort to Prevent Spread of Cruise Missiles, UAVs By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — The United States needs to do more to control the spread of technology capable of being used to develop cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the U.S. General Accounting Office said in a report released earlier this week (see GSN, Oct. 28, 2002). In its report, the congressional researchers said cruise missiles and UAVs pose a “growing threat” to U.S. security because of their potential use as accurate and inexpensive delivery systems for biological and chemical weapons, as well as for conventional explosives. At least 70 countries possess antiship cruise missiles capable of carrying high-explosive warheads, and it is anticipated that land-attack cruise missiles will become increasingly available between 2005 and 2015, the report says. It also says that at least 32 countries are developing a total of 250 different types of UAVs — systems that pose a potentially even greater threat to the United States. “UAVs pose a longer-term threat as accurate and inexpensive delivery systems for chemical and biological weapons and are increasingly sought by nonstate actors,” the report says, citing U.S. officials. To prevent missile proliferation, the United States and other countries employ both multilateral export control systems and national export control regulations. In its report, the GAO found flaws with both approaches. Over the past several years, the United States has had some success in adapting the Missile Technology Control Regime, a 33-nation group that agrees to implement similar export controls on missile technology, to better prevent cruise missile and UAV proliferation, the report says. It cites successes achieved between 1997 and 2002 in adding six of eight U.S.-proposed items related to cruise missile and UAV technology to the MTCR’s control list (see GSN, Sept. 30, 2003). Even with such success, there are still concerns because a number of nonregime members, including China, Israel and India, continue to acquire and proliferate cruise missile and UAV technologies, the report said. In addition, there has been less consensus among MTCR members on restricting cruise missile- and UAV-related exports than on restricting ballistic missile-related exports, the GAO said. Wade Boese of the Arms Control Association charged that the regime is also being weakened by Bush administration attempts to revise the group to allow the export of defensive missiles and related technologies. The administration has claimed that such revisions are necessary to help increase missile defense cooperation (see GSN, Oct. 20, 2003). “Any effort by the United States to urge other MTCR members to limit exports of certain types of missiles, while looking to expand opportunities for the United States to export different types will be doomed from the start. Washington and other capitals must be willing to trade in possible short-term economic and political gains for long-term security by exercising much greater restraint over missiles and missile-related technology exports,” Boese said. U.S. Export Control RegulationsThe GAO also found flaws in the U.S. implementation of its own export control regulations, according to the report. For example, U.S. authorities have reported difficulties in identifying and tracking dual-use items that could be used to develop cruise missiles and UAVs, the report says. The report also notes a striking flaw in U.S. export control regulations that could allow an individual or terrorist group to legally obtain uncontrolled dual-use items capable of being used to build a cruise missile or UAV. The U.S. export control system includes a “catch-all” provision that prohibits an exporter from sending missile-related items for use in 12 projects or 20 countries listed in national export control regulations, even if the export is not included on U.S. control lists. This section of the regulations, the report says, was not intended to apply to nonstate actors, such as individuals or groups. To illustrate the gap in the regulations, the GAO report cites the example of a New Zealand man who last year announced he was able to purchase from the United States the components needed to build a cruise missile. According to the man’s Web site, he was able to do so in fact for a budget of less than $5,000 (see GSN, Dec. 9, 2003). The New Zealand man and his do-it-yourself cruise missile project were not listed as a prohibited project or a terrorist country, so there was no requirement for U.S. exporters to apply for a review of the items to be exported before shipping him uncontrolled cruise missile-related technologies, the GAO report says. “Commerce [Department] officials said that they would need to wait until the New Zealander used the weapon improperly before action under export control law or regulations could be taken,” it adds. The weakness in the current catch-all provision could also help terrorists to convert a small manned aircraft into a weapon, according to analyst Dennis Gormley of the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He said that there are several small aerospace companies that sell flight management systems capable of converting manned aircraft into UAVs. Such systems should either be subject to an export license or should be covered under an expanded catch-all provision, Gormley said, adding that the report could service as a “compelling catalyst” for such action. The GAO also criticized the Commerce, Defense and State departments for failing to conduct adequate post-shipment verification visits to confirm that the recipients of U.S. missile- and UAV-related exports were using them in accordance with export license conditions (see GSN, Feb. 12). The State Department only conducted verification visits for four of the 786 licenses it issued for cruise missile and UAV technology from fiscal 1998 to fiscal 2002, the report says. It also found that the Commerce Department only conducted verification visits on 1 percent of the nearly 2,500 missile-related export licenses issued from fiscal 1998-2002. In its report, the GAO recommended that the Commerce, Defense and State departments each prepare an assessment of the extent of compliance with license conditions on cruise missiles, UAVs and related technologies. The commerce secretary should also report to Congress on the effectiveness of the catch-all provision in preventing missile proliferation to nonstate actors and ways the provision can be improved, the report says. Experts said this week that the GAO report was valuable in highlighting the growing threat posed by cruise missile and UAV proliferation. “The GAO has performed a real service in illuminating the failures of U.S. agencies to pay adequate attention to this threat,” said Richard Speier, a former Pentagon official who helped negotiate the MTCR. “It will be tragic if it takes a 9/11-level shock to bring about the realization that cruise missiles are cheaper, quicker to develop, easier to conceal, more flexible in terms of launch mode, more accurate, and vastly more efficient at delivering biological agents than are ballistic missiles,” he said.
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