The early sparring between President George W. Bush and presumptive Democratic nominee Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) suggests that foreign policy and national security will play a larger role in this year’s presidential race than in any election since the Vietnam War. Bush has made his post-9/11 leadership in the war on terrorism a centerpiece of his re-election bid, and Kerry has already hammered the Bush administration on Iraq, North Korea, Haiti, weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East peace process, the White House’s “pre-emptive war” doctrine, and what Kerry terms an “arrogant, inept, reckless, ideological” foreign policy. A debate on the Bush administration’s foreign-policy record is clearly brewing. In addition, quite a record it is. Since enduring the deadliest attack ever on American soil on September 11, 2001, the United States has fought two wars, launched a global manhunt for al-Qaeda’s terrorists, planted U.S. fortunes firmly in a Middle East seething with anti-American fervor, and clashed diplomatically with some of its closest allies. In a 45-minute interview on March 4 with National Journal Staff Correspondent James Kitfield, Secretary of State Colin Powell defends the Bush foreign-policy record. Edited excerpts follow. National Journal: In the aftermath of the Iraq war, this administration has looked more multilateral in its foreign policy — it has gone back to the United Nations, gone back to NATO for additional support. Have you learned something from the past year and a half? Has your thinking changed? Secretary of State Colin Powell: My thinking has been consistent throughout these three years; and frankly, I think the president’s thinking and strategy have been consistent as well. You said that we returned to multilateralism. I would submit that when the president went to the United Nations on the 12th of September, 2002 — I don’t know of a more multilateral forum than the General Assembly of the United Nations, where 191 nations were present — he was making the case that Iraq was in violation of its obligations to the U.N., and the U.N. should do something about it. We were pretty multilateral in waiting several months while we argued and debated the issue, and fought to get Resolution 1441. Then, when we decided that we now had to take action, we couldn’t get another resolution. We really didn’t think we needed one. But some of our colleagues in the coalition thought that they needed one. We didn’t get it, but we tried to get it, and that gave our partners the political cover they needed. So we went into the Iraq conflict with the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. And now in the aftermath of the conflict, there are some 30-odd countries that are in it with us. So I would submit, even though the president was the leader of this coalition, he made the decision that we had to go to war and invited others to participate in this liberation effort. I’d say that we tried to do it in as multilateral a way as we could. In Afghanistan, remember that we were the ones who were attacked on 9/11 by an al-Qaeda network that was based in Afghanistan and supported by the Taliban. We had to go after them. We didn’t ask anybody. We had 3,000 dead people on our hands, so we went in. But we reached out to other nations; once again, our British colleagues and some others were with us. And now that we’re in the reconstruction phase in Afghanistan, there are many, many nations involved. So I would submit that we have always tried to do things multilaterally, but we have not put ourselves at the mercy of multilateral decisions. NJ: How do you respond to critics who charge that if you were really bent on a multilateral approach on Iraq, you would have waited some more months to get that final resolution from the U.N. Security Council you were looking for? Powell: A number of our colleagues on the Security Council were telling us they would veto it, so we didn’t think there was any utility in waiting any longer. Even before the inspectors had finished their work, France was saying that they were going to veto any resolution that leads to war. So I think it was pretty obvious that there were some members of the council who were not going to be supportive. NJ: Even if you had waited? Powell: Even if we had waited. And our concern was that if we waited through another U.N. season of deliberations, we would be back at the Security Council the following September for another round of desultory consultations, leading to yet another warning resolution to the Iraqis. NJ: You described in a recent Foreign Affairs article how the 2002 National Security Strategy was the essential blueprint for the Bush foreign policy. Most analysts focused their attention on the “pre-emption” doctrine spelled out in that document. Given the United States’ preponderant military power, were you really surprised that a doctrine espousing pre-emptive war provoked alarm around the world? Powell: What caused me concern was that people put the label of “pre-emption” on our whole strategy, when if you actually read the National Security Strategy document, pre-emption doesn’t even come up until way into the text. You have chapter after chapter about partnerships and alliances, about helping people and fighting disease — all the things that people say this president doesn’t stand for. Well, this document says clearly that is exactly what he stands for. And then, finally, you get to no more than two or three lines that say we reserve the right to pre-empt those threats that are coming at us. Now, perhaps because of my military background, pre-emption is not something that seems all that extraordinary to me. In my view, pre-emption is a tactic or strategy, which states that you will pre-empt danger that is heading your way, whether it comes from a rogue, a terrorist organization, or another nation. If we had known the Japanese aircraft carriers were sailing toward Honolulu on that fateful morning in 1941, for instance, we would have pre-empted it. The other aspect of our National Security Strategy that received so much attention was back in the defense section, where we make reference to the point that we want to be militarily stronger than anyone else. People said, “Oh, my God! What a shocking thing to say. We’re shocked, shocked!” We are? Why else have we been working all these years to build the finest, strongest military on the face of the Earth? In my view, we have always worked hard to build the strongest military, to scare people into not bothering you, threatening your interests, or attacking you. NJ: Given that unmatched military strength, and the United States’ aggressive posture after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many allies were alarmed by President Bush’s rhetorical targeting of an “axis of evil” that included Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Did we take into account how our actions and words would be perceived? Powell: I must say that I didn’t expect quite as strong a reaction as we got. I saw the “axis of evil” line before it was delivered. It really put an exclamation behind the point President Bush was trying to make. He said that there are nations in this world, and policies, that are evil, and he was absolutely right, and he fingered three of the worst. Since then we have seen that one of those nations, Iraq, is no longer under the leadership of a dictator. Iran is starting to make adjustments to its massive weapons-of-mass-destruction policies and practices. North Korea is now enmeshed in six-party talks that it would just as soon not be a party to, but it will stay a party to those talks because, ultimately, they have to deal with this problem of their nuclear weapons. So this may have seemed a shocking policy to some people. Nobody, however, could call it an unsuccessful policy with respect to the results that have been seen in the case of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. NJ: So pre-emption is still operative as a policy? Powell: The suggestion in your remark is that we’re going after everybody. We haven’t attacked anybody, besides Afghanistan because they attacked us, and Iraq because they violated their obligations. But I don’t think there is anybody in town who thinks that the president is getting ready to attack or invade North Korea, for instance, or Syria. NJ: But there’s been a lot of nervousness about a war with North Korea in a second Bush term. Powell: Well, yes, but you need to listen to the president, and not those who are really not in power to speak for the president. President Bush said he’s looking for a diplomatic solution. He’s not waiting for a second term in order to start another conflict with somebody. Why would we? NJ: And would you argue that Libya was scared into line, so to speak, by the pre-emptive doctrine and the war in Iraq? Powell: No, as much as we would like to say that’s the cause, I think the Libyan case is more complex than that. I mean, we don’t know the whole story, unless you know how to get in [Muammar] Qadhafi’s mind, God forbid. Here I’m speculating, but let me do a little out-of-body experience and put myself into one of those great desert suits that he has. I think Colonel Qadhafi took a look around, and what did he see? He saw that he had spent a ton of money. He had worked with some very unsavory people such as [Pakistani nuclear scientist and proliferator Abdul Qadeer] Khan. He had bought equipment to develop a nuclear weapon but still hadn’t quite figured out how to put it all together. He had also produced some chemical weapons that he has to keep hidden on a turkey farm. And all Qadhafi had achieved with this massive expenditure of money was to become even more of a pariah in the world. It didn’t do anything for his country. It didn’t do anything for his people. And Qadhafi was no longer scaring anybody, either. President Reagan proved that. So what was the point? Then Qadhafi takes a further look around and sees that the Bush administration comes in with a strong foreign policy, and with a determination to respond to threats. So he watches that a little bit, and then he sees what happens in Afghanistan and Iraq. And he says to himself, “You know, it’s time to get out of this business.” NJ: Before getting off the subject of pre-emption, I’d like to ask about your presentation to the U.N. on Feb. 5, 2003, on Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. Given the failure to find those weapons, and former U.S. chief weapons inspector David Kay’s testimony casting doubt on their existence, do you believe U.S. intelligence is good enough to support a doctrine of pre-emptive war? Powell: Our intelligence is quite good, but no intelligence system produces perfect intelligence. It is always a matter of getting information, and through inferential reasoning and other kinds of reasoning, you try to draw conclusions. Sometimes you can see something perfectly; you know exactly what’s going on. Other times, it’s much less clear. Other times, to cite First Corinthians, you’re really looking into a glass dimly and trying to discern shadows and shapes of reality. It’s only afterwards that you can actually go in and see for yourself. NJ: But having been through this experience, and seeing the fallibility of intelligence, aren’t you wary of basing a decision about war on it? Powell: I think I know how to analyze intelligence for political and policy use. In the case of the Feb. 5 speech, it was the best assessment that was available to us, by people who worked very hard at it. And a lot of it, I think, has stood the test of time. Iraq was developing long-range missiles; they were developing unmanned aerial vehicles; they did have the intention and capability to have such weapons. We haven’t found the stockpiles. That’s a surprise to me, to the intelligence community, to Dr. Kay, to all of us. NJ: In the run-up to the Iraq war, the differences between the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Vice President’s Office seemed to confuse many of our allies, inviting potentially dangerous miscalculations. Isn’t there something dysfunctional about an administration where major power centers seem to be steering in different directions on a question of such critical importance? Powell: That’s the stereotype everybody likes to write. If there’s any disagreement within the government, it’s obviously between Powell and everybody else. That stereotype is inescapable. In reality, however, in August of 2003, I said to the president, “Take this to the United Nations.” [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld agreed, Vice President Cheney agreed, and the president agreed. When we took it to the United Nations, it was clear in my mind that one of two things would happen: After Resolution 1441, we could solve this problem peacefully if Saddam Hussein gave it up to inspectors and sort of changed his stripes. A lot of people insisted that Saddam would not change his stripes, and that’s a reasonable point of view. So within the team, there were those who were more optimistic and those who were less optimistic as to what course of action might actually unfold. My point of view was, “Let’s test him. Let’s give him the chance.” I also knew that if Saddam didn’t change his stripes, then we were going to take it to conflict. And there was no disagreement or fighting on that point. NJ: You play down the ideological divide within the Bush administration’s national security team. However, do you see how that impression is furthered when former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who is on the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and who seems to speak for the neoconservatives in the administration, writes a much-publicized article basically accusing you of being disloyal and subverting the president’s true foreign-policy agenda? Powell: I don’t care what Newt Gingrich or any of them say. The only person whose view on my loyalty I care about is the president. But go ahead, have fun, write it. Because you all enjoy writing about this divide, and it’s a constant in all of the articles that come out. There’s always the need to find some debate or disagreement like this. And, frankly, there are debates and disagreements. I’ve never been in an administration where there weren’t. You know, I cut my milk teeth on similar debates between [Reagan administration Defense Secretary Caspar] Weinberger and [Reagan Secretary of State George] Shultz. I mean, this is not new to me. This is government. And it would be a very boring government if we all sat around agreeing with each other. We do have strong views and strong personalities in this administration, and we argue these things out. And I am generally regarded as a moderate chap who tries to solve problems, and who tries to solve them working with friends and allies. NJ: And you’re happy with that view? Powell: I’m guilty, totally guilty! I was raised as somebody who knows all about war, who knows what it is to see dead people, who know what it is to kill people. And if I can avoid that, I will try to avoid it. If that paints me as whatever label you choose to put on me, I could care less. I am beyond caring. I have seen war. I have lived it. And I am proud of those instances where I have prevented war, just as I am proud of having served my nation in war. NJ: Turning to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, we’re hearing again from people that this administration is not engaged enough. Even Republicans on the Hill are asking, “Where’s the special envoy? Where’s the shuttle diplomacy?” Powell: What is a special envoy going to do? Who is he going to shuttle between, and on what subject? Special envoys do have their purposes and uses, and if we had achieved the kind of progress that we were hoping for after Aqaba last year – where President Bush was himself the special envoy when he went to Sharm el-Sheikh — then we were ready to do a lot more. [national security adviser Condoleezza] Rice and I were going to double-team the process on a regular basis. We sent Ambassador John Wolf over to do the monitoring piece of it. And we were actually considering a special envoy at that time. NJ: Why did you decide against one? Powell: Because it all fell apart, just like it’s fallen apart so many times before, on the issue of security and terror. Right now, we’ve got some new ideas floating around with the proposed withdrawal and pullout of Israeli settlements and forces from Gaza, and maybe it’ll work this time. As I said to my Palestinian interlocutors, we’re looking at the withdrawal proposal and seeing how we can make something comprehensive out of it. But [Palestinian Authority] Prime Minister Abu Ala needs to understand that this won’t work either, unless he does something about security and terror. NJ: In terms of the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, your determination not to be blackmailed or offer North Korea carrots to reverse their program means that, for more than a year, Pyongyang has apparently been reprocessing 8,000 fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. How can that possibly have made America safer? Powell: We’re not going to give them carrots. All the critics want us to essentially adopt a policy of going to the North Koreans and saying, “Oh, dear; you’ve misbehaved again. You’ve deceived us again with your program to develop highly enriched uranium, and now that we have discovered your HEU program, you want to be paid for it and you want carrots.” Well, we’re not going to give them carrots. We have said this repeatedly for a year and a half. We’re not going to change. NJ: But is that approach working? Powell: You never know what’s working until it works. You know, former Senator George Mitchell had a great line. For 700 days, everybody said he was failing in Northern Ireland and that the Good Friday Agreement was terrible, and then one day it was signed, and suddenly it’s a great success. With respect to North Korea, I would submit to you that the situation has not gotten worse, even though people like to keep writing it’s worse. Now North Korea is not facing just the United States of America across the table; it’s facing four other neighbors who are not particularly happy with its behavior. I submit to you, this is a major accomplishment. In terms of China, North Korea is facing its biggest supplier of aid, energy, commerce, and goods. And China is calling for complete, verifiable, irreversible nuclear disarmament. South Korea, which is another great source of support and sustenance for North Korea, is saying the same thing. Japan is calling for complete disarmament and a return of Japanese abductees. So our critics are saying that we should be so terrified by this little country with its 8,000 fuel rods that we should collapse our position. They want the United States to pay North Korea for its misbehavior so that it will give up its nuclear program. Well, that’s what happened before, and we’ve made it clear that is not what is going to happen this time. Look at what we’ve achieved. The five major countries involved in negotiations are like this [he clenches his fist] on North Korea. Secondly, we have exposed the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network. Thirdly, we have pretty much exposed everybody that North Korea has been selling things to. Fourthly, we are looking at other activities in North Korea, which are not very much in their interest to have us look at, such as some of the things they are counterfeiting and selling. This is a regime that is under pressure. And 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods will not produce one pound of rice or turn on one more light bulb in North Korea. So the pressure is now on them. NJ: You’ve mentioned that you feel like the world has misjudged our foreign policy and that if we just stay the course, our good intentions will be clear. But isn’t the world understandably sensitive to a superpower and how it wields its power? Powell: The world is sensitive. With a superpower such as the United States on the world stage, we will always be viewed with a mixture of pride, respect, resentment, and a bit of fear. What we have to do is learn how to encourage the pride and respect, but at the same time not make people fearful of our power. Except, of course, those who we want to be fearful of our power. That puts a particular burden on a lot of us, and especially on me, to reach out to friends and neighbors and allies, to write articles and give speeches. I’ll be doing more of that, to explain ourselves to our friends and those who are uncertain what we are really about. We’re about peace, we’re about partnerships, we’re about solving the problems of people who are dying from HIV/AIDS, we’re about the Millennium Challenge Account [to relieve debt in the developing world], we’re about a lot of things. But if enemies threaten our security and our well-being, or the well-being of our allies, then pre-emption remains a tool in our toolbox. NJ: In making that case to your colleagues in the administration, do you ever mention this to them — that style does matter, that rhetoric does matter? Powell: Sure, we talk about it all the time. I think the president understands it quite well. But the president also understands the value of speaking clearly and directly when you want to send out a message, and you don’t want it to be confused. The “axis of evil” phrase may not have been a phrase headed for a diplomatic award, but it sure got everybody’s attention. NJ: This has been one hell of a ride, this period that you’ve been secretary of state. In your heart of hearts, what do you think your legacy will be from this period? Powell: Well, first of all, I’m not through yet, and it’s a little hard to write your legacy when you’re not through with the job. However, I do think we’ve accomplished some very significant things: Two tyrants are gone — one in Kabul and one in Iraq — and we’re building two new democratic nations. We’re going to finish that job, and that’s going to be a tremendous legacy of this president, and I am glad to be part of it. I think what we’re doing with HIV/AIDS and the Millennium Challenge Account, although they don’t get a lot of attention, will be part of this administration’s legacy. We’ve also worked with our allies in expanding NATO, and we’re assisting them as they expand the European Union. We dealt with a number of problems in Africa that people thought we wouldn’t get involved in: Liberia, the Congo, and Ivory Coast, where we worked along with the French. Hopefully, with a little luck, we’ll get something done with respect to Sudan. So some old, lingering problems are being solved. In Asia, we have the best relations with our allies that we’ve had in decades, and we’re all now working together to do something about the big remaining problem of North Korea. Is there still anti-Americanism out there? Yes. Particularly in the Muslim world? Yes. Particularly in the Arab world? Yes. Any movement or solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would improve that enormously. And I think that, as people see Iraq start to get better — we’ve got tough work ahead — then attitudes will start to change. But legacy — that’s what you do, not me.
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration did not “misrepresent” the WMD and terrorism threats posed by prewar Iraq in an attempt to build support for war, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) said today, offering the latest salvo in the ongoing debate over the accuracy and use of prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq (see GSN, March 10). Seemingly drawing on his years as an attorney, Kyl presented a point-by-point rebuttal to a speech made last week by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), in which Kennedy charged the Bush administration with engaging in “pure unadulterated fear-mongering” to build support for a war based on political concerns. In a speech today hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, Kyl said that while some prewar intelligence on Iraqi WMD efforts was likely wrong, White House officials used the information in “good faith” to justify the invasion (see GSN, March 8). “They did not distort, mislead or misrepresent what the intelligence community said; and the suggestion that they did is not only false but itself a distortion,” Kyl said. The Iraq Survey Group, the unit conducting the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, has so far found no WMD stockpiles. The issue of the accuracy of prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq is the focus of several inquires, including those being conducted by the House and Senate intelligence panels, as well as an investigation to be conducted by an independent commission. The debate over the use of prewar intelligence has seemingly intensified in recent weeks, with both Kennedy and former U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix alleging that U.S. President George W. Bush knew he was overstating the threat. For their part, Kyl and other Republican lawmakers have spoken out in Congress to defend the Bush administration and have called on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to also investigate how Democrats themselves used prewar intelligence, according to reports. In what he called an effort to “debunk some of the myths” surrounding the issue, Kyl today sought to dispute a number of claims made by Kennedy last week. For example, he disputed Kennedy’s assertion that the decision to remove Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from power was a leftover policy from the first Bush administration, noting that a “regime change” policy had been enshrined in U.S. law through the approval of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act during the Clinton administration. Kyl also challenged Kennedy’s claim that the Bush administration exaggerated the nuclear threat posed by Hussein’s regime, noting that the consensus judgment of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate was that Hussein’s regime could have developed a nuclear weapon in less than a year if it had obtained the necessary amount of weapon-grade material. Kyl also disputed Kennedy’s claim that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been “wrong on all counts” by claiming that Iraq possessed biological and chemical weapons stockpiles. “How does Senator Kennedy know this? The Iraq Survey has not completed its work, which could take another two or more years,” Kyl said. He criticized Kennedy himself for claiming the Bush administration orchestrated the invasion of Iraq for political reasons. “That charge, if more than just over-the-top bluster, would be close to an allegation of treason – suggesting that the president deliberately put our young men and women in harm’s way for no purpose other than politics. Such a charge would not only sap the morale of the troops who are fighting even now; it would undercut our entire position in the war on terror generally and in Iraq specifically,” Kyl said. In addition, Kyl questioned Kennedy’s claim that Congress would not have supported the war had it “known the facts.” Kyl quoted statements from several prominent Democratic senators prior to the war, including Minority Leader Tom Daschle (S.D.), that described prewar Iraq as a threat to the United States. “The reality is, no one was duped. We were all working off of the same data. Reasonable people reached different conclusions about what to do based on a commonly understood set of facts. There is nothing devious about that. One need not veer off into conspiracy theories to explain honest differences of opinion about policies,” Kyl said.
The Bush administration has notified the U.S. Congress that it will decide by the end of next week on implementing a law imposing sanctions against Syria, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, March 8). The Syria Accountability Act establishes various sanctions against Damascus if it fails to end its alleged WMD activities and official support for terrorism. The law bans U.S. exports of military and dual-use items to Syria and requires the president to impose at least two additional sanctions from a list of six, such as a ban on U.S. exports to Syria and a downgrading of U.S. diplomatic representation in Damascus. The act also allows the president to waive the penalties if they would interfere with U.S. national security interests. The administration informed Congress that it will likely implement more than two of the six sanctions, according to the Post. The main sanctions will be economic, such as a ban on U.S. exports to Syria except for humanitarian goods and possibly a block on Syrian financial transactions, administration and congressional officials said. The Bush administration is also expected to prohibit Syrian aircraft from flying to the United States or through U.S. airspace, U.S. officials said. The Bush administration has decided not to impose two sanctions included in the law that would limit Syrian diplomatic activities and movement because of concerns that Damascus could enact similar measures and hinder U.S. intelligence operations, officials said (Wright/Kessler, Washington Post, March 12).
The U.S. State Department’s fiscal 2005 budget plan maintains existing funding levels for a program designed to prevent former Soviet scientists from transferring their WMD expertise to countries of concern to the United States, despite evidence of a growing risk that some might do just that, the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council said yesterday (see GSN, March 11). The State Department has requested $108 million for nonproliferation efforts in Russia and other former Soviet states, according to a council analysis. That includes $50.5 million for the department’s Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise program, a slight increase of $300,000 over current funding. While the State Department has sought to maintain constant funding for the program, RANSAC said, its budget justification documents include a reference from a 2003 survey that found that 20 percent of former Soviet scientists with WMD expertise questioned would consider working for countries such as Iran and North Korea. The State Department’s fiscal 2005 budget request also contains $10.6 million to help Russia and other former Soviet states develop improved export controls and border security, an increase of $500,000 from this year’s funding, according to RANSAC. The department has also requested $34.5 million for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, an increase of $4.5 million (RANSAC release, March 11).
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