Top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (shown in a February photo) reportedly told authorities investigating his international nuclear network that he viewed actual North Korean nuclear weapons five years ago at an underground facility in the communist Asian nation (AFP photo/PTV). Khan Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Weapons Top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan told Pakistani authorities that he saw what appeared to be three nuclear weapons five years ago at an underground facility in North Korea, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, April 12). If correct, this would be the first outside confirmation that North Korea has actual nuclear weapons, the Times reported. The United States has so far based its assessments of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities on estimates of how much plutonium North Korea may have produced and its ability to use the material in weapons...Full Story

Hurdles Face Effort to Establish U.N. Agency to Monitor Proliferation of Biological Weapons, Missiles By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Several nations are pressing for creation of a U.N. agency to monitor biological weapons and missiles, but in the face of U.S. opposition such a body might never be anything more than a notion...Full Story

U.S. Set to Ease Nuclear Export Controls The United States is expected to ease controls later this year on nuclear technology exports, Reuters reported today (see GSN, April 12)...Full Story

	Tuesday, April 13, 2004

Hurdles Face Effort to Establish U.N. Agency to Monitor Proliferation of Biological Weapons, Missiles By Chris Schneidmiller Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — Several nations are pressing for creation of a U.N. agency to monitor biological weapons and missiles, but in the face of U.S. opposition such a body might never be anything more than a notion. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological agents and missiles are only nominally monitored by the international community. There has never been a multilateral treaty on missiles, and efforts to create an oversight body for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention died in 2001 when the United States refused to approve a protocol to establish a set of treaty compliance provisions. Late last year France, the United Kingdom and other countries recommended making the U.N. Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission a permanent agency once its mandate in Iraq is finished (see GSN, Nov. 26, 2003).  UNMOVIC has about 50 full-time personnel and another 300 “roster” inspectors who can be called to duty within a matter of days or weeks, said agency spokesman Ewen Buchanan. Over the 13-year life of UNMOVIC and its predecessor, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, these inspectors honed search, identification and interview skills that could be transferred to work on the biological weapons treaty and missile proliferation, researchers said. It is unlikely that any other organization could take up that work, they added. “They have the expertise. They have the experience.  It would be crazy to let that disappear because there is nothing on the horizon that would take its place,” said Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a biological weapons expert at the State University of New York at Purchase.  Another U.N. nonproliferation body could not be born without support from the permanent Security Council members. However, the United States does “not see a need for such an organization and would oppose it as unnecessary,” said State Department spokesman Kurtis Cooper. “The United States strongly believes that the state parties who are members of existing regimes and arms control treaties themselves should determine whether and if so what types of inspection arrangements they require,” Cooper said. “We also see no need for a permanent inspectorate to manage missile programs as there is no global treaty arrangement that might provide a basis for any inspections,” he added. That means nonproliferation advocates will need to look to more modest measures to meet their goals for curbing the spread of these weapons, said Jonathan Tucker, a senior researcher for the Monterey Institute of International Studies. A Need for More Control There are at least 10 countries now known or suspected to have biological weapons programs, including Russia, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Egypt. Two dozen nations have short-range ballistic missiles, and a “handful of countries” have longer-range weapons, said Joseph Cirincione, director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The level of danger posed by these weapons is “a subject of hot debate,” Cirincione said. Missiles are most likely to be used in a regional conflict in the Middle East or parts of Asia, he said. Even considering the U.S. anthrax attacks in 2001, biological weapons are generally too difficult to develop or control to be used offensively, particularly by terrorists, Cirincione said. Tucker argued that developing nations could seek biological agents as a strategic deterrent, and that terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda are increasingly pursuing biological weapons independently or with the aid of a state sponsor. The 151 parties to the Biological Weapons Convention pledge not to develop, produce or stockpile biological agents for nonpeaceful uses. There is no effective international mechanism, however, to restrict any nation from working with anthrax or botulism, much less terrorists unconcerned by treaty law, experts said. The convention’s statutes allowing for consultation and investigation on alleged biological weapons efforts have been used only once, Tucker said, with a questionable claim by Cuba in 1997 that the United States dropped a crop-killing insect on the island. No evidence was found to support the allegation. The U.N. secretary-general has the only other international authority to pursue allegations of biological weapons use. Without a standing investigative body, though, “he would have to rely on hastily assembled ad hoc inspectors contributed by member states, with miscellaneous levels of training and no teamwork experience. Delays, clumsiness and suspicions of bias would be difficult to avoid,” Rosenberg wrote in a recent article in Disarmament Diplomacy entitled “Enforcing WMD Treaties: Consolidating a U.N. Role.” The United Nations has conducted a small number of field investigations into allegations of chemical weapons use, but suspected nations are not legally required to cooperate with the efforts, which ended either with inconclusive findings or a lack of action by the international community, Tucker said. For example, Tucker and his colleague Raymond Zilinskas described in a 2002 Arms Control Today article how the United States charged the governments of Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan with using chemical weapons against their people in the late 1970s. Those allegations could not be proven due to the delay in organizing an investigation, resistance from the countries and questionable testimony from witnesses. While it was proven that Iran and Iraq both used chemical weapons during their 1980s war, neither country was penalized and the enemies continued using those agents. “The record is fairly checkered of these investigations in the past,” Tucker said. “It’s better than nothing, but I think it’s fairly weak.” The Biological Weapons Convention also suffers from lack of an enforcement body, said Angela Woodward, legal researcher for the Verification Research, Training and Information Center (VERTIC) in London. Treaty parties suspected of possessing biological weapons programs — such as China and North Korea — have little to fear as the U.N. secretary-general is only authorized to investigate alleged uses of biological weapons. Each treaty party also pledges to prohibit any biological weapons activity within its borders or areas of control. Only 21 percent of member states responded by August 2003 to a VERTIC survey on treaty enforcement measures; the results and responses indicated that many of the countries, particularly developing nations, had no legislation barring people from producing or keeping biological agents, VERTIC said (see GSN, Aug. 13, 2003). “This sort of thing needs to be addressed,” Woodward said. “Unless states have efficient oversight of their material there is risk of diversion. If someone wants to get their hands on it, they will,” she added. A standing body of 30-35 inspectors, with access to a larger pool of investigators, could manage oversight of missiles and biological weapons, Rosenberg wrote in her article. The U.N. Security Council could convert UNMOVIC for the new task, or develop a smaller organization once UNMOVIC disbands, she said. In the absence of a treaty, the council also could set guidelines on the existence of missiles, Rosenberg said. The organization’s duties could include intrusive inspections of suspect countries, inspections upon request by countries wishing to allay suspicions, developing guidelines for inspection and monitoring procedures, and preparing databases of sites of concern, according to Rosenberg. Time needed to begin investigations would be minimized by having a working organization answering to a 15-member Security Council that is theoretically able to quickly initiate action. The council would also give backbone to the rules with potential penalties ranging from economic sanctions to military action against violators, Cirincione said. Having an international inspection agency would establish “as an international norm” the idea that countries should not engage in proliferation of missiles and biological weapons, he said. Experts could also help countries prepare legislation banning the development and use of biological weapons, and to submit the declarations required by the Biological Weapons Convention, Woodward said. “There’s a distinct lack of assistance for countries that need it,” she said. What Happens Next The U.S. reluctance to allow a multilateral nonproliferation body is not surprising, Tucker said, noting the Bush administration’s decision not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. There is concern about a biological weapons inspection agency. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies fear that opening their doors to inspectors means potentially opening their doors to industrial espionage, Tucker said. Equipment used to make weapon agents can be identical to the equipment for making vaccines or materials, he said. The Bush administration’s focus has been on pressing nations to individually approve antibiological weapon legislation and to slow the spread of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, March 25). If there is a change in leadership following the November presidential election, a new administration might consider some toughening of investigative capability for the Biological Weapons Convention, but is still unlikely to support a protocol body performing routine inspections, Tucker said. “The utility of regular inspections is considered fairly limited,” Tucker said. Nations backing an investigative organization are looking for the right time to bring the item to the United Nations, Rosenberg said. They could offer a “tradeoff” of U.N. aid in Iraq for U.S. support for the protocol organization, she said. It will be up to the U.N. members to decide if they want another WMD inspection organization, said a source at the United Nations. There has been no formal proposal, and no quick answer to the issue is expected. Even if the United States came on board, various issues would have to be addressed to make the search body a reality. Without an international treaty, there is no legal basis for an organization on missile nonproliferation, the U.N. source said. UNMOVIC is funded by the Iraqi oil-for-food program, a source of money unlikely to be available to a successor.  UNMOVIC itself might not be ready to fade away, spokesman Buchanan said. Researchers said the agency’s mandate could end as early as June 30, the scheduled date for transfer of power in Iraq. Buchanan said, though, that options include the designation of inspectors for long-term monitoring in Iraq. “We continue until the [Security] Council says otherwise,” he said. A less ambitious option would be to maintain a roster of experts who could consult with the United Nations on biological weapons and missiles, the U.N. source said. In the meantime, the eight nongovernmental organizations founded the BioWeapons Prevention Project in 2002 to track and report on biological weapons projects. While the “civil society watchdog” has no enforcement authority, its aim is to show nations that such activities are being scrutinized. Representatives from BWC member states will discuss investigations of biological weapons use and suspicious disease outbreaks in December in Geneva during the annual treaty meeting (see GSN, Nov. 18, 2003). Specific proposals are still being developed, but the United States will press to increase the secretary general’s authority by having nations agree to cooperate with investigations, Tucker said. No decisions made this year could be implemented until the convention’s sixth review conference in 2006.  In an article in the current issue of the Monterey Institute’s Nonproliferation Review, Tucker recommends several actions for the session, including making treaty confidence-building measures mandatory, creating a small office to handle documentation and offer support to member nations, and having nations agree to keep watch over their biological defense research programs with an independent review process. In the absence of one overarching organization, it will take work by the United Nations, treaty parties and nongovernmental organizations to slow the spread of biological weapons, Tucker said. “There’s no silver bullet,” he said. “It’s going to take a variety of different measures working together to address the problem,” Tucker added. Back to top       User Fees Removed From U.S. Maritime Security Bill A provision to enact a user fee to help pay for security improvements to improve security at U.S. ports against terrorist attacks has been removed from a new maritime security bill, Lloyd’s List reported today (see GSN, April 9). The provision called for “a service fee on commercial transport entities that benefit from a secure system of international maritime transport to pay for the costs of port security services.” The language was stripped from the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004 through an amendment offered by Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.), according to Lloyd’s List.  Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), a supporter of the user-fee proposal, said he had no objection to a proposal supported by Lott that would direct some of the more than $15 billion paid in custom fees to port security.  “I have no problem with providing this option to the administration,” Hollings said. “I would do whatever it takes to pay for port security,” he added. Last week, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge said the federal government could not fully cover the costs of improving U.S. port security. “We need to talk to the private sector. We don’t have enough public money to do everything that needs to be done,” Ridge said (John McLaughlin, Lloyd’s List, April 13). Back to top       IAEA Plans to Return to Iraq to Complete Work The International Atomic Energy Agency plans to return to Iraq to complete inspections under its existing mandate, but only when security there has improved, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said yesterday (see GSN, March 31). “Weapons inspectors will return to Iraq once the circumstances there calm down and this is according to the instructions of the (U.N.) Security Council, since our mandate there still holds,” he said. ElBaradei made his remarks after arriving in Egypt for a three-day visit, during which he is set to discuss weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East with Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, according to the Associated Press.  IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said the agency plans to return to Iraq once a stable government is formed and has joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. “We have a mandate, and ultimately we have to assume that any new Iraqi government is going to be a signatory of the (treaty) and have a safeguards agreement with agency,” he said (Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, April 12). Back to top       CIA, DIA Trade Blame Over Handling of “Curveball” The CIA and the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Intelligence Agency are blaming each other for the handling of a discredited Iraqi defector known as “Curveball,” who was the main source for the Bush administration’s allegations that prewar Iraq had mobile biological weapons facilities, Newsweek reported this week (see GSN, April 7). Officials familiar with the CIA said that the DIA was in direct contact with the German intelligence agency that managed Curveball. Defense officials, though, said the CIA “should look in the mirror” before blaming the Pentagon’s intelligence agency (Hosenball/Wolffe, Newsweek, April 19). Back to top

Khan Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Weapons Top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan told Pakistani authorities that he saw what appeared to be three nuclear weapons five years ago at an underground facility in North Korea, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, April 12). If correct, this would be the first outside confirmation that North Korea has actual nuclear weapons, the Times reported. The United States has so far based its assessments of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities on estimates of how much plutonium North Korea may have produced and its ability to use the material in weapons. Khan, who has reportedly confessed to transferring Pakistani nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea, said he was allowed to inspect the North Korean weapons for a short time, according to classified briefings Pakistan has provided to countries within range of North Korean missiles. Khan told Pakistani authorities that he viewed what appeared to be plutonium devices at a facility apparently different from the main North Korean nuclear site at Yongbyon, according to officials familiar with the intelligence reports. U.S. intelligence officials, though, said that they cannot verify whether Khan had the time, expertise or equipment to verify North Korea’s claims. While Khan’s background as a metallurgist may not have provided him with the knowledge to differentiate between a real nuclear weapon and a mock-up, he may have been familiar with basic nuclear weapons designs because of his experience with past Pakistani nuclear tests, the Times reported. Khan also told his interrogators that he began discussing possible sales of uranium enrichment technologies with North Korea as early as the late 1980s, but did not begin shipping such equipment until the late 1990s, according to the Times. Khan has admitted to providing North Korea with both the designs for uranium enrichment centrifuges and a small number of the actual machines, as well as a “shopping list” of what was necessary to mass-produce the centrifuges, according to officials who have reviewed the Pakistani intelligence reports. “We think they’ve pretty much bought everything on the list, with the possible exception of a few components,” a U.S. official said (David Sanger, New York Times, April 13). Back to top       U.S. Set to Ease Nuclear Export Controls The United States is expected to ease controls later this year on nuclear technology exports, Reuters reported today (see GSN, April 12). The demand for civilian nuclear power in Asia, where more than half of the world’s nuclear reactors under construction are located, has resulted in increasing attention from U.S., Canadian, European and Russian suppliers, Reuters reported. As a result, sources said the United States is expected in September to ease controls on the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies to select Asian countries, including China, according to Reuters. “U.S. firms are not allowed to provide a whole set of equipment to China, let alone signing contracts and providing loans to build the plants for us. But this September the restriction is expected to be lifted,” said Liu Changxin, deputy secretary general with the Chinese Nuclear Society (Charlie Zhu, Reuters/Planet Ark, April 13).   Back to top

British Firm Suspends Testing on Smallpox Vaccine A British company contracted by the United States to supply a smallpox vaccine suspended trials today after testing volunteers began suffering serious side-effects, the London Evening Standard reported. The United States ordered 209 million doses of Acam2000, a chemically produced vaccine administered by injection. Pharmaceutical company Acambis was required to put the vaccine through the normal tests for other drugs. Some people used in the test suffered a serious heart condition, the Evening Standard reported. No one outside the drug trials has received Acam2000 (Jim Armitage, London Evening Standard, April 13). Back to top       FBI Arrests Man on Charge of Ricin Possession The FBI on Friday arrested a man in Kirkland, Wash., for allegedly possessing ricin, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Feb. 24).  Robert Alberg, 37, faces one count of possession of a biological agent or toxin. FBI agents said they believe Alberg was producing ricin in his apartment, but refused to say how much of the material was discovered or what its intended purpose might have been (Associated Press/Mercury News, April 13). Back to top       HIV Bomb Attack Foiled in Tel Aviv, Israel says Palestinian extremists hoped to detonate a bomb carrying HIV-infected blood during the Passover holiday celebration in Tel Aviv, the Israeli Shin Beth security service said today (see GSN, Oct. 31, 2003). A suicide bomber planned to transport the device from the West Bank town of Qalqilya to Tel Aviv during the weeklong holiday that ended yesterday, a Shin Beth spokeswoman told Agence France-Presse. The plan came to light after a member of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was arrested in the city of Nablus in the northern West Bank. “The terrorist cell apparently planned to obtain contaminated blood from some Palestinian hospitals but they had not passed the preliminary stage in their preparations,” the spokeswoman said (Agence France-Presse, Sunday Times, April 13). Back to top       FBI Faces Slew of Suspicious Material Incidents The FBI’s National Capital Response Squad, which investigates incidents involving suspicious substances, has recently had to cope with as many as 10 incidents per week, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Dec. 9, 2003). The squad, which was created in 1999, has doubled in size to 15 members to respond to the large number of reports generated by the fears created by the 2001 anthrax mail attacks, the Post reported. Almost all the cases the squad has investigated have turned out to be false alarms, according to the Post. For example, there is often “jail mail” — letters sent by prison inmates that contain materials such as talcum powder or plaster. Another incident involved the discovery of a package inside a Washington subway station, on which the word “anthrax” had been repeatedly misspelled and crossed out, according to squad agent Kevin Finnerty. Finnerty quoted some FBI agents as saying after the incident, “If you can’t spell anthrax, you probably can’t make it” (Allan Lengel, Washington Post, April 13). Back to top

Chemical Threat “Limited,” French Official Says The likelihood of a chemical weapons attack in Europe is “limited,” French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said today, apparently responding to reports yesterday that a French official that terrorists were progressing in their ability to use chemical weapons (see GSN, April 12). “A very high degree of technical expertise is in effect required to handle such materials, so it is a limited threat,” he said. “But that should not lead us to minimize the risk,” de Villepin added (Associated Press/Jerusalem Post, April 13).   Back to top

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