By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei yesterday criticized the U.N. Security Council for failing to address North Korea’s nuclear ambitions (see GSN, June 21). The country has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and sought to demonstrate a plutonium-based capability that it calls its nuclear “deterrent.” Periodic six-country talks are under way in a bid to find a solution to an impasse in which North Korea insists on economic and other benefits as a condition of suspending its nuclear weapon work. Yesterday, the United States rejected Pyongyang’s latest proposal for such a format. The IAEA Board of Governors last year referred the case to the Security Council, which ElBaradei yesterday accused of subsequent dangerous “inaction.” “The Security Council has not even reacted. This lack of response ― this inaction ― will be setting the worst precedent of all if it conveys a message that acquiring a nuclear deterrent, by whatever means, will neutralize any compliance mechanism and guaranteed a preferred status,” ElBaradei said. In the same wide-ranging speech at the annual Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, ElBaradei reiterated his frequent call for reforms in the global nonproliferation regime (see GSN, Jan. 7). He urged better control of nuclear technology, increased commitment to the regime by countries and an international security framework. ElBaradei said nuclear export controls should be made binding and expanded to more countries and that consideration should be given to limiting reprocessing, enrichment and spent-fuel management to multinational facilities. He stressed the need for helping countries to convert facilities from dependence on weapon-usable materials such as highly enriched uranium to less sensitive fuels. “Adequate physical protection,” he added, “is still lacking in many [nuclear] facilities in various parts of the world.” The U.N. nuclear chief called for a “concrete road map” for disarmament by the nuclear powers, including timetables. “Thirty years after the enactment of the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], with the Cold War ended, and more than 30,000 nuclear weapons still available for use,” he said, “it should be understandable that many non-nuclear weapon states are no longer willing to accept as credible the commitment of nuclear-weapon states to their NPT disarmament obligations.” The director general said reported U.S. consideration of new nuclear-weapon development could make it harder to obtain stronger inspections in non-nuclear countries suspected of seeking nuclear weapons. Like his IAEA predecessor Hans Blix, who spoke later at the same conference (see related GSN story, today), ElBaradei underlined the need for broad security measures in regions of conflict. The current IAEA chief said India, Pakistan and Israel must be involved in any efforts to reform the nonproliferation regime, with Israel doing so as part of an overall Middle East solution. ElBaradei called for a worldwide “functional system of collective security” and for addressing poverty, rights violations and other “root causes” of insecurity. “Nearly all efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are to be found in the Middle East and other areas of instability,” he said.
By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States is seeking by the end of next year to make countries’ access to nuclear materials conditional on their acceptance of enhanced international inspections, the U.S. State Department’s policy planning director said last night at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. “The Additional Protocol must be made a condition of nuclear supply by the end of next year,” Mitchell Reiss said in a dinnertime defense of U.S. nonproliferation policy. The protocol, now in force in 58 countries, allows for more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections than are afforded by the standard safeguards agreements that governments maintain with the U.N. nuclear watchdog. Although the agency has stressed the desirability of universal acceptance of the document, it has set no deadlines for the effort. A source familiar with the watchdog agency’s work said the body has no power to implement a constraint such as the one Reiss discussed. The source said the Nuclear Suppliers Group could be the forum for such a move but that even there, its passage would be unlikely. In related remarks, Reiss said the suppliers’ group should deny uranium-enrichment and reprocessing technology to all countries except those that already have full-scale, functioning plants that use such equipment. At the same time, he said, countries that forgo enrichment and reprocessing should be guaranteed reliable access to nuclear-reactor fuel. Reiss called for criminalizing WMD trafficking, helping needy countries dispose of prohibited and surplus weapons and materials, sharing WMD information among countries, stepping up international interdiction efforts, strengthening international bodies and bolstering export and border controls. In each case, Reiss cast the United States in the lead role. Asked by a conference attendee about allegedly lagging U.S. efforts to disarm, however, he rejected any “direct correlation” between maintenance of U.S. nuclear forces and other countries’ WMD ambitions. Mainly in response to participants’ questions, the official touched on several problems of current interest. He said the United States supports European efforts to negotiate a resolution to Iran’s alleged pursuit of a nuclear bomb, adding that Washington does not oppose Iran’s right to civilian nuclear facilities. Iran’s Russian-built Bushehr reactor, he said, poses no problem as long as Moscow provides the fuel and takes it back when spent. “I don’t think we’ve ever objected to that,” Reiss said. Regarding North Korea’s avowed nuclear “deterrent” and the six-country talks that are endeavoring to address it, Reiss expressed “frustration” that “the focus always appears to be on the United States” rather than on Pyongyang’s conduct. The United States has refused direct talks with North Korea and rebuffed the country’s bids for economic and other benefits in exchange for progress on the nuclear front. “We are hopeful,” said Reiss, “that the North Koreans can show a little bit more realism, a little bit more flexibility. … We have a model that we’re following, and it’s the Libya model.” Following years of painstaking negotiations, Libya last year announced it was ending its hidden WMD programs and has now begun to emerge from international isolation and to enjoy economic rewards.
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Contrary to the approach taken with a top nuclear scientist who confessed to transferring nuclear technology abroad, Pakistan plans to prosecute any others associated with its nuclear weapons program found to have been involved in illicit nuclear-related exports, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Ashraf Jehangir Qazi said yesterday (see GSN, June 7). “No one is above the law,” Qazi said during a nonproliferation conference hosted here by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. After months of investigation last year, top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely regarded as the “father” of the country’s nuclear arsenal, confessed to having transferred nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Khan’s confession revealed the existence of an international nuclear smuggling network — stretching through a number of countries such as Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates — which provided uranium enrichment technology to the three countries, and perhaps others. Nuclear weapons design information was also transferred at least to Libya. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said during yesterday’s conference that he had been surprised by the “sheer audacity” of the nuclear network, in terms of the types of technologies it provided to clients. Soon after Khan made his reported confession early this year, he received a conditional pardon from Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf in exchange for fully cooperating with Pakistan’s internal investigation into the affair. While calling Khan’s activities an “embarrassment” to Pakistan, Qazi yesterday said the value of information the scientist could provide to the investigation warranted the pardon. There were also “political” concerns that guided the decision to pardon Khan, Qazi said, noting his standing within Pakistan for his nuclear weapons efforts. Pakistani authorities have also detained a number of other scientists and officials involved in its nuclear weapons program as part of its investigation into the illicit transfers. Noting that the number of detainees was “few in number” Qazi said that if there was evidence that any were involved in the illicit transfers, they would be prosecuted, and if found guilty, punished. The Pakistani government has denied sanctioning Khan’s activities — a stance Qazi reiterated yesterday. Pakistan is sharing information gleaned through its continual interrogations of Khan with the International Atomic Energy Agency to aid the agency’s own investigation into the nuclear network, Qazi said. He also said, though, that Pakistan would not make public the information it has learned from Khan. In February, Malaysian authorities publicly released a report detailing the information learned from an investigation into an aspect of the nuclear network based there. Questions remain, according to experts, as to why Khan and perhaps other Pakistani nuclear personnel engaged in the illicit transfers. One possible reason might be the covert nature of Pakistan’s own efforts to develop nuclear weapons, beginning in the mid-1970s, Hussain Haqqani of the Carnegie Endowment said during yesterday’s conference. In what he described as the “drug-user’s dilemma,” Haqqani said that Khan might have had to transfer nuclear technology abroad to help fund Pakistan’s own nuclear weapons efforts. According to reports, Khan confessed to transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea from 1989 to 1997, one year before Pakistan announced that it had tested its own nuclear weapons. U.S. officials have reportedly said, though, that they believe that Khan’s transfers to Libya occurred through 2003, five years after Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program became public.
By Chris Schneidmiller
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Members of a panel of nonproliferation experts agreed yesterday on the need to assess the world’s nuclear threats, but parted ways on identifying the gravest threats to atomic peace. The four speakers were discussing the global threat assessment section of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace draft report on nuclear security, during the organization’s two-day nonproliferation conference (see GSN, June 18). Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security calls on the United States to prepare a comprehensive assessment of nuclear proliferation threats and the division of labor to address the dangers. That assessment should be presented to U.S. allies through NATO, after which the organization would prepare a collective threat assessment for review by its 2006 meeting, the report states. “It’s amazing how much consensus there is that we have to have a global threat assessment,” said Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment director for nonproliferation and one of the report’s authors. “The problem is it hasn’t really happened yet,” he added. The report’s authors prepared a table listing three major proliferation threats. The area of nuclear terrorism and transfers is identified as the most dangerous, followed by regional proliferation and conflict, and then the breakdown of the nonproliferation regime. Each broad heading includes four specific risks — terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials is designated as the most urgent threat and collapse of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as the least. “We now have these messianic, apocalyptic terrorist groups that have shown they are willing to use” unconventional weapons, Cirincione said. “We must do everything we can to prevent them from getting their hands on the material in the first place,” he said. Countries such as Iran and North Korea might be seeking nuclear weapons capability, but they are far less likely to use the weapons than a terrorist organization that does not have to worry about protecting its people or infrastructure, the report states. The most probable targets for terrorists seeking nuclear weapons capability are sites in the former Soviet states and Pakistan, along with fissile material stored at civilian facilities around the world, according to the report. A leadership collapse in nations such as Pakistan, Iran or North Korea, which have or are suspected of seeking nuclear weapons, could also promote the transfer of nuclear equipment or know-how to terrorist organizations, the report states. While Cirincione’s fellow panelists lauded the work done on the draft report, each offered critiques for consideration in the final version. The Carnegie threat lineup should actually be reversed, with nonproliferation regime collapse as the greatest risk, said Oliver Thranert of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The end of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would propel the other dangers in the assessment, Thranert said: North Korea would potentially proceed with work on nuclear weapons; Iran would do the same, followed by its neighbors in the Middle East; and terrorists would have greater access to nuclear weaponry as the number of atomic states expanded. “Without the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty we would lose the norm against nuclear proliferation,” Thranert said. “We would live in a world of deep nuclear uncertainty and would wish to revive the NPT, but it would be too late,” he added. An emphasis on terrorism should not mask other dangers, the report states. Conflicts between Pakistan and India, Taiwan and China, and Israel and the Arab states all carry the potential for “nuclear catastrophe,” according to the report, as do North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Meanwhile, potential development of new nuclear weapons such as the U.S. “bunker buster” could lead to nuclear testing by the United States and other countries, mortally wounding the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Other dangers to the international nonproliferation regime include threats by nations to use nuclear weapons against nonatomic countries and the end to stockpile reductions. More dangerous perhaps than what is happening is what is not being done — meaning the U.N. Security Council’s inability to restrain nuclear efforts by North Korea and Iran, said panel speaker Brad Roberts of the Institute for Defense Analyses. He likened the council to the Keystone Cops, and said its ineffectiveness could create “nuclear recidivism” as countries pull out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and seek to counteract new threats. Roberts said he believes the international community does have a common assessment on matters such as North Korea, but that countries act as if they are still seeking consensus to avoid actually addressing the problem. He also had smaller “quibbles” over the report’s lack of focus on the nuclear domino effect of one country’s nuclear aspirations pushing its neighbors to seek the weapons, and the potential for terrorists to take control of a nuclear state or produce an extended campaign of nuclear attacks. “If I had one I would want five, and I would want America to be sure there would be more punishment to come,” Robert said. The report also “slides past” the issue of terrorists taking physical or electronic control of missile systems, said Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information. An “unprotected electronic back door” was once found that allowed for production of false launch orders for U.S. Trident submarines, Blair said. Blair also warned against rushing for consensus based on bad information, referring to the still-unproven U.S. assertion that prewar Iraq was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Cirincione stressed that issues raised during the panel discussion, and during the question-and-answer session that followed, would be considered as the Carnegie Endowment finishes its report.
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — While the United States plans to nearly halve its nuclear weapons arsenal by 2012, any further significant cuts would not be likely to occur for several years afterward, a senior Bush administration official said yesterday (see GSN, June 4). Such reductions could only occur after the United States has created a nuclear weapons manufacturing infrastructure that could rapidly produce more nuclear weapons, National Nuclear Security Administration head Linton Brooks said during a nonproliferation conference here sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Brooks said that the currently planned arsenal, which he refused to describe specifically, would include a number of reserve warheads to replace those undergoing routine maintenance, to substitute for others found to have defects in the future, and to “hedge against an uncertain future.” He said further reductions could be pursued when money spent on extending the life of warheads in the arsenal is shifted in a few years toward gradually building a “responsive infrastructure.” “And then by sometime late in the next decade, we can look at further significant reductions in nondeployed forces, depending on the infrastructure as our hedge, rather than the spares,” he said. Brooks announced earlier this month that the administration intends to cut by nearly half the number of nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal. “By 2012, the United States’ nuclear stockpile will be the smallest it has been in several decades,” he said in a statement released June 3. While he refused to specify the size of the current or planned arsenal, analysts at the Natural Resources Defense Council estimate there are 10,640 strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal and that the number will shrink to about 6,000 warheads by 2012 under the administration plan. With the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, the Bush administration committed to having in operational deployment no more than 2,200 strategic warheads by the end of 2012. Nuclear weapons and arms control experts have called for much more significant cuts to the total U.S. arsenal. The Carnegie Endowment, in a report released at the conference, urged bilateral U.S.-Russian steps to reduce the number of warheads, which it said would “underscore for the international community that the United States and Russia are serious about their commitments to reduce nuclear weapons.”
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Movement toward disarmament by the five declared nuclear weapons states appears to be stalled and could use significant new initiatives, several experts said yesterday (see GSN, June 8). The five countries — Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States — are required by Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to work toward disarmament, and the countries reaffirmed that commitment at the 1995 and 2000 treaty review conferences as part of a bargain for indefinitely extending the international nuclear weapons ban. Speaking on a panel at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nonproliferation conference yesterday, though, Disarmament Diplomacy editor Rebecca Johnson, Carnegie Moscow Center analyst Alexei Arbatov, and senior U.N. political affairs officer Randy Rydell, speaking in his personal capacity, appeared to agree the states were not doing enough. “Deterioration and perhaps eventual disintegration” of the nonproliferation treaty is occurring, Arbatov said. “The great powers have to live up to their commitments” under Article VI in order to successfully discourage other countries from seeking the bomb, he said. ‘Inconsistency’ Is the ProblemThe issue, though, is not numbers of weapons possessed by the declared nuclear weapons states, but rather, doctrines for use and development of new capabilities, Arbatov said. “The main problem for nuclear proliferation presently is not North Korea or Iran, it is inconsistency,” he said. If the legitimate nuclear powers do not live up to their commitments, “this is a guarantee that nuclear proliferation will follow,” he said. Arbatov urged the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which the Bush administration opposes, and proposed making the 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty a “full-scale treaty” with counting rules, and taking U.S. and Russian strategic forces off alert. Toward Ensuring ComplianceRydell spoke of a more general need for measures to ensure compliance with nuclear reduction requirements. He said true disarmament would be irreversible, transparent, comprehensive, verifiable and binding and listed numerous ways in which he said that standard is now not met. He said, for instance, that the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons called for by the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty are reversible and not transparent, that the actual number of nuclear weapons and fissile material stores around the world is not known, and that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty had not yet entered into force. Johnson said the nuclear weapons states should be prohibited from producing new weapons, and even from modernizing or upgrading existing models. “This is what the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was originally intended to do,” she said. The goal would be effectively “disarmament by attrition,” she said. U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration head Linton Brooks said in a speech earlier yesterday that he was “bothered by the charges that our policy hurts nonproliferation, because our nonproliferation policy is exceptionally good.” “Our nuclear posture and our nonproliferation policy are supportive and entirely consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty,” he said. He said maintaining a strong U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal discourages other countries from trying to surge past the United States and helps to restrain friends and allies from acquiring nuclear weapons because they know the U.S. nuclear umbrella protects them. The 2005 NPT review conference, Johnson said, should not simply “itemize a wish list” for disarmament but should “decide whether to give states parties the tools” for enforcing compliance. She said the United States and France at the 2004 preparatory meetings for the 2005 NPT review conference tried to “back away” from an agreement at the 2000 review conference on 13 steps the legitimate nuclear states would take toward nuclear disarmament (see GSN, May 10). Arbatov was pessimistic that the legitimate nuclear powers would accept a move toward complete nuclear disarmament any time soon. “As far as I know how things are discussed in Moscow … [and] imagine how things are discussed in Washington, using the term ‘nuclear disarmament’ is the most guaranteed way of getting people to stop listening to you,” he said. “Short of that, a lot of things may be proposed and perhaps implemented,” he said.
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States and Russia should jointly work to lower the alert level of their nuclear forces to reduce the chance of an accidental nuclear strike by one against the other and to improve both nations’ standings in conducting international nuclear nonproliferation efforts, former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) said yesterday (see GSN, May 22, 2003). In remarks before a conference held here by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nunn called on both U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin to move away from the Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction and to agree to remove both countries’ nuclear arsenals from “hair-trigger” alert. “We are running the irrational risk of an Armageddon of our own making. It is time to find a safer form of deterrence and security,” said Nunn, who during his Senate tenure helped devise the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which works to dispose of and secure former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and related materials. The issue of reducing the alert levels of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces is not a new one, according to Nunn. He cited a speech made by Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign, in which he called for removal of as many U.S. nuclear weapons “as possible” from hair-trigger alert status. The MAD doctrine is outdated in the post-Cold War atmosphere of improved relations between the United States and Russia, Sergei Rogov, director of the U.S.A and Canada Institute in Moscow, said during yesterday’s conference. He noted that many of the sites in Russia that the United States is working to secure through the CTR program would be targeted by U.S. nuclear weapons under a MAD scenario. “Stability cannot be based on balance of terror,” Rogov said. Nunn yesterday proposed that Bush and Putin order their respective defense officials to present within six months a set of options for fully removing U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert. Under Nunn’s proposal, U.S. and Russian defense officials would jointly determine the threats that justify the need to maintain nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, and what steps each country must take to reduce such threats. The officials would work to incorporate their findings into new nuclear force postures that would ensure the survivability of nuclear forces. Noting that lingering mistrust could hinder efforts to rapidly reduce the alert level of all U.S. and Russian warheads, Nunn also proposed a set of “interim” measures to gradually reach the goal. Both countries could immediately order that all warheads slated to be removed from operational deployment under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty be taken off alert. Nunn said that a precedent existed for such a proposal, citing a 1991 order by then-U.S. President George H.W. Bush to stand down those nuclear forces to be reduced under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The United States and Russia could also agree to limit the number of nuclear weapons deployed on hair-trigger alert as part of a “tiered” force posture, Nunn said. Under a plan developed by Russian researchers, the United States and Russia would develop nuclear force postures that include a “first tier” of a limited number of warheads on hair-trigger alert, a “second tier” of weapons that required days or weeks to be brought to readiness, and a “third tier” of weapons that required even longer periods to be brought on alert. Such an approach, Nunn said, would improve the survivability of both countries’ nuclear forces and would reduce the “pressure on the U.S. and Russian triggers.” Bush and Putin could also agree to reduce the alert status for one leg of their respective countries’ air-, land- and sea-based nuclear triad, Nunn said. Under such a scenario, the United States might agree to eliminate the hair-trigger for its land-based missiles, while Russia could do the same for its sea-based missiles, he said. Such an approach would also improve force survivability and reduce the need for a prompt counter-response, Nunn added. The United States and Russia should agree to study efforts to reduce the alert levels of their nuclear arsenals prior to a review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, set to be held next year, Nunn said (see GSN, May 10). In addition to reducing the likelihood of an accidental U.S. or Russian nuclear strike on the other country, efforts to reduce the alert levels of the U.S. and Russian arsenals could also aid in broader international nonproliferation efforts, Nunn said. He charged the United States and Russia with re-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in national defense strategies. As examples, Nunn cited Russia’s efforts to deploy and develop new advanced ballistic missiles (see GSN, April 21) and the Bush administration’s efforts to seek funding for research into new types of lower-yield nuclear weapons and to improve readiness for new nuclear weapons testing (see GSN, June 16). By reducing their countries’ nuclear alert levels and de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, Bush and Putin would also increase their standing in calling on other countries to forswear nuclear weapons and would help build international pressure against those countries suspected of seeking nuclear weapons, such as Iran and North Korea, Nunn said. “Let history show that we reduced the chance of a disastrous catastrophic mistake; that we showed the world that we were reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons; and that we generated the good will we needed to gain the cooperation of each other and other nations in preventing nuclear dangers and catastrophic terrorism,” he said. [EDITOR’S NOTE: Sam Nunn is chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]
By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The United States yesterday praised the results of talks held last weekend by India and Pakistan on nuclear confidence-building measures and expressed hope that the two South Asian rivals would continue their efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the region (see GSN, June 21). On June 19-20, India and Pakistan held expert-level talks in New Delhi that resulted in an agreement to establish a nuclear “hot line” between the two countries’ foreign secretaries. India and Pakistan also agreed to maintain their respective nuclear test moratoriums, except in the event of “extraordinary events” jeopardizing national security; to develop an agreement on advanced notification of ballistic missile flight tests; and to work to implement a 1999 agreement on nuclear risk reduction measures. The U.S. State Department said yesterday that it hoped India and Pakistan would continue their efforts to engage each other. “We do think this is an opportunity for them to make further progress and comprehensive engagement, while at the same time, agreeing on concrete steps to lower the risk of accidental or intentional use of nuclear weapons. So we do think there are opportunities here and we are glad to see the parties are pursuing them,” department spokesman Richard Boucher said. The talks are “quite encouraging,” said Teresita Schaffer, director of the South Asian program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. While no major breakthroughs were made, the nuclear hot line proposal was significant in helping India and Pakistan to avoid entering into a nuclear war based on an unintended incident, Schaffer said. While a communications link between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries had previously existed “in principle,” it was rarely used, she said. Schaffer also praised the two countries’ plans to develop formal procedures for prenotification of missile tests, saying it would help improve the confidence the nations’ leaders placed in the information received. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a professor of nuclear physics at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, characterized the talks today, though, as mere “eyewash.” “The goal is to create an impression that India and Pakistan are ‘responsible nuclear states’ while, at the same time, keeping the speed of nuclearization at the maximum possible allowed by economic and technical limitations,” he said. Last weekend’s talks were held as part of a joint peace dialogue India and Pakistan launched earlier this year. The next planned step in the dialogue is a meeting scheduled for June 27-28 between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries. Boucher yesterday praised India and Pakistan’s progress to date in conducting the peace dialogue. “We applaud the efforts that are being made by India and Pakistan to try to make progress in their bilateral dialogue,” he said. “We’re glad to see that these [discussions] are going forward and we … really appreciate the efforts on both sides to reduce tensions,” Boucher added. Meanwhile, Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh and Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri yesterday praised the results of last weekend’s talks during a meeting on the sidelines of a regional summit held in China, according to the Indian External Affairs Ministry. During the meeting, the first direct contact between the two since the Congress Party came to power in India, Singh and Kasuri also expressed support for the planned foreign secretaries meeting, which they hope would result in “concrete outcomes” that would help move the peace dialogue forward, a ministry spokesperson said yesterday. Singh and Kasuri are expected to meet again “on several occasions” over the next two months, the spokesperson added.
The United States said yesterday it was working with its negotiating partners on a joint plan to offer aid to North Korea in exchange for a halt to its suspected nuclear weapons development, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, June 21). “We will enter these talks as we have entered previous talks: with flexibility and with an attitude of trying to resolve this problem,” said Secretary of State Colin Powell, as senior-level talks in Beijing are set to begin tomorrow. Preliminary working group sessions are expected to conclude today. Under a proposal being prepared for the session, Japan and South Korea would provide economic aid to North Korea, while the United States and its negotiating partners would pledge that the communist nation would not be attacked if it disarms (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, June 22). Meanwhile, Chinese and South Korean delegates are expected to jointly challenge U.S. insistence on “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” of all North Korea’s nuclear programs, the Christian Science Monitor reported. “We agree with CVID in principle, but we question whether it will allow talks to be productive,” said Jin Linbo, director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing. “China feels that CVID is a final goal, not something that needs to be complete right now,” Jin added. China and South Korea are expected to ask the United States to rethink what a senior official in Beijing calls an “unrealistic” position, according to the Monitor. Some analysts say the new posture by Seoul and Beijing is designed to keep North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il involved in the diplomatic efforts and to ensure he does not feel “ganged up on in the talks,” according to the Beijing source. The Seoul-Beijing plan would aim to secure a freeze of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and to allow inspectors to enter its Yongbyon nuclear facility, according to the Christian Science Monitor (Marquand/Kirk, Christian Science Monitor, June 22).
Failure by Iran to prove it has no nuclear weapons program could lead to U.N. economic sanctions, the United States indicated yesterday (see GSN, June 21). “The international community is expecting them to answer its questions and to respond fully,” said U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell after meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Powell added that “judgments can be made as to what action might be appropriate” in September, when the agency’s governing board is next scheduled to meet. Powell said that he told ElBaradei he was satisfied with the agency’s work. “We hope that in the weeks and months ahead the Iranians will satisfy all the concerns that members of the international community still have,” he said (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, June 21). Meanwhile, Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said yesterday that his country must master the nuclear fuel cycle, but denied the Islamic republic was interested in developing nuclear weapons, Agence France-Presse reported. “It is essential because if the Iranian people cannot” independently produce nuclear fuel, “they will be dependent on outside sources and if these countries decide not to supply us, our stations will be useless,” he said. Iranian hard-liners are pushing to have their nation quit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and look at resuming uranium enrichment, AFP reported. “Iran should resume uranium enrichment. This is Iran’s right,” said conservative MP Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 22).
New Zealand’s main opposition political party said today that it has abandoned plans to end a ban on nuclear ships visiting the country if it wins the next round of national elections, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, May 7). National Party leader Don Brash said that there was little public support for ending the ban, which prevents nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vessels from entering New Zealand. “There will be no change to the law on banning nuclear weapons and nuclear-propelled ships without a referendum,” Brash said (Associated Press, Jan. 22).
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