A former Iraqi surface-to-air missile engine, once tagged by U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq, was found this year by U.N. officials in the Netherlands (UNMOVIC photo). Iraqi Missile Parts Found in Netherlands The engines of two Iraqi surface-to-air missiles have been discovered at a Dutch scrap yard, adding to the difficulty of determining the scope of Iraq’s prewar clandestine arms program, according to a report released yesterday by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (see GSN, June 7). “The existence of missile engines originating in Iraq among scrap in Europe may affect the accounting of proscribed engines known to have been in Iraq’s possession in March 2003,” the report says...Full Story

Weak Modeling Hampers Plans for Operating U.S. Missile Defenses, Pentagon Study Finds By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. military officials lack adequate tools for judging the likely effectiveness of the long-range national missile defense system President George W. Bush has ordered activated later this year, according to a recent Defense Department report and nongovernmental experts...Full Story

U.S. Shows Flexibility in Wording Demands of North Korea The United States has said it is willing to use wording other than “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” in reference to its efforts to shut down North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program, the Yonhap News Agency reported yesterday (see GSN, June 7)...Full Story

	Tuesday, June 8, 2004

Iraqi Missile Parts Found in Netherlands The engines of two Iraqi surface-to-air missiles have been discovered at a Dutch scrap yard, adding to the difficulty of determining the scope of Iraq’s prewar clandestine arms program, according to a report released yesterday by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (see GSN, June 7). “The existence of missile engines originating in Iraq among scrap in Europe may affect the accounting of proscribed engines known to have been in Iraq’s possession in March 2003,” the report says. The UNMOVIC report also presents evidence that up to 12 similar engines had been shipped from Iraq to the scrap yard. “Company staff confirmed that other items made of stainless steel and other corrosion-resistant metal alloys bearing the inscription ‘Iraq’ or ‘Baghdad’ had been observed in shipments delivered from the Middle East since November 2003,” the report notes. The report also includes satellite imagery illustrating that a number of Iraqi sites previously known to have equipment or materials subject to international monitoring have either been “cleared out or destroyed” (UNMOVIC report, May 2004). Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, noting that in his experience British intelligence services “very rarely” err with regard to a “pattern” of intelligence, said yesterday that he remains certain he was not misled by prewar intelligence on Iraq, Agence France-Presse reported. “I think the basic pattern — i.e., that this [former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein] was someone who retained complete determination to pursue this WMD business — I would be very surprised if that turned out to be wrong,” Blair said. “My experience (with the intelligence services) is that they very rarely get a pattern wrong,” he added. Hussein’s alleged WMD programs and the chance that those weapons might end up in terrorist hands were a cornerstone of Blair’s case for the war against Iraq, according to AFP. “In respect to the weapons, I think we should let the Iraq Survey Group do its work, because there are two things we know,” Blair said. “We know he had them because he used them, and that’s why we had 10 years of United Nations resolutions about Saddam and WMD. What we also know is that we haven’t found them in Iraq,” he added. “Whatever else the Iraq Survey Group comes up with … they will not report there was no threat from [Hussein], I don’t believe,” Blair went on (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 8). Back to top       U.S. Faults Others for Failed NPT Meeting Last month’s international meeting to prepare for the 2005 review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty failed to make significant progress because a group of non-nuclear weapon states resisted U.S. efforts to focus attention on proliferation problems, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf said in an interview with Arms Control Today published today (see GSN, May 10). The meeting at the United Nations in New York ended without any recommendations for next year’s conference, and countries in the Nonaligned Movement pushed the United States to do more about nuclear disarmament. The meeting “gave us a chance to make clear that disarmament is proceeding,” Wolf said. “But the fact is that it also provided us with opportunities to say the problem is not the nuclear weapon states. It is the failure of some non-nuclear weapon states to live by their obligations. And the failure by a few puts at risk the benefits for many,” he added. Wolf added that the Nonaligned Movement failed to agree to several proposals on an agenda for the 2005 Review Conference, some of which the United States was prepared to support. “There were at least four, including the chairman’s own proposal, that the United States could have supported,” Wolf said. “So, in a way it’s disappointing that we failed to complete that work. It is not surprising that it didn’t come up with substantive recommendations. In the history of Review Conferences, that tends to be the kind of thing that gets done at the Review Conference and not before the Review Conference,” he added. Wolf also blamed the Nonaligned Movement for failing to engage with nuclear power states such as Russia when offered the opportunity to do so. “The Russian delegate made the point, for instance, that one of their [Nonaligned Movement] recommendations is that the nuclear-weapon states should improve reporting. He said that Russia had been providing reports and whenever Russia asked the Nonaligned Movement, ‘Well, what do you think of our report? How could it be improved? Where do you see problems?’ Russia gets no answers,” Wolf said. “So, (regarding) this sort of drumbeat about disarmament, some might wonder whether or not people are actually looking at the facts or simply reading the speech from last year without taking account of what happened in the year previous,” Wolf added (Arms Control Today, June 2004). Wolf announced last month he plans to leave the State Department in July after having served in the agency for 34 years, recently as ambassador to Malaysia and leading U.S. WMD nonproliferation efforts, according to the Associated Press. He will become president of the Eisenhower Fellowships international exchange program (David Caruso, Associated Press/PhillyBurbs.com, May 21). Back to top       WMD Attack Against Canada ‘Feasible,’ Report Says Canada’s support for the war on terror has made it a potential target for an attack by al-Qaeda using weapons of mass destruction, according to a Canadian intelligence report detailed today by the National Post newspaper (see GSN, April 1). “The changing face of terrorism has made the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons in a terrorist attack feasible,” says the report, Al-Qaeda and the Sunni Islamic Extremist Threat, which was prepared by Canada’s Integrated National Security Assessment Center. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden threatened Canada in a November 2002 audiotape. The North American nation also sent thousands of troops to Afghanistan, the terrorist leader’s former base of operations. The report states that bin Laden’s efforts to acquire unconventional weapons were more advanced than previously believed, according to intelligence gained after the invasion of Afghanistan, and included an advanced biological weapons program. Two of the seven suspected al-Qaeda operatives believed to be in the United States are Canadian, the National Post reported (see GSN, May 27). Several Canadian terrorists, some affiliated with al-Qaeda, are also at large, the intelligence report states. “The naming of Canada by bin Laden as a legitimate al-Qaeda target can be interpreted as a direct threat to Canadian security, both at home and abroad … the possibility of an attack occurring in Canada cannot be ruled out,” the report states (Stewart Bell, National Post, June 8). Back to top

U.S. Shows Flexibility in Wording Demands of North Korea The United States has said it is willing to use wording other than “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” in reference to its efforts to shut down North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program, the Yonhap News Agency reported yesterday (see GSN, June 7). “At the first six-nation working group meeting held in Beijing last month, the chief U.S. delegate, Joseph DeTrani, said it is all right to use a different expression with regard to ‘CVID’ as long as its principles are kept,” said an anonymous South Korean official. “Considering this, the United States is expected not to stick to the term CVID,” added the official. North Korea objects to the term (Yonhap, June 7). Meanwhile, China said today that no date has yet been set for the next round of six-party talks on the nuclear standoff with North Korea, Agence France-Presse reported. Previous reports had the negotiations scheduled for June 23-25 in Beijing. “I’ve seen reports about the date of the six-party talks, but to be frank with you, the date has not been finalized yet,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said. “Various parties have put forward proposals for when the talks should be held. The Chinese side will consult with the other parties in order to achieve consensus for an early date,” he added (Agence France-Presse, June 8). Elsewhere, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said he believes North Korean leader Kim Jong Il intends to dismantle his nuclear programs, based on talks to two leaders held in Pyongyang last month, the Financial Times reported. “He [Kim] clearly stated that the objective was denuclearization,” Koizumi said. “He further stated very clearly that freezing of the nuclear program is to be accompanied by verification,” he added. “I told him face to face that, if you compare what you gain from nuclear weapons with what you gain from dismantling them, it is like the difference between heaven and earth,” Koizumi went on. “I felt personally that North Korea is interested in moving forward,” he said. The interpretation of Kim’s remarks by Koizumi may be regarded as naive, according to the Financial Times. Many experts believe North Korea has bought time by engaging in the six-party talks in order to continue its nuclear development, the Times reported. Some experts also speculate that Kim is attempting to drive a wedge between Japan and other parties to the talks by bringing Koizumi into bilateral talks, according to the Times (David Pilling, Financial Times, June 7). Back to top       Three Russian Nuclear Submarines to be Scrapped The United States and the United Kingdom are separately financing the disposal of three Russian missile-carrying submarines, officials announced this week (see GSN, April 7). The United Kingdom paid nearly $20 million for the destruction of two Granit-class, also called Oscar-class, multipurpose nuclear submarines. Both submarines had 24 launchers for nuclear missiles (ITAR-Tass, June 7). The United States is funding disposal of an Akula-class, also called Typhoon class, nuclear-power submarine armed with 20 ballistic-missile launchers (ITAR-Tass, June 8). Both projects are part of efforts to reduce Russia’s stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Back to top

Bush Administration Pushes for Anthrax Treatments The Bush Administration hopes to order this summer enough units of a new anthrax vaccine to inoculate 25 million people in the United States, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, April 29). If the purchase occurs on schedule, the vaccine could be in government hands by 2005 and would be sufficient to provide protection against a large-scale bioterrorist attack, according to the Post. The treatment’s lifespan might be no longer than six years, but research would continue on longer-lasting vaccines, said Philip Russell, a Health and Human Services Department bioterrorism adviser. Russell also announced that the government is looking to buy a new treatment for people exposed to anthrax. Antibiotics are now used to treat anthrax victims, but do not always help those who are already sick, the Post said. A drug using antibodies, a protein created by the body to fight infection, could be more effective, scientists have said (Justin Gillis, Washington Post, June 8). Meanwhile, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has approved the first commercially available test that could diagnose anthrax infection in less than an hour, Reuters reported yesterday. The blood test detects antibodies, and can be used without special equipment or training. Immunetics Inc. of Boston produces the test kits, which cost about $480 and contain 96 disposable tests. The test has only a 1-percent possibility of making a false positive, and can be used to detect anthrax exposures through inhalation, skin contact or ingestion, Reuters said. “The approval represents a significant step forward in the public health community’s ability to diagnose anthrax,” Immunetics chief executive Andrew Levin said in a prepared statement (Susan Heavey, Reuters, June 7). Back to top

U.S. Army Reviewing Mustard Agent Leak at Aberdeen The U.S. Army and contractors are reviewing a June 4 incident in which a trace amount of mustard agent was apparently released in a drain station room at the Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Maryland (see GSN, April 6). Two workers removing waste bags from the room when the detection alarm sounded were evaluated and cleared for exposure to mustard agent, according to the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency. Subsequent monitoring indicated no further presence of agent vapor. The drain station facility was evacuated during the check and operations resumed later that evening. The incident posed no threat to the community or environment, the agency said. Initial indications are that a “minute quantity” of mustard gas might have escaped through a waste bag that was not fully sealed, according to the agency. The review will determine if procedures must be altered to prevent a future agent release (Army Chemical Materials Agency release, June 7). Back to top

Taiwan Rejects China Proposal for Missile Withdrawal Taiwan rejected a Chinese proposal today that it cease purchasing advanced weaponry from the United States in exchange for China withdrawing hundreds of ballistic missiles aimed at the island, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, June 3). “(This) is intended to reduce or even cut off U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, tipping the military balance in favor of communist China,” Taiwan’s Defense Ministry spokesman Huang Suey-sheng said. Taiwan’s government spokesman, Chen Chi-mai, said yesterday that China’s arms buildup threatens Taiwan. “China’s military spending has risen at a double-digit rate each year. ... Their military spending last year amounted to between $50 billion and $70 billion,” Chen said. Taiwan’s cabinet has approved a special military draft budget of $18.2 billion over 15 years beginning in 2005, according to Agence France-Presse. The funds would be earmarked for eight submarines, a modified version of the Patriot antimissile system and a fleet of antisubmarine aircraft (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 8). Meanwhile, the U.S. Defense Department stated last month that the growth of China’s ballistic missile inventory would enable Beijing to launch a devastating attack on Taiwanese infrastructure, Aviation Week reported. “China most likely will be able to cause significant damage to all of Taiwan’s airfields and quickly degrade Taiwan’s ground-based air defenses and associated command and control through a combination of SRBMs, land-attack cruise missiles, special operations forces and other assets,” according to an annual Pentagon report on Chinese military developments. The report highlighted the growth in China’s short-range ballistic missile inventory last year by 50 missiles, bringing its estimated total to 500 (Robert Wall, Aviation Week, June 7). Back to top

Weak Modeling Hampers Plans for Operating U.S. Missile Defenses, Pentagon Study Finds By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. military officials lack adequate tools for judging the likely effectiveness of the long-range national missile defense system President George W. Bush has ordered activated later this year, according to a recent Defense Department report and nongovernmental experts. As a result, the U.S. Strategic Command, which has overall responsibility for operating the system, has not received critical information needed to develop operational plans, according to the experts and the Defense Science Board report Missile Defense Phase III, Modeling and Simulation, which was released by the Pentagon in March. Furthermore, Missile Defense Agency development and procurement decision-makers also lack sufficient assessments of capabilities needed to perform cost-benefit assessments, they said. The problems are caused by the agency conducting insufficient modeling and simulation of the Ballistic Missile Defense System and its components, tools that are key for understanding the operational capability of the system. Modeling and simulation is a discipline that enables weapons developers to examine potential capabilities of weapons systems by approximating operations in the field to provide data for making managerial or technical decisions. The report concludes, “The GMD model treats some critical parameters such as discrimination [warhead identification] and overall probability of kill too simplistically for adequate credibility,” referring to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, pieces of which were ordered by Bush to be activated this year. The ultimate objective of the ballistic missile defense system’s development is to produce a high “kill probability,” which is Missile Defense Agency jargon for the estimated probability of successfully destroying an enemy warhead. For modeling and simulation to be useful, the report says, agency models must include “credible, higher-fidelity” assessments of the GMD system’s discrimination capabilities and kill probability. Modeling of the overarching Ballistic Missile Defense System, of which the GMD project is just one component, also is deficient, it says. The Missile Defense Agency lacks useful models for boost-phase intercept systems, it says, and lacks a single model for assessing the potential capabilities of the entire system that could be useful in deciding which systems to develop for fielding in two-year “block” increments, it says. The agency should “improve the general level of fidelity for ‘hardware-in-the-loop’ testing [simulation testing of hardware] of all BMDS elements,” the report states. Claims Challenged Critics reviewing the report said its findings undercut Pentagon assertions about the system’s capability used to justify the deployment plans. “They’re making detailed claims about how well it will work and they have no idea about whether it will work at all. … They have no idea of what the capability of this system is,” said MIT professor Ted Postol, a prominent critic of the program. Last year, a senior Pentagon official estimated to Congress that the system would have a 90-percent kill probability using multiple interceptors against a single North Korean ICBM warhead (see GSN, March 21, 2003). The Missile Defense Agency this year invited reporters to participate in a computerized war game that reportedly assumed a 91-percent kill probability for the entire BMDS system as it is projected to be configured years from now (see GSN, March 17). Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish has been less specific about the system’s kill probability. In the June issue of the National Defense Industrial Association’s National Defense magazine, he cited agency modeling and simulation efforts to argue that the fielded system would be effective regardless of the outcome of two flight-intercept tests scheduled for this year. “We will have the capability in September. Modeling and simulation predicts with great precision what would happen if it works as designed,” he said. Philip Coyle of the Center for Defense Information, who was the Pentagon’s top testing official during the Clinton administration, challenged that level of certainty. “Modeling and simulation of missile defense has never predicted actual system performance with great precision,” he said.   “Current models and simulations simply do not capture the most significant variables in a missile defense engagement, and aren’t likely to any time soon. The battle environment is highly complex, the software programming requirements are daunting, and the models don’t begin to capture the real physics,” he said. Coyle, for example, noted the report’s conclusion that models of potential targets were based on “uncertain or unavailable data.” Bill Sowder, a missile defense expert at Teledyne Brown Engineering, agreed that Pentagon testing has been simplistic so far. “We’re sort of in kindergarten right now entering first grade and we’re trying to move up,” he said. “This is a monumental program, much beyond the Manhattan project or the development of Atlas, the first ICBMs. This is much bigger than that.  We have not had many chances in this country to look at, and develop and actually test and actually deploy a system of systems,” he said. A statistical analysis Coyle co-authored and released last month argued that the GMD system’s kill probability is unknown given the limited testing so far and is probably extremely low. Such a low probability would undermine the Pentagon’s claims that simply deploying more interceptors could ensure success. The analysis found that firing large numbers of low-kill-probability interceptors would do little to increase the chances of shooting down all enemy warheads (see GSN, May 14). The military “has conducted exercises for the media, the purpose of which was to show that more interceptors did help. So clearly those models have loaded into them very high kill probabilities, but they have no basis of asserting those kill probabilities given the basis of what the tests have done so far,” Coyle said in an e-mail. Kadish and other officials have said they do have an assessment of the capability but would not release it because it is classified. The Missile Defense Agency also told GSN in a statement that, “Over time we are building up our modeling and simulation capability at the system level to approximate more closely the type of end-to-end testing we would like to have to verify that the system is doing what we want it to do.” It said the agency has followed the report’s recommendation to appoint a program director for modeling and simulation and has created a new modeling and simulation directorate. Implications Alleged Implications of the reported modeling and simulations deficiencies, according to the Defense Science Board report and the experts, are several and significant.  For instance, the report says that the Missile Defense Agency is not providing the U.S. Strategic Command, which has overall responsibility for using the system, a modeling and simulation tool for assessing operational effectiveness of each two-year block of new equipment it delivers. The command could use such capability, it says, to develop regional and global contingency plans incorporating the system, write offensive war plans with defenses in mind, and “assess the likely effectiveness of the deployed system against evolving threats.” Without the benefit of modeling and simulations assessments, he said, “you don’t have a technical basis for making operational decisions in a real battle,” he said. “You have to characterize what the system can do before you have confidence that you can really meet the challenge that the adversary can throw at you,” Sowder said. The report notes a lack of an “end-to-end system engineering and verification tool,” which experts say models the actual performance of the entire system of components.   It would give operators “an idea of what you can expect when you call the system up,” Postol said. It is “difficult to understand how BMDS could be put on alert without such a tool,” the report says. Needed for Decision-Making Insufficient modeling capabilities also affect Missile Defense Agency program-planning decisions, according to the report. Knowledge of system effectiveness, according to Coyle, affects planning for how many interceptors should be launched at a single target — and therefore calculations of how many should be purchased for defense against an estimated threat. Because agency officials have “stopped flight-intercept testing and also don’t have realistic models, they have no real basis to show the Congress why they need the money they say they need,” he said. U.S. military officials have said that the planned activation this year would give the country protection when it currently has none. Back to top

Top Pentagon Testing Official Profiled By George Cahlink Government Executive WASHINGTON — Thomas Christie, the Pentagon’s in-house weapons tester, sounds like an independent watchdog when talking about the impact the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had on the development of weapons. “Every time you have a conflict, it’s an opportunity to go show off these systems,” he says. “I might call them toys.” A moment later, though, Christie backs off, fearing his comment sounds too pejorative. He strikes a more diplomatic note, saying that today’s wars require “new kinds of thinking and some new approaches.” Lately, Christie, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation, is trying to cut back on bashing weapons developers. Instead, he wants military testers to work more closely with program managers, engineers and contractors to field weapons more quickly and safely. To maintain his influence, Christie has been walking the fine line between pushing for tough testing and gaining the respect of weapons developers. Weapons testers must “change our way of doing business, adapt to the new acquisition paradigms and the realities of the war on terrorism, or we will find ourselves becoming irrelevant, with dire consequences to the operational forces,” Christie said this spring at the National Defense Industrial Association’s test and evaluation symposium in Reno, Nev. Weapons program managers, he said, “appear to be learning faster how to avoid testing than we are learning to do it better.” The U.S. Defense Department will spend $74 billion this year buying new weapons, and Christie wants to make sure they work as expected. With snow-white hair and deep wrinkles across his broad face, Christie appears well suited for the role of curmudgeon and skeptic-in-chief. He asks if Army ground vehicles had enough rounds fired at them, questions whether Air Force planes were forced to maneuver in real dogfights and wonders whether Navy ships had powerful enough waves slammed into their hulls. Congress created Christie’s office in the mid-1980s (he’s been its director since 2001), amid reports that weapons system managers were skirting tough testing. In one infamous case, the Air Force dropped a heat-seeking missile from a crane onto a target warmed by an electric hot plate and claimed success. Christie’s office doesn’t conduct tests itself, but rather reviews the services’ evaluation efforts to ensure weapons pass more than a hot-plate test. He can’t stop a system from being built, but his critiques often lead to more testing before a weapon moves from factory to foxhole. “Just having the office there makes a difference because it encourages [weapons] developers to do things they might not have done otherwise,” says Philip Coyle, who preceded Christie as the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation from 1994 to 2001. “Everybody wants to get into production and not spend money that they don’t feel they have to.” In recent years, the Pentagon has embraced a piecemeal approach, known as “spiral development,” to buying weapons. The strategy calls for fielding weapons in stages and upgrading them as technologies mature rather than waiting years (in some cases, decades) for systems to be fully developed. Supporters say spiral development allows the services to field technology faster, especially during wartime. Critics warn that systems are being fielded before they are ready. Christie says spiral development, coupled with a rush to field weapons during recent conflicts, calls for “up-to-date, continuous test and evaluation.” Implementing weapons systems more quickly requires operational testing earlier in the process, he argues. Jacques Gansler, who served as the Pentagon’s acquisition chief in the Clinton administration, agrees. He says that rather than focusing on “no-go tests” just before weapons are fielded, testers should work with developers early on. “You need to keep challenging systems,” Gansler says. Dina Rasor, whose work as an investigative reporter about lax weapons testing helped convince Congress to create Christie’s office, cautions against having operational testers work too closely with program managers and contractors. “You have to have someone who has the attitude, ‘Let’s go out there and break it,’” says Rasor, who is now a member of the board of directors of the Project on Government Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog organization in Washington. “There are no checks and balances if you are all buddy-buddy.” Christie says no systems have been fielded on his watch that would place troops at risk, although he has issued warnings about potential problems. He cautioned the Army about insufficient armor on its Stryker vehicles and the service made upgrades before the vehicles were sent to Iraq. His office informed the Navy of a faulty avionics subsystem on its F-18 E/F Hornet fighter aircraft, and as a result one commander told pilots not to use that feature during combat operations. In March, Christie informed Congress that the Pentagon’s multibillion-dollar missile defense system set to be deployed later this year hasn’t been thoroughly tested and might not work. Operational testers also have scrutinized the Air Force’s F/A-22 fighter, which has been in development since 1988 at a cost of $32 billion. The planes now cost more than $250 million apiece. “It’s a question of almost 20 years later, what do we have?” Christie asks. He has repeatedly warned the Air Force that the aircraft is not ready for independent operational testing and can’t be fielded by the end of 2005 as planned. The Air Force has heeded those concerns and slowed down the fighter plane’s schedule. The service is now testing the F-22 in various battle scenarios, ranging from defending land from enemy fighters to escorting bombers. Christie credits the Air Force with coming around to the idea of more testing. However, he adds, the service only agreed to the plan to “get people off their backs,” and hopes successful results will “help sell it even more.” The balance Christie strikes between keeping an eye on F/A-22 developers and working more closely with them is a role he been honing since his federal career began almost 50 years ago as a GS-5 analyst at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., where he earned $4,000 annually. In the mid-1960s, Christie met an up-and-coming fighter pilot, Maj. John Boyd, a visionary but eccentric strategist who later became a driving force in developing the Air Force’s F-15 and F-16 fighter planes. Boyd, who was not popular with military brass, needed computer power to test his theories on aircraft maneuverability, and Christie had computer access. Christie had the numbers crunched; Boyd used them to craft his theories. The Air Force’s inspector general investigated allegations of $1 million in illegal computer use by Boyd, but did not find evidence of misuse. Christie was never targeted. Almost two decades later, Christie was a manager in the Pentagon’s Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, which advises the Defense secretary on weapons spending. One of his employees, an outspoken analyst named Chuck Spinney, was holding press conferences and testifying before Congress that the Pentagon was underestimating the cost of the Reagan defense buildup by billions of dollars. Pentagon leaders wanted Spinney gone; Christie kept him on. Spinney, who remained in the office until he retired last year, says Christie has the remarkable ability to be accepted by Defense reformers and still rise in the Pentagon bureaucracy. That capacity led to the nickname his colleagues pinned on him: The Finagler. By now, Christie, who turns 70 next spring, is in some ways the consummate Defense insider. He has a large Pentagon office and oversees 46 analysts. He reports only to the Defense secretary and is widely quoted in the press when he testifies before Congress. Christie says he’s more cautious in such a visible role. But then, he adds, “Sometimes it’s easier not to operate out in the open.” As always, Thomas Christie walks a fine line. Back to top

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