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Experts Praise U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Enhancements, Say More Must Be Done By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — While praising the nuclear security measures agreed to yesterday by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, nonproliferation experts said the two leaders failed to make progress on a number of important bilateral nonproliferation issues (see GSN, Feb. 24). During a summit yesterday in the Slovak capital of Bratislava, Bush and Putin approved a number of measures designed to enhance U.S.-Russian efforts against nuclear terrorism. They include efforts to improve the nuclear “security culture” in both countries and to share best practices information on improving security at nuclear sites, the establishment of a senior-level bilateral interagency group, improving capabilities to respond to acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism, and continuing efforts to repatriate U.S.- and Russian-origin fresh and spent highly enriched uranium fuel from research reactors around the world and develop new low-enriched uranium for use as replacement fuel. “We bear a special responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons and fissile material, in order to ensure that there is no possibility such weapons or materials would fall into terrorist hands,” Bush and Putin said in a joint statement. The so-called “Bratislava Initiatives” were announced amid increasing concerns about the security of Russian nuclear facilities and materials. Earlier this month, CIA Director Porter Goss told the Senate intelligence committee that enough Russian nuclear material was unaccounted to develop a nuclear weapon, and that he could not be certain that terrorists had not obtained some of the material. Goss’s warnings followed a CIA report prepared late last year that expressed concern over the likelihood of undetected nuclear smuggling of Russian nuclear materials. Senior Russian officials, however, have repeatedly denied allegations that Russian nuclear weapons or weapon-grade materials have been lost. The measures agreed to by Bush and Putin are “a potentially historic step to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism,” said Matthew Bunn, senior research analyst at Harvard University’s Managing the Atom project. “If each of them follows through with the needed commitment, by May, when they meet again in Moscow, we can expect real progress toward forging a fast-paced global effort to lock down the world's nuclear stockpiles and keep them out of terrorist hands,” he said in a statement. Among the “key” developments stemming from yesterday’s meeting was the creation of the Senior Interagency Group and the new emphasis on developing a nuclear security culture, said Ken Luongo, executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. “The true test,” though, “is whether they [Bush and Putin] can make good on the commitments and promises in the obligatory post-summit statement,” Arms Control Association Executive Director Daryl Kimball said today. Experts, however, also decried the lack of progress made at yesterday’s summit on several bilateral issues, including increased access to Russian facilities and the resolution of a lingering dispute centering on liability protections for U.S. nonproliferation work conducted in Russia. “It is unfortunate that there were no major breakthroughs on the impediments that are hobbling the realization of their nuclear security goals,” Luongo said in a statement. “Deadly terrorists are seeking WMD and they are not waiting,” he added. While saying it was a “positive sign” that Bush and Putin discussed the need to improve nuclear security efforts, Kimball described the summit as an “opportunity for serious progress that was not fulfilled.” U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice informed Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) on Feb. 14 that the United States had recently sent a proposal to Moscow to resolve the liability dispute. The Washington Post reported yesterday, though, that despite last-minute meetings in Moscow and London, U.S. and Russian officials could not reach a final agreement on the issue, which has blocked a U.S.-Russian project to jointly eliminate 68 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. Yesterday’s summit could help the United States and Russia move forward on several other nonproliferation issues, said Nuclear Threat Initiative Co-Chairman Sam Nunn. They include removing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert status, increased transparency for U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons, accelerated destruction of Russian chemical weapons and increased cooperation against biological terrorism, he said. “There must be an increased measure of reciprocal transparency on both the U.S. and Russian side and an enhanced effort to foster a true partnership to achieve this imperative security agenda,” Nunn said in a statement. [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.]
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