U.S. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) introduced a counterterrorism bill this week that reaffirms funding and support for U.S. threat-reduction programs (AFP photo/Eric Feferberg). Senate Bill Would Boost Nonproliferation Measures By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) proposed this week to re-establish U.S. efforts to convert Russian nuclear weapons production sites to civilian use (see GSN, Jan. 14)...Full Story

U.S. Report Questions Pakistani and Bush Claims on Khan Nuclear Proliferation Network By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A new report by the research arm of the U.S. Congress questions official claims that former Pakistani nuclear weapons laboratory director Abdul Qadeer Khan provided nuclear technology to other nations without his government’s permission (see GSN, Jan. 4)...Full Story

United Kingdom to Provide $20 Million to Aid Shutdown of Russian Plutonium-Producing Reactors By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United Kingdom agreed this week to provide $20 million to a U.S. effort to shut down three nuclear reactors in Russia that produce weapon-grade plutonium (see GSN, Jan. 26)...Full Story

	Friday, January 28, 2005

Nuclear Terrorism Greatest Threat, Ashcroft Says The greatest terrorist danger to the United States is that an extremist group would gain access to a nuclear weapon, outgoing Attorney General John Ashcroft said yesterday in an interview with the Associated Press (see GSN, Jan. 3). “If you were to have nuclear proliferation find its way into the hands of terrorists, the entire world might be very seriously disrupted by a few individuals who sought to impose their will, their arcane philosophy, on the rest of mankind,” Ashcroft said. U.S. officials “from time to time” find indications of terrorists trying to acquire nuclear weapons, he added. It remains unclear, however, whether they have progressed in that effort, he told AP. Authorities have prosecuted more than 375 people in terrorism-related cases in the United States since the Sept. 11, 2002, attacks. Those cases so far have resulted in 195 convictions or guilty pleas, AP reported (Curt Anderson, Associated Press/Billings Gazette, Jan. 27). Back to top

Senate Bill Would Boost Nonproliferation Measures By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) proposed this week to re-establish U.S. efforts to convert Russian nuclear weapons production sites to civilian use (see GSN, Jan. 14). The proposal was contained in a massive counterterrorism bill introduced Wednesday by Biden, the Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005. The bill would re-establish the U.S. Energy Department’s Nuclear Cities Initiative, which once sought to reduce the Russian nuclear weapons complex but was allowed to expire in 2003, according to a Biden press release. His legislation would authorize $60 million to be appropriated to the Energy Department for the effort (see GSN, Sept. 22, 2003). The bill also would require the Defense and Energy departments to work with Moscow to consolidate and dismantle Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Each department would be authorized $25 million for the effort. In addition, the bill would authorize an additional $40 million for the Defense Department in fiscal 2006 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which seeks to secure and dispose of Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction. Of that money, $15 million would support efforts to accelerate security upgrades at nuclear weapons sites located in Russia and other former Soviet states; $10 million would be used to accelerate security upgrades at warhead storage sites outside the former Soviet Union; and $15 million would go toward accelerating biological nonproliferation efforts in Kazakhstan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. The bill would also enact into law a measure proposed by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) to remove restrictions placed on aid provided through the CTR program to both projects within the former Soviet Union and in other countries (see GSN, Nov. 15, 2004). Last year, the CTR program deactivated more than 300 Russian nuclear warheads, bringing the total deactivated since the effort began in 1991 to more than 6,500, Lugar’s office announced yesterday. The program last year also resulted in the destruction of 41 Russian SS-18 ICBMs and 22 SS-18 missile silos, 18 Backfire strategic bombers in Ukraine; 93 AS-4/KH-22 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles; 81 SS-N-23, SS-N-20 and SS-N-18 submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and nine SS-24 ICBM mobile launchers. Pakistan Biden’s bill would authorize $10 million in fiscal 2006 aid to Pakistan for nonproliferation programs. The assistance would be part of a broader $800 million aid package. Under Biden’s bill, however, the president would be required to certify that no U.S. economic or military aid to Pakistan was being passed on by the Pakistani government “to a person that is opposing or undermining the efforts of the United States government to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” Pakistan’s commitment to nonproliferation has come into the question following the confession in early 2004 of former top nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan to having orchestrated the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. The bill contains a finding of Congress that “Pakistan’s maintenance of a global missile and nuclear proliferation network would be inconsistent with Pakistan being considered an ally of the United States.” Back to top

U.S. Report Questions Pakistani and Bush Claims on Khan Nuclear Proliferation Network By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A new report by the research arm of the U.S. Congress questions official claims that former Pakistani nuclear weapons laboratory director Abdul Qadeer Khan provided nuclear technology to other nations without his government’s permission (see GSN, Jan. 4). Questions about government responsibility in the technology transfer to Iran, Libya, and other countries — as well as its commitment to eliminating al-Qaeda terrorists — raise concerns about whether Pakistan can be trusted not to share nuclear weapons technology in the future, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report says. “While Pakistani leaders have proclaimed that their nuclear weapons are secure and that Pakistan has not been involved in selling or transferring nuclear weapons technology, this claim is cast into doubt by the activities of Dr. A.Q. Khan over more than a decade,” the report states. Khan confessed in February 2004 to coordinating nuclear transfers for years to Iran, Libya and North Korea.  Top Pakistani leaders maintain, however, that they were not complicit. The Bush administration appears to have accepted that explanation, at least publicly, portraying Khan as the greedy head of a black-market operation. A senior Bush administration told reporters on Dec. 4 that Khan was “a traitor to Pakistan” and that President George W. Bush had thanked Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then visiting the Oval Office, “for a decisive move he made to work with us to roll up the A.Q. Khan network.” A senior U.S. official last year told reporters that while Khan’s activities probably involved some Pakistani government and military officials, they were not believed to have been approved by top Pakistani leaders (see GSN, March 31, 2004).  Apparently concerned about preserving antiterrorism cooperation, the report says, the Bush administration has not triggered sanctions against Pakistan for the proliferation and U.S. officials’ statements “appear designed to minimize American concern about the light treatment given” Khan by Musharraf. Pakistan also apparently has not given the U.S. government access to Khan. The CRS report quotes a statement by now Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice last year that “national humiliation is justice” for Khan, who received a conditional pardon from Musharraf but remains under house arrest. Full disclosure could give the United States a better understanding of North Korean and other countries’ nuclear weapons capabilities, said one of the authors, CRS nonproliferation expert Sharon Squassoni, in an interview today. “We know so little about the North Korean program. … Without direct access to Khan, it’s very difficult to know the truth [about the] role of the Pakistani government and what he provided to whom,” she said. The report finds, though, that the United States has few good options for compelling greater Pakistani nonproliferation cooperation. ‘Claim is Cast Into Doubt’ The analytic report by the Congressional Research Service, published Tuesday and circulated publicly by Federation of American Scientists analyst Steven Aftergood, argues it was improbable that top Pakistani authorities were unaware of Khan’s activities. Beginning in the 1980s, it says, Khan reportedly provided a range of technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other countries, including blueprints, components, and full centrifuge assemblies, uranium hexafluoride feedstock, and nuclear weapon designs. While Pakistan previously had denied that any proliferation occurred to North Korea, the U.S. position was that it occurred, the report says. The U.S. intelligence community knew of multiple times Khan visited North Korea beginning in the mid-1990s, it says. Khan “could not have functioned without some level of cooperation by Pakistani military personnel, who maintained tight security around the key nuclear facilities, and possibly civilian officials as well,” the report says. Khan’s celebrity status and “the degree to which he enriched himself,” including millions of dollars channeled through foreign banks, have been cited as evidence that his activities were not government policy, the report says. The scientist’s reputation as a national hero, though, “appears to be manufactured” at the expense of other leading scientists who also solved key problems to give the country a nuclear capability, it says. “Whether President Musharraf’s delicate treatment of Khan following his reported confession reflects some level of official culpability is arguable,” the report says, noting reports that Khan was allowed to keep “millions of ill-gotten dollars.” Khan in a televised statement in February 2004 said he took full responsibility for the proliferation activities and said Islamabad “never ever” authorized them. Nevertheless, Musharraf the next day decided that Khan would not be prosecuted for any proliferation-related activities, the report says. The report also cites a February 2004 Washington Post story that Khan told a senior Pakistani investigator that Musharraf and other former army chiefs had known of and approved his work with North Korea. It notes Musharraf in a 2004 statement said he had long been suspicious of Khan’s activities, and asks, “Why Musharraf had not followed up on his own alleged suspicions has not been explained.” Pakistani officials “at a very minimum,” were “incredibly lax in responding to rumors of his activities,” the report says. The report appears to support criticisms raised by U.S. nongovernmental experts regarding the Bush administration’s positions. “We have long held to the belief that Khan was not a rogue operator,” says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “It is inconceivable that Khan conducted his vast, multinational business operations for two decades without the knowledge and support of military and political leaders.  Khan himself says that one of the reasons for his trades was to finance the Pakistani missile program.  He used military planes to ferry cargo from, and presumably to, North Korea.  Khan was not a ‘nonstate actor,’” Cirincione said. “This was — and may still be — a state-sanctioned black market operation run by A.Q. Khan,” he added. Future Proliferation Concerns The report suggests that the Bush administration may be reluctant to confront Pakistan over nuclear proliferation to avoid undermining its support for operations against the al-Qaeda terror network. It says, however, some analysts suspect that Pakistan’s apparent unwillingness to allow U.S. access to Khan may signal a reluctance to restrain nuclear proliferation. Pakistan began to unravel the Khan operation after U.S. officials presented it with intelligence evidence implicating Khan and other scientists in a proliferation ring, the report says. Pakistan’s commitment to eradicating al-Qaeda is also a concern, according to the report. “Although Pakistan has captured or facilitated the capture of hundreds of alleged terrorists, including some very high level al-Qaeda figures, persistent reports question whether Pakistan has given as much assistance as it could, and they suggest ongoing relationships between Pakistan’s military intelligence officers and some key Taliban leaders who are thought to live openly in northern Pakistan,” it says. The report lists several policy options for U.S. future relations with Pakistan, though noting there are “more constraints than options:” — Make support to Musharraf fully conditioned on continued counterterrorism support; — Rather than penalizing Pakistan or demanding a full accounting of Khan’s activities, pursue measures to eliminate global supply networks, which it says the administration appears to be attempting; — Condition high-value assistance such as Pakistani-sought F-16 fighter aircraft on access to Khan, full cooperation on rolling up the network, and a full halt to proliferation and nuclear testing; and — Re-impose nuclear proliferation sanctions. Back to top       United Kingdom to Provide $20 Million to Aid Shutdown of Russian Plutonium-Producing Reactors By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — The United Kingdom agreed this week to provide $20 million to a U.S. effort to shut down three nuclear reactors in Russia that produce weapon-grade plutonium (see GSN, Jan. 26). The British aid would be provided through a memorandum of understanding signed Wednesday in London by representatives from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration and the British Trade and Industry Ministry. The funding would be used in the design and construction of a new fossil-fuel energy plant to replace one of the three Russian reactors, located in the closed city of Zheleznogorsk. “The signing of this MOU is a major step in our collaborative efforts to address our mutual nonproliferation objectives,” NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said in a statement. “When the Zheleznogorsk reactor is finally shut down, there will be one less source of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium in the world.” “I am delighted that the U.K., in collaboration with our U.S. and Russian partners, can contribute to this vital program and play a full part in addressing these crucial issues,” British Trade and Industry Minister Nigel Griffiths said in a separate statement. The Zheleznogorsk reactor and two reactors in the closed city of Seversk have been estimated to produce up to 1.2 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium annually — enough to create as many as 300 nuclear weapons. Russia has agreed to shut down the three reactors once replacement facilities are in place to continue to provide electricity and heat to the 215,000 combined residents of the two cities. Construction of the new fossil-fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk is expected to be completed by the end of 2011. Late last month, the Nuclear Security Administration awarded a $285 million contract to the U.S. firm Washington Group International to refurbish an existing coal-fired electric plant at Seversk to replace the two reactors there. That project is expected to be completed by 2009, though early progress could result in one of the two reactors being shut down in 2007, according to the U.S. Energy Department. The cost to shut down all three reactors has been previously estimated at more than $460 million. The British aid to the reactor shutdown project is being provided as part of the United Kingdom’s contribution to the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The world’s top eight economic powers — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — launched the effort in 2002 to provide $20 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation projects, primarily in Russia. Since the effort began, 13 additional countries have joined as donor nations. In addition, Ukraine has been selected as the next formal recipient country. Back to top       U.S. Favors Diplomacy With Iran, Rice Says U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said yesterday that the United States continues to back diplomacy as the means to ending the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, Reuters reported (see GSN, Jan. 27). Rice was later sworn into office this morning. “I think this is something we can solve through diplomacy,” Rice told France’s Le Figaro magazine in an interview due to be published tomorrow. “But the most important thing, whatever the agreements reached, is that we have the means to check what the Iranians are doing and that they can’t get away with it by lying.” She added that Iran could still be reported to the U.N. Security Council for possible economic sanctions if it does not cease nuclear weapons activity (Reuters, Jan. 27). International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said today he hoped Washington would work with the European powers in talks with Iran. “I would hope that the U.S. eventually would be actively engaged with the Europeans in the dialogue with Iran,” ElBaradei told Reuters. ElBaradei said Iran has been cooperating with inspectors, though the agency’s investigation continues. “So far, we are getting good cooperation and I think we still have work to do. But I’m optimistic that we’re getting good positive cooperation,” he said on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “There is still a lot of concern about the Iranian program,” he added. “The more Iran cooperates the better for them and for the international community” (Knut Engelmann, Reuters, Jan. 28). Former U.S. President Bill Clinton also urged the Bush administration yesterday to increase diplomatic efforts toward Iran, AFP reported. “I personally believe we ought to give some final vigorous push to diplomacy to try to deal with this,” said Clinton, who was also attending the World Economic Forum. “I’m not entirely convinced that what our British and German and French and other friends are trying to do won’t work.” Clinton said that while he did not think Iran would use a nuclear weapon should it develop one, weapons-related fissile material could fall into the hands of terrorists. “If Iran had a nuclear weapon, the main thing it would do would be to cast a pall over the Middle East, but it would take a long time before they used it because they’d be toast if they used it,” he said. “The reason you don’t want Iran to have an active nuclear program is that given the present state of play you will never know if the materials are secure or being transported to terrorist networks” (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Jan. 27). Meanwhile, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder today urged Iran to renounce all weapons-related nuclear work, Agence France-Presse reported. “We are most decisively in favor of the fact that Iran completely gives up military use of nuclear power, forever if at all possible,” Schroeder said in Davos. “But we are just as convinced that has to be achieved through diplomatic and political means,” he added (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Jan. 28). Back to top       U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts Expected to Meet With International Criticism International opposition to several U.S. nuclear nonproliferation initiatives is expected to continue and could become heated at a conference this May in New York to examine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 26). U.S. demands for treaty reform are expected to be met with criticism due to Washington’s continued nuclear arms research and its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, according to the Journal. The Bush administration’s most controversial proposal is likely to be a plan to ban sales of nuclear-fuel manufacturing technology to nations that do not already such facilities. France and the United Kingdom have proposed that other countries still be allowed to enter the market if they can prove they have no nuclear arms ambitions, while the United States has argued that proliferators could outmaneuver any such standards. Washington has seen some nonproliferation policy successes, notably its Proliferation Security Initiative, under which roughly 60 countries have agreed to cooperate in intercepting WMD shipments on the high seas. Even Russia, which joined the effort last year but has a long history of weapons sales, in recent months attempted to block alleged shipments passing through its borders of missile components from North Korea to Iran, according to a U.S. official. Other U.S. initiatives have been a tougher sale, including attempting to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group to restrict enrichment or reprocessing technology sales to states that are not capable of processing their own fuel, the Journal reported. However, the Group of Eight economic powers last year did agree to a one-year halt on fuel-technology sales to new buyers. While Washington’s widely reported efforts to oust IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei have met resistance (see GSN, Jan. 24), U.S. officials have continued to insist that support for ElBaradei is weak. Washington plans to continue lobbying members of the agency’s Board of Governors in time for an expected vote in June, officials added. Administration officials also expect to press for creation of a special committee within the IAEA Board of Governors, but a U.S. official was purposely vague on the extent of its authority, the Journal reported (Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27). Back to top       Egyptian Prime Minister Says IAEA Was Not Informed About Nuclear Experiments Due to Poor Record-Keeping Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Mahmoud Nazief yesterday blamed Egypt’s failure to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency about past nuclear experiments on poor record-keeping (see GSN, Jan. 26). While diplomats said the experiments appeared to have occurred in the 1980s or 1990s, Nazief said they happened even earlier. “It was a case of lack of reporting,” Nazief told the Associated Press. “There was a program that was about 30 years old that had been abandoned but there were some remaining items from that program that were under lock and key but were not accounted for.” Egyptian Finance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali said his country had not violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but acknowledged “clerical irregularities — somebody not writing the proper form at the proper time” (George Jahn, Associated Press, Jan. 27). Back to top       China Wants Working-Group Talks on North Korea China is seeking to jump-start negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program with a round of working-level talks, diplomatic sources said today (see GSN, Jan. 27). “China proposed that we hold working-level talks to prepare for a fourth round of six-party talks in the near future,” a diplomatic source in Tokyo told Reuters. The proposal came earlier this month during a tsunami aid summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Reuters reported. It remains unclear whether North Korea could be persuaded to join, according to another source. “We have to confirm whether North Korea will actually take part in the talks,” he said. China would be unlikely to make such a proposal if North Korea had not already expressed interest in the talks, the source added. “Even if working-level talks were to be held, that would not necessarily mean full-scale six-party talks would resume anytime soon,” he said. “North Korea may want to use the working-level talks to check U.S. policy on North Korea’s nuclear development,” he added. Pyongyang has not yet been persuaded to resume negotiations, a South Korean official said. “It’ll be all set if China persuades North Korea. ... China will probably start moving after President [George W.] Bush’s State of the Union address,” he said (Teruaki Ueno, Reuters, Jan. 28). Back to top       1991 Gulf War Prevented Iraq From Acquiring Nuclear Weapons, Former Program Scientist Says Iraq would have been able to develop nuclear weapons had former President Saddam Hussein decided not to invade Kuwait in the early 1990s, the former scientific head of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 12, 2004). “By the end of 1990, about 8,000 people were involved directly or indirectly in the nuclear program,” Jafar Dhia Jafar said yesterday in Oslo, presenting his new Norwegian-language book, Oppdraget, which means The Assignment, describing the program. “We were three years away, give or take a year,” he said. Jafar said the nuclear weapons program began in earnest after Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. The effort went underground in 1986 when it moved beyond the restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, he said (Doug Mellgren, Associated Press/New Orleans Times-Picayune, Jan. 28). Back to top

U.S. Senate Majority Leader Calls for Massive Research Project to Counter Biological Terrorism The United States needs to engage in a research project to counter the threat of biological terrorism greater than the effort that led to the development of nuclear weapons, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 14). “I think we need to do something that even dwarfs the Manhattan Project to stay ahead, to be prepared, in a flexible way, to (respond to) agents that can be altered, that can be changed,” Frist said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. He said an attack would occur within the next decade. Frist, along with former CIA Director John Deutch, warned that terrorists could obtain smallpox with which to conduct an attack. One possible source, according to Frist, is the former Soviet Union, which produced as much as three tons of smallpox annually during the Cold War. “Do we know where all that is? No, nobody can know for sure,” he said. Another possible source for traces of smallpox is “old graves, dumps of one kind or another” in “less hygienic parts of the world,” Deutch said. He called for mass smallpox and anthrax vaccinations. Frist also warned that the threat of bioterrorism is “not just one country’s problem.” “It’s a global threat,” he said (Agence France-Presse/TurkishPress.com, Jan. 27). Back to top

More State and Federal Officials Express Opposition to Pentagon Study of Moving Chemical Weapons Utah’s governor and state lawmakers pledged yesterday to block any effort to ship chemical weapons from U.S. depots with no disposal facilities to operating incinerators such as the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in their state, the Salt Lake Tribune reported (see GSN, Jan. 27). “There is no way this governor will ever support transporting such toxic chemical weapons into Utah,” Governor Jon Huntsman Jr. said in a statement. “We will utilize all means to prevent any quantity of mustard gas [from the Pueblo, Colo., stockpile] from moving into the state of Utah.” Members of Utah’s congressional delegation and other lawmakers yesterday also objected to potential chemical weapons relocation. U.S. Senator Bob Bennett (R) yesterday agreed to co-sponsor legislation introduced Wednesday by Senator Wayne Allard (R-Colo.) that would prohibit the U.S. Defense Department from even studying moving the weapons. Representative Jim Matheson (D) sent a letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld yesterday opposing any relocation effort. “This will not happen so long as I am a U.S. senator,” said Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), one of five senators who have already signed on to co-sponsor Allard’s bill. “Moving 60-year-old stockpiles of leaking mustard agent is not a solution to a budget problem, it is a recipe for disaster” (Robert Gehrke, Salt Lake Tribune, Jan. 28). The Army Chemical Materials Agency announced today that it has formed its evaluation team to consider munitions relocation and other alternatives aimed at ensuring the United States meets the 2012 deadline to destroy all chemical weapons. The team would be led by Kevin Duvall, acting director of the CMA Cooperative Threat Reduction Support Directorate, and would include representatives from various CMA, Army and Defense Department offices. “The technical assessment is in an early stage. It is too early to speculate what will be included in the assessment,” CMA Director Michael Parker said in a press release. “We will meet the directive given us. … Our mission at CMA is to safely store and dispose of these obsolete weapons while fulfilling the imperative of national defense. Safety of our workers, our communities and our environment will not be compromised” (U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency release, Jan. 2). Back to top       Dutch Court Releases Businessman Suspected of Aiding Iraq’s Past Chemical Weapons Efforts A Dutch court yesterday ordered the release from custody of businessman Fran van Anraat, who has been accused of providing chemical weapons precursors to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Dec. 7, 2004). The release might indicate that Dutch prosecutors do not have enough evidence to convict Van Anraat on suspicion of aiding genocide by supplying materials that Hussein used in the 1988 chemical attack on Halabja that killed more than 5,000 people, AP reported. A court spokesman declined to comment. Van Anraat’s first public court hearing is set for March (Associated Press, Jan. 27). Back to top

Al-Qaeda Operatives in Germany Discussed Acquiring Uranium for “Dirty Bomb,” Official Says German intelligence agents conducting surveillance on two terrorism suspects for more than two years overheard the men discuss obtaining uranium for a “dirty bomb” that they hoped to use against Americans, the Christian Science Monitor reported today (see GSN, Jan. 24). The two men were arrested Sunday when it appeared they meant to move from Germany to the Netherlands, where German authorities feared they might escape surveillance, according to a European official. The suspects have been identified only as Ibrahim Mohamed K., an Iraqi national, and Yasser Abu S., a Palestinian, the Monitor reported. Wiretaps allowed German operatives to hear the men discussing where they might obtain uranium. Agents found no evidence, however, that the suspects had managed to make a purchase, according to the European official. “They are extremists for sure who hate the U.S.,” said the official (Faye Bowers, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 28).   Back to top

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