By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — While members of the U.S. Congress so far have said little regarding a White House deal that would allow U.S. nuclear energy technology exports to India, a recent report by the body’s research arm offers a sharp critique of the plan (see GSN, Aug. 2). It questions the supposed nonproliferation benefits the United States would gain in the deal, says it would treat India as a legitimate nuclear weapons state and could encourage proliferation by other countries. “Although some states may agree that it is necessary to create a new paradigm for India, others may believe that this agreement undercuts the basic bargain of the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] — peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for forswearing nuclear weapons,” according to a July 29 report published by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service. “Observers note that U.S.-India cooperation could have wide ranging implications for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify their supplying other non-nuclear weapon states, like Pakistan,” it says. Weapons Capability UntouchedThe deal announced July 18 by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is intended to create “full civil nuclear energy cooperation” between the United States and India, which has been subject to U.S. and international nuclear technology transfer restrictions since conducting a live nuclear test in 1974. In exchange for potential U.S. nuclear technology trade, India has agreed to: separate civilian and military nuclear facilities, voluntarily place civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, sign the Additional Protocol allowing for more intrusive IAEA inspections of civilian facilities, and subject Indian nuclear technology to export controls. The report says that while such steps are “positive” and “welcome,” they do not work to reverse India’s nuclear weapons capability. Rather, they would effectively treat India as a legitimate nuclear weapons power. They agreement puts “India squarely in the company of nuclear weapon states. There are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India’s nuclear weapons program,” the Research Service said. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty designates China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States as nuclear weapons states. India, which has conducted six nuclear tests, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea are known or suspected nuclear powers that are not treaty members. Benefits QuestionedSome of the listed nonproliferation benefits of the deal already essentially exist, according to the report. It notes India has maintained a voluntary nuclear test moratorium since it conducted five live nuclear explosions in May 1998. There also has been little concern historically about Indian nuclear technology proliferation to other countries, according to the report. “India’s promise to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, as well as its promise to adhere to [Nuclear Suppliers Group] guidelines, may be formalities,” it says. India already is obliged under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 to strengthen its export control laws, the report states. The report also questions the value of India’s pledge to help the United States negotiate a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. “It continues to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapons program, despite support for FMCT negotiations,” the report says, adding, “Few observers are sanguine that FMCT negotiations can proceed quickly in the Conference on Disarmament.” The report applies the Bush administration’s own arguments against fissile material production verification to raise doubts about administration assurances U.S. nuclear technology would not aid India’s unsafeguarded nuclear weapons program. “The administration’s position [in international negotiations] that a fissile material production cutoff is inherently unverifiable because of the existence of unsafeguarded facilities and materials may be at odds with Undersecretary of State [for Political Affairs] Nick Burns’ statement to reporters on July 19, 2005 that `this agreement can be verified and will be verified,’” it says. Burns at that briefing cited “trust,” based on India’s nonproliferation record, as a reason the administration believes nuclear materials would not be diverted. “If you look at what India has done as it’s developed its civil nuclear power sector, its economy and how it’s treated fissile material, other sensitive materials and nuclear technologies, India has not been a proliferator. India has not sold or transferred those materials and equipment to third parties that do not have them. India has been responsible,” he said. The report notes, though, that India secretly developed its nuclear weapons capability through diversions of U.S.-supplied material for nuclear energy. “As a result, the United States has refused nuclear cooperation with India for twenty-five years and has tried to convince others to do the same,” it says. The report notes that Article 1 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty forbids that states “in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture nuclear weapons.” “A significant question,” it says, “is how India, in the absence of full-scope safeguards, can provide adequate confidence that U.S. peaceful nuclear technology will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes.” Loosening of Export Controls RequiredThe Bush-Singh announcement says Bush would “seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies.” The report lists several actions potentially required by Congress to put the deal in effect. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 — prompted by India’s first nuclear test — for instance requires “full-scope safeguards for non-nuclear weapons states, and a guarantee that no transferred items or special nuclear material produced by them is used for a weapon, prior to significant nuclear energy cooperation agreement. Congress could change that. Alternatively, the president could waive the requirements, but that would require approval by both houses of Congress. Full-scope safeguards are IAEA accounting of and controls on nuclear materials at all member facilities to detect diversion for weapons purposes. U.S. export licensing requirements on significant nuclear technology also could require changes, according to the report. Section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires that a non-nuclear weapons state have full-scope safeguards. The president can waive that restriction, if not blocked by Congress, if he determines it would be “prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” Section 129 requires ending nuclear exports to any non-nuclear weapons state that conducted a nuclear test or took steps with direct significance toward a nuclear weapons capability after March 10, 1978. That requirement can also be waived with congressional approval. Treaty ImplicationsThe report says the deal could have a negative impact on the international nonproliferation regime and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in particular. “At a time when the United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and implementation and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating an exception to the [international Nuclear Suppliers Group] full-scope safeguards requirements,” it says. The deal could require an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 44 countries that seek to voluntarily restrict nuclear technology exports. Bush administration efforts to press for exemption for India there “could be counterproductive” to other U.S. objectives, such as “restricting the fuel cycle, disarming North Korea, and restraining Iran,” the report says. The Bush administration has argued that India is a special case, and should be allowed special exceptions to international nonproliferation restrictions. “In light of this closer relationship [U.S.-India], and the recognition of India’s growing role in enhancing regional and global security, the prime minister and the president agree that international institutions must fully reflect changes in the global scenario that have taken place since 1945. The president reiterated his view that international institutions are going to have to adapt to reflect India’s central and growing role,” according to the joint statement issued by the two leaders. The joint statement said the deal would further nuclear nonproliferation by more tightly securing India’s nuclear fuel production and by strengthening India’s commitment to nonproliferation. The two leaders “reiterated their commitment that their countries would play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons,” it said. Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, argued in a Washington Post opinion piece Monday that the deal would improve nonproliferation security because strengthened controls are needed over growing Indian stores of fissile material. “The administration has wisely recognized that it is imperative for the United States to bind India tightly to the global nonproliferation regime in order to make sure that this fissile material is not transferred to others,” he wrote. He said it is necessary even though India has not been considered a risk for spreading nuclear material. “Even though it is not an NPT signatory, India has in practice observed Article One of the treaty, which bars such transfers [of fissile material for weapons], and the Indo-U.S. agreement concluded on July 18 formalizes and reinforces the Indian commitment to abide by nonproliferation norms,” he wrote. “We think we’re far better off having secured these commitments than having not secured them in terms of nuclear safety in the world, nuclear power safety,” Burns said at the July briefing.
The new head of Iranian nuclear policy indicated that Tehran stands by its decision last week to resume uranium conversion, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, Aug. 12). “Iran does not accept the [International Atomic Energy Agency] resolution” adopted last week urging it to maintain its nuclear freeze, Supreme National Security Council chief Ali Larijani told the Shargh newspaper following his appointment yesterday. “We insist on Natanz,” Iran’s uranium enrichment plant, “but this must go through the channel of negotiations,” he said, referring to nuclear talks with France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Aug. 16). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, has not yet announced whether Larijani would handle the negotiations, the Associated Press reported (Nasser Karimi, Associated Press I/San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 15). Meanwhile, two IAEA inspectors were expected to arrive in Tehran today en route to the Isfahan uranium conversion facility, where they are scheduled to monitor activities for 10 days, the Mehr news agency reported. Four agency experts arrived Friday in Tehran for talks with Iran’s nuclear officials, according to Mehr. The U.N. agency plans to keep a two-person team in Iran, a source said (Mehr/BBC Monitoring, Aug. 15). Elsewhere, Washington said yesterday it would seek economic and political sanctions against Iran through the U.N. Security Council if Tehran abandoned its nuclear freeze commitment or failed to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, AP reported. President George W. Bush’s statement Friday that “all options are on the table,” presumably including military force, is something “any president would say,” said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack. McCormack said the United States continues to support the EU diplomatic effort. “We are working well on this diplomatic approach,” he said (Barry Schweid, Associated Press II/Yahoo!News, Aug. 15).
Russian Strategic Missile Commander Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov said yesterday that the service’s rail-based missile launchers have all been permanently removed from operation (see GSN, Aug. 4). The last launcher was removed from service Aug. 12. The missiles mounted on the launchers are being destroyed at a storage base in the Perm region, while the launchers are being taken apart at a repair facility in Bryansk. “It is impossible to extend the service life of any type of weapon eternally. That is why, no matter how sorry we are, we have to say goodbye to the rail-based missile launchers,” Solovtsov told Russia’s Interfax-Military News Agency. “It is unacceptable to keep missile systems that have outlived their usefulness in the inventory,” he said. “One must never fool around with nuclear weapons, otherwise there will be a lot of trouble.” “Another reason is the rail-based missile systems were designed and mass-produced in Ukraine. The enterprises that were involved in their development and production now no longer exist,” Solovtsov added. The missile launchers will be replaced through “the commissioning of the new Topol M missile systems, both mobile and silo-based ones,” according to Solovtsov (BBC Monitoring/Interfax Military News Agency, Aug. 15).
The Bush administration’s second term has been characterized by a greater emphasis on multilateralism and diplomacy in addressing the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, analysts told Agence France-Presse (see GSN, June 1). “It is a real change in the sense that after all, their capacity to act unilaterally themselves has been greatly reduced by the war in Iraq," said Anatol Lieven, a senior research fellow at the New American Foundation. For the policy to produce results, Lieven said, the United States would have to make substantial concessions. “It is pretty clear that in the case of Iran, the Europeans on their own simply cannot offer enough,” he said. The United States must offer economic concessions and diplomatic recognition for Iran to give up its nuclear program, Lieven said. “If [the] Americans will not offer that, then ultimately, the British, the French and the Germans are not going to succeed,” he added. North Korea, meanwhile, seems intent on gaining diplomatic recognition from Washington, Lieven said. “Of course, it does raise enormous questions whether you could trust the North Koreans about that,” he said. “But nonetheless, if the Americans do not even consider offering [recognition] as a bargaining trick, then it is also highly unlikely that the Chinese again will be able to achieve anything,” he said (Agence France-Presse I/SpaceWar.com, Aug. 15). There is no “substitute for diplomacy” for halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph said yesterday. “I think diplomacy is always going to be important whether it’s in the context of North Korea or Iran,” he said (Agence France-Presse II/Yahoo!News, Aug. 15).
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon is expected to meet with U.S. officials in Washington this week to discuss the North Korean nuclear disarmament talks, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, Aug. 12). Ban is due to meet with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and lead U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill around Saturday, according to the South Korean Foreign Ministry (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Aug. 16).
Malaysia is expected this month to join the Megaports Initiative, under which the United States would provide equipment and training to screen cargo for nuclear or radioactive materials, Asia Africa Intelligence Wire reported today (see GSN, May 4). “In principle, we have agreed and are in the final stages of preparing the documents to sign the agreement with the United States,” said Malaysian Customs Director General Abdul Halil Abdul Mutalib. Malaysia signed on to the U.S. Container Security Initiative in 2004 (see GSN, March 9, 2004; Asia Africa Intelligence Wire/BBC Monitoring, Aug. 16).
Former Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov said yesterday that U.S. charges against him were motivated by politics, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, July 19). Adamov said the United States, through allegations that he stole more than $9 million meant to improve Russian nuclear security, is sending the message, “You guys … don’t forget who’s the boss in the world,” according to a letter published in Russia’s Izvestia newspaper. The former Russian minister said the United States fabricated the allegations because of visits he paid to Iran, India and China in 1998 to speed the construction of Russian nuclear facilities in the countries, according to AP. Adamov, who is in Swiss custody, also said that a Russian investigation into financial abuses at the nuclear ministry was pushed by the United States, AP reported (Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press/USA Today, Aug. 15).
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