U.S. Response:  NRC Orders Nuclear Plants to Increase Security

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission yesterday ordered all 103 U.S. nuclear power plants to tighten and improve security to better protect against a terrorist attack (see GSN, Feb. 13).

Under the new security measures, cars and trucks arriving at nuclear power plants will be stopped at a farther distance from the plant’s gates, the NRC said.  Plant employees also will be more restricted inside plants and there will be increased screening and identification checks of contractors and plant visitors.

The new security measures are an enhancement to those already in place at nuclear plants, said the Nuclear Energy Institute, the main lobbying group for the U.S. nuclear industry.

“We’re talking about refinements on the margin, given that there are already well-trained and well-armed security forces in place,” said NEI spokesman Steve Kerekes.

Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.), however, criticized the new NRC security upgrades.

The new measures are “too little, too late and too temporary,” Markey said (Julie Vorman, Reuters/Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 15).

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Iraq:  Baghdad to Allow Inspectors, With One Condition

Iraq might accept “some form of inspection” to monitor its weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz told the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine in an interview published yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 13).

Iraq would only allow weapons inspectors to return to Iraq if other countries in the Middle East also submit to inspections, Aziz said (David Sands, Washington Times, Feb. 15).  Inspections should ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not exist anywhere in the region, he said, in what the Deutsche Presse-Agentur said was a clear reference to Israel.

Any negotiations with the United Nations would have to address unkept U.N. commitments to Iraq — not only Iraq’s refusal to accept inspectors, Aziz said (see GSN, Feb. 6). 

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were destroyed during the 1991 Gulf War, and Iraq has built no more, Aziz said, adding that Iraq is also not involved in supporting terrorism (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Feb. 14).

Aziz’s statements followed recent U.S. statements increasing pressure on Iraq to allow inspectors to return (see GSN, Feb. 14).  Iraq has refused to accept inspectors since 1998 (Sands, Washington Times, Feb. 15).

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United States:  Democrats Attack Bush Nuclear Posture Review

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Senate Democrats at a hearing yesterday criticized the Bush administration’s new nuclear weapon policies for making no new cuts to U.S. delivery vehicles, for planning to keep thousands of nuclear warheads in storage, and for retaining a nuclear triad of aircraft, submarines and missiles to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons.

A danger with the plan, they said, is that Russia would similarly opt against destroying warheads in favor of storing them, making them potentially available to terrorists by theft by or sale.

“By failing to destroy nuclear warheads, the Nuclear Posture Review would increase the threat of proliferation at the very time the al-Qaeda terrorist network is known to be pursuing nuclear weapons,” Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.), whose panel held the hearing, said.

Defending the plan, Defense Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith said it increases U.S. security because it shifts the focus of U.S. nuclear doctrine.  The United States no longer considers Russia to be threat warranting a strategy of mutual assured destruction, Feith said, adding that the new U.S. doctrine was based on maintaining flexibility to deal with new unforeseen threats.

“Now we are not focused on a balance of terror with Russia,” he said.

In questioning, however, he acknowledged that Russia has indicated in negotiations it is not satisfied with the plan to keep warheads in reserve, saying, “I don’t know where we’re going to end up on that issue.”

Republican committee members praised the plan.

“I think this document, the Nuclear Posture Review, is an excellent one by the way.  A very creative approach,” Senator John Warner (R-Va.) said.

No Decision So Far on Cuts

The session was Congress’ first opportunity to query administration officials about the plan, disclosed by the Pentagon last month in a public setting, and it resulted in some intense exchanges.

The Nuclear Posture Review was heralded by the administration as groundbreaking because it would significantly reduce the number of “operationally deployed” U.S. nuclear warheads (see GSN, Jan. 9).  The plan would keep only 1,700-2,200, of the estimated 8,000 warheads in the stockpile, deployed on delivery vehicles.  An unspecified number of the nondeployed warheads would be kept in storage for possible reinsertion into the force later.

Feith said the Pentagon also intends to destroy some of the nondeployed warheads, but Levin said the committee was not briefed that any warheads would be destroyed.

Senator Jack Reed (D-R.I.), asked Feith how the policy of mutual assured destruction between the United States and Russia could be considered dead in light of the plan to keep as many nuclear delivery vehicles as planned by the Clinton administration and to retain a triad of strategic weapons — bombers, land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles.

“You claim we’ve had a revolutionary change in thinking, but still we have roughly same total number of warheads, and the same basic platforms,” he said.  It seems that it might be dead, but MAD is still ruling us from the grave.”

What is Significant?

Levin criticized the plan for not specifying the destruction of any nuclear warheads or delivery systems beyond the goals in the 1994 posture review, and current warhead levels set by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991.

“It comes up with the same structure, the same number of planes, the same number of ships, the same number of missiles, and the 8,000 [warheads] is the same,” Levin said.

“How is this dramatically different?” Levin asked. “It looks to me to be exactly the same, except you move some thousands of warheads off the delivery systems into a warehouse where they are available for reinsertion into the delivery system should you need them.”

Feith acknowledged no additional cuts to delivery systems were proposed by the review, but he emphasized as significant that nearly two-thirds of the warheads would be taken off active duty.

“The idea that one renders weapons available for immediate use not available for immediate use, that idea, I think, is highly significant and it does constitute a reduction,” he said.

Asked how quickly the stored warheads could be reinserted into the force, Feith said they would not be available in the “near term” and “in some cases it could be years before they are available for use.”  Asked for more detail, Feith said, “it varies from system to system.”

Levin also said the administration’s rejection of the START II agreement, abandons a provision that would have eliminated Russia’s land-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

“Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that this approach ‘increases our security.’  I fear the opposite is true: over time, America would be less secure,” he said.

Questions Over Destruction Plans

Feith said the military was planning to destroy some of the downloaded warheads, but said he did not know how many.

“Mr. Chairman, I can’t tell you that now.  The decision has not yet been made.”

Levin said his committee staff was not briefed that any warhead dismantlement would occur and that they could not find any notice of that in materials they were provided in the classified Nuclear Posture Review.

“That’s very different from the briefing we got from the Pentagon, which says that the downloaded warheads will be preserved for the responsive force,” he said.

Feith responded: “My understanding is that we are going to reserving some of the warheads, but that they will not be available for near-term use, but some of the warheads that will be reduced from the arsenal will be destroyed.”

Proliferation Concerns

Levin expressed concern Russia would likewise decide against destroying all of its downloaded warheads, perhaps making them more susceptible to acquisition by terrorists.

“If we store our nuclear weapons, Russia is likely to follow suit.  And if there are more warheads retained by Russia, the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons will increase,” he said.

President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a summit in November jointly announced planned warhead reductions (see GSN, Nov. 16, 2001).  An unclassified U.S. intelligence report released in January said “unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015 — with or without arms control” (see GSN, Jan. 10).

Feith said the U.S. warheads that would be held in reserve would not be intended for Russia and that he believes there are some officials in Russia “very open to the idea of a completely new concept of strategic stability and a completely new relationship between the United States and Russia.

Levin questioned whether the administration was “making assumptions” as to how the Russians would respond.

What Are The Threats?

Senate Democrats questioned whether any threats are foreseen that justified the force numbers set out in the Nuclear Posture Review, in light of the new relationship with Russia.

Feith said the Pentagon had moved away from basing nuclear planning on “threats-based” analysis toward what it calls “capabilities-based analysis,” saying:

“We are focused on the capabilities that we might need to deal with the kinds of threats that can emerge in the future,” he said.

Asked to specify the threats, Feith said, “for many years, we focused on specific threats, based on the reasonable assumption that we had an idea what the threats were and what the threats were going to be going into the future.”

For the Nuclear Posture Review, he said, “when we looked at what we need to maintain as a nuclear force, on the offensive side and the defensive side, we listed the kinds of missions that we need to accomplish, we looked at the kinds of capabilities we may face, the kinds of capabilities we would need to counter the threats.”

“This seems to be a very sort of ambiguous, imprecise and notional view of strategy,” said Reid.

“You seem to have this big disconnect between specific threats to the United States, and there are and there are many of them, and the specific threats that you are proposing.  You’re prepared for any capability … at some point you have to narrow the issues down to credible, believable threats.  That’s not coming out of your discussion.”

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U.S. Testing I:  No Live Testing Needed For Now, U.S. Official Testifies

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A senior Bush administration official yesterday reiterated the Energy Department’s conclusion that there is no need for explosive nuclear weapons testing for safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile in the near future.

Energy Undersecretary for Nuclear Security John Gordon told the Senate Armed Services Committee he sees “no near-term need for nuclear testing.”  Gordon heads the National Nuclear Security Administration, responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile.

“Today, our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure and reliable,” he said.

Gordon said the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which maintains the weapons, has been addressing problems related to the aging of the weapons, but he said, “they do not affect the safety of the systems.”

He also said, however, he would like to see the Energy Department increase its readiness for resuming testing in the event it is needed (see GSN, Jan. 8).

The United States has had a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing, as have most other nuclear states, since the early 1990s.  Gordon said in prepared testimony that President George W. Bush “supports a continued moratorium on underground nuclear testing.”

Possible Scenario

A 1993 presidential directive requires Gordon’s agency to be able to conduct an underground nuclear test within 24 to 36 months of a presidential decision to do so.

“My judgment is that our current posture is a bit too relaxed,” he said.

That view was reflected in information released by the Defense Department describing the results of its new nuclear weapons plans, though officials have not said how much they want to crop the readiness time.

Gordon, in prepared testimony, gave a scenario in which nuclear testing might be desired, and quickly:

“If we believed that a defect uncovered in the stockpile surveillance program, or through new insight gained in [research and development] efforts, had degraded our confidence in the safety and/or reliability of the W-76 warhead  — the warhead deployed on Trident submarines and comprising the most substantial part of our strategic deterrent — the ability to conduct a test more quickly might be critically important.”

The Bush administration’s fiscal 2003 budget requests $15 million to increase testing readiness.

Maybe in a Decade

Asked by Senator John Warner (R-Va.) at what point the U.S. stockpile maintenance program might develop the technological capabilities to provide a sufficient substitute for actual testing, Gordon said it would take about a decade.

The United States is on “seven- to 10-year cycle,” he said, referring to computing, simulation and other testing replacement technologies now under development.

Gordon said, however, he could not express with absolute certainty that testing would never be necessary again, “I cannot tell you for certain whether or not we will need to test, I can’t do that for certain.”

Warner said that at previous hearings national nuclear laboratory directors testified that the United States is not moving as quickly as it should to develop a substitute system for replacing actual nuclear weapons testing.

Time-frame projections varied from several years to a decade or more, he said.

“They showed the world how our inventory was aging and the scientists determined at what point they may be perceived as not maintaining credible weapons.  We’re going to cross that point,” Warner said.

Gordon expressed confidence in the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

“I want to report that I am fundamentally satisfied with the progress we are making with Stockpile Stewardship, improved surveillance, tools, finding problems, knowing how to fix them,” he said.

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U.S. Testing II:  U.S. and U.K. Conduct Joint Subcritical Nuclear Test

U.S. and British government scientists yesterday conducted a successful subcritical nuclear test yesterday at the U.S. Nevada Test Site.  It was the first time the countries have worked together to conduct such a test, said La Tomya Glass, spokeswoman for the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration.

The test was designed to check the safety and reliability of the two countries’ nuclear arsenals without conducting full nuclear explosions (see related GSN story, today).

Unlike critical nuclear tests, which lead to a nuclear chain reaction, subcritical tests are allowed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Channel NewsAsia, Feb. 15).  Both the United States and the United Kingdom have signed the CTBT, but the United Kingdom has ratified it and the United States has not (CTBT Organization, Feb. 15).

Yesterday’s test, named Vito, was the 16^th U.S. subcritical nuclear test since 1997, when the program began (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2001).  The last subcritical test, Oboe 7, was conducted Dec. 13, 2001 (Las Vegas Review-Journal, Feb. 15).

Criticism

Although the test did not violate the CTBT, some analysts and officials expressed concern about the U.S. subcritical test program.  Critics said the United States could use the data from the tests not only to test the safety of its nuclear weapons but also to develop new nuclear warhead designs (see GSN, Feb. 11).

The United Kingdom is trying to choose a replacement for its Trident system by the end of the decade and may also be interested in new warhead designs, according to the British American Security Information Council.

“Britain now appears to be increasing its involvement in Washington’s controversial subcritical nuclear testing program while turning a blind eye to ... the Bush administration’s efforts to destroy the CTBT,” said BASIC Director Ian Davis.  “While the safety and reliability of the U.K. nuclear arsenal is of paramount importance, this should not conflict with Britain’s disarmament commitments, nor block the government from raising objections to U.S. policy” (BASIC release, Feb. 14).

Japan is tolerating the test, said Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, adding he is concerned that U.S. testing could encourage other states with nuclear arsenals to conduct their own tests, the Jiji news agency reported, according to Channel NewsAsia (Channel NewsAsia, Feb. 15).

ExperiencedTechnicians Waning

Meanwhile, the aging of employees at the Nevada Test Site and national laboratories presents an obstacle to the Bush administration’s plan to decrease the time needed to conduct nuclear tests, said John Gordon, administrator for the National Nuclear Security Agency, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 10).

The average age of employees with essential skills for the U.S. nuclear weapons program is 48 — much older than for the general high-tech industry, he said.  Only 400 of 1,407 employees at the Nevada Test Site have underground nuclear testing experience, said test site spokesman Darwin Morgan.

The last underground nuclear explosion at the site was on Sept. 23, 1992.

“We are always concerned, as years go by and people retire, about maintaining the knowledge base that we have and how we can pass that on to young people,” Morgan said, adding that the test site has videos of interviews with scientists who were involved with former nuclear tests.

Much of the aging of the employees is due to low hiring rates in the early and mid-1990s due to budget decreases, Gordon said.  “Recruiting rates have gone up modestly but are still much lower than required to support planned programs.”

Scientists would need 30 to 36 months to prepare for another nuclear test, Gordon said (Tony Batt, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Feb. 15).

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India:  We Will Not Test Nuclear Weapons, Official Assures EU

Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh told several European Union officials that India will adhere to its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, despite Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s suggestion Tuesday that India might have conducted a nuclear test or might be planning to do so (see GSN, Feb. 13).

During a meeting in Madrid this week, Singh told EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique and others that India will not test nuclear weapons (see GSN, Feb. 11).

“I think this canard about India undertaking another nuclear test is really simply that, a canard,” Singh said (see GSN, Feb. 13).  “We have publicly stated … that there is a voluntary moratorium that is in force.  It shall remain in force, and it is not time bound.”

India still hopes to hold talks with Pakistan, but India’s belief that Pakistan continues to support terrorism is a serious obstacle, Singh said (Channel NewsAsia, Feb. 15).

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Russia I:  Military Builds Four Ballistic Missile Silos

Russia has constructed four silos for Topol-M ballistic missiles at an army base in the southern Saratov region, a Russian military official said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 30).

Along with the four silos already constructed, two more “are in order” at the Tatishchevo army base, said Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Kosovan.  He added that if Russia purchases six Topol-M missiles, a total of eight silos would be constructed.

“We will reach the objective — fully and ahead of schedule — to put on combat duty the manufactured missiles,” Kosovan said (Xinhuanet.com, Feb. 15).

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Russia II:  Moscow Will Recover Fuel From Russian-Built Reactors

Russia will reclaim spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants it constructs in Iran, China and India, said Russian officials yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 13).

The plants will use Russian nuclear fuel, which Russia is obligated to reclaim under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, said Valeriy Lebedev, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy.

Russia is expected to complete construction of a nuclear plant in Iran by early 2005, Lebedev said (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001).  He added that nuclear fuel assemblies are to be shipped to the Iranian nuclear plant upon its completion (ITAR-Tass/BBC Monitoring/Financial Times, Feb. 14).

Russia remains committed to the Bushehr nuclear project with Iran, despite U.S. objections, and will fulfill its side of the contract, Lebedev said.

The United States has claimed that the reactor could be used to help Iran develop nuclear weapons, according to the Associated Press.  Russia, however, has said the reactor can only be used for civilian purposes and will have international oversight (Associated Press, Feb. 14).

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Latin America:  Nuclear-Free Zone in Effect for 35 Years

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Latin American countries yesterday marked the 35^th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlateloloco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in the region.

The treaty, which was the first to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in the world, bans construction, storage and testing of nuclear weapons throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean.  It includes two protocols calling on nuclear weapon states to recognize the nuclear-free zone and calling on countries with colonies in the region to adhere to the zone.

Out of 33 member states, 32 have signed and ratified the treaty.  Cuba signed but did not ratify the treaty in 1995.  In 1992, the country dropped its demands for the United States to leave the Guantanamo Bay naval base as a precondition for signing the treaty.

Discussions on the Tlateloloco treaty began in 1963 and 15 Latin American states signed a draft of the treaty in 1967.  The treaty entered into force in 1968.

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U.S. Response:  State and Local Bioterrorism Funds Start Going Out Today

By Greg Seigle
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Twenty percent of the $1.1 billion in federal funding for state and local bioterrorism preparation for fiscal 2002 is being sent out today, according to U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson.

Hospitals, laboratories and first responders will begin to receive $220 million of the funds over the holiday weekend, with the remaining $880 million to be distributed this spring, Thompson told the Senate Budget Committee yesterday.

Starting March 15 state and local recipients are to begin presenting plans on how to spend the money, plans which need to be approved by their governors, then the Health and Human Services Department, Thompson said.

The final 80 percent may not reach states until May, department spokesman Bill Pierce said this morning.

The $1.1 billion is not intended to purchase equipment such as fire trucks and chemical and biological protection suits, but is earmarked for the purchase of communications systems that link with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention public health alert network, Pierce said.

Some senators, however, expressed displeasure that state and local authorities have to “jump through hoops” to obtain the funds, which officials said are sorely needed to prepare U.S. cities and states for any bioterrorism attacks.

“I’m troubled, not baffled, that the Department of Health and Human Services is only releasing 20 percent of the $1.1 billion,” said Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.).  “Why are the states forced to run this bureaucratic red tape gauntlet before receiving the remaining 80 percent?”

Thompson said his department is not sending out all the money immediately because state and local authorities need time to absorb the funds — and to come up with a “complete, comprehensive plan” to prepare for bioterrorism attacks in the United States.

“We will see more biological attacks, period,” said Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), the Senate’s only serving medical doctor.

Raw Capacity

Overall this year’s Health and Human Services budget includes $2.9 billion for various bioterrorism programs, much of it intended to give first responders the basic capabilities to respond to and handle a biological attack.  Another $4.3 billion is slated for next year in the fiscal 2003 White House budget proposal.

“We have got to get money to the local level very quickly in order to just get some raw capacity in there,” Tara O’Toole, director of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, said during a November 2001 speech.

“You have to have a system of systems to combat bioterrorism” at the vital local level, Jonathan Ban, a Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute research associate, told Global Security Newswire previously (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2001).  “You need a system that has detection capabilities, laboratory diagnostics, epidemiological capabilities … Currently there isn’t any of that.”

Yesterday Byrd was clearly upset that the $15 billion he proposed for bioterrorism preparation this year did not appear in the White House budget request.

Byrd’s fiscal 2002 proposal had been approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee but “was basically killed on the floor,” Jim Dobbs, Byrd’s deputy press secretary, said.

First Responders Anxious

If White House officials had not opposed his $15 billion proposal, which would have been in addition to the $40 billion in emergency supplemental funds rushed through Congress after Sept. 11, “we’d have that money right now,” Byrd said.

President George W. Bush, Byrd said, believed it was “too large and too early.”

“We want to make sure that money gets out there … for surge capacity and so on,” Thompson testified.

“We’re anxious to get the money,” said Lt. Aaron Osgood, head of special operations for the Portland, Maine, fire department.  “We really need it quickly.”

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Anthrax:  Contaminated Washington Postal Center to be Fumigated

The U.S. Postal Service plans to decontaminate Washington’s Brentwood Road mail-sorting facility of anthrax spores through the use of chlorine dioxide gas, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 7).

Plans call for the Brentwood facility to be fumigated by the same method used to decontaminate the Hart Senate Office Building last month (see GSN, Jan. 23). Officials have begun preparing the facility for the fumigation effort, said Postal Service spokeswoman Deborah Yackley.

“Every little crack and crevice of the building has been sealed, and the crews have been doing spot cleaning with chlorine dioxide liquid inside the building,” Yackley said (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, Feb. 15).

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United States:  Alabama Governor Tries to Block CW Incinerator

Alabama Governor Don Siegelman filed a lawsuit yesterday to block the opening of a $1 billion chemical weapons incinerator at the Anniston Army Depot.  He said the federal government failed to spend $40.5 million in safety measures for the surrounding communities (see GSN, Feb. 14).

“Not so much as a match will be struck in Anniston until the safety of our citizens is guaranteed,” Siegelman said.  There are 75,000 people living within 10 miles of the facility.

Alabama officials and the U.S. Army agreed last year to spend $40.5 million in federal funds on gas masks, protective suits and other safety measures, Siegelman said.  Later, the Federal Emergency Management Agency decided not to buy some of the equipment, following a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report that said part of the plan would present logistical problems and have a harmful psychological effect on residents living near the incinerator.

The federal government decided against spending $15.5 million of the agreed funds on gas masks and protective suits, said Mike Abrams, spokesman for the incinerator.  Instead, authorities told residents to seal houses with plastic sheeting and duct tape if an accident occurs.

The Army said it has implemented all possible safety measures.  The safest thing is to destroy the chemical agents, the Army said (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2001).  Storing the chemicals is more dangerous, said Abrams.  “They will be a problem until we process them in our facility,” he said.

The lawsuit is unnecessary, said Congressman Bob Riley (R-Ala.), a potential opponent to Siegelman in November’s elections.  The federal government has provided “every assurance” that Alabama would get the money, he said.  “The last thing we need to do is get a bunch of lawyers involved.”

The Army plans to destroy 2,254 tons of chemical weapons dating back to World War II during a four-year period (Jay Reeves, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Feb. 15).

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International Response:  Code of Conduct Ineffective, Experts Say

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The approved draft proposal of an international ballistic missile code of conduct will do little to stop missile proliferation, arms control experts told Global Security Newswire this week, although some said the code is a progressive step (see GSN, Feb. 12).

The code will undermine efforts to stop ballistic missile proliferation and will instead help missiles spread “more rapidly,” said Richard Speier, a former Pentagon official who served on the U.S. negotiating team for the Missile Technology Control Regime.  The MTCR is an export control regime under which most industrial nations have agreed on rules to restrict the export of critical missile technologies.

During a two-day round of talks in Paris last week, more than 80 states approved a draft proposal of a missile code of conduct.  The code is a political agreement that calls on signatories to declare their ballistic missile programs once a year and to alert other signatories before conducting any missile tests.

Critics of the code said the lack of defined incentives for countries to join and a competition between the code and other agreements under negotiation will make the international code of conduct ineffective.  The United States, however, is likely to support final approval of the code, experts said.

Lack of Incentives Could “Doom” Code

The code is an “important first step” and useful because it helps establish world norms on nonproliferation, said Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  The lack of concrete incentives in the code, however, could doom it to failure, he said.

Instead, a one-line paragraph in the code gives a state “unknown incentives to get rid of [its] entire ballistic missile program,” said Alex Wagner of the Arms Control Association.  For any state that has devoted many resources toward a ballistic missile program, there is no reason to join the code, Wagner said.

This lack of tangible incentives is what will keep rogue states such as Iran and North Korea from joining, Wagner said.  Instead, Eastern European states such as Slovakia and the Balkans will flock to the code and give up their remaining stockpiles of Soviet-era ballistic missiles to better facilitate entrance into NATO, he said (see GSN, Jan. 18).

“If it doesn’t provide incentives and all you have are sticks, it’s not very effective,” Wolfsthal said.  “First you set a code, then you find bilateral ways to provide incentives.”

Would Rogue States Want to Join?

The Bush administration has so far shown no willingness to offer any incentives to rogue states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, Wolfsthal said.  Evidence has shown, however, that North Korea responds favorably to well-packaged and sincere initiatives, he said (see GSN, Feb. 14).

There is no doubt the United States can work with North Korea on the issue of ballistic missiles, since they “need more things than missiles,” said Chris Madison, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

It would be more difficult for the United States to provide similar incentives to Iran due to the distrust and long history between the two nations since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Wolfsthal said.  European countries, however, could have better success at offering incentives because of the built-up contacts and level of trust.  European countries could also better work with reformers within Iran without damaging their credibility, he said.

The international code of conduct could help increase ballistic missile sales, Wagner said.  Sales of ballistic missiles and technology between signatories to the code and certain allies would become more legitimized, he said.

The code “would create almost a [North American Free Trade Agreement] for missiles,” Wagner said.

Missiles vs. Rockets

Wagner said one set of incentives, examined early on in the negotiations for the draft code proposal, would have centered on assistance for space technology programs.  Technical assistance and space launch services could have been offered to deter states from developing ballistic missiles under the guise of space-launch vehicles.

The United States, however, fears that states could use technology gained from assistance with space programs for military purposes, Wagner said.  U.S. officials, therefore, do not want to offer technical proliferation as an incentive.

While space-launch technology assistance has been one of the best incentives for states to join missile agreements such as the code, it was right that it was left out, Speier said.

It would be “like offering peaceful nuclear explosions to countries to refrain from developing nuclear weapons,” Speier said, adding that there is virtually no difference between space-launch and ballistic missile technology.

The code already treats “scientific rockets” more generously than ballistic missiles and establishes a difference in controls with the MTCR, Speier said.  Many countries already use space-launch vehicles to further develop ballistic missiles, which allows countries to feign peaceful development, he said.

Competing Agreements Could Lead to “Venue Shopping”

Another flaw in the proposed international code of conduct is that it creates a direct competitor to the MTCR, according to Speier.  Before the code, the MTCR was the only set of rules governing proliferation of missiles and missile technology.  With the code, however, nations could go “venue shopping” to find the best set of rules that still allows them to achieve their aims, Speier said.

“It would be better if we pursued one set of rules — the MTCR,” he said.

More Treaties Could Weaken Oversight Power

The creation of more than one set of rules regulating missile and missile technology proliferation will also deflect staff work on nonproliferation in governments, Speier said.

“Nonproliferation regimes are only as good as the work put into them,” Speier said.

It takes large amounts of work to adequately track, and if need be, protest missile technology transfers — work that is already being done by tiny staffs in various governments, Speier said.  Many MTCR member states have no more than three people each following missile nonproliferation, and removing even one person to work on the code could lead to damaging efforts as a whole, according to Speier.

Global Control System Lite?

Experts said the code of conduct might also derail two other missile proliferation efforts, led by Russia and the United Nations.

The code is a response by other countries to create an agreement that is a more “benign” alternative than provisions in a Russian proposal called the Global Control System, Speier said.

Russia proposed the GCS in 1999 and included provisions similar to the code of conduct, but with concrete incentives to join, Wagner said.  The United States boycotted a conference on the Global Control System last year, a move seen as a way to focus attention on the international code of conduct, he said.

The countries that created the code of conduct, however, “might have created something as bad,” Speier said, adding that the only way he would have recommended approval of the code “would’ve been over my dead body if I was still in government.”

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said Russia is happy that several delegates to the code conference are still interested in the Global Control System, according to a Russian Foreign Ministry release.

“We note with satisfaction the wishes expressed by the representatives of a number of countries to continue work on the Russian initiative relating to GCS,” Yakovenko said.

U.N. Missile Control

The code also runs against a U.N. working group on missiles sponsored by Iran, Wagner said.  While praising the code of conduct, Iran and China both have suggested that U.N. involvement is needed on the issue.

The United Nations and the countries of the MTCR compete with each other on crafting an agreement, with the United States and France not wanting work on the code to leave the MTCR regime countries, he said.

The U.N. working group on missiles is “not going down the same path as the code of conduct,” Wagner said.

Final Approval Likely

Despite the potential weaknesses of the code, the United States came out in support of it after the Paris talks and is likely to support its final approval.  The U.S. State Department offered tentative support of the approved draft proposal of the code on Monday, after the completion of the Paris talks.

“The United States supports efforts to establish a universal code of conduct against missile proliferation,” said a State Department spokesman.  “The draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is intended to create a widely subscribed international predisposition against ballistic missile proliferation.”

The code of conduct is not going to end ballistic missile programs in countries of concern to the United States, Wolfsthal said.  It does, however, “provide another tool in the arsenal.”

Speier said he hopes the Bush administration will take a “second look” at the code before the meetings on final approval scheduled to be hosted by Spain at the end of the year.  The decision to approve the draft proposal of the code was made early in the administration, and it is not the type of arms control agreement the administration has favored in the past, he said.

“It’s in writing,” Speier said, noting the administration’s aversion to formal arms control agreements.

No Changes Planned

It is likely the draft proposal will now move on to the next round of talks, which will be a “rubber stamp,” Wagner said.  He added he is not optimistic that the code will get any “teeth” before it is signed in a ceremony at The Hague.

At the Paris round of talks, the U.S. position was that there was no room for negotiations on the code at that point, Wagner said.  It was almost “take it or leave it.”

The code “could have been a fantastic vehicle for shoring up missile proliferation,” Wagner said, “but the Bush administration dropped the ball.”

The code is a “good sign and it’s better than building a missile defense,” Madison said.  He added that the code has some use because it is a multilateral approach to ballistic missile nonproliferation rather than a unilateral technical hardware approach.  It was a good thing any time “you get people even thinking about transparency, Madison said, but he cautioned, “It’s not a panacea.”

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Israel:  Bush Proposes $66 Million to Fund Israeli Arrow Program

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

U.S. President George W. Bush’s recent fiscal 2003 budget request includes $66 million for the U.S.-funded Israeli Arrow missile defense program (see GSN, Feb. 1).

According to U.S. Defense Department Comptroller Dov Zakheim, the $66 million includes:

*         $10 million for a deployability program,

*         $50 million for an improvements program,

*         $3 million for an Israeli test bed,

*         $2 million for Israeli system architecture and

*         $1 million for program support (see GSN, Dec. 21, 2001).

The request is “pretty comprehensive,” Zakheim told the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee yesterday.  It “reflects very intense discussions with the Israeli Ministry of Defense as to — and, of course, our own people — as to what was needed to keep this program ongoing,” he said.

The budget request also includes $3.5 million for the Tactical High Energy Laser program, which intercepted a target in 2000, Zakheim said.  “The Israelis have moved with us to a more mobile variant, which would, I think, better meet both our needs,” he said.

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Nuclear Waste:  Abraham Formally Recommends Yucca Mountain Site

U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham yesterday formally recommended Yucca Mountain in Nevada to President George W. Bush as the site of a long-term high-level nuclear waste repository (see GSN, Feb. 13).

“I have considered whether sound science supports the determination that the Yucca Mountain site is scientifically and technically suitable for the development of a repository,” Abraham wrote in a letter to Bush that accompanied the recommendation.  “I am convinced that it does.”

As the basis of his decision that Yucca Mountain is scientifically suitable as a repository site, Abraham cited the results of a study that lasted more than 20 years and cost $4 billion.  There are also compelling national interests, such as homeland security, nuclear nonproliferation issues and environmental cleanup operations at former nuclear weapons plants, that increase the need for a waste repository, Abraham said.

“More than 161 million people live within 75 miles of one or more of these sites,” Abraham said.  “The facilities housing these materials were intended to do so on a temporary basis.  They should be able to withstand current terrorist threats, but that may not remain the case in the future.  These materials would be far better secured in a deep underground repository at Yucca Mountain” (Energy Department release, Feb. 14).

Nevada Officials Prepare to Fight

“I told the president that if he decides to go forward with a recommendation to designate Yucca Mountain as a nuclear repository, I will exercise my veto power,” said Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn (Associated Press/Reno Gazette-Journal, Feb. 15).

Some opponents of the Yucca Mountain plan said they believe Bush would act on Abraham’s recommendation as early as today, according to the New York Times.  Once Bush makes his decision on Yucca Mountain, Nevada has 60 days to veto the plan, which would require Congress to make the final decision.

Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman reacted to Abraham’s recommendation with sarcasm (see GSN, Feb. 8).

“What a Valentine’s Day gift,” Goodman said in a statement before Abraham’s recommendation was made public.  “Cupid shot nuclear-tipped arrows at the 43 states along the proposed transportation routes.  What an expression of love for the country” (Matthew Wald, New York Times, Feb. 15).

Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.), citing studies conducted by the General Accounting Office, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the Inspector General of the Energy Department, said he challenges Abraham’s claim that the science behind Yucca Mountain is sound (see GSN, Feb. 6).

“These experts all say that the science is not sound,” Reid said yesterday on the floor of the Senate.  “No one can challenge the credibility of this all-star team of experts.”

“Secretary Abraham has made a hasty, poor and really indefensible decision,” Reid said.  “Now the questions of whether a high-level nuclear waste dump will be built in Nevada lies with the president of the United States.  The president should demand sound science — peer-reviewed scientific evidence of the highest caliber — and wait” (Congressional Record, Feb. 14).

Yucca Mountain Could Become Energy Source

After touring Yucca Mountain yesterday, Geraldine Ferraro, former Democratic vice presidential candidate, and former New Hampshire Governor John Sununu said they support Abraham’s recommendation.

Sununu and Ferraro, who have lobbied for the Yucca Mountain plan on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said they believe Nevada citizens’ fears over the site would be addressed during the licensing phase of the repository.

“Most potent poisons last forever,” Sununu said, referring to the tons of nuclear waste expected to be stored within Yucca Mountain.  “This stuff doesn’t.”

In the future, new technological advances could develop ways to turn the waste that would be stored within the mountain into an energy source, Sununu said.

“It will turn out to be the most economically viable source of energy in the future,” he said.

“Everything I saw confirms … it’s a very appropriate selection,” Sununu said.

Ferraro agreed that Yucca Mountain is the best site for a nuclear waste repository.

“To me, it’s the one place on this Earth that seems appropriate,” she said (Las Vegas Review-Journal, Feb. 15).

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Radiological Weapons:  Westchester County Wants Potassium Iodide

Officials in Westchester County, New York, said yesterday they will ask the state for more than 500,000 potassium iodide pills to protect people living near the Indian Point nuclear power plants from thyroid cancer risks in the case of radiation exposure.

Some people have expressed concern about Indian Point because it is near a heavily populated area and could be vulnerable to terrorist attack, according to the New York Times (see related GSN story, today).

New York is requesting 1.2 million potassium iodide pills from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is offering six million pills to states (see GSN, Feb. 5).  Eight other states have also requested pills.

Andrew Spano, the county executive, met with 150 school and municipal officials and emergency workers yesterday to discuss plans for distributing the pills.  He outlined a plan with a goal to place pills in people’s homes before any emergency occurs.  The county does not plan to distribute pills from a central location during an emergency, because it could inhibit evacuation procedures.

The county would also try to teach people how to use the pills and inform the population that the pills do not provide a panacea for radiation sickness.

Some people at the meeting expressed concern that providing the pills would detract attention from improving evacuation plans, the Times reported.

Indian Point Radiation Leak

Meanwhile, Entergy, the company that operates the two active reactors at Indian Point, told Spano yesterday that the Indian Point 2 reactor has a small radioactive leak, although it does not pose any public health threat (see GSN, Oct. 19, 2001).  The reactor is leaking four ounces of water a day, which is below the five gallons a day of leakage allowed under an Entergy-Nuclear Regulatory Commission agreement and far below the 432 gallons a day allowed under general rules established by the U.S. government and nuclear industry, according to the New York Times (Randal Archibold, New York Times, Feb. 15).

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