Iraq:  U.K. Advocates Returning Inspectors, Not Ousting Hussein

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw indicated a departure from U.S. policy yesterday in statements regarding British goals in Iraq.

The United Kingdom is not aiming to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power but rather to return U.N. weapons inspectors to the country, Straw told the BBC Today radio program.  Returning inspectors would be the best way to respond to the potential threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, he said (see GSN, Aug. 16).

“If my prayers were answered,” Straw said, Hussein would be “removed by divine intervention.”  However, removing Hussein from power “is not an object of British foreign policy” (see GSN, May 10).

U.S. President George W. Bush has repeatedly said that U.S. policy is to promote a regime change.  Returning inspectors would not be sufficient to reduce the threat, Bush has said, although he added Wednesday that he remains open to nonmilitary means to remove Hussein.

Both Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have faced internal opposition to military action against Iraq.  Several members of Blair’s Labor Party, in addition to the Conservative and Liberal parties, have said they would not support attacking Iraq (Suzanne Kapner, New York Times, Aug. 23).

Bush has not explained why military action is necessary or what to do with Iraq after removing Hussein, Labor Party member Gerald Kaufman said.  The Bush administration does not understand the potential dangers of attacking Iraq, he wrote in an article for the Spectator, according to the Baltimore Sun. 

Other European Countries Oppose Attack

France also has expressed serious doubts about any plan to attack Iraq, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has said that Germany will not be involved in Bush’s “adventure” (see GSN, July 31).

“What has been lacking in Germany and all of Europe is any discussion about what Iraq would look like after any military action, and that requires a leadership that so far people heave not seen,” according to Frank Umbach, an analyst at the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Affairs (Todd Richissin, Baltimore Sun, Aug. 23).

Saudi Reaction

Top Saudi military officials have tentatively agreed to come to the United States this autumn for high-level defense talks that have been postponed since last summer, a senior defense official said.  Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, has denied use of its territory as a base for an attack but has not yet firmly said whether it would allow U.S. airplanes to use its air space (see GSN, Aug. 8; Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 23).

Iraqi Opposition Groups Meet

Meanwhile, in one attempt to bring Iraqi opposition groups together to support a potential overthrow of Hussein and plan for a transitional government, the CIA brought Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani — the leaders of the two main Kurdish opposition groups in northern Iraq — to the United States in April to discuss cooperation in an effort to overthrow Hussein, the Christian Science Monitor reported today (see GSN, Aug. 9).  Talabani and Barzani, however, have expressed skepticism about such cooperation, particularly since the United States encouraged the groups to fight against Hussein twice before but then abandoned the effort, according to the Monitor (see GSN, Aug. 14).

Administration officials are hoping six opposition groups that have agreed to meet in Europe next month will find a way to cooperate, the Monitor reported (Bowers/Grier, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 23).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)

U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)

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Israeli Response:  Country Prepares for Potential Iraqi WMD Attack

Israel has been accelerating efforts to defend against a WMD attack as concerns rise that a U.S. attack on Iraq might unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel, the Washington Post reported today.

Israeli hospitals and emergency response teams have been practicing drills in preparation for several potential crises, including an attack with conventional missiles or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, Israeli Health Ministry Director General Boaz Lev said.

During the last few weeks, the 30 gas mask distribution centers in Israel have received 5,000 new requests each day for new gas masks or trade-ins on masks that were issued during the Gulf War.  Israel is adding iodine pills — which protect the thyroid gland against some of the effects of radioactive fallout — to the gas mask kits (see GSN, Aug. 14).

In addition, Israel decided Wednesday to vaccinate 15,000 emergency workers against smallpox because of concerns Iraq might have weaponized the disease (see GSN, Aug. 21).

Beyond providing gas masks and vaccinations, the Israeli military has stepped up efforts to expand the Arrow 2 system, which Israel and the United States have developed jointly to protect the country against missiles (see related GSN story today).

Israel has also said it would respond militarily to any Iraqi attack and not restrain from retaliation as it did during the Gulf War when Iraq struck the country with conventional missiles (see GSN, Aug. 16).

“What I told the Americans, and I repeat:  ‘Don’t expect us to continue to live with the process of restraint.  If they hit us, we reserve the right of response,’” Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer told the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Aharonoth, according to the Post (Molly Moore, Washington Post, Aug. 23).

For further information, see:

CDC Smallpox Information

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Smallpox

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

Federation of American Scientists Background on Arrow

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International Response:  Weapon-Grade Uranium Exits Yugoslavia

The United States, in cooperation with Yugoslav and Russian authorities and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, secretly transported more than 100 pounds of weapon-grade nuclear material Wednesday from a reactor in Yugoslavia to Russia, U.S. officials said.

Three guarded trucks left the Vinca Institute Wednesday night and drove to the Belgrade airport.  One of the trucks carried more than 5,000 rods of highly enriched uranium — enough to make two nuclear bombs.  The material was flown to Russia, where it will be processed for use in a commercial power plant, and arrived in the country yesterday.

U.S. State Department officials said Wednesday night that they did not know where in Russia the material would be processed, but Serbian officials told Reuters it would go to the Ulyanovsk Nuclear Processing Plant, the New York Times reported.

U.S. officials and nuclear analysts praised the project as an example of international cooperation to reduce the risk that terrorists or hostile states could acquire nuclear weapon materials.  The United States paid $2.5 million for the project out of State Department nuclear threat reduction funds, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private nonprofit group, provided $5 million for environmental cleanup at the Vinca Institute, State Department officials said.

The United States had been concerned that adversaries could acquire nuclear material from the institute, which has been closed for more than a decade with questionable security, according to the Times.

“Serbia might have decided to sell this material to Iraq,” said Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “It’s a good thing for all of us that that possibility has now been eliminated” (Dames Dao, New York Times, Aug. 23).

“By disposing of the hazardous material, which could be used to make nuclear weapons, Vinca is no longer a potential target for possible terrorist attempts to get hold of this fuel,” a Yugoslav government spokesman said.

State Department officials praised Russia for its cooperation.  In past years, Russia had been unwilling to help return nuclear supplies that the Soviet Union had provided to allies to Russia for reprocessing, but the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry worked closely with U.S. officials for many months to plan this week’s operation and agreed to accept the uranium.

“There has been a sea change,” said Janet Bogue, deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs.  “The Russians were eager to get this done.  They are just as acutely aware of the risks as we are” (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Aug. 23). 

The Soviet Union had provided the Vinca Institute’s reactor, and it was used for scientific research, training power plant operators and producing medical and industrial materials, the Times reported (Dao, New York Times).

The Washington Post, however, reported that former Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito carried out a secret nuclear weapons development program at the institute.  “We must have the atomic bomb.  We must build it even if it costs us one-half of our income for years,” he told aides in 1950, according to histories of the time.

Yugoslavia never developed nuclear weapons, but there were concerns about the remaining unused uranium fuel left at the reactor when it closed in 1984, said William Potter, director of the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

“You still have at Vinca many of the scientists who had been involved in this covert nuclear weapons program,” Potter said.  “Whatever technical know-how is needed for a weapon, you have that in spades at Vinca” (Warrick, Washington Post, Aug. 23).

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group, Inc.]

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South Asia:  Armitage Continues Peace Efforts

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is to arrive in New Delhi today and travel to Islamabad tomorrow as part of U.S. efforts to stabilize relations between India and Pakistan, Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported today.

Armitage intends to emphasize that as nuclear-armed states, the two countries no longer have the option of fighting wars to resolve disputes, the State Department has said (see GSN, July 30).

“He is going to continue our dialogue on both bilateral issues as well as on continuing tensions between the two countries,” a State Department official told Dawn.  Tensions between India and Pakistan have decreased but military forces are still mobilized along the border, the official added.

Indian officials indicated earlier this week that Armitage might receive a somewhat cool reception because of India’s concern that the United States has been unable to persuade Pakistan to end cross-border movement by militants in Kashmir, according to Dawn (see GSN, July 29).  Indian Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani said yesterday, however, that Pakistan has “partially fulfilled” its promise to stop infiltration, Dawn reported.

If infiltration continues, it is without Pakistani knowledge or support, Pakistani Deputy Foreign Minister Inamul Haq said earlier yesterday (Dawn, Aug. 23).

For further information, see:

Pakistani Embassy to the United States

Indian Embassy to the United States

Carnegie Endowment Nuclear Status Map

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Argentina:  Proliferation Concerns Influenced U.S. Policy, Newly Released Report Says

Newly released documents indicate that U.S. attempts to curb human rights abuses in Argentina during the 1970s were tempered by a desire to dissuade the country from developing nuclear weapons, the Los Angeles Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 15).

A 1978 U.S. State Department intelligence report — one of more than 4,000 the department declassified and released this week — says that while the Carter administration was increasing pressure on Argentina to cease its campaign against dissidents, U.S. policymakers were concerned that such pressure might harm attempts to convince Argentina to join a treaty establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America.

“Argentina’s nuclear status and capabilities have forced the United States to examine carefully the possibility that human rights initiatives could be detrimental to continued U.S. influence in the nuclear area,” the report from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research said.  “The U.S. human rights approach to Argentina has always been tempered by Argentina’s potential as a nuclear proliferator.”

The nuclear weapons issue was one of the major topics on the agenda of a September 1977 meeting between former U.S. and Argentine Presidents Jimmy Carter and Jorge Rafael Videla, according to the report.  The issue came up again during a visit by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Buenos Aires in November 1977.

Even though Argentina never developed nuclear weapons, analysts have said the country was close to doing so during the period of military rule from 1976 to 1983.  The United States was particularly worried about Argentina’s nuclear development because of its rivalry with neighbor Brazil, the Times reported.

Argentina’s military junta never attempted to use the nuclear weapons issue to ease U.S. pressures on human rights violations, the State report says.  It did, however, “undoubtedly appreciate the bargaining power of their nuclear chip,” the report says, adding that the generals might “attempt to inject it directly into human rights discussions.”

The report demonstrates that nuclear proliferation concerns were a “very, very important factor” in influencing U.S. policy toward Argentina at the time, said Carlos Osorios, an analyst at the National Security Archive (Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 23).

For further information, see:

Treaty of Tlatelolco Text

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IAEA:  U.S. Appropriates Emergency Funds to Agency

Emergency legislation signed Aug. 16 by U.S. President George W. Bush provides $9 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Nucleonics Week reported earlier this month.

The legislation — the second fiscal 2002 supplemental appropriations bill related to Sept. 11 response efforts — includes $4 million for additional IAEA safeguards in “specific countries under safeguards” and $5 million for nuclear materials security programs, according to Nucleonics Week.  Although the White House had not requested the funds, Congress added the money.

In other legislation, Congress has proposed offering more funds to the agency than Bush requested in some areas, while making cuts in others.

The Senate Appropriations Committee approved July 18 its version of the fiscal 2003 foreign operations appropriations bill, which would add $3.5 million to the White House’s request of $50 million for U.S. “voluntary” contributions to the IAEA.  The House has not yet acted on its version of the bill.

Conversely, Senate legislation that would fund the Commerce, Justice and State departments would provide $47.5 million for the “assessed” contribution to the IAEA, down from the White House’s request of $52.2 million.  The Senate Appropriations Committee approved the bill July 18, but the House has not taken it up yet (Daniel Horner, Nucleonics Week, Aug. 8).

For further information, see:

International Atomic Energy Agency

U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement (U.S. State Department)

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Taiwan:  Cabinet Drafts Weapons Ban Legislation

Taiwan’s Cabinet has drafted a bill stating Taiwan’s position on banning use of nuclear weapons and its opposition to nuclear proliferation, AFXpress reported today (see GSN, March 14).  Officials plan to submit the bill to the Parliament in the session set to start next month, C.J. Yeh, minister without portfolio, has said (AFXpress, Aug. 23).

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Anthrax:  Brentwood Test Successful, Officials Say

A small-scale test of the planned fumigation process for decontaminating the Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington has been a success, the U.S. Postal Service said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 21).

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention analyzed more than 190 liquid samples and 10 air samples from the July 29 test.  All the samples have tested negative for anthrax, demonstrating that no spores survived the chlorine dioxide used in the test process, postal officials said.  Preparations to fumigate the entire facility have begun, they added.

“These test results should ensure the community that the fumigation process will be a success,” Washington Health Department Senior Deputy Director Theodore Gordon said (Randolph Schmid, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Aug. 23).

For further information, see:

GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)

CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax

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U.S. Response:  Pentagon Seeks Chemical Detection Standard

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — As U.S. military forces prepare to better fend off potential chemical attacks, defense officials have acknowledged they lack a standard for determining the effectiveness of chemical detection systems, and they are seeking an independent assessment to help them establish a common set of objectives for field tests.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has asked the National Academy of Sciences to study “the issues surrounding the requirements for operational testing of chemical stand-off detection technologies,” the agency said this month.

“The results of this study will provide the basis for programmatic and other acquisition decisions on a number of chemical agent standoff detectors currently in the acquisition process” designed to detect chemical agents from distances ranging from five meters to 20 kilometers.

Officials said that the study’s findings will help determine which chemical detection technologies now being designed should be acquired in quantity and deployed in the field.

The military departments are developing a variety of new stand-off chemical detectors.  They include the M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), an automatic infrared sensor that detects Tabun, Sarin and Soman nerve gases and H and L blister agents from as far as five kilometers; the Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector, which can detect nerve, blister and blood agents at ranges up to five kilometers; and the Artemis system, which is mounted on a vehicle and can detect, range and map chemical warfare agents at distances up to 20 kilometers.

Standards of effectiveness for field tests of such devices will vary according to each detection system, officials said.  “Testing could well depend on the technology used for detection,” DTRA said.

The National Academy of Sciences study will take six months, officials said.

While U.S. military forces are already considered the best equipped in the world to operate in chemical, biological or nuclear conditions, new technologies are being pursued as the threat of chemical warfare grows.

One novel idea that DTRA is pursuing involves outfitting a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle to disperse chemical detectors that can collect samples of chemical clouds or plumes.

“The probability of U.S. forces encountering chemical or biological agents during worldwide conflicts remain high,” the 2001 Defense Department Chemical and Biological Defense Program annual report to Congress says.  “An effective defense reduces the probability of a chemical or biological attack, and if an attack occurs, it enables U.S. forces to survive, continue operations and win.”

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Russia:  Withheld U.S. Funds Might Delay Weapons Disposal Plants

A lack of U.S. funding might delay construction on two Russian chemical weapons destruction facilities, Interfax reported Wednesday.  One plant is located near the Russian city of Shchuchye, and the other is located in the Udmurtia republic (see GSN, May 30; see GSN, April 12).  The United States has not said when it plans to resume funding, said Sergei Kiriyenko, chairman of the Russian State Commission for Chemical Disarmament (Interfax, Aug. 21).

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International Response:  EU Works to Finalize Missile Code of Conduct

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Officials of Denmark, currently holding the presidency of the European Union, have begun talks with several countries to finalize work on an international code of conduct to halt ballistic missile proliferation, a Danish official told Global Security Newswire today (see GSN, July 8).

The consultations, which Denmark began soon after assuming the EU presidency from Spain July 1, are intended to explore how to accommodate several outstanding concerns about the code without turning it into a “Christmas tree,” the official said.  The EU has shepherded efforts this year to negotiate the code, which was first drafted in 2000 by countries of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Negotiators have already held meetings with China and are set to begin consulting with India today, the official said.  In addition, representatives are expected to visit to Israel and Egypt next week, the official added.  A number of other countries that have been active in the code’s development are also slated to be consulted.

There are currently no plans to consult with North Korea, which has long been a country of concern for missile proliferation, the Danish official said, citing Pyongyang’s past lack of cooperation.

There also will probably be no further consultations with Iran.  The country previously was active in developing the code, but it did not attend the last conference on the code in Madrid in June even though it had been invited and showed an early willingness to attend.  Iran’s decision not to attend has made it difficult to conduct a dialogue, the official said.

Ongoing consultations cover several issues.  For example, some countries have expressed reluctance toward confidence-building measures in the code, which would require each signatory to outline its ballistic missile program once a year and to notify other signatories of any ballistic missile tests, according to the official.

Some countries would like the code to address cooperation issues such as satellite launch assistance, the official said (see GSN, Feb. 15).  A set of incentives considered during the draft process focused on offering assistance for space technology programs to deter countries from building ballistic missiles under the pretense of developing space-launch vehicles.  Those incentives were dropped, however, before the draft was approved during a February conference in Paris (see GSN, Feb. 11).  The general consensus seems to be that cooperation issues are beyond the scope of the code, the official said.

One country is concerned that by agreeing to the code it would be forced to abide by other international arms control agreements such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the official said.  Other talks center around regional issues, the official said, declining to name specific countries.

Once consultations are completed, the European Union plans to conduct an assessment to determine the next step in the process, the official said, adding that it “won’t take months before we get to a consensus.”  There will probably not be another full conference on the code since it would not lead to a better understanding, the official said.  The European Union’s long-stated goal is to launch the code at a ceremony in The Hague by the end of the year — a goal shared by the United States and other countries involved, the official said (see GSN, Feb. 12).

“The code is in good health,” the official said.  “I think we’re going to have a code that will be balanced and at the same time be a first step in the curbing and prevention of the proliferation of ballistic missiles.”

For further information, see:

Draft International Code of Conduct (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

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North Korea:  United States Imposes Sanctions Over Sale to Yemen

The United States has sanctioned a North Korean firm over a sale of Scud missile components to Yemen that occurred during the Clinton administration, U.S. officials said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 22).

Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, the marketing section for North Korea’s missile program, has been sanctioned for the sale, the New York Times reported today.  The sanctions also apply to North Korea itself and include its work on missile technology electronics, space systems and military aircraft, according to the Times.

While the United States conducts no trade with North Korea, the sanctions are still an important gesture, a Bush administration official said.

“We are making a statement to the world that North Korea engages in dangerous and illicit activity,” an administration official said.  “We are making it clear that if you are a friend of the United States or civil society these are characters you do not want to be associated with.”

After the United States raised concerns over the sale, Yemen indicated that it would no longer purchase missile components from North Korea, U.S. officials said.  North Korea has been notified about the sanctions, but has not appeared to respond, they said.

The review of the Scud component sale has been underway for some time, a U.S. official said.  The delay in administering sanctions on North Korea for the sale does not indicate divisions within the Bush administration and is not meant to affect broader U.S. policy toward North Korea, the official said.

“It simply reflected the difficulty in assembling the necessary intelligence and making a judgment about it,” the official said (Michael Gordon, New York Times, Aug. 23).

This latest round of sanctions is the seventh time North Korea has been penalized for violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (Peter Slevin, Washington Post, Aug. 23).

For further information, see:

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

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Iraq:  Iran Considers Selling Shahab 3

Iran and Iraq have agreed to establish a committee to consider Iraq’s request to buy Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missiles and up to 100 aircraft from Iran, Western intelligence sources said, according to Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, which cited a Middle East Newsline report (see GSN, Aug. 5).

“Iran won’t do anything that is rash.  But the mere fact that Iran did not say no to the Iraqi request is significant and reflects how far their relations have developed,” a Western intelligence analyst said.  The two countries fought an eight-year war in the 1980s (see GSN, Aug. 19; Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, Aug. 19).

For further information, see:

Carnegie Endowment World Missile Chart

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U.S.-Russia:  U.S. Contractor, Russian Institute Pursue Missile Defense Cooperation

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — Officials from U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin and the premier Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center in Moscow are pursuing a deal to cooperate closely on missile defense and other space-related work.

Details of a possible agreement — which would capitalize on U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and a strategic relationship proposed by the U.S. and Russian presidents in May — have not been disclosed.  For the work to take place, however, the parties would need their respective governments to make “certain political decisions,” including relaxation of technology and information controls, a senior Russian official said this week.

The official, Anatoly Kuzin, deputy director general of strategic planning at the Khrunichev center, urged such changes in a speech here at a conference on missile defense.

“Certain political decisions will have to be made by proper authorities of our two nations before any full scale of joint efforts in the area of missile defense will be launched,” he said through a translator.  “We on our side understand that for such decisions to be made, certain organizational and informational underpinnings will have to be put in place.”

According to a Lockheed Martin official, “very sensitive discussions” also have been taking place between the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency and Russian government officials.

Signs of Support

The talks between Lockheed Martin and Khrunichev apparently were underway before the United States pulled out of the ABM Treaty.  The treaty was viewed as an obstacle to the proposed cooperation, said U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), who introduced Kuzin as the featured speaker at a banquet Wednesday.

Weldon, a member of the House International Relations committee and a adamant promoter of both U.S. missile defense and of U.S.-Russian cooperation, said the parties both told him, “We really can’t come out public with this yet, because the research we’re talking about perhaps will not be allowed under the ABM Treaty.  But after the treaty expires, we can talk about it publicly.”

U.S. Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish alluded to the Khrunichev-Lockheed Martin consultations June 27 at a congressional hearing, expressing muted support for the proposed venture.

Additionally, in a joint declaration signed by U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin May 24, the presidents agreed to steps “aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems.”

They also agreed to “study” possible areas for missile defense cooperation, “including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense technologies.”

Some Opposition

Despite evidence of high-level support for collaboration, some U.S. and Russian officials have expressed concerns, if not outright opposition to close collaboration on missile defense.

At the June 27 congressional hearing U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz expressed concern that shared U.S. technology might leak to third parties.

“There’s no way we can cooperate with them on missile defense if the technology goes out the back door to countries like Iran,” he said.

Some Russian officials have expressed skepticism about the prospects for close cooperation.

“I believe that there is more talk to it at this point than real plans or programs,” Alexei Arbatov, vice chairman of the Russian Duma for defense, said at a press conference in late June.

Arbatov disputed the widely touted notion that the new principles of a strategic relationship and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also signed May 24, have ushered in a new strategic relationship between the two countries.

“Despite the agreement to reduce strategic offensive weapons, relations of mutual nuclear deterrence remain in place between our countries as the base of our relations in this field,” he said.  “Since strategic missile defense is interconnected with offensive strategic forces, there can be no real cooperation here.”

Arbatov suggested real cooperation on missile defense can only occur after a treaty is signed to cut each country’s arsenals.  The May 24 agreements allow each country to keep downloaded weapons in storage.

Russian Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the Geopolitical Problems Academy, said a major obstacle to cooperation is that Russia does not have plans for a national missile defense system and that the United States probably would not share its technology.

Export Control Restrictions

Whether the United States or Russia will choose to significantly relax its technology restrictions also remains to be seen.  Both countries created stringent arms export regimes during the Cold War, prohibiting exchanges of sensitive technology and information that could be used for military purposes by certain countries.

According to the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), it is U.S. policy to deny approval of exports to or imports from a group of about two dozen countries, including Russia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria.

Bush administration officials and U.S. legislators including Weldon, meanwhile, have criticized Russia for allowing certain military exports to Iran and helping that country build nuclear reactors, which might produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons.

Export control restrictions like the arms trade regulations have tightly constrained the ability of U.S. and Russian developers to share information and technology, said James McCurry, a Lockheed Martin representative at the conference.  They would probably obstruct any close cooperation on missile defense, he said.

“Without loosening up ITAR, I can’t really see how they will be able to do that,” he said.

Referring to his conference booth promotional posters, McCurry said, “I’ve had to water down this material to the point where it has all been in the public domain,” because foreign visitors were attending, he said.

Working within those restrictions, another company at the conference displayed a sign saying it would allow only U.S. citizens into its tent.  Company representatives checked IDs and took names.

Long-Term Relationship

Khrunichev has been “cooperating closely” with U.S. companies — Lockheed Martin in particular — since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Kuzin said.  Since 1995, it and Russian company RSC Energia have participated in a joint venture called International Launch Services through which the two parties launch satellites for customers on U.S. Atlas and Russian Proton missiles from their respective countries.

The venture’s “dual launch” capability, Kuzin said, has enabled it to offer customers “guaranteed launch dates and a high degree of reliability of the services we offer” and made the venture a success.

“Over the years of our cooperation, we have succeeded in establishing a rapport not only as engineers working in the same field but also as business partners and as human beings working side-to-side with each other,” he said.

Any close cooperation on missile defense between U.S. and Russian entities should be viewed as “long-term cooperation between equal strategic partners,” and involve transparency and openness, Kuzin said, speaking at the conference.

“As we cooperate, we should be provided with the opportunity to share our technologies and technological expertise, and it goes without saying it should be a two-way street,” he said.

In an interview with Global Security Newswire, Kuzin suggested the Russian government also would need to abandon its support for adherence to the terms of the ABM Treaty, the purpose of which was to tightly restrict missile defenses against ICBMs.

“It has been the Russian government’s decision that all things could be achieved within the framework of the ABM treaty,” he said.

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Israel:  Officials Deploy Patriot Batteries Near Nuclear Plant

Israel’s Ma’ariv reported today that officials have deployed Patriot missile interceptors near the Dimona nuclear power plant, according to Agence France-Presse (see GSN, Aug. 15).  The deployment is part of a training exercise and officials plan to move the interceptors when the exercise ends, an Israeli military spokesman said (Agence France-Presse, Aug. 23).

During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq fired about 40 Scud missiles at Israel.  One hit an area near the Dimona plant, which Iraq said was an attempt to destroy it, according to Associated Press.

Israel also deployed a battery of Arrow missile interceptors in the central part of the country earlier this month, AP reported (see GSN, June 19).  Some have speculated the deployment was preparation for a possible Iraqi missile strike (see related GSN story today; Celean Jacobson, Associated Press/Jordan Times, Aug. 23).

For further information, see:

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

Federation of American Scientists Background on Arrow

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U.S. Plans:  MDA to Award Target Contract by May 2003

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is expected to award a contract by May for managing targets and countermeasures in the U.S. layered missile defense program, Aerospace Daily reported Monday (see GSN, July 17).

The main responsibilities of the contractor would be the “design, prototyping, development, procurement, certification, product improvement and qualification testing of a suite of targets and countermeasures that provide (a) threat-realistic challenge to the evolving layered missile defense system,” the agency said last month.

The agency is expected later this month to issue a request for proposals for the contract, which could be worth as much as $500 million annually, according to Aerospace Daily.

Based on current missile defense test schedules, the agency has estimated that between fiscal 2004 and 2008, it will need 23 targets for short-range ballistic missiles, 19 for medium-range ballistic missiles, two for intermediate-range ballistic missiles and 16 for ICBMs.  Those numbers are expected to increase as the agency better defines its testing plans for the next several years (Sharon Weinberger, Aerospace Daily, Aug. 19).

For further information, see:

MDA Basics of Missile Defense

MDA Missile Defense System

MDA Boost Defense Segment

MDA Midcourse Defense Segment

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

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