By David Ruppe Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — After three months of searching, U.S.-led investigators have found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the lead investigator David Kay told the U.S. Congress yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 2).
They also have found no evidence that Iraq had active nuclear or chemical weapons programs when U.S. and British forces invaded last March, nor have they discovered any evidence of biological weapons production, though they did find evidence suggesting clandestine research activity on weapons-capable biological agents, he said.
The 1,200-member, U.S.-sponsored team, called the Iraq Survey Group, also ruled out the possibility that two equipment-laden trailers found this spring in Iraq were intended for mobile biological weapons production (see GSN, Aug. 11), despite U.S. President George W. Bush’s May declaration that the trailers proved “we found the weapons of mass destruction” (see GSN, June 2).
In addition, Kay reported that no information has been uncovered to indicate that Iraq had prepared chemical rounds for rapid deployment against the invading forces (see GSN, Sept. 30).
Despite the lack of weapon discoveries, Kay said his team has uncovered “dozens of WMD-related program activities” and equipment previously concealed from U.N. inspectors.
He said his conclusions were preliminary and that further investigation is warranted.
“We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapons stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find whether they have gone,” Kay said in testimony to a joint hearing of the House and Senate intelligence committees that was released to the public.
“We are still very much in the collection and analysis mode,” he said.
The Bush administration had cited a threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to make its case for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which began last March and the subsequent occupation. Some officials had said there was evidence Iraq was attempting to develop nuclear weapons and that they feared Iraq might one day share them with terrorists.
Invading U.S. military forces did not report finding any banned weapons, however, and the Bush administration has been criticized for using the survey group instead of the standing U.N. arms inspection commission to search for banned weapons.
The group so far has spent an estimated $300 million on the search and the administration reportedly is asking for another $600 million and six to nine months more to continue the investigation, according to the New York Times.
No Visible Nuclear or Chemical Weapons Programs
Kay said deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein wanted to obtain nuclear weapons and would have if U.N. sanctions had been lifted.
He said, though, that “to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material.”
He said there was no indication of activities related to an Iraqi centrifuge enrichment program. U.S. intelligence agencies had previously reported that Iraqi had tried to import aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment centrifuges.
Kay’s team did find, however, some evidence that Iraq took steps to preserve some technological capability from its pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.
Kay also said Iraq appeared to have no significant chemical weapons program.
“Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program after 1991,” he said.
“Information found to date suggests that Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced — if not entirely destroyed — during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections,” he said.
Biological Weapons Activities Suspected
While Kay indicated no evidence of biological weapons stores or production, he said the group uncovered “significant information” indicating “biological warfare activities,” including “research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities.”
“All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents,” he said.
In particular, he said a reference strain of a biological organism that could be used to produce biological weapons was found concealed in a scientist’s home and that “new research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin” that was not reported to U.N. inspectors was uncovered.
Kay said a prison that might have been used for biological weapons testing on humans had been “explicitly ordered” not to be declared to the United Nations.
He said investigators have begun to uncover a “clandestine network of laboratories and facilities” within Iraq’s intelligence apparatus that was not declared to U.N. inspectors.
“We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D — all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production,” he said.
Milton Leitenberg, a professor and arms control expert at the University of Maryland, said today the evidence Kay has produced so far on Iraqi biological agent activities does indicate a biological weapon program was underway, though a “little” one.
“I think there are no problems answering that there are no stockpiles, there are no weapons in the sense of munitions, there are no bulk agents.
“But I don’t think you can say those things [Kay described] aren’t part of a program. Every one of them is a material breach. There shouldn’t have been a pathogen in a refrigerator. There shouldn’t have been any equipment in a mosque. There shouldn’t have been those two dozen or 20 laboratories in the Iraqi intelligence service,” Leitenberg said.
Two Trailers Ruled Out
Prior to the invasion, U.S. officials had said Iraq possessed trailers containing specialized equipment that were apparently intended for mobile biological weapons production and at least two suspected trailers were later found by occupying forces.
Kay’s report yesterday said the Iraq Survey Group was yet “unable to corroborate the existence of a mobile [biological weapons] BW production effort.”
It said an investigation ruled out the two trailers were intended for biological weapons production and other suspected purposes, saying “technical limitations would prevent any of these processes from being ideally suited to these trailers.”
Kay said the group has identified individuals who were at one time part of a mobile program and would continue to search for evidence of its existence.
Chemical Weapons Attack Plans Discounted
The Iraq Survey Group has also found no evidence that Iraq had prepared chemical weapons rounds for quickly attacking invading U.S. and British forces.
Kay said the inspectors “acquired information related to Iraq’s CW doctrine and Iraq’s war plans for [countering the invasion], but we have not yet found evidence to confirm prewar reporting that Iraqi military units were prepared to use CW against coalition forces.”
A British document controversially claimed an Iraqi order had been given to be capable of launching a chemical attack in 45 minutes. President George W. Bush in September 2002 had restated that claim and the White House had issued a statement saying Iraq “could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given.”
As for Iraq’s ballistic missile efforts, the Kay’s team found evidence that Iraq was engaged in missile development activities “that would have, if [the invasion] had not occurred, dramatically breached U.N. restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.”
“The Iraqis were engaged in a very full-scale program that would have extended their delivery systems out beyond 1,000 kilometers,” Kay told reporters after the hearing.
By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON ― As top U.S. weapons hunter David Kay told lawmakers his teams have “not yet found stocks of weapons” of mass destruction in Iraq — but cannot say for sure that no such weapons were present when the U.S. war in Iraq began — U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld yesterday defended controversial prewar intelligence on Iraq’s alleged WMD programs and how the Bush administration used the intelligence (see related GSN story, today).
Rumsfeld said at a Pentagon briefing that he has seen nothing that indicates prewar intelligence on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs was “necessarily, in the aggregate, inaccurate.” He added that there was “no debate” at the United Nations before the war “as to whether or not Saddam Hussein had these programs under way.”
“The only debate in the U.N. was whether or not you should wait longer and allow another resolution before deciding that the inspectors weren’t finding it,” said Rumsfeld.
The defense chief’s comments appeared to be at odds with statements by antiwar parties early this year in the U.N. Security Council. Russian U.N. Ambassador Sergei Lavrov said March 4 that Russia's “own data does not confirm the U.S. charges” about Iraq’s weapons programs.
On March 7, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission head Hans Blix told the council they had found no evidence to support U.S. charges of revived Iraqi weapons programs but needed more time. On March 19, as U.S. troops prepared to enter Iraq, Blix said that “3 1/2 months of work carried out in Iraq have not brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction” and expressed regret that “no more time is available for our inspections.”
Rumsfeld’s comments yesterday came a week after leaders of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee wrote CIA Director George Tenet to criticize last October’s national intelligence estimate and amid increasing questions about how much influence top administration officials had in preparing the document, which administration members cited frequently in making the case for war.
Rumsfeld said he has “never seen anything that was perfect” in the area of intelligence and added, in an apparent reference to the format of the national intelligence estimate, “The collective judgment, with a footnote saying, ‘I don’t agree with that,’ ends up getting circulated.”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Joseph Cirincione called Rumsfeld’s portrayal of the intelligence “a rewrite of history.”
“The October 2002 NIE is notable for two things. It was the NIE with the most dissents, and the most serious dissents, of any NIE in memory, and … it was strikingly different from all Iraq threat assessments that preceded it. So the question is, what went on with that NIE? Who intervened to make that NIE come out the way it did?” Cirincione said.
The answer, he said, is that Vice President Dick Cheney’s office and the Defense Department’s Office of Special Plans heavily influenced the preparation of the intelligence report.
Rumsfeld characterized Kay’s report yesterday as “some sort of an interim report,” adding that U.S. weapons hunters “have a lot of work left to do,” including visits to a number ― described by Rumsfeld as “quite low” ― of “suspect sites” they have not yet visited.
“Trying to, you know, make an early decision on it, it seems to me, would be not something that I’d have the confidence in doing,” Rumsfeld said.
Asked about a New York Times report that $600 million of the $87 billion the Bush administration is seeking for activities in Iraq is for continuing the WMD search, Rumsfeld said, “It’s classified.” Asked why, he replied, “I don’t classify these things.”
In related news, Maj. Gen. David Cone yesterday criticized prewar intelligence about what advancing U.S. troops could expect in a battle for Iraq’s capital. The remarks came as Cone briefed the press on an effort he has led to determine the U.S. military’s “lessons learned” from the Iraq war.
“I don’t think the intelligence was good at all in terms of what we expected from an enemy inside the city,” Cone said.
Asked about prewar concerns that the tactics of Iraqi forces defending Baghdad could include use of weapons of mass destruction, Cone said U.S. commanders told him that, before arriving in Baghdad, they believed “the question was when they would use it, not if they would use it.”
U.S. Justice Department officials will begin interviewing Bush administration officials in the next few days to find the source of the apparently politically motivated exposure of a undercover CIA agent, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Sept. 30).
“We will move quickly to interview likely suspects in the next few days,” a Justice Department official said. The CIA agent was identified to the media after her husband — former Ambassador Joseph Wilson — openly criticized the Bush administration’s justification for invading Iraq.
The quick action could be an effort to undermine Democratic calls for an independent counsel to investigate the leak, according to the Post.
Justice Department officials also intend to investigate administration officials at the Defense and State departments (Schmidt/Allen, Washington Post, Oct. 3).
“We will cooperate fully,” said State Department spokeswoman Susan Pittman. Justice Department officials have sent “do not destroy” letters to both agencies, asking officials to hold on to phone logs, e-mail and other evidence (Associated Press/Baltimore Sun, Oct. 3).
“One of the first steps is you have to determine the universe of people who had access to the information,” said Justice Department spokesman Mark Corallo.
Meanwhile, Republican aides sought to portray the situation as concocted by scandal-seeking Democrats.
“If you make it a partisan squabble, it casts doubt on the whole story and people tune it out,” said a House Republican aide.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan said yesterday that Democrats are trying to “sensationalize this issue.”
“Unfortunately, there are some that are looking through the lens of political opportunism,” he said (Schmidt/Allen, Washington Post).
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