By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire
VIENNA — Despite the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — and its efforts to shorten the time needed to prepare for resumed nuclear testing — top international officials here are holding out hope that patient diplomacy can reinvigorate the stalled global effort to ban nuclear test explosions (see GSN, July 25).
Twelve specific countries’ ratifications are still needed for the treaty to take effect, but a special focus on the recalcitrant United States was apparent in interviews here last week with those behind the push to bring the treaty into force.
“What is really important is where the United States are going, and without the United States, this treaty really … would have no future — if the United States would pull out of this. But this is not what is happening,” said Wolfgang Hoffmann, executive director of the CTBT Organization, the institution created to implement the 1996 treaty.
Although Washington has observed a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests for 11 years, officials in the Bush administration have said unforeseen stockpile problems or newly developed weapons might require resumed testing, and the administration has openly expressed its opposition to ratifying the treaty.
The CTBTO convened countries here early this month in a bid to jump-start progress on the treaty, but the United States, citing its opposition to the pact, sent no delegation (see GSN, July 9). The organization this week released its report on the Sept. 3-5 meeting (see GSN, Sept. 5).
Several countries at the meeting expressed frustration at the pace of progress toward implementation of the treaty and the course of U.S. nuclear policy. Speaking on behalf of the increasingly visible Nonaligned Movement, Malaysia expressed concern at both the U.S. treaty position and Washington’s recent Nuclear Posture Review, which envisions the possibility of new nuclear weapon testing.
“We believe that the principle of leadership by example should be displayed by the nuclear weapon states in this important endeavor,” the statement said.
Besides promoting signatures and ratifications, the CTBTO is overseeing the establishment of a global system to detect nuclear explosions, with an eye toward monitoring treaty compliance. Hoffmann stressed progress on the latter front, as well as U.S. support for the effort — the United States supplies 22 percent of the CTBTO budget, much of it devoted to the monitoring network — despite Washington’s avowed intention not to ratify the treaty.
“On the technical track, we have made a lot of progress. … We are confident now that there are no ‘white spots’ on the globe, at least with our mainstay, which is seismic detection,” said Hoffmann, drawing a link between the effectiveness of the monitoring system and prospects for new ratifications.
“The United States are very much interested in what we are doing technically, and there we are having an excellent cooperation. They are helping us, we are helping them, and the money is coming in. … We would be lost without this money; this is quite clear. … This very practical approach to the CTBT is very important for us,” Hoffman said (see GSN, Sept. 18, 2002).
Finnish envoy Tom Groenberg, who led preparations for this month’s conference, said he views the United States as bound by the CTBT under the Vienna Convention on treaties, despite its failure to ratify the test ban pact.
“We hope, of course, that they would” ratify the treaty, Groenberg said, “but this administration has indicated what the position of the current administration is.”
“If you are cynical,” he said, “you could ask yourself, ‘So what?’ … According to international law, you are bound by a treaty with your signature … as long as there is a perspective that it would enter into force — and we do have that perspective.”
“Whether you have ratified or not isn’t actually that important,” he said.
In any case, according to Hoffmann, a new multilateralism may be on the rise in Washington, signaling better times ahead for measures such as the CTBT.
“We see changes in the American position towards multilateral approaches. I mean, you see what’s happening now as far as Iraq is concerned. The Americans are approaching the U.N., and this is a question of burden-sharing,” Hoffmann said.
“For a time,” he added, “multilateralism had a bad name in the United States; this you can see across the spectrum. … Now, the pendulum seems to swing more in the direction of a multilateral approach, and if this is true for Iraq, this might become true for other areas as well.”
Citing technical and political considerations, both Hoffman and Groenberg said new U.S. tests are not necessarily imminent, and neither offered any assessment of the implications of such tests for the CTBT.
“We, of course, do hope that no tests will take place, and, of course, according to the treaty, you are not supposed to make any tests. … And there is the good old British saying that you shouldn’t cross the bridge before you have reached it,” said Groenberg.
Said Hoffmann, “I don’t think [tests are] a necessity, and I think that this might … in global politics … give the wrong signal to others, and therefore, I think the United States will weigh this very carefully. … They will always act along with their own lines of interest.”
CTBTO Pushed “Road Map,” but Some Seek More Radical Change
Under the terms of the treaty, entry into force requires signature and ratification by 44 specific countries, 32 of which have ratified. Nine others — China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States and Vietnam — have signed but not ratified, and three — North Korea, India and Pakistan — have not signed.
Several European countries have pushed for U.S. ratification during Washington visits this year, and this month’s conference ended with a call for more such diplomacy. The meeting, a biannual affair authorized under Article XIV of the treaty, yielded a declaration that included a general call for new signatures and ratifications and the proposal of 12 specific measures — including regional seminars and a heightened attention to the pact in bilateral talks involving signatories — to promote the treaty’s entry into force.
“New in the declaration,” said Groenberg, “is that it isn’t just a repetition. We do have … what you could call a … road map or an action plan. … And that, I hope, will be a kind of motor in order to get countries to do something.”
“There definitely won’t be an entry into force in the very near future,” he added, “but if you have a longer-term perspective, I think there are reasons that one could be optimistic. We are certainly going to be able to bring down the number of 12 to, I hope, less than 10, in a year or two — in a year, actually, in one year. … We have got indications that a number of countries are actually prepared now, and the obstacles are technical, not political.”
China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo appear to be among the countries cited by Groenberg. China has vowed to ratify the treaty quickly, but, as Hoffmann said, “‘Quickly’ in Chinese terms can be long in European terms. What is important now is that they say they are moving toward ratification” (see GSN, Sept. 4). Hoffmann added that, with a new D.R.C. legislature set to begin work Oct. 3, the CTBTO has “the assurance of the political leadership that they will bring this into parliament and have this ratified.”
Among the developments at this month’s meeting that could lead to more ratifications, Hoffmann cited a proposal to create a permanent special representative of the signatory states “to look after this question of entry into force … a sort of coordination point who would pull together the strings, the endeavors of different states and also coordinate with the secretariat.” He also noted that a “special fund” has been proposed “to further ratifications,” but he acknowledged that the concrete uses to which the money would be put remain unclear.
Many nongovernmental organizations appear to support such efforts. Klaus Renoldner of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War said getting the CTBT on the agenda of various bilateral meetings should be a main mechanism for exerting pressure on recalcitrant signatories. Speaking for 97 NGOs earlier this month at the CTBTO meeting, Renoldner said NGOs, governments, international organizations and members of the media should all contribute to the effort.
Calls have begun to be heard, though, for more innovative efforts to speed the treaty’s entry into force. South African representative Alfred Tokollo Moleah said Sept. 5, as the Article XIV meeting drew to a close, that his country has doubts about the effectiveness of the biannual conferences. He called this year’s meeting less “dynamic” than those held in 2001 and 1999 (see GSN, Nov. 15, 2001).
Under Article XIV, countries that have ratified the CTBT could be justified in pursuing more dramatic means than the stepped-up diplomatic measures that have been tried so far. The treaty is written in broad terms, giving countries that have ratified the ability to use Article XIV conferences to “consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process.”
Groenberg maintained that signatories are bound by the text for now and as long as there is a “perspective” of entry into force, but he added that different measures could one day become appropriate.
“We might one day, of course, face a situation where there is a need, perhaps, to do something in order to either keep the perspective or … to amend the text so that it would enter into force. … That time hasn’t yet come,” he said.
Hoffman said questions of “whether one could change this formula for entry into force or whether one should declare provisional application of the treaty” have “not been part of the official dealings of the conference,” adding, “Multilateral diplomacy is always long-term.”
The executive director added, though, that if the CTBT monitoring network is completed before the treaty enters into force, “The question arises, ‘What are we doing with this?’”
“I think only then,” he said, “we have the serious question of whether we would like to apply this treaty, with all its assets, provisionally. And for me, it’s difficult to see whether and when such a path would be taken. I mean, at the moment, the clear hope is that the Americans, among these 12, will come around and ratify the treaty at their own will and decision.”
Hoffmann added that political progress in regions such as South Asia and the Middle East could ease ratifications of the treaty independently of any U.N. or CTBTO action.
In the Middle East, he said, “it would be … important that one of the countries that play a major role would be the first to do it.” India and Pakistan, he added, “will sign” when “the train starts moving,” but for now are both observing a test moratorium.
“If India signs, then Pakistan will sign immediately. Pakistan would not feel secure enough to sign first,” Hoffmann said.
“Everybody is looking at everybody else,” he said, “and, in the long run, they probably can go together, hand in hand, to [U.N. Secretary General] Kofi Annan and hand in their instruments of ratification, to be sure that the other one is not holding back.”
In the case of Iran, which is under a deadline to step up cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and demonstrate it is not covertly developing nuclear weapons, the prospect for CTBT ratification is unclear.
“When I visited Iran,” Hoffmann said, “I met some people who really were with us, but others who were adamantly opposed to this treaty, because they thought that we just came in to spy on them. … The Iranians will have to make up their minds what they really want, but of course, foremost in their mind is the dealings with the agency at the moment.”
Renoldner, the NGO representative, cited a conversation with an Iranian delegate at recent CTBT talks, who said his country supported the treaty.
“I said to him, ‘Why didn’t you sign?’ … The answer that he gave me was not a reasonable answer,” he said.
Ultimately, the fate of the treaty could depend on the will of the United States, which under former President Bill Clinton supported ratification of the treaty. Countries that have not signed or ratified may be more likely to do so if the United States came into the fold, sources agreed.
“We can just hope,” Renoldner said, “that one day, there will be another president of the United States who maybe will restart a campaign for the CTBT again.”
Saudi Arabia has begun a strategic review that includes considering the option of acquiring nuclear weapons, the London Guardian reported today.
According to the Guardian, senior Saudi officials are currently examining such options as obtaining nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, maintaining or entering into an alliance with a nuclear-armed country for protection, or attempting to create a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone. It is unknown if Saudi officials have made any decisions on any of the three approaches.
David Albright, director of the Institute for Science and International Security, said that Saudi Arabia, if it were to choose to obtain nuclear weapons, would be more likely to buy them outright rather than attempt to build them. If Saudi Arabia were to do so, it would become the first nuclear-armed country to obtain its weapons by purchasing them, according to the Guardian.
“There [have] always been worries that the Saudis would go down this path if provoked,” Albright said. “There is growing U.S. hostility which could lead to the removal of the U.S. umbrella and will the Saudis be intimidated by Iran? They’ve got to be nervous,” he said.
A senior U.N. official involved in nuclear nonproliferation efforts said Saudi Arabia’s examination of its nuclear options would be carefully monitored.
“Our antennae are up,” the official said. “The international community can rest assured we do keep track of such events if they go beyond talk,” the official added (MacAskill/Traynor, London Guardian, Sept. 18).
Saudi Arabia today, however, denied the Guardian report.
“Saudi Arabia is not considering acquiring a nuclear bomb or nuclear weapons of any kind,” the Saudi Embassy in London said in a statement. “There is no atomic energy program in any part of the kingdom and neither is one being considered,” it said (Reuters, Sept. 18).
The Arab League yesterday submitted a draft resolution to the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, currently meeting in Vienna, calling on Israel to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to open its nuclear sites to international inspections (see GSN, July 28).
“The minimum is that Israel could sign the NPT,” Omani IAEA Ambassador Salim al-Riyami said. “All the countries in the region have signed it,” he said.
While Israel has never formally acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons, experts believe it has between 100 and 200 bombs, according to Al-Jazeera.net. Al-Riyami said it was unfair for Western countries to call on the IAEA to apply pressure on Iran while ignoring Israel’s nuclear weapons program.
“I think in the Arab region, people do think that there is a double standard regarding the countries and how (their nuclear programs) should be tackled,” al-Riyami said.
Gideon Frank, head of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, called on conference members to not support the Arab League’s resolution, saying “We see no factual basis for this draft resolution”(Al-Jazeera.net, Sept. 17).
U.S. and Israeli officials, joined by private analysts, warned yesterday that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program that threatens the Middle East, the United States and the international nonproliferation regime (see GSN, Sept. 17).
At a Washington session of the U.S.-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee, the panel of experts offered a dire outlook of Iran’s intentions.
“Iran is in fact emerging rapidly as the new mass destruction weapon threat in the Middle East. It is clear to me, at least from what I know, that if Iran continues down its present path, we will be looking at a new nuclear weapons power within the next few years,” said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.
Milhollin said Iran’s pursuit of ballistic missile technology was intended only to provide the means to deliver nuclear weapons (see GSN, Aug. 6).
Israeli Knesset member Yuval Steinitz agreed.
“The Iranian nuclear program is really a military nuclear program with the aim of threatening not just the Middle East or Israel, but NATO and Europe, and maybe to be able to target the United States of America,” he said.
A U.S. State Department official said Iran’s efforts were endangering the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other international efforts.
“If left unchallenged, Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons program will seriously weaken the NPT and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. Already faced with North Korea’s brazen disregard for its treaty obligations, the NPT would be undermined still further if Iran were able to disregard its treaty obligations in a similar way,” said Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter (Deborah Tate, VOA News, Sept. 18).
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