U.S.-Russia:  Senate Should Attach Conditions to Treaty Approval, Analyst Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A leading arms control group refused Tuesday to support ratification of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty unless the U.S. Senate attached several conditions to its approval (see GSN, July 24).  A senior analyst from the group, the Natural Resources Defense Council, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the third of a series of hearings on the agreement (see GSN, July 9 and July 18).

“As a legally binding agreement it [the treaty] is a sham, a mere ‘memorandum of conversation’ masquerading as a treaty,” said Christopher Paine, a nuclear program senior analyst with the council.  “And that raises the question of whether the Senate can or should ratify the treaty in its present form, without the addition of significant binding conditions to cure the most serious defects.”

Paine said he “was not persuaded that the document which lies before you rises to the level of what the legal profession would call a “legally cognizable” treaty obligation — that is, an agreement with binding, self-evident reciprocal obligations, such that an impartial authority, or the parties themselves, can reasonably ascertain these mutual obligations and adjudicate compliance.”

“The present agreement brings to mind an old nostrum that was once very popular with some of our Republican friends:  ‘A bad treaty is worse than having no treaty at all,’” Paine said in prepared testimony.  “It may actually be quite apt in this case.”

The Moscow Treaty imposes no limits on current or future U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, Paine said.  It also does nothing to improve storage and security of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, he said. 

The treaty mandates that both the United States and Russia reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads each, and the first article of the treaty sets a Dec. 31, 2012, deadline for both states to have done so.  That date, however, is also the same date the treaty ends, Paine said.

“Even the treaty’s sole purported limit, on ‘operationally deployed strategic warheads’ turns out to be hollow — a public relations stunt that expires the moment it enters into force,” Paine said.  “Truly, this is the kind of arms control ‘treaty’ that even [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein could love.”

Paine outlined several conditions that the Senate should impose before giving its advice and consent on the treaty. 

First, it should demand that the reductions be in place for a longer time than the treaty requires, by directing the president to accelerate the treaty reductions.  The Senate should require the United States to reach the level of 1,700 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the end of 2007, Paine said.

Second, the Senate should require the reducing the number of active reserve strategic warheads to below 1,000 within five years, Paine said.  Any warheads above this level should either be destroyed or stored in facilities to be monitored by Russia.

Third, Paine called on the Senate to require the United States to reduce its total warhead arsenal — including active and inactive warheads, both strategic and tactical — to below 3,500 within five years.

Fourth, the Senate should require that dismantled nuclear weapon materials be placed under international monitoring and that the president issue an annual report describing the status of all nuclear weapon materials that are not deployed on weapons, Paine said.

Finally, Paine urged the Senate to require its advice and consent if the president chose in the future to withdraw from the treaty (see GSN, June 12).

Only with these conditions would NRDC support the treaty’s ratification, Paine said. “Without them, we believe the treaty is, for all practical purposes, meaningless.  In that case, in order to avoid further damage to the integrity of the U.S. treaty process, we could not support ratification of the Moscow Treaty.”

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

Back to top

United States:  B-2 Fleet Is Only 42 Percent Ready, Sources Say

The U.S Air Force’s fleet of B-2 stealth bombers currently has a mission-capable rate of 42 percent, meaning only eight aircraft are ready for use at any one time, Inside the Pentagon reported today (see GSN, March 20).

Of the Air Force’s 21 B-2s, one has been heavily damaged in an accident and an additional three are in depot, according to Inside the Pentagon sources.  The remaining 17 bombers need replacement parts and must be put in “pristine condition” before they can contribute to a military operation, a defense expert said.

One of the main factors for the poor preparedness is an inability to meet stealth requirements, Air Force officials said.  The B-2’s composite skin needs intensive repairs before it meets standards, according to Inside the Pentagon.  If the stealth requirements were not a factor, then the fleet probably would have an 80 percent mission-capable rate, Air Force officials said.

A lack of Air Force specialists trained to repair the bombers’ composite skin is the main reason that stealth maintenance is lagging, according to experts.  Specialists on the composite skin divide their time between maintaining the B-2s and maintaining the service’s fleet of F-117 stealth fighters, according to Inside the Pentagon.

Last week a representative from defense contractor Northrop Grumman discussed a proposal with an advisory board to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on how the company could supplement the Air Force’s maintenance capability, sources said.  Only a few Air Force officials, however, were familiar with the proposal, Inside the Pentagon reported.

The Air Force itself has begun a B-2 “mission-capable rate improvement plan” developed by Northrop Grumman, according to service officials.  The service plans to replace current composite skin repair methods — tape and caulking materials — with a spray-on radar-absorbing material that has already been tested, according to Inside the Pentagon.  The new method is expected to save both time and money for the Air Force, and service officials have said they plan to begin using it over a period of seven years as B-2s move in and out of depot (Elaine Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, July 25).

Back to top

U.S.-Russia:  Former U.S. Officials Urge Treaty Ratification

By Kerry Boyd and Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Several former U.S. officials voiced support yesterday for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, but they recommended further implementation measures.  The officials testified before Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the third of a series of hearings on the treaty (see GSN, July 9 and July 18).

The treaty’s existence affirms that resolve in the face of harsh criticism toward U.S. foreign policy can pay off “handsomely,” said Kenneth Adelman, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in his prepared testimony.

“This treaty may be the last strategic arms accord, the culmination of 30 years of this arms control process,” Adelman said.  “It will dramatically reduce strategic nuclear weapons and increase stability.”

The Senate should vote to approve the treaty without significant amendments, former Senator Sam Nunn said in prepared testimony, adding that it “points us in the right direction.”  He expressed full support for the treaty but emphasized that the United States and Russia must follow up with concrete actions.

“If it is not followed with other substantive actions,” Nunn said regarding the treaty, “it will become irrelevant at best — counterproductive at worse.”

Nunn outlined several steps that U.S. and Russian officials should take to ensure that the treaty becomes a foundation for a new and improved relationship rather than a treaty that was “signed because it was quick and easy” and that failed to reflect any “deep commitment to thinking anew.”

Reducing Weapons

Both countries should begin taking steps to reduce operationally deployed weapons, Nunn said.

“The U.S. Department of Defense should develop and make public at the earliest possible date its own plans for reducing our ‘operationally deployed’ forces under this treaty, and I urge Russia to do the same,” Nunn said.

Retired Air Force Gen. Eugene Habiger, former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, echoed the suggestion in his prepared testimony.  U.S. officials should begin moving more strategic weapons off alert status, he said, beginning with four Ohio-class Trident submarines, all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and other strategic forces the United States plans to reduce under the treaty (see GSN, April 8 and June 3).

“If the premise of the treaty is correct — that we have embarked with the Russians on a new strategic relationship — then we should be prepared to demonstrate ‘good faith’ by standing these forces down immediately, and not making that contingent on Russian action in advance,” Habiger said.  “At the same time, the Russians should understand that the warm climate in our relations could quickly turn cold if a standdown on the U.S. side is not matched by a standdown on the Russian side.”

Reviewing Nuclear Postures

In addition, the two countries should change their nuclear postures, which have not altered since the Cold War despite significant changes in the U.S.-Russian relationship, Nunn said.  Thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons remain on high alert and are ready to launch within minutes, creating the potential for misunderstandings and mistakes that could be disastrous.

“The next step our two nations must take is to ease our fingers away from the nuclear trigger.  It’s too easy for a trigger finger to slip, too easy to think you see the other person’s trigger finger begin to squeeze,” Nunn said.

Russia and the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from hair-trigger alert, possibly beginning by ordering an immediate stand-down of the weapons that are slated to be reduced, Nunn suggested.  The two countries should also cooperate to improve Russia’s early warning capabilities, he said.

Both the United States and Russia should agree to destroy, rather than merely store in reserve, the nuclear warheads slated to be reduced under the treaty, Habiger said (see GSN, July 10).  The offered rationale for their storage — a potential worsening of U.S.-Russian relations — is “anachronistic,” he said.

“We have more than enough warheads in our active reserve to guard against all contingencies,” Habiger said.

Verifiability

Nunn and Habiger both suggested that the United States propose comprehensive transparency measures and work to make the treaty’s provisions verifiable.

“I believe that even the best-written treaties and agreements cannot accomplish their purpose unless they’re matched with transparency,” Habiger said.  “Trust is not a static thing.  It has to be built by many actions and can be destroyed by one.  It must be extended gradually, but can be withdrawn instantly.  In the end, trust must be fulfilled by transparency, which shows the trust is well placed.”

U.S. and Russian officials should allow each other to see where nuclear weapons are actually destroyed, according to Habiger.  He recommended that Russian officials should be allowed to visit the U.S. Pantex dismantlement site in exchange for reciprocal U.S. inspections, adding that the sensitivity of such sites has been “vastly overstated” (see GSN, May 2).

“The fear has always been that the inspectors would be able to pick up on the design engineering of the warheads.  My official response to that is:  ‘So what?’” Habiger said.  “The Russians don’t need our warhead information.”

Adelman, however, said the Moscow Treaty’s lack of formal verification procedures should cause little concern (see GSN, July 9).  One reason is that START I Treaty verification measures are scheduled to remain in effect until 2009, he said.  Additionally, the lack of verification measures in the Moscow Treaty will allow U.S. intelligence agencies to focus on more important missions such as tracking terrorists, he added.

The United States also is able to make judgments on Russian compliance with the treaty even with a lack of verification measures, Adelman said.  During the Cold War-era, the United States knew that the former Soviet Union had violated the Biological Weapons Convention, he added.

“We reached this conclusion when the U.S.S.R. was a closed society,” Adelman said.  “It is far easier to monitor treaty compliance in a fairly open society, as Russia has become.”

Tactical Weapons

Nunn and Habiger urged the United States and Russia to find ways to ensure accurate accounting and safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons, which, Nunn said, arms control treaties have never covered (see GSN, May 29).

Citing Russia’s estimated arsenal of 12,000-18,000 tactical warheads, Habiger said he supports formation of a treaty to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons (see GSN, May 29).  Such weapons pose an attractive target to terrorists attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction, he said.

Safeguards

The United States should continue to provide assistance to safeguard and destroy Russian weapons of mass destruction through the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs, Nunn said.  He expressed concern that the Bush administration put some of that work on hold when it decided not to certify Russian compliance with certain arms control treaties — a requirement for Nunn-Lugar assistance.  Nunn urged Congress to grant the president the authority to wave the requirement (see GSN, May 9).

In an attempt to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Russia must launch a “Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism,” Nunn said.

“Terrorists and certain states are racing to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and we ought to be racing together to stop them,” Nunn said.

“There is only thing in the world that can destroy the United States of America today — and that is Russian nuclear warheads,” Habiger told the committee.  “That is why this treaty and all these follow-on steps ... are so essential to our security.  I want the children of tomorrow to know about nuclear missiles on alert, huge stockpiles of warheads, poorly guarded weapons materials and unknown numbers of tactical nuclear weapons.  But I want them to read about it in the history books, not the newspapers.”

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

U.S. Defense Department CTR Site

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

START I Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

Back to top

Russia:  Air Force to Acquire New Tu-160 Strategic Bombers

According to the Russian newspaper Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, the Russian Air Force plans to increase its arsenal of Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers, Defense and Security reported today (see GSN, July 9).

Russian Air Force Col. Gen. Vladimir Mikhaliov made the announcement during a visit in March to the Kazan Aircraft Production Association, which is currently building three Tu-160s.  Builders will probably complete the first of the three by the beginning of next year, the Obozrenie reported.  Once the three bombers are completed, Russia will have 18 Tu-160s, which are expected to remain in service until 2030.

The increase in Tu-160s is not to be seen as an attempt to increase Russia’s nuclear warfare capability, according to the Obozrenie.  Instead, planners envision the bombers as increasing the Russian Air Force’s ability to attack remote targets with precision-guided weapons, the Obozrenie reported.

Once the three new Tu-160s are complete, the aircraft association plans to refit the 15 existing bombers to carry long-range cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads, according to the Obozrenie.  Officials said they plan to equip the bombers with new electronics systems that would enable them to carry the KH-555 cruise missile and possibly the KH-101 super-long-range missile, which is currently being developed (see GSN, May 20; S. Sokut, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie/Defense and Security, July 24).

Back to top

Iran-Russia:  Russia Prepares to Take Bushehr Waste

Russian Mining and Chemical Complex officials in Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk, have been preparing to receive spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which Russia is constructing in Iran, Nuclear Waste News reported July 11 (see GSN, July 15).

The Russian facility, which plans to take the spent fuel after it has cooled for three years in Iran, will probably store the waste for several more years before reprocessing it, the News reported.  Once engineers have vitrified the waste, Russia plans to return it to Iran for final disposal, Zheleznogorsk chief engineer Yuri Revenko said.  The International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to monitor the entire operation, Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valeriy Lebedev said.

Russian officials also have conducted an exercise in which they simulated a transportation accident involving special units of the Russian Emergencies Ministry, Minatom nuclear experts and employees of the complex and the Krasnoyarsk railway, the News reported.

Some Russian environmentalists have criticized the arrangement, according to the News.  For example, Greenpeace coordinator Ivan Blokov has charged that Russia does not have the capability to import and store spent fuel from another country (Judith Perera, Nuclear Waste News, July 11).

Back to top

China:  Beijing Demonstrates Missile Defense Countermeasures

China recently test-launched a medium-range ballistic missile equipped with multiple dummy warheads to counter a missile defense system, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, July 15).

Early this month, developers launched a CSS-5 medium-range missile from a base in southern China, according to officials familiar with the intelligence report.  U.S. intelligence sources tracked the missile to an impact range in Western China 1,300 miles from the launch site, according to the Times.  The CSS-5 is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead with a yield as large as 300 kilotons, the Times reported.

Satellite photos of the missile’s target area indicate that, in addition to the main warhead, six or seven dummy warheads hit the range.  Such mock warheads could be capable of diverting a missile interceptor, the Times reported.  The CSS-5, also known as the Dongfeng 21, is an advanced Chinese weapons system designed for use against Taiwan or U.S. military forces in Asia, said Richard Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military with the Jamestown Foundation.  The missile is equipped with a precision-guided warhead and probably utilizes a Global Positioning System for targeting, he said.

The dummies indicate that the Chinese military is developing measures to defeat regional missile defense systems in Asia such as those being developed by the Untied States and Japan, intelligence analysts said (see GSN, July 12).

“We’ve known since 1996 that this missile had a terminally guided warhead that is capable of extreme accuracy,” Fisher said.  “The emergence of penetration aids all points to the (CSS-5) as a highly survivable and accurate missile that will have the capability of defeating future American theater missile defenses” (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, July 23).

Back to top

India-Pakistan:  Kalam Reaffirms No-First-Use

India’s nuclear arsenal is secure and the country plans to continue its no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons, President-elect Abdul Kalam said recently (see GSN, July 18).

“Nuclear command and control is mostly for deployment,” Kalam wrote in response to questions from the Wall Street Journal.  “Regarding the accidents, necessary safety procedures and protocols are in place.  With [India’s] nuclear weapons policy of ‘no-first-use,’ India is strong in both,” Kalam wrote.

Kalam, who is considered the father of the country’s missile program, is expected to be inaugurated president Thursday.  The position of Indian president is mostly ceremonial, but Kalam’s responsibilities technically are to include acting as commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, July 22).

U.S. Employees Return

Meanwhile, U.S. government employees and their families have received permission to return to India after leaving the country in June, the U.S. State Department said today (see GSN, June 3).

“Although the risk of renewed, increased tensions between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out, tensions have subsided,” the department statement said, adding that U.S. citizens should not travel to the Indian-Pakistani border or the disputed Kashmir region.

Officials had previously issued a warning advising Americans to leave India because there was a “small chance” of nuclear war between the two rivals, U.S. Ambassador Robert Blackwill said (Associated Press/New York Times, July 22).

Straw Fails to Win Promises

In Pakistan Saturday, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that India and Pakistan have made progress since tensions were particularly high in May, but “more needs to be done” (Ian Fisher, New York Times, July 21).

Pakistan told Straw, however, that it is unwilling to make new promises to try to achieve peace with India, according to the Times of India.

“Islamabad has already taken measures that it could take to ease tensions, and it is not prepared to do more,” Pakistani official Inamul Haq said (Press Trust of India/Times of India, July 22).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell is expected to arrive in Pakistan July 28 after visiting India (Fisher, New York Times, July 21).

For further information, see:

Stimson Center Background on Kashmir

Pakistani Embassy to the United States

Indian Embassy to the United States

Back to top

About Newswire  |  Contact National Journal  |  Re-Use Guidelines

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  GET INVOLVED  |  SITE MAP