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This weeks Weapons of Mass Destruction stories for Friday, August 23, 2002.
Iraq: U.K. Advocates Returning Inspectors, Not Ousting HusseinBritish Foreign Secretary Jack Straw indicated a departure from U.S. policy yesterday in statements regarding British goals in Iraq. The United Kingdom is not aiming to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power but rather to return U.N. weapons inspectors to the country, Straw told the BBC Today radio program. Returning inspectors would be the best way to respond to the potential threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, he said (see GSN, Aug. 16). “If my prayers were answered,” Straw said, Hussein would be “removed by divine intervention.” However, removing Hussein from power “is not an object of British foreign policy” (see GSN, May 10). U.S. President George W. Bush has repeatedly said that U.S. policy is to promote a regime change. Returning inspectors would not be sufficient to reduce the threat, Bush has said, although he added Wednesday that he remains open to nonmilitary means to remove Hussein. Both Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have faced internal opposition to military action against Iraq. Several members of Blair’s Labor Party, in addition to the Conservative and Liberal parties, have said they would not support attacking Iraq (Suzanne Kapner, New York Times, Aug. 23). Bush has not explained why military action is necessary or what to do with Iraq after removing Hussein, Labor Party member Gerald Kaufman said. The Bush administration does not understand the potential dangers of attacking Iraq, he wrote in an article for the Spectator, according to the Baltimore Sun. Other European Countries Oppose Attack France also has expressed serious doubts about any plan to attack Iraq, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has said that Germany will not be involved in Bush’s “adventure” (see GSN, July 31). “What has been lacking in Germany and all of Europe is any discussion about what Iraq would look like after any military action, and that requires a leadership that so far people heave not seen,” according to Frank Umbach, an analyst at the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Affairs (Todd Richissin, Baltimore Sun, Aug. 23). Saudi Reaction Top Saudi military officials have tentatively agreed to come to the United States this autumn for high-level defense talks that have been postponed since last summer, a senior defense official said. Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, has denied use of its territory as a base for an attack but has not yet firmly said whether it would allow U.S. airplanes to use its air space (see GSN, Aug. 8; Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 23). Iraqi Opposition Groups Meet Meanwhile, in one attempt to bring Iraqi opposition groups together to support a potential overthrow of Hussein and plan for a transitional government, the CIA brought Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani — the leaders of the two main Kurdish opposition groups in northern Iraq — to the United States in April to discuss cooperation in an effort to overthrow Hussein, the Christian Science Monitor reported today (see GSN, Aug. 9). Talabani and Barzani, however, have expressed skepticism about such cooperation, particularly since the United States encouraged the groups to fight against Hussein twice before but then abandoned the effort, according to the Monitor (see GSN, Aug. 14). Administration officials are hoping six opposition groups that have agreed to meet in Europe next month will find a way to cooperate, the Monitor reported (Bowers/Grier, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 23). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime) U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)
Israeli Response: Country Prepares for Potential Iraqi WMD AttackIsrael has been accelerating efforts to defend against a WMD attack as concerns rise that a U.S. attack on Iraq might unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel, the Washington Post reported today. Israeli hospitals and emergency response teams have been practicing drills in preparation for several potential crises, including an attack with conventional missiles or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, Israeli Health Ministry Director General Boaz Lev said. During the last few weeks, the 30 gas mask distribution centers in Israel have received 5,000 new requests each day for new gas masks or trade-ins on masks that were issued during the Gulf War. Israel is adding iodine pills — which protect the thyroid gland against some of the effects of radioactive fallout — to the gas mask kits (see GSN, Aug. 14). In addition, Israel decided Wednesday to vaccinate 15,000 emergency workers against smallpox because of concerns Iraq might have weaponized the disease (see GSN, Aug. 21). Beyond providing gas masks and vaccinations, the Israeli military has stepped up efforts to expand the Arrow 2 system, which Israel and the United States have developed jointly to protect the country against missiles (see related GSN story today). Israel has also said it would respond militarily to any Iraqi attack and not restrain from retaliation as it did during the Gulf War when Iraq struck the country with conventional missiles (see GSN, Aug. 16). “What I told the Americans, and I repeat: ‘Don’t expect us to continue to live with the process of restraint. If they hit us, we reserve the right of response,’” Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer told the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Aharonoth, according to the Post (Molly Moore, Washington Post, Aug. 23). For further information, see: Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Smallpox Federation of American Scientists Background on Arrow
U.S.-Russia: Russian Weapons Scientists Study Radiological ThreatsBy Bryan Bender Energy’s Office of Nonproliferation and its National Nuclear Security Administration last week said they plan to award a one-year contract to the Russian Analytical Center for Nonproliferation, which was created to foster the conversion of the Soviet Union’s vast nuclear weapons complex. The contract is funded under the Nuclear Cities Initiative, a program to aid the transition to peace in Russia’s 10 nuclear cities. Using scientists and materials from the former Soviet nuclear cities of Sarov and Snezhnisk, the center plans to study and make recommendations on the potential threat from actinides, a series of radioactive metallic elements known for their radioactive instability. “The proposed effort fulfills the objective of NCI closed nuclear cities to engage scientists, engineers and technologists in nonproliferation and conversion activities,” according to an Aug. 13 Energy Department announcement. Some of the actinide elements — which include actinium, thorium, protactinium, uranium, neptunium, plutonium, americium, curium, berkelium, californium, einsteinium, fermium, mendelevium, nobelium and lawrencium — are found in nature, but others have only been synthesized in nuclear reactions. The one-year study calls for an intermediate report as well as final recommendations and a draft protocol for how to restrict extraction of actinides from spent nuclear fuel for uses such as makeshift radiological weapons. U.S. officials are increasingly concerned about the threat of radiological weapons, including a conventional explosive mated with radioactive materials, commonly referred to as a “dirty bomb.” They have taken a variety of steps to better secure such materials, both at home and abroad, particularly those such as cesium that are widely used in industrial activities and medical facilities. Now they are using the Nuclear Cities Initiative as another means of assessing what is considered to be the growing threat of radiological attack from terrorist groups and other nonstate actors. Of the nuclear cities that will be involved in the actinides study, the Sarov facility, formerly known as Arzamas-16, houses elements of the Federal Nuclear Center and Avangard Electromechanical Plant, while Snezhinsk, formerly known as Chelyabinsk-70, is also part of the Federal Nuclear Center. Russia created the Analytical Center for Nonproliferation to help take advantage of the U.S. nonproliferation aid. The new Energy contract comes as the department is seeking to expand its nonproliferation efforts in general. The Bush administration has requested $1.1 billion for Energy nonproliferation programs in fiscal 2003, $86 million more than last year. The funds will go for a variety of programs, including $448 million for plutonium disposition, $233 million for materials protection control and accounting in Russia and $39 million for the Nuclear Cities Initiative. The new work for Russian weapons scientists also comes as one of the original sponsors of U.S. weapons aid in the former Soviet Union, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), visits Russia this week to see some of the U.S. programs first-hand (see GSN, Aug. 19). Before leaving on his trip, Lugar highlighted the importance of supporting peaceful pursuits for Russian weapons scientists, noting that U.S. efforts so far have provided them only with short-term employment. “Tens of thousands of Russian weapon scientists have been employed by the U.S. in peaceful pursuits under the International Science and Technology Centers and the IPP program at the Department of Energy,” Lugar told reporters July 24. “These programs are critical to U.S. security. If desperation and bankruptcy become the norm, many weapons experts might leave Russia and renew their weapons careers.” “I encourage U.S. corporations and those from G-8 states to explore the possibility of purchasing or investing in Russian laboratories,” Lugar said. “Only when these scientists have long-term employment in peaceful pursuits and succeed in domestic and international markets, will we be able to scale back our efforts.”
U.S. Response I: Advisers Gather to Discuss Security, Defense PlansU.S. President George W. Bush is expected to meet with senior officials tomorrow to discuss plans to accelerate development of a U.S. missile defense system and other security and defense issues (see GSN, Aug. 19). The meeting will probably not include any discussions on potential U.S. military action against Iraq, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said (see GSN, Aug. 19). “Now, can I guarantee you that that word will never come up? No, of course not,” he said. “But the purpose of the meeting, the focus of the meeting, is much bigger than that.” Bush is expected to receive updates on missile defense program timetables from Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during the meeting at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers are also expected to attend the meeting. Another potential topic for discussion is the recent discovery by CNN of an al-Qaeda videotape collection that shows scenes of experiments with crude chemical weapons, according to the Washington Times (see GSN, Aug. 19). “It’s another reminder of the type of enemy that we face in the war on terror,” Fleischer said. “This underscores why it’s so important to pursue the war on terror and to win it” (Bill Sammon, Washington Times, Aug. 20). For further information, see: Federation of American Scientists Information on Chemical Weapons
U.S. Response II: Sandia Develops Software to Simulate AttackThe U.S. Sandia National Laboratories plans to make new simulation software available to public agencies in the next few months to help plan for potentially disastrous WMD situations such as a biological attack or nuclear blast, the San Francisco Chronicle reported yesterday. The program, called Weapons of Mass Destruction Decisions Analysis Center, simulates possible situations, such an apparent flu outbreak that begins to look like an anthrax attack, and provides the user with relevant information, including charts showing the number of deaths and which hospitals have the most patients. When the simulation is complete, the program provides different possible outcomes.
U.S.-Russia: Lugar Pushes to Visit Closed Russian FacilityBy Bryan Bender Lugar — the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who co-authored 1991 Nunn-Lugar legislation creating the Cooperative Threat Reduction program — is planning to travel to Russia this week to observe U.S.-funded programs for destroying former Soviet strategic weapons and for shifting weapons laboratories to peaceful pursuits. Although Lugar has expressed hope Russia will allow him to visit the Kirov 200 laboratory when he travels there Aug. 28, the visit “is still unconfirmed,” his office said today. Lauding strengthened international commitment to addressing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere (see GSN, June 28), Lugar last month was optimistic he could help unlock the “mystery of the biological situation.” Theories differ on why Russia has prohibited U.S. or other Western officials from seeing the four weapons facilities, believed to be the heart of the Soviet military’s advanced efforts to develop deadly pathogens during the Cold War. Experts’ views range from a dissatisfaction with U.S. reciprocity at its own nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities — Russian access to U.S. facilities has been almost nonexistent — to what Lugar considers simple embarrassment over the utterly macabre nature of the Soviet program, suspected of developing “designer” and exponentially more deadly pathogens. Any embarrassment may also signal decades of Soviet violations of the 1969 Biological Weapons Convention. Lugar is to arrive in Russia Wednesday and remain more than a week to meet with top Russian officials and visit weapons facilities and laboratories that are recipients of U.S. nonproliferation aid. He plans to first visit nuclear and biological laboratories near St. Petersburg, according to the official itinerary. He then plans to travel to submarine dismantlement facilities at SevMash and Zvezdochka, near Severodvinsk, where 41 ballistic missile submarines and 612 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers are being dismantled under Nunn-Lugar programs. SevMash is the site where crews are destroying Typhoon class submarines, which can carry 200 nuclear weapons (see GSN, July 16). Lugar is also scheduled to visit the Atomflot shipyard near Murmansk to view radiological monitoring and waste disposal programs and review more submarine dismantlement efforts at the Nerpa Shipyard. In the Moscow area, Lugar plans to tour biological facilities where Nunn-Lugar funds are employing former weapons scientists in vaccine research and treatment for diseases such as brucellosis and anthrax (see GSN, June 3). Before visiting Kirov 200, Lugar plans to view neutralization facilities and missile-cutting operations at the Surovatilka Missile Elimination Dismantlement and Storage Facility, where SS-24 ICBMs and their launch canisters are destroyed (see GSN, Aug. 12). A second facility is eliminating SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and launchers. Lugar will wrap up the trip Aug. 29 with a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and the head of the Russian general staff. “Our allies have committed to joining the U.S. in addressing critical proliferation threats emanating from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere,” Lugar told reporters last month, “but the future is not assured.” [EDITOR'S NOTE: Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.] For further information, see: U.S. Defense Department CTR Site U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Nonproliferation Programs in Russia (May 24, 2002) U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Nuclear Materials Reduction (May 24, 2002) U.S.-Russia Joint Declaration on Cooperation (May 24, 2002) BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)
Threat Assessment: Intelligence Agencies Ruled Out WMD Attack in 1960sBy David Ruppe The Soviet Union or China, furthermore, could possibly have smuggled and used a nuclear weapon but would have been similarly deterred by the risks of retaliation, the agencies concluded. The conclusions are provided in a 1968 national intelligence estimate of the likelihood of the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the United States. The State Department released the report — most of it declassified — Wednesday as part of a new history on the foreign and national security policies of the Johnson administration. Non-U.S. powers would have to calculate that the U.S. military would not be destroyed by an attack with a smuggled weapon of mass destruction, the report says, and the presence of a smuggled weapon of mass destruction in the country might not deter Washington from overwhelming retaliation. “In considering the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the United States,” the report says, “enemy leaders would have to weigh any possible advantages against the grave consequences which would follow from discovery. Despite all precautions there would always be risk of detection arising not only from specific U.S. security measures, but also from the chance of U.S. penetration of the clandestine apparatus, the defection of an agent or sheer accident.” “The enemy leaders would almost certainly judge that use of this tactic would be regarded by the United States as a warlike act, if not as a cause for war, and that it would precipitate an international political crisis of the first magnitude,” according to the report. The report indicates a certain confidence that the United States had during the Cold War in its capability of deterrence through the prospect of retaliation, national security experts have said. That confidence, some said, might still be valid today in dissuading most countries, but it might not apply to “nonstate” terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or to a cornered regime such as that of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. “The same basic calculus exists today. I have always felt that the likelihood of a major state smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States is highly unlikely,” said Matthew Bunn, a senior research associate on nuclear weapons issues at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Even someone like Saddam Hussein has frequently shown he shrinks back at the prospect of having his regime completely obliterated. So I think a much greater concern is that terrorists would acquire some sort of nuclear explosive or radiological materials,” he said. Chemical and Biological Weapons “Virtually any industrial nation” could produce chemical and biological agents and introduce them clandestinely into the United States in relatively small quantities, the report says. “We do not believe, however, that any potential enemy would plan the clandestine use of BW [biological weapons] or CW [chemical weapons] on a scale sufficient to achieve strategic military objectives,” it says. The report does not rule out the possibility of a country using biological or chemical weapons “for sabotage and other special purposes for which they could be very effective.” It says, however, that a foreign power could “without great difficulty or risk of detection” covertly produce such weapons in the United States. “Therefore we consider that their clandestine introduction would be unnecessary, and unlikely in view of the risks involved,” it says. Nuclear Weapons The report devotes the most attention to questions of a nuclear smuggling threat. It concludes the Soviets could have introduced nuclear weapons clandestinely into the country, and might consider doing so if they were to plan a deliberate surprise attack. It would not, however, be worth the risk, the report concludes. “Considering the large numbers of strategic weapons now in their arsenal, however, the Soviets would see the contribution of a clandestine emplacement effort as marginal and would consider any advantages it offered as outweighed by the risks of jeopardizing surprise and of precipitating a U.S. preemptive attack,” it says. China in the late 1960s lacked any other means of attacking the United States with nuclear weapons and so might have considered introducing a weapon clandestinely to deter a U.S. attack, the report says. But China’s capabilities for doing so at that time were far less than those of the Soviets, it says, adding that Beijing lacked formal diplomatic relations with the United States, Canada or Mexico. “They could not be sure that the United States would be deterred and they would have to consider that detection might result in, rather than stave off, a devastating U.S. strike,” the report says. The report also rules out the possibility the Soviet Union or China would ask a third country such as Cuba to accept such a dangerous assignment of smuggling in a nuclear weapon, and that such a country would accept. “We consider this unlikely,” it says. The only other foreign powers at the time with nuclear weapons were Britain and France, and the report says they would probably not smuggle a weapon into the United States. Difficulties of Detection U.S. leaders have been concerned about nuclear smuggling since the early years of the Cold War, Bunn said. “In the early days, because the Soviet Union didn’t have missiles or bombers that could reach the United States, the notion of bombs smuggled into the United States was considered one of the bigger security threats from nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union,” he said. In a famous incident in the 1950s, former Manhattan Project scientific director Robert Oppenheimer was asked at a congressional hearing how authorities would detect a nuclear weapon in an incoming shipping crate. The answer was “with a screwdriver.” During the closed session of an earlier hearing, Oppenheimer was asked whether three or four men could smuggle components of a nuclear weapon into New York City and blow it up. “Of course it could be done,” he replied. The Atomic Energy Commission then commissioned a panel to study how to detect and prevent nuclear weapons from being smuggled into the country. It became known as the Screwdriver Report and remains classified today. The 1968 report says a low-yield nuclear warhead could be smuggled across a border “without great difficulty” and that a larger weapon could be detonated aboard a fishing boat or merchant ship, presumably in a harbor. The National Academies of Sciences concluded in a June 26 report that if terrorists were to explode a nuclear weapon, the United States does not presently have the capabilities in place to identify the source of the weapon or to respond sufficiently to such a disaster (See GSN, June 26). The Screwdriver Report did lead to some forerunners of technology used today, such as nuclear material detectors, but fundamental challenges remain, Bunn said, adding that U.S. borders are long, many people cross them each year and technical difficulties in detecting radioactive material are great. “The laws of physics are such that you just can’t detect this material from very far away and you can’t detect it very well if it is shielded, and unfortunately for the world, plutonium and uranium just aren’t that radioactive,” he said. “And of course it’s not possible to inspect every shipment that enters the United States with a nuclear material detector.” Consequently, a major U.S. approach to detection, Bunn said, “is to try to figure out a large category of imported objects with which you don’t have to bother, because they are considered low-risk.”
Iraq: Sabri Renews Invitation; Diplomats SkepticalIraq reiterated its offer Friday to allow the head U.N. weapons inspector to visit Baghdad and discuss the terms of future inspections. The United Nations provided no formal response, but diplomats expressed doubt that the latest invitation would persuade U.N. leaders to send inspectors to Iraq (see GSN, Aug. 7). Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri agreed to discuss “practical arrangements” for returning inspectors in a letter Thursday to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, according to a senior diplomat who saw the letter. U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission head Hans Blix has said discussions should focus on “technical” issues. “We reiterate our invitation to the U.N. Secretariat to come to Iraq. We are saying that whatever Blix has on his mind — the practical issues related to his future work — we are ready to discuss it,” said Iraqi Ambassador Muhammad Duri, who delivered Sabri’s letter to Annan. Sabri said the U.N. officials would have to identify what they were searching for before they could resume inspections. In response to an earlier invitation from Iraq, Annan wrote in an Aug. 6 letter that Iraq must comply with Security Council rules for inspections. The council has demanded that Iraq allow inspectors to return unconditionally (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Aug. 17). Inspectors Waiting, Blix Says The U.N. inspection team is “very eager to start inspections” in Iraq, Blix said Sunday in an interview on BBC Breakfast with Frost. “We would be very glad to discuss with the Iraqis the practical arrangements — like where were to land in Baghdad — where are inspectors to be lodged and the communications and so forth. But the Iraqis have so far not been interested in discussing that. I hope they will be,” Blix said. The Security Council plan calls for inspectors to visit Iraq for two months and then present the important issues to the council for its approval, “not to the Iraqis for approval,” Blix said. “So far the Iraqis have not given a sign that they are ready for inspection, but it may well happen,” he added. Inspections are important to determine whether Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, Blix said. “I'm not assuming at all that the Iraqis have retained weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it would evidently be naive of me to conclude that they don't,” he said (BBC Breakfast with Frost, Aug. 18). Bush Says He Is Listening to Opponents … Meanwhile, U.S. President George W. Bush said Friday that he is listening “very carefully” to Republicans who have expressed concern that the administration might decide to attack Iraq, but he added that “I’ll be making up my mind based upon the latest intelligence and how best to protect our own country plus our friends and allies” (see GSN, Aug. 16). Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who served during Bush’s father’s presidency, have expressed caution against attacking Iraq to oust President Saddam Hussein (Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times, Aug. 17). Retired U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the allied forces during the 1991 Gulf War campaign against Iraq, has added his voice to those who oppose a unilateral U.S. campaign, the London Times reported today. The 1991 campaign’s success was based on a broad international coalition, Schwarzkopf said. Attacking Iraq would not be easy, “but it would be much more effective if we didn’t have to do it alone,” he said, adding that an invasion would require launching points from Kuwait, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has refused to allow U.S. forces to use its territory for an invasion (see GSN, Aug. 8). Wesley Clark, the retired general who led the NATO alliance during the Kosovo campaign, has also said the United States should not try to invade Iraq without international cooperation (Reid/Cecil, London Times, Aug. 19). Rebuilding Suspected Chemical Weapons Sites While international and U.S. officials debate inspections and military action, Iraq has been rebuilding its Fullujah I, II and III chemical facilities near Habbaniyah, northwest of Baghdad, the New York Post reported today. The United States bombed the sites in 1991 because they produced precursor chemicals that Iraq used to make nerve gas agents, according to the Post. Recent photos taken by the commercial satellite company Digital Globe show that Iraq has rebuilt the sites and constructed large storage facilities, the Post reported (see GSN, Aug. 13; Niles Lathem, New York Post, Aug. 19). U.S. Military Buildup Meanwhile, the U.S. Defense Department is sending to the Middle East large amounts of weapons and supplies that would be necessary for supporting military action against Iraq, the New York Times reported today. Supply efforts do not indicate an imminent attack against Iraq, senior Defense officials said. Some of the work was ordered months or years ago, and some is replenishing U.S. supplies after the Afghanistan campaign, they said. Building up U.S. forces in the region, however, might be a way to demonstrate that the United States would win any fight, U.S. officials said. U.S. planners want to convince the Iraqis responsible for weapons of mass destruction and missiles that using those weapons would result in severe punishment, according to the Times (Schmitt/Shanker, New York Times, Aug. 19). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime) U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)
U.S. Response: Bush Administration Approves Federal Worker Evacuation PlanThe Bush administration has approved a plan to begin evacuating all federal workers within 15 minutes of any attack or threat of an attack with weapons of mass destruction, the Washington Post reported Saturday (see GSN, Aug. 15). The Federal Emergency Decision and Notification Protocol authorizes the Office of Personnel Management, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the General Services Administration to release as many as 350,000 federal workers in Washington and 1.8 million throughout the United States once a threat has been confirmed. The evacuation decision would then launch a series of bulletins to news media, U.S. agencies and officials in Washington, Maryland and Virginia. “You just don’t know what might happen next,” said a U.S. official familiar with the plan. “Who knows? But next time, we feel we’ll be better prepared, and there won’t be a director saying, ‘Get hold of the mayor, get hold of local government,’ and we can’t deliver on it but still as a federal agency have to act.” The three agencies have also established 24-hour operations centers that are in continuous contact with the FBI, antiterrorism task forces and law enforcement. Crucial government employees in executive positions have been given communications equipment and emergency call lists, officials familiar with the plan said. The evacuation notification plan has been drilled down to take no more than 15 minutes, OPM spokesman Scott Hatch said. “We have this (initial) official notice to the emergency agencies simply to allow them — even if it’s two, three, four, five minutes — to give them as much advance time as we can,” Hatch said (Spencer Hsu, Washington Post, Aug. 17).
International Response: Rumsfeld, Ivanov Discuss Preparations for September MeetingU.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov last week discussed preparations for a meeting of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security in September (see GSN, June 21). Rumsfeld and Ivanov agreed that the meeting, to be held in Washington, should focus on security guarantees, arms proliferation and the war on terrorism (RFE/RL NewsLine, Aug. 16). “We agreed on practical preparations for a consultative meeting of the Russian and U.S. defense and foreign ministers,” Ivanov said (ITAR-Tass, Aug. 15, in FBIS-SOV, Aug. 15).
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