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Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China
Background:
Between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese Imperial Army deployed and used chemical weapons (CW) in China. Estimates of CW attacks in China during this period range from 889 to 2,900. Prior to 1945, Japan produced an estimated seven million chemical munitions, for which four million are currently unaccounted. Scholars have deduced that by 1945 the Japanese Imperial Army had used CW in China more than in any other country, contributing to an estimated 80,000 injuries and 10,000 fatalities during WWII, as well as 2,000 casualties since the end of the war. [Peter O'Meara Evans, "Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China," September 1997, BICC Paper Series (No. 13), p. 2].
At the Conference on Disarmament in 1992, China issued a paper presenting details regarding abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) in China. Two million CW munitions were estimated to have been abandoned on Chinese territory and another 300,000 CW munitions were either destroyed or preliminarily treated. The two million CW munitions amounted to an estimated 100 tons; the 300,000 CW munitions that were destroyed totaled approximately 20 tons. ["Some information on discovered chemical weapons abandoned in China by a foreign State," CD/1127, 18 February 1992.]
Most CW abandoned in China consist of a mustard gas-lewisite mixture and were abandoned primarily in the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin. Approximately 90 percent of the CW Japan abandoned are located near Dunhua, Jilin Province. ACWs were also discovered in Shanxi, Hebei, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Jiangsu Provinces as well as in the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. ["Japan to Send Chemical Weapon Survey Team to China," Jiji Press News wire, 20 May 1997.] Based on the 1999 estimate of the corroded and malformed ACWs already unearthed, 18% still contained explosives and 53% still contained chemical agents. All of the chemical agents fit into one of the following categories: "Yellow munitions (Mustard, Lewisite), Red munitions (Diphenylcyanoarsine, Diphenylchloroarsine), Red canisters, Green canisters (Chloroacetophenone) and drum cans containing Yellow agents."
Recognizing that once the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into force it would address the ACW issue, in 1991 China and Japan began to hold fact-finding missions and started to address the legal, political, and financial aspects of ACW in China. By 2003, 23 fact-finding missions had taken place. During the sixth mission in late May 1996, the Japanese authorities estimated that 700,000 ACW in Jilin Province were of Japanese origin. ["Japan to Send Chemical Weapon Survey Team to China," Jiji Press News wire, 20 May 1997.] However, Chinese officials dispute the Japanese estimate arguing that some 2 million ACWs are in China. Based on stipulation of the CWC, there is a "rough" deadline of 2007 for Japan to complete the cleanup of ACW sites in China. However, Japan feels this date is unrealistic given the scale of the operation, and Japanese officials are expected to seek a five-year extension. According to the CWC, the extension can be granted only with China's consent. ["Japan, China agreed on Abandoned Chemical Weapons, not setting deadline", Asahi Shimbun , 5/7/99]
ACW and the CWC:
As the State Party on whose territory CW were abandoned, China is the Territorial State Party (TSP) under the CWC. As the State Party who abandoned CW on another State Party's territory after 1925, Japan is the Abandoning State Party (ASP). In the case of ACW in China, Japan as the ASP is obligated to destroy the CW it abandoned on Chinese territory by April 2007. This date can be postponed with the approval of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council, and could very well be extended considering the size of the alleged ACW cache and the technological challenges to destroying ACW. As the Territorial State Party (TSP), China is obligated to cooperate with the ASP as Japan assumes financial and technical responsibilities for the safe removal or destruction of ACW in China. [Verification Annex of the CWC, Part IV (B), Section B, "Regime for Abandoned Chemical Weapons.]
Japan and China have agreed that the ACW will be destroyed in China and that Japan will finance their safe destruction. Japan's latest estimates have the cost of clean-up at around US $1.6 billion dollars (200 billion yen). However, this figure is still based upon the Japanese estimate of 700,000 abandoned shells and not the Chinese estimate of 2 million abandoned shells. The technology to be used for destruction. Since Japan does not have the capability to destroy chemical weapons, it will need to depend on foreign technology. As Japan is the Abandoning State Party, Tokyo holds that it is Japan's responsibility to chose the technology and firm that will undertake the destruction process. Japan has also indicated that it realizes the importance of consulting with the Chinese authorities on these issues. At the same time, since the destruction of the abandoned chemical weapons will take place on Chinese territory, China argued that it should take a key role in addressing these difficult issues. ["Japan's Chemical Arms Disposal in China to Top $683M," Inside China Today, 14 August 1998.] Negotiations between the two states continued, and in 2003 the Japanese government announced at the First Review Conference of the CWC that the agreement had been reached on some of the important logistical issues. According to a Japanese Paper released on 25 April 2003:
"[I]n April 2003, Japanese and Chinese experts agreed on the selection of main technologies for the ACW destruction. Both sides also agreed on the location of the destruction plant, which will be in the vicinity of Haerbaling. Currently, experts from both sides are studying environmental standards to be applied to the destruction process with a view to agreeing on them soon."
The paper released by the Japanese delegation at the 2003 Review Conference also described Tokyo's efforts to destroy ACWs in China, as well as the technical difficulties it faced due to the age and decrepit state of many of the weapons. It suggested that the Verification Annex of the CWC be applied more flexibly in Japan's case, considering the unique nature of the task. This would indicate that Japan may want to request an extension on its 2007 deadline at a later stage. Despite these difficulties, Japan reported some success in recovering ACWs. According to the paper, Japan has conducted 23 ACW-site investigations since 1991, and, with cooperation from China, has carried out excavation and recovery operations in Beian City, Heilongjiang Province; Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province; and Sunwu County, Heilongjiang Province. ACWs recovered during these operations were moved to temporary storehouses in China. These storehouses, in accordance with CWC provisions, received eight initial OPCW inspections. In addition, three OPCW inspections were carried out at burial sites while excavation was in progress, allowing inspectors to view the ACWs before they were sealed in protective containers.
According to China's Report on CWC Implementation released at the Review Conference:
"The OPCW [had between 1997 and 2003] conducted 16 on-site inspections of the sites of the Japanese ACWs, which have all confirmed Japan as the Abandoning State, a fact consistent with the relevant Chinese declarations."
Other Progress and Developments:
In April 1999, the Japanese government established the Abandoned Chemical Weapon (ACW) Office in order to implement its commitments; this step was taken as a direct result of fact finding missions which began in the early 1990s. The creation of the ACW Office is the first step in the preparation effort to begin the actual destruction of ACWs in China. The Defense Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will play a significant role in the destruction of the ACWs; throughout the entire process Tokyo is expected to cooperate closely with the Chinese government on all aspects of the operation. [Seigi Hinata, "ACW Destruction in China", Presentation at the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 6/11/99] The Technology Study Group for the Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons, established in the late 90's, was tasked to study the various technologies for destruction of ACW. It published the results of its work in a report in May 1999.
In July 1999 Japan and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding to expedite work on this issue. In the MOU Japan reaffirmed its responsibility for the ACWs in China and, per the CWC, promised to provide all the financial, technical, and personnel resources required to clear China of all of its ACWs. During the cleanup, Japan will also be responsible for the protection of China's environment and the safety of all personnel. In the event of an accident, immediate consultations will be held between Beijing and Tokyo, after which Japan will pay an agreed-upon compensation. China, in return, not only pledges its cooperation with the Japanese government but also agreed that the destruction of ACWs will occur within Chinese territory. In the MOU, both nations will work together in deciding the location and construction of the facilities, objectives, rules, time limits and technology to be used. ["Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Japan and China on the Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China", The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 7/30/99] On 25 April 2003, Chinese and Japanese experts agreed on the main technologies to be used in the destruction of the ACWs. They also agreed that the destruction plant would be located near Harbin.
In February 2000, over 17,600 chemical weapons discovered in Nanjing were determined to be of Japanese origin. Japanese investigators were sent to destroy them. ["Chemical Weapons Left By Japanese Troops Found in Nanjing," Xinhua General News Service, 21 June 2000.] During September of the same year, in Bei'an China, scientists and workmen from both Japan and China conducted the "first large scale joint operation" for the excavation and recovery of ACWs. Cooperative efforts have also included joint site investigations, studies on weapon destruction, as well as research on security systems protecting both humans and the environment. In addition to major strides in cooperation, the beginning of 2001 ushered in the introduction of management consultants engaged in experimentation and evaluation of weapon destruction devices. Furthermore, plans are currently underway for a program of weapon removal at Haerbaling, where the majority of buried ACWs are located. The eradication of these stockpiles will mark a significant step in eliminating ACWs on Chinese soil. While still regarded as a difficult deadline to meet, April 2007 remains the target date for completion of ACW destruction. For more details on these developments please see "The Destruction of ACW in China." [Koijima, Seiji, "The Destruction of ACW in China," Office for ACW, Cabinet Office, Tokyo, Japan, 2001.]
A further example of collaborative efforts occurred in March 2001, when a joint Chinese-Japanese investigation team discovered a new chemical weapons storage facility (CWSF) in Henan Province. [The CBW Convention Bulletin, Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, No. 52, June 2001; and “Japanese Poison Gas Shells Found in Henan, China,” Kyodo News Service, 10 April 2001 in FBIS JPP20010410000138.] Retrieval efforts continued in September 2002 in Heilongjiang Province, where a Japanese government team excavated and retrieved 193 chemical shells, 154 toxic canisters, and four barrels of chemical toxicant. ["China: Japanese Team Retrieves Chemical Weapons Abandoned during War in Heilongjiang", Xinhua, 27 September 2002 in FBIS CPP20020927000118.]
Despite Japan's acceptance of responsibility for the ACWs left in China, individual Chinese citizens injured by unearthed munitions have had difficulty receiving compensation from Tokyo. In May 2003, a Tokyo court ruled against five Chinese nationals who had filed suit against the Japanese government claiming that they had suffered blistered skin and breathing difficulties after inhaling poison gas from canisters abandoned by the Imperial Japanese Army. While rejecting their claim to compensation, presiding Judge Takashi Saito acknowledged that the plaintiffs had, indeed, been harmed by the weapons. However, Saito ruled that: "The Japanese government cannot take effective steps to prevent Chinese from falling victim to the poison gas because even if Tokyo asked Beijing to recover and store the chemical weapons, the request would be affected by China's decision." ["Tokyo Court Rejects Chinese Suit for Damage by Chemical Weapons Abandoned in WWII," The Daily Yomiuri, 15 May 2003.] This contrasts with treatment given to Japanese citizens who suffered similar injuries due to ACWs left on Japanese territory. In June 2003, the Japanese government released a financial aid package to compensate residents of the Japanese town of Kamisu, who suffered from various ailments due to the extremely high levels of arsenic in their drinking water, believed to be caused by ACWs buried in the area. ["Government to Pay Medical Costs of Ibaraki Poison Gas Victims," Tokyo Kyodo World Service in English, 4 June 2003]
In an incident that spurred further calls for compensation from Japan, 36 workers in Heilongjiang Province were injured on 4 August by chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese army after World War II. The accident occurred after workers at a construction site in Qiqihar City unearthed five metallic barrels. One barrel ruptured while being removed, leaking fluid into the surrounding soil. Unaware of their contents, two workers cut the barrels into pieces and sold them to a recycling facility. Contaminated soil was also removed from the construction site and transported to other locations. By the evening of 4 August, workers and residents who had been in contact with the material began to report a number of symptoms, such as severe headache, eye-irritation, and vomiting. In all, 43 people were hospitalized, three in critical condition. On 9 August, Chinese scientists determined the substance to be mustard gas. On 22 August, one of the workers hospitalized died of his injuries. His father demanded compensation from the Japanese government. ["Japan-made Mustard Gas Injures 36, Three in Critical Condition," China Daily, 10 August, 2003, "Victims Seek Compensation," Eastday.com, 11 August, 2003.] ["Father of Dead Mustard Gas Incident Victim Asks Japan for Compensation," Beijing Xinhua in English, 22 August, 2003.] The Japanese and Chinese governments reached an agreement on 19 October that Tokyo would pay a compensation package of 300 million yen to the victims and their families. Japan described the payment as "fees for the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons. On 31 December, the package was given as a lump sum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to distribute among the victims as it saw fit. ["Japan, China Agree on 300 Million Yen over Poison Gas Leak," Tokyo Kyodo World Service in English, 19 October 2003; "Japan Compensates Mainland Chinese Victims of Abandoned Chemical Weapons," South China Morning Post, 31 December 2003].
In September 2003, Tokyo District Court ruled in favor of a group of Chinese plaintiffs whose relatives were killed or who themselves were injured by Japanese chemical weapons abandoned in China. The ruling ordered the Japanese government to pay a total of 190 million yen (1.7 million dollars) to the thirteen plaintiffs. The case, which was first brought before the court in 1996, covered injuries that occurred between 1974 and 1995. ["Japan Ordered to Compensate Chinese Killed, Injured by Dumped Weapons," Hong Kong AFP in English, 29 September 2003].
Key statements/documents related to Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China:
For more CW nonproliferation, see:
[MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN]
[FURTHER DETAILS ON THE LOCATIONS AND TYPES OF ACW IN CHINA]
[CHEMICAL WEAPON-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
[CHINA AND CBW NONPROLIFERATION]
[CHINA AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION]
[SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CHINA in PDF format]
Updated 02/06/2004
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
