China's Nuclear Doctrine

China's Nuclear Doctrine

A Credible "Minimum Deterrent"

China has never publicly discussed its nuclear doctrine since it became a nuclear power in 1964. According to Iain Johnston, "for about 30 years after China exploded its first nuclear weapon there was no coherent, publicly articulated nuclear doctrine." It was only beginning in the 1980s that the Chinese military began to conduct strategic research and to link China's nuclear arsenal to its foreign policy and national security objectives. For decades, Chinese leaders often stated that China possessed nuclear weapons and their delivery means in order to prevent blackmail and coercion by the other nuclear powers, principally the US and the then-Soviet Union. This statement combined with the small and relatively unsophisticated nature of China's nuclear force structure has led most analysts to conclude that China subscribed to a policy of minimum deterrence, relying on counter-value targeting.

China's leader Deng Xiaoping highlighted standpoint on the purpose of nuclear weapons in 1983 when he stated that stated that China "must have what others have, and anyone who wants to destroy us will be subject to retaliation." On a 15 July 1997, in a speech to the US Army War College, Lt. General Li Jijun, Vice President of the PLA's Academy of Military Science described China's nuclear strategy, stating that:

"China's nuclear strategy is purely defensive in nature. The decision to develop nuclear weapons was a choice China had to make in the face of real nuclear threats. A small arsenal is retained only for the purpose of self-defense. ...China's strategy is completely defensive, focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear blackmail being used against China by other nuclear powers." [“Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China,” An Address at the US Army War College, Letort Paper No. 1, 29 August 1997, p. 7.]

Reiterating the points made in LtGen Li's speech, the China's 1998 White Paper on National Defense pointed out that:

"From the first day it possessed nuclear weapons, China has solemnly declared its determination not to be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and later undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones."

Although China has in recent years placed significant importance on modernizing its military, including its nuclear forces, Beijing continues to claim that it has "exercised utmost restraint on the development of nuclear weapons, and its nuclear arsenal is kept at the lowest level necessary for self-defense only." [See 2002 White Paper on China's National Defense]

Existential Constraints Define China's Doctrine

Given the absence of explicit statements on the issue, Beijing's doctrine is largely determined by various constraints on China's use of nuclear weapons. China's nuclear doctrine can be broken into 8 elements:

Since 1964, China has adopted a universal no-first-use (NFU) pledge. (China applies NFU to Taiwan);
China provides non-nuclear weapon states with unconditional negative security assurances;
China participates in several nuclear weapon free zone treaties in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa. These commitments prohibit China from deploying, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in these regions;
China has pledged not to target its nuclear weapons against the US or Russia;
China urges the United States and Russia to make deep cuts in their nuclear forces and advocates the complete destruction of nuclear weapons;
China opposes the development and deployment of space-based weapons and missile defenses;
In 1994, China reversed its earlier opposition and publicly endorsed an early conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material (Ultimately, Chinese support for a FMCT has been mixed, and has been complicated by friction between the U.S. and China in the Conference on Disarmament);
China has agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing and has signed - but not ratified - the CTBT.

Based on these constraints, China appears to follow a retaliation strategy similar to one of delayed second strike (DSS). This means that China will retaliate after withstanding a nuclear strike, rather than attempting either a launch under attack (LUA) or a launch-on-warning (LOW)-type strategy, where missiles are launched after detection of an attack but before impact. China currently does not possess the requisite early warning capabilities needed to move toward a LOW-type policy. It is not clear, however, in what time frame China would retaliate after an initial nuclear attack. The long launch preparation time of Chinese missiles reduces their ability to conduct a LUA or LOW attack.

Shifting to Limited Deterrence?

The first hints of a Chinese nuclear weapons doctrine surfaced in July 2000 during the Central Military Commission conference on strategic military equipment. Jiang Zemin outlined the "Five Musts" on nuclear weapons.

China must own strategic nuclear weapons of a definite quality and quantity in order to ensure national security;
China must guarantee the safety of strategic nuclear bases and prevent against the loss of combat effectiveness from attacks and destruction by hostile countries;
China must ensure that its strategic nuclear weapons are at a high degree of war preparedness;
When an aggressor launches a nuclear attack against China, China must be able to launch nuclear counterattack and nuclear re-attack against the aggressor;
China must pay attention to the global situation of strategic balance and stability and, when there are changes in the situation, adjust its strategic nuclear weapon development strategy in a timely manner.

Jiang's statement as well as recent research has suggested that Chinese strategists have begun to shift their doctrine from minimum to limited deterrence in which China would possess a more sophisticated nuclear force structure capable of controlling nuclear escalation during a conflict and bringing about intra-war deterrence. This new doctrine may also provide for nuclear-warfighting in specific circumstances. Yet, this shift to limited deterrence would require nuclear forces that are much more advanced than China currently possesses. Such a limited deterrence capability may still be a long way off. According to Iain Johnston, "While the data on extant Chinese operational nuclear capabilities, targeting and launch doctrine are extremely poor, it is fairly safe to say that Chinese capabilities come nowhere near the level required by the concept of limited deterrence."

One of the central motivations for China to adopt a new doctrine based on limited deterrence is US plans to deploy a national missile defense system and theater missile defense systems in East Asia. China officials appear to believe (although will not admit publicly) that both types of ballistic missile defense would undermine the credibility of China's nuclear deterrent against the U.S. and also against Japan. US-Japan missile defense cooperation is expanding, and the Bush administration is pushing ahead with its plans to deploy a missile defense system for the continental United States. [The US plan, as of December 2002, called for up to 20 long-range interceptors to be based in Alaska and California, up to 20 sea-based short and medium range interceptors, as well as PAC-3 systems, relying on an array of land, sea, and space-based sensors.] Chinese statements have suggested - but never explicitly admitted - that deployment by the U.S. of any missile defense system would lead Beijing to expand the size of its nuclear arsenal and intensify its nuclear weapons modernization efforts. This latter step will likely involve either the development and deployment of MIRVed missiles or missiles with an extensive array of countermeasures.

[Sources: John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 233; Vipin Gupta, "Assessment Of China's Nuclear Test Site Near Lop Nor," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1993, p. 380; Paul Godwin and John J. Schulz, "Arming The Dragon For The 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 6; Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Yong Liu, "China And A Fissile Material Production Cut-Off," Survival, Winter 1995-96, p. 152; Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 5-42; Viktor Stefashin, Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 11 July 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-133, 11 July 1995; Wen Jen, "HK Paper Reports PRC CMC Meeting on Nuclear Weapons Strategy," Hong Kong Tai Yang Pao (internet version-WWW) in Chinese 17 July 2000, in FBIS-CPP20000717000021; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," The China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 552-558.]

For more on China's nuclear doctrine, see:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DECLARATORY POLICY] (See especially [CHINA AND NO-FIRST-USE], [CHINA AND SECURITY ASSURANCES] and [CHINA AND DETARGETING AGREEMENTS])

[CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE]

[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR DETERRENCE]

[CHINA AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL]

For information on China's current and projected future nuclear weapons capabilities, see:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCES] (See especially [WARHEAD STOCKPILE AND DEPLOYMENTS])

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION]

Other critical issues related to China's nuclear doctrine:

[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSILE DEFENSE]

[AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN NORTHEAST ASIA, 1990-PRESENT]

Last Updated 09/25/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.