 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
Annecy, France, March 14, 2003
[Source: Website of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland]
Let me begin by thanking the workshop sponsors for providing me with such a
valuable opportunity to meet many of my old friends. Those familiar faces have
brought back my memories of the debates and negotiations with them in the good
old days. Apparently, arms control and disarmament affairs have melted into my
blood.
As one of the participants in the 1994 DPRK nuclear standoff management, I had
been closely following the developments since the DPRK nuclear issue resurfaced
last year. Now I would like to share with you some of my personal thoughts on
this issue from China’s perspective.
I. How to Read the DPRK’s Withdrawal from the NPT?
On January 10, 2003, the DPRK government declared “an automatic and immediate
effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT”. The DPRK had subsequently informed
the United Nations Security Council of its decision. In my judgment, the DPRK’s
intention behind is to capture the United States’ attention, thus opening the
way for resolving relevant issues directly and bilaterally with the United
States. Supposing this is correct, and then there exists a serious possibility
for the DPRK to take further actions down the road, should the United States
continue to ignore the demands. In this connection, the DPRK’s pullout from the
NPT is not isolated but closely linked to the larger nuclear issue.
Twice had the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT since it acceded to the
treaty. Such non-conventional moves by the DPRK clearly run counter to the trend
of the times, as the universality and effectiveness of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime is constantly increasing today. The DPRK’s security
cannot be enhanced even if it develops or possesses nuclear weapons after the
withdrawal.
The impact of the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT on the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime should be assessed objectively and in a fair manner.
Accession to and withdrawal from a treaty is the legitimate sovereign right of
any state party. Article X paragraph 1 of the NPT stipulates that,
“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the
Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.”
Let me say, no one shares the view that the DPRK can save its previous
withdrawal period for another use. However, on the issue as whether the DPRK is
facing such “extraordinary events” having “jeopardized its supreme interests”,
there is agreement among many. It is fair to say that the DPRK does have
legitimate security concerns, which should be catered for. The only country that
can address this concern is the United States. After all, as far as the DPRK is
concerned, nothing can jeopardize its supreme national interests than being
labeled as the “axis of evil” and listed on the preemptive nuclear strike
targets.
The NPT has three pillars, i.e., nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament
and peaceful use of nuclear energy. As one of the most universal treaties, the
NPT is not only a legal instrument, with its universality, it has established a
forceful moral norm and a code of conduct. Development of nuclear weapons by
anyone will impact on national, regional, international security, and on nuclear
non-proliferation regime as well as the world order. Therefore, the norms set by
the NPT allows no breach. As two old Chinese sayings go, “the Heaven’s will can
not be defied”, and “the net of Heaven has large meshes, but it lets nothing
through”. In this sense, “Heaven’s will” is the non-manufacture and
non-proliferation, either horizontal or vertical, of nuclear weapons. Moral and
legal norms set by the NPT weave the “net of Heaven”. If one dares to defy
Heaven’s will, he is bound to fall into the net of Heaven. It is tantamount to
lifting a rock only to drop it on one’s own feet. By that time, it would be too
late to regret.
Each and every State Party is obliged to preserve the integrity and
effectiveness and to enhance universality of the NPT. Whether to accede to a
treaty is the sovereign and voluntary choice of the State. Once acceded to a
treaty, the State should faithfully fulfill its obligations and commitments. How
to contain the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT from setting a negative model is a
crucial issue in front of the international community.
II. How to Cope with the DPRK’s Withdrawal from the NPT?
The DPRK nuclear issue has its international and regional dimensions, since it
does correlate to the security of the neighboring states and international
nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, the core of the whole issue is the
relationship between the DPRK and the United States. The fact that the DPRK
nuclear issue resumed salience this time per se is partly due to the slow or
non-implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United
States. The DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT should be seen in a much broader
perspective, and its solution depends upon many other factors. The DPRK’s
withdrawal from the NPT is not an isolated event. Accusations, use or threat of
use of sanctions, will only prove to be counterproductive.
Military option should be completely ruled out in light of the recent history of
the Korean Peninsular. Should the “regime change” be the ultimate policy goal,
then the resolution of the DPRK’s nuclear issue will remain illusive. What else
can be expected if, on one hand claiming to seek resolution of the issue, while
deep down brews distaste for the counterpart. Calling for a peaceful resolution
while keeping escalating the situation will only sadden the friends and gladden
the foes. Should this tendency go unchecked, eventually, it will get enmeshed in
a web of its own spinning. Reciprocity cannot be understood as tit-for-tat which
will only make things worse. Meanwhile, if face-saving mentality continues to
restrain one from taking the initiative to take the first step, then the
resolution will be further delayed.
Therefore, the only effective means to settle the DPRK nuclear issue is through
dialogue and negotiation. The key lies in direct bilateral dialogue and
negotiation between the DPRK and the United States. There are matters that
others cannot help, such as the security assurances for the DPRK, because the
DPRK’s fear of insecurity stems from no one else but the United States. The top
priority now is to keep the tension from getting more acute. All parties
concerned should exercise restraint. Talks about use or threat of force can only
push the situation going further down. We expect the only “super power” in the
world, in the interest of preserving global and regional peace and stability,
demonstrate due resolve and vision by taking the first step toward direct
dialogue. Only by so doing, will the prerequisite for and necessary atmosphere
of political resolution be created.
III. China’s Policy and Our Role
Since last October, China has been working hard. Due to the “uniqueness” of the
DPRK, we prefer a private and quiet diplomacy. We are not after headline
sensations. We have had about 60 rounds of exchanges with both the DPRK and the
United States at various levels. It is simply not true to suggest that China
sits on its hands watching the standoff.
On the DPRK nuclear issue, China’s position can be summed up as “two oppositions
and one preservation”, so to speak.
Firstly, China is firmly opposed to the development and possession of nuclear
weapons by the DPRK. China steadfastly supports the declared goal of both the
North and South Koreas for a nuclear-weapon-free Peninsular. It is China’s firm
belief that DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot dissolve its security
concern. On the contrary, it will only trigger a series of negative fallouts. We
have consistently supported and preserved the international non-proliferation
regime, including the NPT. Therefore, we are not in favor of the DPRK’s
withdrawal from the NPT. Secondly, China is firmly opposed to waging another war
in the Korean Peninsular. The DPRK’s nuclear issue must be settled peacefully
through dialogue and negotiation.
In a nutshell, China’s objective is to preserve peace and stability in the
Korean Peninsular. The denuclearization of the Peninsular can only be ensured
under this premise. The DPRK should undertake not to develop nuclear weapons in
a verifiable manner, whereas the United States should address DPRK’s legitimate
security concern.
Up to now, the international community has expressed its concerns over the DPRK
nuclear issue and tabled a number of proposals. In this regard, our position is
that we are open to any proposal conducive to the peaceful solution. China
sincerely hopes that relevant parties will seriously study and deal with these
proposals.
Our vision is to build a well-off society in China in the next 20 years. To this
end, we need a peaceful and stable neighboring environment. Preserving peace,
stability and security in the Korean Peninsular is crucial for China. It is our
starting point as well as objective when we address matters related to the
Peninsular. I would like to reiterate that a peaceful resolution is not only in
the interest of all parities but also in conformity with the demands for peace
and security in this very region.
Finally, I appeal for an early peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue so
as to make the DPRK return to the NPT.
Thank you.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
