 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
China's Nuclear Submarine Program
|
|
|
|
|
NUCLEAR STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (SSBNs)
Xia (Daqingyu) Class SSBN (Type 09-2 [No. 406]):
The Xia-class SSBN is a modification of the Han-class SSN, lengthened to house 12 missile tubes. China has stated that it has built two Xia-class SSBNs, each of which can carry 12 JL-1 SLBMs. However, reports conflict as to whether China has actually deployed two SSBNs. Most analysts estimate only one is operational (the 09-2).
The 09-2 SSBN first went on patrol in 1986. It is still unknown if the submarines are deployed armed with nuclear missiles, as China has been secretive about nuclear deployment details in order to enhance the survivability of the launch platforms.
The strategic value of the 09-2 SSBN is questionable; it uses very old technology and is thus highly vulnerable to acoustic detection and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems, and has never sailed beyond China's regional waters, operating for only short periods in China's coastal waters. Also, a minimum of three SSBNs must be operational in order to have one constantly on patrol. The 09-2 has also been hindered by the low level of reliability of its nuclear power plant. Other questions remain regarding the Xia's operational status. In August 2000 the Agence France Presse quoted an annonymous Asian military expert saying, "The Xia has not been out to sea for several years and it has not fired any ballistic missiles since at least the early nineties."
[Sources: John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy - Part 1: Restructuring Begins," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1996, p. 131; Dunbar Lockwood, "The Status Of US, Russian And Chinese Nuclear Forces In Northeast Asia," Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 24; John Jordan, "The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1994, p. 282; "Experts Suggest China May Accede To Ban On Nuclear Tests," Defense News, 22 June 1992, p. 12; SIPRI Yearbook 1995, p. 380; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 396; Chong Pin Lin, "Red Fist: China's Army In Transition," International Defense Review, February 1995, p. 32; "Russia Helps China Take New SSNs Into Silent Era," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 August 1997, p. 14; "China's Aging Submarine Fleet Worse than Russia's," Agence France Presse, 23 August 2000, reported in Inside China Today Daily online (www.insidechina.com).]
Golf-class submarine (SSB):
One Golf-class test submarine (SSB), although not nuclear-powered, is reportedly capable of carrying two JL-1 SLBMs for rapid deployment.
[Soures: SIPRI Yearbook 1995, p. 333.]
Type 09-4 SSBN (under development):
China is developing a second-generation SSBN, named the 09-4 SSBN, to replace its older Xia-class SSBN. The 09-4 will carry the JL-2 (CSS-N-4) (CSS-NX-4) SLBM. Reports indicate that China's new SSBNs may be modified to carry 16 tubes for the JL-2 (currently under development) and later SLBMs. Construction has reportedly begun on the 09-4 at the Hu Lu Dao shipyard. General Zhang Wannian, the vice chairman of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party reportedly visited the shipyard with over 200 senior military and scientific personnel. Although it has admitted to assisting China with its new 09-3 SSN program, Russia denies assisting China with its new SSBN. Russia may be helping China to improve the noise insulation of the submarine's hull for quieter movement and decreased vulnerability to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.
The first 09-4 SSBN probably will not be deployed until at least after 2000, and will have improved quieting and sensor systems over the current SSBN. Its deployment could be delayed due to technical problems with solid missile fuel and the submarines' nuclear reactors. China is believed to be planning the construction of three or four, in order to ensure that one boat is always on patrol. For maximum protection, these will probably operate close to the mainland, behind layered defenses.
[Sources: John Downing, "China's Maritime Strategy-Part 2: The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1996, pp. 188-189; "Chinese Nuclear And Conventional Forces 1993," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 29; SIPRI Yearbook 1995, pp. 333, 378; Ian Kemp, Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1995, p. 1; Jon B. Wolfsthal and Dunbar Lockwood, Arms Control Today, July 1994, p. 23; Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Arsenals of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China: A Status Report," presented at the 5th ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Chengdu, China, November 1996, p. 6; "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November-December 1996, p. 67; Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 5, p. 373; Paul Godwin and John J. Schulz, "Arming The Dragon For The 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 6; "China Should Receive Its Third 'Kilo" By November," Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 July 1997, p. 16; "Selected Military Capabilities of the People's Republic of China," Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97 National Defense Authorization Act; "Russia Helps China Take New SSNs Into Silent Era," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 August 1997, p. 14; John Downing, "China Equips Itself for Power Projection," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 2000, p 43.]
NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES (SSNs)
Han-class SSN (Type 09-1) (No. 401-405):
The Han-class SSN first entered service in 1974. China currently deploys five Han-class SSNs from the North Sea Fleet Headquarters at Qingdao. The Han-class SSNs have never sailed beyond Chinese regional waters, operating for only short periods in China's coastal waters, and their capabilities would be limited in the face of Western or Russian anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The Han-class SSNs are also quite noisy and thus vulnerable to detection by ASW capabilities, and have been hindered by the low level of reliability of their nuclear power plants.
[Sources: "Selected Military Capabilities of the People's Republic of China," Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97 National Defense Authorization Act; "Russia Helps China Take New SSNs Into Silent Era," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 August 1997, p. 14.]
Type 09-3 SSN (under development):
China is developing the Type 09-3 SSN with Russian assistance to replace its five older Han-class SSNs. Russia has admitted to providing technical assistance to China on the new SSN program, and may be helping China to improve the noise insulation of the submarine's hull for quieter movement and decreased vulnerability to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Indeed, the 09-3 has been compared to the Russian Victor III second-generation SSN.
The 09-3 SSN will probably be armed with the nuclear Skhval 200 kT rocket-powered torpedoes, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missiles, and possibly submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) such as the follow-on to the C-801. The SSN will be used for multiple purposes, including SSBN security duties and for anti-surface warfare. The 09-3 will reportedly be equipped with improved quieting, weapons, and sensors. The reactor of the 09-3 is about the same size as the Han-class, but is planned to have improved safety, strength, and efficiency. Construction of the 09-3 will most likely not take place until after 2000, and China will likely only commission a few boats.
[Sources: John Downing, "China's Maritime Strategy-Part 2: The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1996, p. 189; "China Should Receive Its Third 'Kilo" By November," Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 July 1997, p. 16; "Russia Helps China Take New SSNs Into Silent Era," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 August 1997, p. 14.]
North Sea Fleet Headquarters, Qingdao Seaport, Huludao:
Location where the Chinese Navy bases its nuclear submarines. One of three fleet headquarters which commands submarines. Likely the base for China's Unit 09, which is reportedly responsible for all testing and training of SSBNs and SLBMs. China's Xia (Daqingyu) class SSBN (No. 406) and Golf-class training submarine are reportedly deployed in Unit 09. China's five Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) are also stationed at Qingdao.
Unit 09 is possibly deployed at Ningbo.
East Sea Fleet Headquarters, Shanghai:
One of three fleet headquarters which commands submarines.
South Sea Fleet Headquarters, Zhanjiang:
One of three fleet headquarters which commands submarines. Has some responsibility for SLBM testing.
[Sources: Richard W. Fieldhouse, Chinese Nuclear Weapons: A Current and Historical Overview, Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper NWD 91-1, National Resources Defense Council, March 1991, pp. 26, 34; Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, p. 52; John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy - Part 1: Restructuring Begins," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1996, p. 132; Office of Naval Intelligence, "Worldwide Submarine Challenges," 1997. Sources: Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 339-341]
China reportedly uses low-enriched uranium (LEU) to fuel its nuclear submarines. According to Albright, et al, a typical naval core would contain about 1,400 kg of 5 percent-enriched uranium fuel (with 70 kg of U-235).
[Sources: Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, p. 129; Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson, and Marvin Miller, "A Cutoff In The Production Of Fissile Material," International Security, Winter 1995/96, p. 178]
Related issues:
[CHINA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM MODERNIZATION]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
