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	Database Launch November 2

DISARMAMENT ISSUES
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Russia / Soviet Union

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NPT Nuclear Weapon State

Estimated Arsenal Size:
Total stockpile size is uncertain because there is no accurate count of tactical nuclear weapons.
Approximately 16,000 warheads.
Active and operational warheads: approximately 5,830.
Based on "START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms: Fact Sheet, Jan 2006"
Deployed strategic nuclear warheads 4,399
Deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicle: 927

Key Weapon Systems:
-- Strategic:
- ICBM (SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-27).
- SLBM (SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, SS-N-23).
- Bombers: (Tu-95 Bear G, Tu-95 Bear H16, Tu-160 Blackjack).
-- Non-strategic:
- Aviation (Tu-22M Backfire, Su-24 Fencer).
- SLCM.

Estimated Destructive Power:
~2030 megaton

Military Fissile Material Stockpile (estimated):
Plutonium: 95 mt
HEU: 670 mt

Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size:
- Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.
- Reduced arsenals under INF and START I.
Future Commitments:
- Plan to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012 under the Moscow Treaty.
- In support of verifiable FMCT. The treaty should not cover existing stockpiles.

Nuclear Weapons Policy:
1. Nuclear testing:
- Observed nuclear testing moratorium since 1990.
- Signed and ratified CTBT.
- Party to PTBT (banning nuclear tests in atmosphere, in outer space, and under water test).
2. Use of nuclear weapons:
- Retain first use policy.
- Committed not to use nuclear weapons against members to Tlateloco and Rarotonga. Has signed but not yet ratified Pelindaba. Has not signed Bangkok
- Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.