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Progress towards Reducing the Threat
and Numbers of Existing Nuclear Weapons
Home | Map | Timeline | Treaties | Stockpiles | Reduction | Proposals | Resources | Glossary
Project Overview
The aim of this interactive database is to disseminate timely information on the continued threat of nuclear weapons, as well as information and analysis on progress made toward eliminating this threat. Based on open source material only, this analysis by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) provides information on nuclear weapon proliferation since 1945 including how many weapons exist in the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states and how many have been destroyed to date. As far as possible, information is provided on the size of stockpiles, categories of existing nuclear weapons, and their destructive power. The database also includes factual information, including a comparative chart on nuclear weapon reductions/ dismantlement in accordance with bilateral arms control and arms reduction treaties, and unilateral initiatives. In addition, the database includes a useful compilation of national proposals related to nuclear disarmament made in the context of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review process since 2005.
Introduction
More than sixty years after the atomic bombs were used against Japan, nuclear weapons continue to be the basis for a number of states' national security policies. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits its parties from manufacturing nuclear weapons. The treaty, however, exempts five de jure nuclear weapon states (France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from this ban. These five states had tested nuclear weapons before the treaty was finally negotiated in 1968. This "exemption" is, however, countered with a legal obligation in Article VI of the treaty for these states to eventually disarm. Other nuclear armed states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—have not joined the NPT, but are commonly considered as de facto nuclear weapon states.
Fifteen years since the end of the Cold War, approximately 20,350 nuclear warheads remain in the arsenals in eight states (China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and the United States) of which around 10,300 are actively deployed.[1] Large quantities of weapon-grade fissile material that remain in the military stockpiles of several of these states could potentially be converted into many thousands of additional warheads.
In October 2006, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), which withdrew from the NPT in 2003, conducted an underground nuclear explosion proving that the country has developed the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. In addition the opaque intentions of Iran further fueled by refusal to fully comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Security Council resolutions have led many to believe that Iran may soon be able to develop nuclear weapons.
In addition to the nuclear warheads on the territories of the existing de jure (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and the United States) and de facto (Israel, India, and Pakistan) nuclear weapon states, as well as North Korea, six European NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) may have up to 350 U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on their territories in accordance with declared NATO nuclear policies.[2] [3] Many states believe that the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are contrary to Article I of the NPT which requires that nuclear weapons state parties to the Treaty (NWS) not "transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." The United States used to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea and in Greece but withdrew these weapons in 1991 and in 2001, after 33 years and 40 years respectively. (Most recently, reliable documents indicate that estimated 130 U.S. nuclear weapons at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany appear to have been removed in July 2007, which reduced the number of US nuclear weapons in Germany to only 20. )
In sharp contrast to the large number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals, or on the territories of a handful of countries, the majority of countries in the world—the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) —are committed to be free of nuclear weapons. South Africa, long suspected of having developed a clandestine nuclear weapons program, announced in July 1993 that it had in fact developed a small arsenal before destroying it in 1991 in order to join the NPT as a NNWS. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned large arsenals of nuclear warheads and associated delivery systems belonging to the former Soviet Union to Russia in the mid-1990s before joining the NPT as NNWS.
Other countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, examined the possibility of nuclear weapons programs, but abandoned these ideas before they accepted binding restrains on nuclear weapon development. These two states too decided to join the NPT in 1994 and 1995, respectively, as NNWS. In further support of their legal obligations under the NPT, a large number NNWS are parties to nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs), and have thereby accepted additional legal obligations not to develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, possess, or control any nuclear explosive device on their territories. Today more than 110 countries belong to legally binding NWFZ treaties.
Nuclear Disarmament and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
The NPT prohibits NWS (France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from transferring nuclear weapons to, or assisting NNWS in the development of nuclear weapons.[4] At the same time, NNWS are legally required not to receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons[5], and to place all their peaceful use nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards.[6]
The NPT not only prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, and transfer of nuclear weapons, but Article VI of the treaty requires all of its state parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." While this article does not specify a time frame in which nuclear disarmament should occur, nor does it provide a verification mechanism to monitor such disarmament, it places a legal obligation on states with nuclear weapons to stop the nuclear arms race and to disarm their nuclear arsenals. As such this obligation is one of the three main "pillars" of the treaty, the other two being nuclear nonproliferation and the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the state parties agreed to indefinitely extend the life of the treaty based on a package of decisions that included Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, which called for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally." It is widely understood that it would not have been possible to indefinitely extend the NPT without the concurrent commitment to this program of action. The president of that historic conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, pointed out in his concluding remarks at the meeting, that "permanence of the treaty does not represent a permanence of unbalanced obligations, nor does it represent the permanence of nuclear apartheid between nuclear haves and have nots." [7]
Further building on this action plan, the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in its consensus final document, laid out 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, including an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." [8] This "unequivocal undertaking" was significant in that it recommitted NWS to their Article VI obligations, and for the first time in the NPT's history the NWS agreed to "the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." While no timeframe was attached to this "undertaking," it is significant to note the omission of the reference to the "ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons", as was agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The deletion of the notion that nuclear disarmament is the ultimate goal of the NPT was considered a major accomplishment by the NNWS at the 2000 Review Conference, and was one of several compromises that led to the successful conclusion of the conference.
Very little concrete progress has been made towards meeting the 1995 and 2000 milestone agreements. While increasing emphasis is being placed on ways to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapon material and technologies by terrorist groups and by states currently without nuclear weapons, the very existence of thousands of nuclear warheads and large stocks of weapon-grade nuclear material deserves equal attention. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized at the United Nations Millennium Assembly that eliminating nuclear weapons is no less important than preventing their further spread. He said: "The objective of nuclear nonproliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon states continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace. If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately, the reverse is true."[9]
Has Any Progress Been Made Towards Disarmament?
Although critics say the pace of nuclear disarmament and efforts by the nuclear weapon states are far from satisfactory, the size of nuclear weapon arsenals, particularly in the United States and Soviet Union/Russia, has since the height of the Cold War been reduced from more than 70,000 to approximately 20,350 today. On December 18, 2007, the White House announced that the 2004 decision to reduce the size of the Department of Defense's nuclear weapons stockpile by nearly 50 percent from the 2001 level was accomplished in December 2007, five years ahead of time. [10]
Yet, many states and members of civil society believe that the NPT nuclear weapon states are not fully meeting their disarmament obligations as required by Article VI of the NPT. Moreover, concerns exist that since the three de facto nuclear weapon states are not bound by the treaty's requirements, that they are increasing their nuclear arsenals.
The 2002 Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (known as the Moscow Treaty) provides for a significant reduction of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in their respective arsenals to less than 1700-2200. However, this treaty does not have a mutual verification mechanism and no progress has been made towards reaching the required levels of warhead reductions. [11] Fears also exist that since the treaty will expire by the end of 2012, that it may not be replaced by any legally binding obligation on the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals to reduce the number of strategic warheads in their possession. Of further concern in this regard is that the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) will also expire in December 2009 without an appropriate legally binding mechanism to further reduce the arsenals in these two states. Of additional concern is the decision by the United States to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in 2001 which in turn prompted the Russian Federation to withdraw from the START II Treaty. START II provided for verified reduction of deployed strategic warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500, as well as the destruction of launchers and delivery platforms. The Moscow Treaty does not include such provisions.
Other than their general NPT Article VI commitments, the other NWS- are not bound by any arms reduction agreements. While both France and the United Kingdom have reduced their arsenals unilaterally, renewed concerns exist over especially the United Kingdom's intention to renew the nuclear submarines used as launching platforms for the UK's Trident nuclear missile system.[12] Pronouncements by then - French President Chiraq have led to concerns that France is hardening its French nuclear posture.[13]
The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), is widely considered to be a significant milestone towards nuclear arms reduction and disarmament. This treaty, adhered to by 144 state parties, prohibits all nuclear testing under any circumstance, and as such caps the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of existing nuclear weapons states, while providing additional mechanisms to verify that non-nuclear weapons states not develop nuclear weapons of their own. However, for the treaty to enter into force, 44 "Annex II" states that were considered to have nuclear power and/or research reactors at the time of the treaty's negotiations, are required to ratify first. To date, 9 of these states have not yet ratified.[14]
While France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom have ratified the CTBT, the United States Senate voted in 1999 not to give its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty. China has for the past eight years claimed that it is in the process of completing the ratification process. India and Pakistan have both refused to sign the treaty, and while Israel has signed, it is yet to ratify. North Korea, now armed with a few nuclear warheads is also required to ratify before the treaty can enter into force. Several NPT non-nuclear-weapons Annex II states— Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran—have signed but not yet ratified.
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei at the 10th anniversary of the signing of the treaty stated: "Without the CTBT we will continue to see qualitative development of nuclear weapons. Without the CTBT in force we risk that new countries might in fact be tempted to test nuclear weapons—without violating any legal norm."
Another mechanism to cap the development of nuclear weapons would be a treaty to ban the production of fissile material used for nuclear weapons. Negotiations of such a treaty has been a priority for the Conference on Disarmament since the adoption of the so-called Shannon Mandate in 1995 which provided for negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, known variously as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), fissban, or fissile materials treaty. However, the CD negotiations have been deadlocked since 1998 due in part to the insistence by China to link negotiations of such a treaty to negotiations on a treaty banning the militarization of outer space and a linkage by Pakistan to the establishment of a CD mechanism on nuclear disarmament, and by the United States for its 2004 decision to abrogate the Shannon Mandate by calling for a non-verifiable treaty.
IAEA Director-General ElBaradei highlighted widely held concerns over the slow progress in disarmament by referring to the lack of progress towards negotiating an FMCT when he stated: "It is unfortunately symptomatic of the slow progress overall with regard to moving towards nuclear disarmament. For example, consider the negotiation that is supposed to be taking place in Geneva on a "Cut-Off" Treaty that would prohibit the production of nuclear material for weapon purposes; you are all aware that for 10 years now we have not even been able to agree on a mandate to start negotiating this Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The FMCT and the CTBT are intended to work together in parallel, to prohibit both the quantitative and qualitative tools that would enable countries to develop nuclear weapons-whether new countries or countries that already have these weapons."[15]
While different interpretations remain over the level of nuclear disarmament in recent years, many NNWS are concerned that the apparent lack of commitment could lead to an increase in nuclear proliferation, with serious longer term consequences for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Former Secretary-General Annan urged the Conference on Disarmament in June 2006 "... to build a common understanding of the most immediate nuclear threats. The debate between those who insist on disarmament before further nonproliferation measures, and those who argue the opposite, is self-defeating. It should be self-evident that both are essential for security."
The stand-off between the nuclear "haves and have nots" contributed significantly to the failure of NPT parties to reach any substantive agreement at the seventh NPT Review Conference in 2005 while country leaders at the 2005 UN summit were not able to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and nonproliferation. These events symbolize the unprecedented challenges that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is facing. In this regard the IAEA Director-General called for new approaches: "First, a commitment to disarmament - a move away from strategies that rely on nuclear weapons, which serve as constant stimulus for other nations to acquire them." He also emphasized that "Either we begin finding creative, outside-the-box solutions or the international nuclear safeguards regime will become obsolete." [16]
Progressive Efforts to Promote Nuclear Disarmament:
Despite numerous challenges in the path towards a world free of nuclear weapons, many national governments and members of civil society have cooperated in initiatives to promote progress towards this goal.
Most recently, UK Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne Illustrated the country's commitment to nuclear disarmament in its concrete plan in his statement at the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008. The plan includes a technical cooperation initiative between the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment and the Norwegian government to develop technology to verify warhead dismantlement. As a next step, the UK offered to host a technical conference of NWS nuclear laboratories on nuclear disarmament verification before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. [17]
One of the most progressive approaches to promote nuclear disarmament was taken by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). In June 1998, foreign ministers from Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia (which later withdrew from the NAC), South Africa, and Sweden issued a statement calling for a new nuclear disarmament agenda, "Toward a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: Time for a New Agenda". The aim of these like-minded countries is to increase political momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons at a time when progress in nuclear disarmament seemed to be stagnant. The NAC proposed a number of concrete steps to be taken by the five NPT nuclear weapon states and the three non NPT nuclear weapon states. The NAC served as an essential instrument to cause the nuclear weapon states to negotiate disarmament issues at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. As a result, the final document of the 2000 Review Conference includes "thirteen practical steps" towards nuclear disarmament, most significant of which is an "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. However, no time line was attached to this undertaking. Since its establishment in 1998, the NAC countries have consistently submitted to the United General Assembly resolutions calling for a nuclear weapon-free world.[18]
At about same time, the Middle Powers Initiative was established in support of non-nuclear weapons states' efforts to reduce and eliminate worldwide nuclear weapons arsenals. The Middle Powers Initiative, in cooperation with middle power governments works as a catalyst in promoting practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to encourage and educate nuclear weapon states to be more attentive to their disarmament obligations. Following the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Middle Powers Initiative launched the "Article VI Forum" in October 2005 to examine the legal, technical, and political requirements to fulfill nonproliferation and disarmament commitments for a nuclear weapon-free world.
Japan, the only country to suffer nuclear weapon attacks, continues to take a principled stance on nuclear disarmament based on strong domestic opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan. Since 1994, the Japanese government has sponsored a United Nations General Assembly resolution, Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.[19] This, and subsequent resolutions, included a number of concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament. Following the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Japan submitted a new disarmament resolution titled Renewed Determination toward the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
While the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to adopt a consensus final document on all respects of the treaties, particularly, in the field of nuclear disarmament, many NPT state parties including the NWS offered several useful proposals and provided information on steps undertaken toward nuclear disarmament. Moreover, NPT parties at the 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review Conference further expanded on disarmament related proposals, many of which were included in the factual summary by the PrepCom Chairman (submitted as Chairman's working paper). Amongst the ideas included such as the early entry into force of the CTBT, the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations, and increased transparency and accountability in the process of nuclear disarmament, was a proposal to compile a comparative table recording concrete measures undertaken by the NWS in achieving their nuclear disarmament obligations. As part of its goals to contribute to the NPT review process, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has compiled a comparative chart showing the number of nuclear warheads and related systems that have been dismantled and destroyed by all states currently armed with nuclear weapons, as well as those who gave up or destroyed their nuclear weapons arsenals.
It is also significant that several independent international commissions have played an important role by providing expert recommendations in the form of nuclear disarmament action plans. These commissions include the 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons sponsored by the Australian Government, the 1998 Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and disarmament sponsored by the Japanese government, and most recently, the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission.
Chaired by former IAEA Director-General and Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission was established amidst stagnation of nuclear disarmament and unprecedented challenges facing nonproliferation regimes. The commission's report attributes the stagnation in global arms control and disarmament forums to the fact "that the nuclear weapon states no longer seem to take their commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously-even though this was an essential part of the NPT bargain, both at the treaty's birth in 1968 and when it was extended indefinitely in 1995."
Based on this observation, the "Blix" report offers several recommendations on furthering nuclear disarmament through multilateral cooperative actions. Significant among these recommendations is the call on all NPT nuclear weapons states to take steps towards nuclear disarmament as required by the NPT and the commitments made in connection with the treaty's indefinite extension.[20] Other important recommendations include the early entry into force of the CTBT; the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty without preconditions; the revision by all nuclear possessor states of their nuclear defense doctrines, and their policies of no first use; an agreement between Russia and the United States to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert; and the withdrawal of all non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage on national territories pending their eventual elimination. The commission also encouraged all states possessing nuclear weapons to "start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that include definitions, benchmarks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament."
At the First Committee of the 61st General Assembly, Dr. Blix, in his statement, reiterated the central message of the WMD Commission's report stating "that the global process of arms control and disarmament, which has stagnated in the last decade, must be revived and pursued in parallel with the efforts to prevent the spread of WMD to further states and to terrorist movements."
The WMD Commission's recommendations are not totally improbable. Each recommendation could be achieved over the medium term if there is a strong political will among the states parties. These are an essential step towards a safer world free of nuclear threats.
Many of the WMD Commission's recommendations were included in a Wall Street Journal op-ed co-authored by four prominent former U.S. lawmakers and senior government officials —George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," first in January 2007, and their floow up op-ed in January 2008, "Toward a Nuclear Weapon Free World" to establish a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. [21][22]. In addressing the "tremendous dangers" presented by nuclear weapons, they argued that "U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage - to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world." They called on the leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons "to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise." Such a joint enterprise, they considered, "would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran."
The important role of disarmament and nonproliferation education in promoting nuclear disarmament must also be recognized. Following the adoption General Assembly resolution 57/60 in November 2002, many initiatives have been undertaken to enhance the knowledge and skills of individuals so that they can contribute to achieving concrete disarmament and nonproliferation measures, as well as the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This CNS/NTI product is in furtherance of that objective.
Sources:
[1] Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists, January 2008. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nukestatus.html
[2] US Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Natural Resource Defense Council, Feb. 2005, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp
[3] NATO Press Release, "Final Communiqué," Ministerial Meeting Of The Defense Planning Committee And The Nuclear Planning Group, 9 Jun. 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-075e.htm
[4] Article I of the NPT
[5] Article II of the NPT
[6] Article III of the NPT
[7] Statement by the President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, NPT/CONF. 1995/PV.19, 13 May 1995, http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/nptconf/217a.htm
[8] 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/npt2kfd.pdf
[9] 'We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,' Report by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (A/54/2000), presented to the General Assembly, April 3, 2000; full report available at http://www.un.org/Millennium/sg/report/
[10]The United States and Article VI: A Record of Accomplishment by Thomas D’Agostino, Administrator, NNSA at the Conference on disarmament, February 7, 2008, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/1session/Feb7agostino.pdf
[11] The SORT treaty's lack of a verification mechanism allows warheads to be separated from delivery systems and stored until treaty expires on 31 December 2012, rendering the reduction of warheads impermanent. The treaty does not specifically define procedures of liquidation of weapons reduced and verification of the process.
[12] "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent," December 2006. http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf
[13] "Chirac Reasserts French Nuclear Weapons Policy" Disarmament Diplomacy, Spring 2006 http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd82/82chirac.htm#en01
[14] China, Columbia, North Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and United States
[15] CTBT: Synergies with Science (1996 - 2006 and Beyond) by Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n017.html
[16] Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards, Mohamed ElBaradei, Washington Post, June 14, 2006 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/13/AR2006061301498.html
[17] Speech by UK Secretary of State for Defence Mr Des Browne. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/1session/Feb5UKDefSecDesBrown.pdf
[18] The most recent resolution A/RES/60/56 was entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments"
[19] Given opposition among NPT states that advocate nuclear disarmament to the term "ultimate elimination" (it implies that nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future), Japan changed the title of the resolution in 2000 to A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
[20] At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the State parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely as part of a package of decisions that included the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and the program of action on nuclear disarmament contained therein. The program of action included the conclusion and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test ban Treaty (CTBT); the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT); and the determined pursuit by the NWS of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.
[21] "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, George P Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, January 4, 2007.
[22] “Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, George P Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, January 15, 2008.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007
by MIIS.
