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China
Chinese policymakers have yet to set any national policy regarding HEU. While China, as a nuclear weapons state, uses HEU in its weapons program, it has only a few civilian installations that use HEU, and has been converting or shutting down these reactors (see HEU-fueled Reactors in China, below). Thus, making the choice to forgo the use of HEU in civilian applications would not entail difficult choices for Beijing.
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Indeed, although the new China Experimental Fast Reactor has been loaded with HEU fuel, Beijing plans to use MOX fuel in its industrial-scale (600 MW) China Prototype Fast Reactor and future fast reactors.[1] Other recent and planned Chinese research reactors use LEU. Though not directly participating in RERTR, China has followed the research done under the program and is working along similar lines. In 2007, Beijing converted its HFETR reactor along with the MJTR reactor, while it shut down the MNSR-SH reactor.[2] The HFETR critical assembly, reported as already shut down, was reported converted in 2007 as well. (Note: this likely means the last HEU fuel was removed from the critical assembly in 2007.) China has assisted Pakistan in the conversion of the PARR-1 reactor, and has been working on development of high density LEU fuels.[3] Beijing is also active in a new IAEA program to convert the miniature reactors that it supplied to foreign countries, and is likely to agree to take back their HEU fuel.[4]
Despite these choices, indicating some awareness of the dangers posed by HEU and the global trend against the use of that material in civilian facilities, Chinese officials have not been very engaged in programs devoted to HEU minimization or discussions of the matter, either on the domestic or global level. Beijing may view the RERTR program as too closely tied to the U.S. government, which may explain why it did not send scientists to attend these meetings from the late 1990s (when the lone Chinese participant was an individual who was living in Europe, and therefore did not require Chinese permission to travel) until 2008. In October 2008, however, Chinese scientists attended the RERTR meeting (in 2007, Chinese participation was scheduled but canceled at the last moment, ostensibly for visa reasons).[5]
Overview of Chinese HEU Holdings
There is very little information about China’s HEU holdings, domestic or military. The Global Fissile Materials Panel estimated that China has 20 metric tons of HEU in primary military stocks.[6] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer have reported that China's holdings equal about 1 metric ton of civilian HEU. The latter was enriched in Russia as well as in China itself. In 2005, Albright and Kramer projected that the country would have 1.5 metric tons of civil HEU (including irradiated fuel) by 2020 because Beijing would continue using HEU fuel in some of its existing research reactors and did not appear to have the means to reprocess HEU spent fuel.[7] Today, it appears that China’s inventory will not increase, if current trends continue.
Information on Chinese reactors, production, security of stockpiles, and related issues is highly secret. While Beijing has recently begun cooperating with the US DOE on exchanging information on MPC&A equipment and measures, there is still no information available on Chinese measures at sites with HEU.
On the military side, China has not declared any military HEU excess. It should be noted, however, that Beijing uses LEU fuels in its naval propulsion reactors; thus, its military stocks are only used for actual weapons. There are no reports of China using HEU for space propulsion.
HEU Production
China produced its own HEU for military use, but has imported some HEU fuel from Russia for civilian use. Since China treats details about a key enrichment plant as secret, information on Chinese enrichment is scarce.
China ended uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons around 1987, although Beijing has never made an official announcement to this effect.[8] Albright and Kramer’s chapter on Chinese military inventories notes that unofficial Chinese statements indicate production ended by about 1991. In February 1997, a senior Chinese official "confirmed to the authors that production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in China had ceased." (For additional information, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, China: Nuclear Capabilities.)
HEU Commerce
China supplied about 200 kg of 20.05% HEU to Brazil in the 1980s.[9] This material has since been blended down to LEU (slightly below 20%). Chinese export of MNSR reactors included sales of HEU fuel. These reactors require about 1 kg of HEU fuel. None appear to have been refueled since their sale. Although the Syrian reactor is due for refueling in the near future, it will likely be converted and fueled with LEU at that time.
Continuing HEU Use
As for imports, China’s pilot fast neutron reactor, the Chinese Experimental Fast Neutron Reactor (CEFR), is using HEU fuel imported from Russia at least initially.[10] According to Russian Government Directive N 621-r of April 19, 1999, plans called for fuel up to 64.4% enrichment. In 2004, Russia’s Machine Engineering Plant (MSZ) indeed supplied China with the fuel for CEFR.[11] In addition, Russia and China have agreed to a feasibility study to construct a 600 megawatt fast neutron power reactor in China, though it is supposed to be fueled with MOX, not HEU fuel.[12]
HEU-fueled Reactors in China [13]
Reactor |
Location |
Characteristics |
Status |
HFETR |
Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy, |
Tank, LW, |
Converted in March 2007, operational |
HFETR Critical Assembly |
Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy, |
Critical assembly, LW, |
Converted in April 2007, reported shut down |
MJTR |
Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy, |
Pool, LW, |
Employs fuel from the HFETR, converted in 2007 |
MNSR IAE |
China Institute of Atomic Energy, Tuoli, Fangshan District, Beijing |
Tank in pool, LW, |
Operational |
MNSR-SD |
Research Institute of Geological Sciences, |
Tank in pool, LW, |
Operational |
MNSR-SH |
Shanghai Institute for Measurement and Testing Technology, Shanghai |
Tank in pool, LW, |
Shut down in March 2007 |
MNSR-SZ |
Shenzhen University, |
Tank in pool, LW, |
Operational |
Zero-Power Fast Critical Reactor |
China Institute of Atomic Energy, Jianiang/ Chengdu, Sichuan |
Critical fast, |
Operational |
PPR Pulsing Reactor |
Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy, |
Pool, UZRH, |
Operational |
China Prototype Fast Reactor (CPFR) |
China Institute of Atomic Energy, Fangshan District, Beijing |
Fast neutron reactor, |
Fuel has already been delivered,[14] scheduled to be commissioned in 2010.[15] |
Conversion and Shutdown of HEU-Fueled Reactors and Reactor Projects
In 2007, China converted its HFETR reactor at the Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy in Jiajiang (near Chengdu), Sichuan. The test reactor MJTR employs fuel discharged from HFETR, and thus will no longer use HEU fuel as soon as all of the older HFETR fuel is discharged. The HFETR critical assembly was shut down in 2007, as was the MNSR-SH reactor.[16]
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The work on converting the HFETR apparently began as long as a decade ago, when Chinese officials reportedly told their US counterparts about research on converting the HFETR reactor to use LEU fuel.[17] In 1999, scientists from the Academy presented findings at the RERTR meeting that suggested LEU fuel had been tested in the reactor.[18] At the time, it did not appear that a decision had been made to convert the reactor to LEU use long-term. But Chinese scientists continued to work on high-density fuel development, publishing papers on its manufacture.[19] According to a Chinese Atomic Energy Agency official interviewed in September 2005, some ten years ago China signed an MoU with the United States regarding reactor conversion, and would still be open to engaging with the United States on conversion. It is possible the document referred to was the February 23, 1995, Secretary of Energy/China Atomic Energy Agency President Statement of Intent on cooperation with RERTR. However, China converted the facilities in Sichuan on its own.
In November 2005, DOE officials announced that the Miniature Neutron Source reactors (MNSR) in China (four reactors) as well as the ones that China had sold to other countries (one each in Ghana, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria) had become part of the RERTR program; the IAEA is assisting this program. This was China’s first involvement in the GTRI program, following an initial April 2005 meeting at the IAEA on the possible conversion of MNSRs.[20] Chinese scientists attended a Vienna meeting in April 2006 as well as the 2008 RERTR meeting in Washington (their first RERTR attendance in a decade). Should the Chinese fail to develop an LEU fuel that could be made available to convert the MNSRs outside the country, the RERTR program has a back-up plan of purchasing LEU fuel for the Chinese-built MNSRs from Canada.[21] While in 2005 some Chinese officials had questioned the proliferation relevance of facilities with insignificant amounts of material (the reactors have only about 1 kg of HEU fuel), they recognized the importance of the principle of conversion.[22] Since 2007, the Chinese have been quite engaged in the RERTR conversion program, though they have decided to convert Chinese reactors on their own. Additionally, Beijing has decided to shut down its own MNSRs and replace them with new facilities designed to use LEU fuel from the start, in lieu of converting the older HEU-fueled facilities.
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Continuing HEU Use
As of November 2008, the China Experimental Fast Reactor had been loaded with HEU fuel and was scheduled to start up operations in 2010. However, the industrial-scale (600 MW) China Prototype Fast Reactor, for which the CEFR is a mock-up, is being designed to use mixed oxide plutonium (MOX) fuel.
Future fast reactors are expected to use MOX fuel as well.[23] Other recent and planned Chinese research reactors use LEU. Thus, after HEU fuel is no longer needed at the CEFR, China is not expected to have any HEU-fueled reactors in the civilian sphere.
Policy Issues
China has no national policy related to the civilian use of HEU. The China Atomic Energy Agency is the senior official body dealing with nuclear exports and domestic research reactors. However, an HEU minimization policy would clearly require the involvement of other executive bodies. The agency, for its part, does not appear to be set against the elimination of the civilian use of HEU. China does not use a great deal of HEU, and there are no plans for future exports. The Chinese justification for developing fast reactors is China’s insufficient uranium supply; Beijing plans to focus on the use of MOX, not HEU, in future.
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Beijing is a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT), and has voted in factor of the resolution on FMCT at each session of the General Assembly. However, it has linked negotiations of the FMCT to the negotiations on prevention of an arms race in outer space, with which the United States does not agree. This is one reason for the stalemate in FMCT negotiations.
In 1994, China and the United States issued a joint statement on stopping production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, agreeing to "work together to promote the earliest possible achievement of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."[24] This commitment was reaffirmed in a 1997 joint statement by the two nations.[25]
As far as the security of sites with fissile material is concerned, China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1989. However, there is no open-source information on its implementation of the security recommendations in the convention. [For information on Chinese physical protection requirements, see Nathan Busch, "China's Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting: The Case for Renewed Collaboration," Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2002, pp. 89-106.]
Given the importance Beijing places on its role as a supporter of nonproliferation worldwide, China could well decide to adopt a significant role in pushing an international civilian HEU ban. However, as Beijing was long wary of joining the U.S.-led RERTR program, it does not appear likely to promote global conversion from HEU unless the issue is taken up in a broader forum, and China is given a more visible international role.
Sources:
[1] Mark Hibbs, "Chinese Breeder Reactor Criticality Delayed until 2008," Nucleonics Week, 18 August 2005.
[2] GuJianfeng, "The Nuclear Safety Regulation on Research Reactors in China," paper give at the First Technical Meeting of Research Reactor Decommissioning Demonstration Project, 26-30 March 2006, Manila, Philippines, http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/projects/r2d2/workshop1/national-reports/China/china-national-report.pdf; NNSA Factsheet, "GTRI: More Than Four Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats," October 2008, http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/793.htm.
[3] The China Advanced Research Reactor, currently under construction, will use 19.75% dispersion fuel with a density of 4.3g/cm3. This fuel is being developed by the Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy. Changgeng Yin, "Development of Fuel Element for Research Reactor in Nuclear Power Institute of China," Atomic Energy Science and Technology, Vol. 39 (July 2005).
[4] Indeed, Chinese scientists have been studying the conversion of Miniature Neutron Source Reactors for several years now. Note, for instance: "The Feasible Research on Developing Application of Miniature Neutron Source Reactor Loaded Low-Enrichment Fuel," Zheng Lu, et al. Atomic Energy Science and Technology, Vol. 37 (March 2003).
[5] This was the case at the 2006 RERTR meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. Since the scientists received all of their visa paperwork months ahead of time, the visa explanation is not entirely credible. It would appear that although the scientists are interested in RERTR, there are officials in the Chinese government not yet prepared to participate in this event.
[6] International Panel on Fissile Materials Report 2007, http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf.
[7] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium,” February 2005, revised August 2005, ISIS, http://isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf.
[8] Ann MacLachlan, and Mark Hibbs, "China Stops Production of Military Fuel: All SWU Capacity Now for Civil Use," NuclearFuel, November 13, 1989. The 1987 data are from a personal communication to one of the authors of the Albright report from Hibbs, who was told in turn by the head of the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation.
[9] Albright and Kramer.
[10] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Separated Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current Status
and Future Directions," June 10, 2005, revised July 8, 2005, http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/separated_civil_pu.pdf, p. 6.
[11] Produktsiya yaderno-toplivnogo tsikla, Elemash website, November 2008, http://www.elemash.ru/ru/manufacture/product/nuclear/.
[12] "China Offers Russia Cooperation in Fast Breeding Reactor Project," ITAR-TASS, October 30, 2005.
[13] Also see Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, "HEU Fuel Cycle Inventories and Progress on Global Minimization," The Nonproliferation Review, July 2008, 15/2, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol15/152_reistad_appendix2.pdf.
[14] Mark Hibbs, "Sino-Russian pilot FBR to begin installing equipment next March," NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 22, October 28, 2002. On fuel delivery: RIA Novosti, September 7, 2005.
[15] "China, India Plan To Build Their Own Experimental Fast Reactors By 2010," Interfax, 21 May 2008, Open Source Center Document CEP20080521950519.
[16] NNSA Factsheet, "GTRI: More Than Four Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats," October 2008, op. cit.
[17] China’s Research Reactors, Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 29, 2003, http://www.nti.org/db/china/resrctr.htm.
[18] Peng Feng and Fu Rong, "Reduced Enrichment Neutronic Study on High Power Research Reactor," RERTR Meeting, 1999, http://www.td.anl.gov/Web1999/ PDF/30feng.htm.
[19] Peng Feng, "Reduced Enrichment Neutronics Study on High Power Research Reactor," Chinese Journal of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Vol.18 (September 1998); Yalun Kang, "Progress of Fuel Assembly Design and Test for China Advanced Research Reactor," Atomic Energy Science and Technology, Vol.37, (July 2003); and Changgeng Yin, op. cit.
[20] "RERTR program adds MNSRs to reactor list," NuclearFuel, Vol. 30, No. 25 (December 5, 2005), pp. 1, 13.
[21] CNS interview of IAEA official, October 2006.
[22] CNS interview with China Atomic Energy Agency official, September 29, 2005.
[23] Mark Hibbs, "Chinese Breeder Reactor Criticality Delayed until 2008," Nucleonics Week, 18 August 2005.
[24] Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation/Stopping the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons, October 4, 1994, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/mtcrusch.htm.
[25] Joint U.S.-China Statement, October 29, 1997, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/uschst97.htm.
This material is
produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.
