Abstract:
Syria's acquisition of North Korean-modified Scud-Bs is based on Syria's doctrine of "strategic parity" and the need to match Israeli military potential in the wake of the Egyptian- Israeli peace agreement of the late-1970s and the Syrian defeat in Lebanon in 1982. Ballistic missiles with unconventional warheads could offer Syria the capability of striking "Israel's strategic rear" in any one-on-one engagement. Integral to this policy was the desire to acquire Soviet SS-23 missiles. Although repeated Syrian requests were deemed excessive, the Soviets did supply SS-21 missiles in 1983.

At that time as well, Syria began to develop its own indigenous missile production capability using stocks of Scud-Bs and SS-21s with the goal of reverse engineering or manufacturing foreign-designed missiles. This effort would include conventional and chemical/warhead capabilities. At least one (unidentified) West European nation was contacted for its assistance, but that country's minimal assistance was soon ended.

By 1986, it was known that Syria possessed sufficient technology to produce chemically armed Scuds and possibly SS-21s. This capability may have been assisted by Libya, reportedly after having acquired such warheads from the Soviet Union. Libya may also have passed on this technology to Iran, though this is questionable as is the information regarding Soviet chemical warhead technology transfers to Libya.

Syria probably obtained chemical warhead technology for its missiles through cooperation with Iran, Libya, and North Korea, as well as through the assistance of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In May 1986, Syria was believed to be close to obtaining SS- 23 missiles from the Soviets. Although this information was proved wrong, a tentative agreement may have been signed. By July 1987, however, the Soviet Union had publicly withdrawn from any such agreement, perhaps based on concerns regarding Syria's financial status.

Seeking a more amenable supplier in late 1987 or early 1988, Syria entered negotiations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) for its M-9 missile (600km range) -- a missile developed specifically for the hard currency export market. At the time the PRC was also negotiating with Iran, Libya and Pakistan for such missiles. Libya was to finance the Syrian-PRC deal, signed in May 1989, for the delivery of 140 M-9s at a cost of $170 million. Eighty missiles would go to Syria and the rest to Libya, but the deal was canceled following a visit to the PRC by US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Hence, Syria made proposals and entered negotiations with North Korea late in 1989 and early in 1990 seeking to acquire that nation's modified Scuds or Scud-Cs.

Previously, North Korea provided modified Scuds to Iran in 1988 during its conflict with Iraq and also provided missile development assistance. In March 1991, Syria took delivery of 24 missiles and 20 launchers from North Korea, referred to by Israel and the United States as "Scud-Cs."

Apparently, these Scud-Cs are actually Scud-PIPs or locally modified Scud-B derivatives with a 500km range, 700kg warhead, and improved accuracy over the "standard Scud-B." Syria's Foreign Minister, Farouk al-Shara, stated that Syria was "still in a state of war with Israel" and hence justified Syrian missile acquisitions as necessary to balance Israel's "many missiles" and "mass destruction weapons."

North Korea has also exported missile systems or technology to Iran, Libya, Egypt, possibly Cuba, and was considering Iraqi requests in 1990 for both missiles and launchers. North Korean missile export policy appears to be motivated by profit and the decline of Soviet transactions.