Features

This material is produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
What's New in the Database
Belarus Export Controls
Introduction
Administrative Bodies
The Security Council
Foreign Economic Relations (MFA)
Defense (MOD)
Justice
State Security Committee (KGB)
State Customs Committee (Gosudarstvenniy Tamozhennyy Komitet - GTK)
The Main Directorate of Border Guards Authorities
Economy
Key Legislative Acts and Executive Decrees
Other Control Related Legislative Acts and Executive Decrees
Legislative Acts
Executive Decrees
Export Licensing Process
International/Bilateral Agreements


Belarus: Export Controls Introduction
This is an archived page. Please visit the new Belarus country profile

Belarus: Export Control Introduction

See also:
Export Control Developments
Export Licensing Process
Key Legislative Acts and Executive Decrees
Other Control Related Legislative Acts and Executive Decrees
International Organization and Treaty Tables

This report was prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Energy or the United States Government.

The Republic of Belarus has taken many of the essential preparatory steps for the establishment of an effective export control system. However, there has been little progress over the past year. Indeed, according to some Belarusian political analysts, in recent months there has been a trend toward a decreased emphasis on nonproliferation and arms control, including export control issues, in the Belarusian government.

A draft comprehensive export control law still has not been submitted to the parliament, although it has been ready since summer of 1996. Neither the President’s office nor parliamentary leaders in the Supreme Soviet had anticipated much opposition to the law, but export control issues were relegated to the back burner in Fall 1996 when President Aleksandr Lukashenka and the Belarusian Supreme Soviet clashed over constitutional issues. After a referendum on a new constitution on November 24, 1996, President Lukashenka restructured the Parliament into a bicameral legislature, the National Assembly.[1] The law may be re-submitted to the National Assembly in Fall 1997.[2]

According to a group of American legal experts, if the draft law is adopted, "it could form the basis of an export control system governed by the principles of legality and transparency" and would give the government of Belarus "a sound basis for meeting international obligations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."[3] However, many features common to Western export control laws, such as penalties, remedies and enforcement powers, are absent from this draft law. According to Belarusian experts these provisions will be referenced in relevant sections of the revised criminal and civil codes, which have not yet been approved by the National Assembly. The existing criminal code dates back to 1984.

Belarus is not a member of any of the key multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Although Belarus does not have a nuclear industry that produces direct-use nuclear or nuclear dual-use items, there are approximately 40 Belarusian enterprises that produce items that are subject to export controls. These commodities are primarily in the area of conventional arms, although there may be enterprises that produce component parts that would be controlled by the MTCR. In addition, over the past few years Belarus has sold a significant portion of the stockpiles military equipment left on its territory by the former Soviet Army.[4]

The establishment of a CIS Customs Union, as well as the trend toward integration and even unification of Belarus and Russia, could have major implications for the enforcement of nonproliferation export controls. Belarus and Russia have announced their intention to fully integrate their Customs and Border Guards authorities, and by the end of 1996 all check-points had been abolished along the Belarusian-Russian border. Until the legal and logistical aspects of this integration are worked out, the illegal transshipment of controlled items across the Belarusian-Russian border may become an issue of serious concern. In early 1997, for example, Russia re-introduced check-points on the Russian side of the border. Russian customs authorities claimed that transit goods were being smuggled into Russia in violation of its customs regulations. Belarusian authorities have disputed this claim.

This report describes the status of export controls in the Republic of Belarus as of May 1997. It focuses in particular on the organizational actors with responsibilities for export controls, export control decrees and legislation, and international agreements. A description of the export control licensing process is also included. The full text of selected export control decrees, as well as the full text of a draft export control law are attached as appendices.[5]

Sources:
[1] "Belarus: Administrative Bodies," NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, March 1997.

[2] CNS discussions with Belarusian nonproliferation specialist, March 21, 1997.
[3] Ambassador Michael Newlin (ret.); Burrus Carnahan, Science Applications International Corporation; Dan Hoydysh, Unisys Corp.; and John Parachini, Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Expert Summary" released after a workshop sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, and the Government of the Republic of Belarus to review and discuss the draft export control law, February 29 - March 1, 1996.
[4] Sergei Anisko, "Belarus: Problemy Reformirovaniya Armiyi I Eksport Vooruzheniyy," Eksport Obychnykh Vooruzheniyy, No. 1-2 (9 - 10), Center PIR, Moscow, 1997.
[5] The documents provided have been translated into English. The original Russian language texts are available upon request.

 

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  SITE MAP