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This material is produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
What's New in the Database
Belarus Nuclear Weapons
Strategic Weapons Overview
Weapons on Territory
ICBM Designations/Number of Warheads
ICBM Bases
START-Accountable Launchers   Warheads
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Denuclearization Overview
Missile Deactivation and Warhead Transfer
Silo/Launcher Dismantlement
Issues Surrounding Missile Transfer to Russia
Financial Compensation


Belarus: Weapons on Territory
This is an archived page. Please visit the new Belarus country profile

Belarus: Weapons On Territory

The last SS-25 Topol ICBMs on Belarusian territory were withdrawn to Russia on 27 November 1996. All warheads for the missiles were withdrawn to Russia on 23 November 1996. For information on statements concerning the possible redeployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus please see the Positions on Nuclear-Weapons-Related Issues file.
["Belarus Completes the Withdrawal of the Remaining Russian Missiles," Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the United States of America, 27 November 1996.] {Entered JL 1/8/97}
 
ICBM DESIGNATIONS / NUMBER OF WARHEADS
NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle' (road-mobile)
USSR-Russian designation RS-12M 'Topol'
No. of warheads 1

 
ICBM BASES
9/90 START I MOU [1] 27 SS-25 at Lida
27 SS-25 at Mozyr
12/91 peak deployment [2] 81 SS-25 at Lida, Mozyr, and Postavy (breakdown unknown)
12/94 MOU [3] 18 SS-25 at Lida
18 SS-25 at Mozyr
1/1/96 MOU [4] 9 SS-25 at Lida
9 SS-25 at Mozyr
7/1/96 MOU [5] 7 SS-25 at Lida
9 SS-25 at Mozyr
2 non-deployed launchers at Lida
1/1/97 MOU [6] 0 at Lida
0 at Mozyr
7/31/2000 MOU [7] 0 at Lida
0 at Mozyr

Sources:
[1] September 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
[2] Leonard Spector and William Potter, Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report, A Cooperative Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1995, p. 6.
[3] December 1994 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
[4] "Fact Sheet," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,  2 April 1996.
[5] START I Memorandum of Understanding, effective date 1 July 1996.
[6] 1 January 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,  released 1 April 1997.
[7] 31 July 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Department of State. {Updated 3/9/01 RG}
 
START-ACCOUNTABLE LAUNCHERS & WARHEADS
While all warheads and missiles were removed from Belarus in November 1996, the launchers remain START-accountable until their removal has been verified.
9/90 START I MOU [1] 54 ICBMs
54 warheads
12/91 peak deployment [2] 81 ICBMs
81 warheads
12/94 MOU [3] 36 ICBMs
36 warheads
1/1/96 MOU [4] 18 ICBMs
18 warheads
7/1/96 MOU [5] 16 ICBMs
16 warheads*
1/1/97 MOU [6] 0 ICBMs
0 warheads
7/31/2000 MOU [7] 0 ICBMs
0 warheads

* It is assumed that the warheads from the 2 missiles transferred to Russia in 1996 were also removed from Belarus.
Sources:
[1] September 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
[2] Leonard Spector and William Potter, Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report, A Cooperative Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1995, p. 6.
[3] December 1994 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
[4] "Fact Sheet," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 2 October 1996, p. 1.
[5] START I Memorandum of Understanding, effective date 1 July 1996.
[6] 1 January 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1 April 1997.
[7] 31 July 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), US Department of State. {Updated 3/9/01 RG}
 
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
All tactical nuclear weapons were removed from Belarus at the start of May 1992; two months ahead of the 1 July 1992 scheduled deadline.
["Status Reaffirmed," JPRS-TND-92-014, 14 May 1992, p. 18.]
 
 
Last updated 16 April 2001
 
Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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