On 18 February 1993, after more than a year of negotiations, the United States
and Russia signed the Highly
Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement (also referred to as Megatons to Megawatts
and the HEU Purchase Agreement)—the first nonproliferation agreement with a
commercial basis. Spanning 20 years, the Megatons to Megawatts agreement aims to
convert 500 metric tons (t) of HEU, the equivalent of approximately 20,000
nuclear warheads, from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into low-enriched
uranium (LEU), which is then converted into nuclear fuel for use in U.S.
commercial reactors.[1]
The agreement required the
United States and Russia to appoint an executive agent to implement the
commercial contracts. Russia chose
Tekhsnabeksport (TENEX), the
Russian nuclear ministry's (now Rosatom) foreign trade organization, while the
United States initially selected its Department of Energy, but later settled on
the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) as its
agent. USEC was privatized in 1998, but remained the sole U.S. executive agent
for carrying out the contract.
When the agreement was first negotiated, its estimated revenue to Russia was
expected to be $12 billion, which included approximately $8 billion for Russia's
enrichment services in producing LEU and $4 billion for the natural uranium
component.
Currently, the agreement
calls for an annual blend-down rate of approximately 30t of HEU, though many
nonproliferation experts, including some government officials in the United
States, Russia, and other countries, advocate an increase in this rate (see the
discussion later in the overview).
As of 31 March 2005, 237t of HEU, the equivalent of 9,472 warheads had been
converted into 6,974t of LEU power plant fuel.[1] (For information on the
progress of the HEU-LEU downblending program, please refer to the
Megatons to Megawatts section on the USEC website.)
HEU Blend-Down Process
Several Russian facilities are involved in the HEU blend-down process, from
warhead dismantlement to dilution into LEU. First, Russian nuclear warheads are
dismantled at nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly facilities. Following
this, HEU components are shipped to the
Siberian Chemical Combine
(in Seversk) and the Mayak
Production Association (in Ozersk), where they are turned into metal
shavings and then converted into uranium oxide (U3O8). The U3O8 is then
converted into highly enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at either the
Siberian Chemical Combine or the
Krasnoyarsk Electrochemical
Plant (in Zelenogorsk). These two facilities, as well as the
Ural Electrochemical Combine
(in Novouralsk), dilute the UF6 to produce LEU with a concentration of
uranium-235 below 5%. (For more information on this process, refer to the
Megatons to Megawatts section of the USEC website.) The LEU is then packaged
and shipped via St. Petersburg to the United States. Upon receipt of the LEU,
USEC pays TENEX. Once in the United States, USEC may alter the LEU enrichment
level according to its customers' specifications, or send the LEU unaltered to a
US commercial nuclear-fuel fabricator.[1]
Transparency Measures
The Megatons to Megawatts program includes various transparency measures to
verify its faithful execution. The transparency regime covering the processing
of HEU into LEU was established in March 1994 with the Protocol on HEU
Transparency Arrangements. The protocol outlines the specific monitoring,
observation, and assessment activities permitted at both US and Russian
facilities. This is the only formal ex-weapon fissile material transparency
regime currently being implemented on a large scale.[2]
Both the United States and Russia are allowed reciprocal visits to certain
facilities in each country. The transparency regime covers the four Russian
facilities involved in the HEU blend-down process: the Siberian Chemical
Combine, the Ural Electrochemical Combine, the Krasnoyarsk Electrochemical
Plant, and the Mayak Production Association. The transparency measures do not
include any Russian facilities involved in warhead dismantlement or the
transportation of ex-warhead HEU to the four facilities involved in the
downblending process.
Beginning in 1996, US monitors were allowed to perform the following activities
at the four Russian facilities: observe the transformation of HEU from metal
shavings into a gaseous form for blending; visit the areas where HEU is blended
into LEU; apply US tags and seals to HEU and LEU containers; and review copies
of Russian nuclear material control and accounting documents. Later, Russia also
agreed to the use of US-manufactured,
portable equipment to confirm the presence or absence of weapons-grade HEU in
closed containers, and the installation of Blend-Down Monitoring Systems (BDMS)
verifying the downblending of HEU into LEU by monitoring the enrichment level of
the latter.[3]
In the United States, six facilities that process the LEU are subject to Russian
monitoring. These facilities belong to: Siemens Power Corporation,
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, ABB/Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
Westinghouse Nuclear, Framatome Cogema Fuels, and GE Nuclear Energy.
Commercial Arrangements for the HEU-LEU Agreement
The commercial component
of the HEU-LEU agreement consists of two parts: a commercial contract for
purchasing Russian LEU (or, more precisely, LEU enrichment services) and an
agreement for reimbursing Russia for the natural uranium it would have used in
the production of LEU if it had been produced from natural uranium rather than
from recycled warhead HEU.
The first contract between USEC and TENEX
on LEU enrichment services was signed in 1996. It stipulated quantities and
prices of the blended-down uranium for the next five years. Under this contract,
USEC paid TENEX a fixed price for the LEU, which was only slightly below its
market value at the time. This contract did not consider the possibility of
market fluctuations, which became a concern to USEC, when it saw reduced profits
as a result of a sharp drop in the market price of uranium in the late 1990s. As
a result of this development, USEC insisted on re-negotiating the pricing scheme
after the original 5-year contract expired. In June 2002, TENEX agreed to a new
pricing scheme after protracted negotiations between both governments. Effective
1 January 2003,
the new terms of the contract instituted a market-based pricing formula taking
into account price fluctuations over the
period of three years. This price also includes a discount to USEC.[4]
The second commercial contract involves payments to
Russia for the natural uranium feed material. This distinction between the LEU
enrichment services and compensation for natural uranium feed is derived from
established practice in the United States, where nuclear utilities pay
separately for uranium and enrichment services. A formal agreement between the
United States and Russia that regulates the amounts of natural uranium to be put
aside in the United States as a compensation for the Russian uranium used in the
process of making LEU, its subsequent use, sale and/or shipments was signed in
1998 and is known as the HEU Feed Deal.[4]
The implementation of both contracts—on LEU enrichment and
for the natural uranium feed component—has not
been without difficulties and setbacks. (A chronology of major developments in
the implementation of the HEU-LEU Program can be found in the
Archived HEU Deal Developments section.) Despite these
challenges, the Megatons to Megawatts Program is one of the most successful
US-Russia nonproliferation efforts. It eliminates excess HEU and thus
reduces the risk that it might be diverted, misused, or became the target of a
terrorist attack. In addition, it provides Russia's nuclear industry with
revenue (about $500 million a year) and employment for its specialists at
facilities involved in HEU downblending. These HEU-LEU revenues help fund Russian nuclear
industry conversion.
Calls for Accelerating HEU Downblending
Currently, the primary concern raised by the HEU-LEU Program relates to
the amount and rate of HEU to be blended down. The 500t of HEU identified in the
1993 agreement is less than one half of the total amount of HEU Russia is
thought to have produced. Additional quantities of HEU from dismantled warheads
continue to be added to HEU stockpiles every year due to reductions in the
Russian nuclear arsenal. Thus, after Russian nuclear military complex needs and
civilian demands for HEU (research reactor fuel,
nuclear submarine and
icebreaker fuel) are satisfied, the amount
of surplus HEU will be far greater than the 500t identified in the US-Russian
agreement. Although the exact amount of surplus HEU is not known (there is no
official data on the total Russian HEU produced or on the Russian military and
civilian HEU requirements), analysts estimate that at least 350t of HEU could be
declared excess beyond the 500t identified in the 1993 agreement.[5]
Another related concern is the pace of the HEU downblending process. At the
current rate of 30t per year, the process is unlikely to be finished by 2013.
Even if the completion date is met, nonproliferation experts argue that with a
relatively small investment this rate could be significantly increased, and
risks associated with HEU eliminated far more quickly. In 2003, the US Administration,
based on the recommendations of a US-Russian joint expert group, proposed an
increase in the HEU downbledning rate of 1.5-5t per year and included a $25 million
request in its fiscal year 2004 budget proposal. However, Congress did not
approve this request, arguing that the proposed increase would have a marginal
nonproliferation benefit and that the HEU-LEU program is a commercial program
and should not be funded with US taxpayer dollars.[6] The expert community
continues to discuss ways to accelerate HEU blenddown and possible scenarios for
such an acceleration. A
Swedish Nuclear Power
Inspectorate study proposed the doubling of
excess Russian HEU elimination, by downblending the material to just below 20%
uranium-235 and involving European countries to fund this program. Downblending
HEU to below 20% would make the material unsuitable for use in a nuclear weapon. The
resulting LEU could be withheld for future release on the uranium market, in
order to minimize any adverse affects on that market.[7] Another effort,
spearheaded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, involves a detailed study by
Russian scientists, with the cooperation of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy
Agency (Rosatom), of various options for accelerating HEU downblending in
Russia. The study examines options for increasing the amount of HEU blended down
each year from 30t to 35, 40, 50, or 60 metric tons per year, and considers
different possible enrichment levels for the final product--4.5%, 12%, and 19%
uranium-235, taking into account technological, proliferation, and financial
considerations.[8] Sources:
[1] "Fact Sheet, US-Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program," USEC Web Site,
http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/megatons_fact.asp.
[2] Matthew Bunn, “The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads
and Fissile Material,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Harvard
Project on Managing the Atom, April 2000, p. 50.
[3] “Nuclear Nonproliferation, Status of Transparency Measures for U.S.
Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium,” US General Accounting Office,
September 1999;
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99194.pdf.
[4] J. Peter Scoblic, “United States,
Russia Approve New ‘HEU Deal’ Contract,”
Arms Control Today on-line edition,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/heujul_aug02.asp, July/August
2002.
[5] Robert L. Civiak, "Closing the Gaps: Securing High Enriched Uranium in the
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," May 2002, p.9, Federation of American
Scientists website,
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/020500-heu/index.html.
[6] Daniel Horner, "House appropriators chop funds for increased HEU
downblending," NuclearFuel, Vol. 28, No. 15 (July,
2003), p. 1.
[7] Gunnar Arbman, et. all, "Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium:
Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation," April
2004;
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/heu-200415.pdf.
[8] Daniel Horner, "NTI Blend-Down Study of Russian HEU to Examine Many Options
for Speed-Up," NuclearFuel, Vol. 28, No.6 (March 17, 2003), pp. 12-13.
Fissile Material Production and Disposition
