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Russia Fissile Material Production and Disposition Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments
Fissile Material Production and Disposition Overview
Weapons-Grade Fissile Material Cycle Overview
Weapons-Grade Fissile Material Cycle Chart
Uranium Mining and Milling
Uranium Enrichment
Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine
Electrochemical Plant
Urals Electrochemical Combine
Siberian Chemical Combine
Uranium Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities
VNIIKhT
Chepetsk Mechanical Plant
Konstantinov Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine
Luch Scientific Production Association
Machine Building Plant (Elektrostal)
Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant
TVEL Joint-Stock Company
Plutonium Production
Mayak Production Association (MPA)
Mining and Chemical Combine (GKhK, Krasnoyarsk-26)
Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK, Tomsk-7)
US-Russia HEU-LEU Program Overview
Plutonium Disposition Overview
+Plutonium Disposition Article
MOX Fuel Overview
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments
Closed Nuclear Cities Map and Table
Naval Reactor Fuel Cycle (Naval Reactor Section)


Russia: Plutonium Disposition Overview
Russia:  Plutonium Disposition Overview

History
US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement
Implementation Issues
US Funding Developments
Sites involved with plutonium disposition
The Trilateral Initiative
Introduction to Plutonium Disposition, article by A. Bernstein
Plutonium Disposition Issue Brief
Plutonium Disposition Full-Text Documents
Archived Plutonium Disposition Developments
MOX Fuel Overview Archived MOX Fuel Developments

For major recent developments, see the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.

History

The United States and the Soviet Union accumulated large stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium throughout the Cold War, which are today no longer necessary for nuclear weapons. The United States has produced more than 111 metric tons (t) of plutonium, and the Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia are believed to have produced at least 150t.[17] In 1995, US President Bill Clinton announced that the United States possessed over 50t of plutonium in excess of national security needs. Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin reciprocated by announcing in 1997 that Russia intended to remove 50t of plutonium from its defense programs.[1,2,3] Both countries have pledged to take steps so that this material is never again used for weapons.
 
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin commissioned a bilateral panel in 1996 to recommend a course of action for plutonium disposition.  The panel reported in June 1997 that plutonium immobilization, mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and its use in civilian reactors, or a combination of the two were the most practical options for plutonium disposition (please see the full text of the report for details).  For an analysis of Russian and US plutonium disposition options and challenges, please see Dr. Adam Bernstein’s 1997 article Introduction to Plutonium Disposition.
 
The Gore-Kiriyenko meeting of July 1998 further expanded on previous meetings.  Both sides signed the US-Russian Agreement on Management of Used Plutonium in which they agreed to establish and expand scientific cooperation for the management of excess plutonium. 
 
A major breakthrough towards a bilateral agreement came on 2 September 1998, when Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed a joint statement on plutonium disposition during the seventh Clinton-Yeltsin summit.  Negotiations concerning the creation of a bilateral agreement continued over the next two years, building upon the framework of the 1998 Clinton-Yeltsin joint statement.[2,3]
 
US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement
 
On 4 June 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin announced that the negotiations had successfully ended with an agreement on the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium.  US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov officially signed the US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement on 1 September 2000.  
 
According to the agreement, both countries must dispose of at least 34t of weapons-grade plutonium.  The United States plans to burn 25.5t as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and immobilize the remaining 8.5t.  Russia intends to burn all 34t as MOX fuel. Both countries must begin either immobilization or burning by 2007 at the rate of at least 2t per year. In the second phase, the disposition rate should reach 5t per year.[2,5,7] The agreement bans any reprocessing of irradiated MOX fuel until all 34t are disposed of. Any additional plutonium designated in the future by either country as excess to defense needs can be disposed of under the terms and conditions of the 1 September 2000 agreement.[2,5]
 
Verification, monitoring, and inspections are vital aspects of the agreement. The September 2000 agreement sets forth broad principles upon which monitoring and inspection would be based, but since facilities in Russia and the United States are not scheduled to be online until 2007, details will be covered in a separate “follow-on” negotiation to be held within a few years. The United States and Russia are engaged in consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency to work out verification procedures.[4] 
 
Implementation Issues
 
Several tasks must be accomplished before full-scale implementation of the agreement can proceed in Russia: 1) evaluation of necessary investment and operating costs; 2) site selection; 3) coordination of light water reactor (LWR) technology and MOX fuel specifications; 4) acquisition of licenses to use test assemblies in LWRs; 5) development of regulations with Russian regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor (GAN); and 6) completion of research focusing on MOX fuel use in LWRs and in the BN-600 fast reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[7,8]
 
As of September 2001, no large-scale MOX production facilities exist in Russia that can store and reprocess plutonium or fabricate MOX fuel. One small, experimental production plant, Paket, currently produces MOX fuel at Mayak Production Association in Ozersk. However, the throughput of the Paket plant is too small to ensure enough MOX fuel production to meet the 2t per year initial disposition rate that the agreement calls for.[6] To meet plutonium conversion and MOX fuel production needs, Russia intends to build a facility for converting plutonium metal to an oxide form suitable for fabrication of MOX fuel. According to earlier decisions, Russia intends to locate the conversion facility at Mayak. In addition, an industrial-scale MOX fabrication facility has to be designed and constructed. The location of this facility could be at Mayak or at the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk.[18] One of the options Russia is considering is importing equipment from the German Hanau MOX fuel fabrication plant
 
Additionally, there are not enough reactors in Russia that can burn MOX fuel from weapons-grade plutonium. Currently, only the BN-600 fast neutron reactor at Beloyarsk NPP and the BOR-60 fast neutron research reactor at the Scientific Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (SRIAR) in Dimitrovgrad can use MOX fuel. The use of MOX fuel fabricated from weapons-origin plutonium in these reactors is still being tested, and modifications to the BN-600 are needed to convert it to a net plutonium burner that can dispose of up to 1.3t annually. Potentially, six VVER-1000 light water reactors (four units at Balakovo NPP and two units at Kalinin NPP) could be modified to use MOX fuel and thus allow Russia to meet the 2t/year disposition rate.[6,18] In February 2001, Minatom announced its intention to build a BN-800 fast neutron reactor at Beloyarsk NPP by 2009. The BN-800 is a modification of the BN-600 reactor and could also be used for plutonium disposition.[19]
 
As of 2001, research and development (R&D) for the Russian plutonium disposition program, including international cooperation projects, is focused on the following activities: 1) design and pilot demonstration of plutonium metal to oxide conversion facility; 2) development of a MOX fuel production method compatible with weapons-grade plutonium and analysis of its use in VVER-1000 and BN-600 reactors; 3) assessment of BN-600 reactor conversion and light water reactor modifications; 4) the Parallex Project; 5) high temperature gas reactor research and development to supplement plutonium irradiation capacity; and 6) development of plutonium immobilization technology.[10]
 
These activities are being undertaken by a number of research institutes and nuclear facilities in Russia: the Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Inorganic Materials (VNIINM), the Scientific Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (SRIAR), the Institute for Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), the V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute Scientific Production Association, the Kurchatov Institute, the All-Russia Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operation (VNIIAES), the State Specialized Design Institute (GSPI), the SNIIP Scientific and Engineering Center, the All-Russian Planning and Design Research Institute of Energy Technology (VNIPIET), the Experimental Machine Building Design Bureau (OKBM), the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (NZKhK), Luch Scientific Production Association, the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK), the Mining and Chemical Combine (GKhK), and Mayak Production Association (PO Mayak).[10] For short summaries of these facilities' activities in the plutonium disposition program, see the DOE map and chart on Sites Involved with Plutonium Disposition in Russia.
 
The main roadblock to disposing of Russian plutonium is the question of financing. Two independent studies--one by the US Department of Energy and another by France, Germany, and Russia--estimate the cost of the plutonium disposition program in Russia at $1.7-1.9 billion over 20 or more years.[2,14] The September 2000 agreement "recognizes the need for international financing and assistance" in order for Russia to implement its plutonium disposition plans.[8] The G-8 countries are attempting to create an overall investment and funding strategy for Russia’s plutonium disposition program.[9] As of May 2001, less than $700 million had been secured to support Russian plutonium disposition. The G-8 meeting in Genoa in July 2001 was set as an intermediate deadline to finalize international funding for the plutonium disposition program in Russia. However, international funding pledges to the effort were still below the mark, and the discussion of the plutonium disposition program in Russia was removed from the Genoa meeting agenda.[20]
 
Minatom has criticized the G-8 for being slow in pledging funds for the program. First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov urged Western countries to resolve financing issue by April 2002. According to Ivanov, if funding is not secured by that time, Russia may reexamine the program. As an alternative option to plutonium disposition implementation, Minatom officials propose allowing Russia to "lease" its MOX fuel to Western customers in order to increase revenue for the plutonium disposition program. This way, they claim, international funding could be reduced to $1 billion.[12,13]   
 
In addition to financing, there are other outstanding issues which the G-8 group must overcome before the Russian plutonium disposition program begins. The special plutonium disposition group, a G-8 body tasked with providing a funding and management framework for Russian plutonium disposition, is working on several unresolved issues: 1) the structure and operating procedures of the international entity that will supervise the Russian program; 2) the role of the donor countries, the makeup of the donor council, Russia's status as a member of the group, and voting procedures for all members; and 3) the nature and extent of the Russian contribution to the program.[15] 
 
Several countries besides the United States have been actively assisting Russia in its plutonium disposition efforts during the past several years, and in most cases, cooperative efforts began well before the September 2000 US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement was signed. The countries have focused upon one or more of the issues highlighted earlier concerning Russia's R&D activities for plutonium disposition.  For example, Japan has been active in plutonium disposition projects with the BN-600 reactor at the Beloyarsk NPP.  Canada agreed to test experimental Russian MOX fuel from weapons-grade plutonium in CANDU reactors under the Parallex Project.[16] A French-German-Russian group has focused on plutonium conversion and MOX fuel fabrication facilities, and the use of VVER-1000 light water reactors and the BN-600 reactor to burn weapons-origin MOX fuel.[2,11,16]


US Funding Developments
The US Congress approved $200 million for the construction of facilities in Russia to dispose of plutonium in the FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277). The Clinton administration requested another $200 million for plutonium disposition efforts in Russia for FY 2001. However, the actual spending in 2000-2001 on plutonium disposition facilities in Russia was primarily limited to their design and planning and was funded separately from the emergency funds: $4,168 million in FY 2000 and $16,650 million in FY 2001.[22]

 

Table I:  US Funding of Russian Fissile Materials Disposition 
  FY2000

[22]

FY2001

[23]

FY2002

[23]

FY2003 (Budget Request)

[23]

Russian Plutonium Disposition $4.168 million $12.851 million $42 million $64 million
Support and Oversight in the United States $20.777 million $16.809 million $14 million $33 million
Advanced Reactor Technology $5 million $9.847 million $5 million $1 million
Subtotal, Russian Surplus Fissile Material Disposition $29.945 million $39.507 million $61 million $98 million
Less Use of Prior-Year Balances - - -$42 million -$64 million

Total

$29.945 million $39.507 million $19 million $34 million

Sources:
[1] Adam Bernstein, “Plutonium Disposition in Russia: Executive Summary,” November 1997,  Center for Nonproliferation Studies,  http://www.cns.miis.edu/.
[2] Christopher Ficek, “Plutonium Disposition Update,” RANSAC Web Site, http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/pub/reports/pudisp-2000.html.
[3] Elizabeth Turpen et al., “The Challenge of Plutonium Disposition: Status and Future Prospects,” Paper presented at the International Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 40th Annual Meeting, 25-29 July, 1999, Phoenix, Arizona.
[4] “Briefing by DOE on Plutonium Disposition Program and MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility Licensing,” Public Meeting at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 27 November 2000, NRC Web Site, http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/.../20001127b.html.
[6] “Disposing of Surplus U.S. Plutonium,” National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Web Site, http://twilight.saic.com/md/pu_main.htm
[5] “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation,” US Department of Energy Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/docs/pudispagree.pdf.
[7] Valentin Ivanov, “Management of plutonium derived from military programmes,” Twenty-Fifth Annual International Symposium 2000, London, August 31-September 1 2000, the Uranium Institute Web Site, http://www.uilondon.org/uilondon/uilondon/sym/00idx.htm.
[8] “Uncertainties About the Implementation of U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts,” US General Accounting Office, http://www.access.gpo.gov/...docid=f:rc98046.txt.pdf.
[9] “PIR Press Release—Minatom Leader Answers PIR Center’s Questions,” PIR Center press release, 16 April 2001.
[10] "Sites Involved with Plutonium Disposition in Russia," DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Web Site, http://twilight.saic.com/md/russianmap.htm.
[11] “Plutonium Agreement Boosts Russian MOX Fuel Plant Scheme,” RANSAC Nuclear News, 26 June 2000, RANSAC Web Site, http://www.ransac.org.
[12] "Scheme to Burn Russian Weapons Pu as MOX in West Hinges on German OK," NuclearFuel, Vol. 25, No. 21, 16 October 2000, Platts Global Energy Web Site, http://www.archive.mhenergy.com/cgi-bin/archive/.
[13] "Moskva: Zamglavy Minatoma RF: Na realizatsiyu programmu pererabotki oruzheynogo plutoniya Rossii potrebuyetsya primerno 2 mlrd doll.," RosBiznesKonsalting, 16 April 2000; in Minatom press digest,  http://www.minatom.ru.
[14] "G-8 Moving to Pu Disposition Program into High Gear," NuclearFuel, 11 December 2000, p.7-8. 
[15] "Pu Diposition Paper for G-8 Leaders Completed, Issues Unresolved," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 7 & 8, 16 April 2001.  
[16] Vladimir Rybachenkov, "O Mezhdunarodnom sotrudnichestve Rossii v oblasti utilizatsii izbytochnogo oruzheynogo plutoniya," Yadernyy Kontrol, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2000, pp. 51-58. {Entered 5/7/2001 GD}
[17] “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How Much of a Challenge,” Remarks of Ambassador Eileen Malloy, U.S. Department of Energy, 12 December 1999, presented at CNS conference “Assessing US Dismantlement and Nonproliferation Assistance Programs in the Newly Independent States,” Monterey, California, 11-13 December 1999.  
[18] Alice K. Caponiti et al.,"Technology Cooperation with Russia on Plutonium Disposition," Paper presented at the International Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 41st Annual Meeting, July 2000, New Orleans, Louisiana.
[19] "V 2009 godu v Rossii dolzhen nachat rabotat chetvertyy blok Beloyarskoy AES s reaktorom na bystrykh neytronakh novogo pokoleniya," ITAR-TASS, 27 April 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.  {Revised 5/16/2001 ES}
[20] Yekaterina Kats, "Ne soshlis v tsene," Vremya novostey; in Integrum Techno, http://www.intergrum.ru.
[22] William Hoehn, "Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Requests for U.S.-Former Soviet Union Nuclear Security: Department of Energy Programs," 10 August 2001, http://www.ransac.org.
[23] US Department of Energy, "Budget Highlights:  Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Request," DOE Web Site, http://www.energy.gov/DOEBudget/Highlght.pdf.
[24] US House of Representatives, Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill and Report, 2002, 107th Congress, H.R. 2311 and H. Report 107-112, 26 June 2001.

[25] US Senate, Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill and Report, 2002, 107th Congress, S.R. 1171 and S. Report 107-39, 13 July 2001. {Updated 11 October 2001, ES}

Page last updated 24 September 2004
For major recent developments, see the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.
For archived developments, see the Plutonium Disposition Developments page.

Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: Elena.SokovaATmiis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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