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Russia Fissile Material Production and Disposition Uranium Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities
Overview
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Technology
Chepetsk Mechanical Plant
Konstantinov Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Combine
Luch Scientific Production Association
Machine Building Plant (Elektrostal)
Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant
TVEL Joint-Stock Company


Russia: Fissile Material: Uranium Fuel Processing: Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant (NZKHK) Russia:  Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant (NZKhK)

Новосибирский завод химконцентратов (НЗХК)

LOCATION: Novosibirsk
Address: 94 ulitsa Bogdana Khmelnitskogo, 630110
Telephone: (7-383) 274-81-64, (7-383) 274-83-46, (7-383) 274-83-86
Fax: (7-383) 274-30-71
["Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant," Los Alamos National Laboratory, MPC&A Program Web Site, http://mpca.lanl.gov.] {Checked 11/29/2000 GD}
HOMEPAGE: http://sdi.siberia.net/nzhk/about.html {Entered 11/21/2002}
SUBORDINATION:  
NZKhK is part of the TVEL joint stock company, which is managed by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency.
[Nuclear Business Directory-2000 (Moscow: International Business Corporation, 2000 edition), p. 98.] {Entered 11/29/2000 GD}
ACTIVITIES:
NZKhK began operating in 1949 as part of the military's nuclear program. In 1974, the plant began producing fuel pellets, rods, and assemblies for VVER-1000 reactors.[1] As of 1995, it was fabricating natural uranium fuel rods and HEU spike rods for plutonium production reactors, HEU cores for tritium production reactors, and HEU fuel for research reactors.[2] The plant produced 210MT of VVER-1000 LEU fuel in 1993.[3] As of 1995, NZKhK's annual capacity for VVER-1000 fuel was 1,000MT. As of 1999, NZKhK was producing 11 percent of the world's fuel.[4] The plant's annual production capacity for HEU fuel was 70,000 fuel rods, about 1.2MT, as of 1999. NZKhK was scheduled to begin fabricating HEU fuel for the converted cores of the SKhK and GKhK plutonium production reactors by 2000.[5] NZKhK also uses blended-down weapons-grade HEU as feedstock for research reactor fuels.[6]
 
NZKhK began improving its VVER-1000 and VVER-440 fuel-assembly production in 1995, at which time its two production lines were producing 60 four-seam fuel rods per hour. Current research projects at the plant include concurrent two-seam and four-seam fuel rod production, anodizing, and contact-joint welding technologies. The plant produced a sample fuel pellet in March 1999, in August it produced the first test batch, and planned to produce 2MT of the new pellets by the end of the year. The new production technique has reduced the cost of each pellet by 30 percent, and reduced the overall production cost by 15 percent. Implementing the new technologies has doubled the plant's two-seam VVER-1000 and VVER-440 fuel rod production capacity.[4] In July 2001, NZKhK Director announced that to increase self-sufficiency in the fuel production process, the plant plans to begin production of the powder used to produce uranium pellets. NZKhK currently buys the powder from various other plants.[7] 
 
NZKhK has developed many technological innovations in lithium chloride and metallic lithium manufacturing. One of these is a process to produce granulated lithium from ore, which is easier to use in manufacturing processes.[4]
 
NZKhK is currently participating in over 112 collaborative research projects with a number of companies, including Russia's Elektrosignal and Sibtekmash, and the Korean firm Samsung. Over the past 10 years, NZKhK has participated in nearly 60 projects with 17 Russian Academy of Sciences institutions. TVEL contributed funding for some of this research.[4]
 
In 1995, the All-Russian Research Institute of Normalization and Mechanical Engineering (VNIINMash) gave NZKhK quality-control systems high marks, certifying the plant's production processes to the ISO-9002 quality standard.[4]
Sources:
[1] O. Bukharin, "Integration Of Defense And Civil Fuel Cycles Of Russia," Byulleten Tsentra Obshchestvennoy Informatsii po Atomnoy Energii, No. 5-6, 1995, p. 11.
[2] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin  (Boulder: Westview Press,  1995),  p. 191-192.
[3] "World Nuclear Industry Handbook," Nuclear Engineering International, 1995.
[4] Gennadiy Voskresenskiy, "Kak uranovaya tabletka zavod izlechila," Vek, No. 44, 12 November 1999, p.8.
[5] "Novosibirsk Facility to Fabricate HEU Fuel for Converted Pu Reactors," Post-Soviet States & Eastern Europe Monitor, 19 July 1999, p.17.
[6] Mark Hibbs, "Cache Of Material Seized In Munich Is Said To Be High-Grade MOX Fuel," Nuclear Fuel, 29 August 1994, pp. 2-4. {Updated 2/21/00 LWB}
[7] "Sovremennyye tekhnologii kak alternativa rasprodazhe syrya," Minatom Press Center, http://www.minatom.ru/presscenter, 22 September 2001. {Updated 2/21/00 LWB}{Updated 10/12/01 EC}
MPC&A:
NZKhK participates in the US Department of Energy MPC&A program. Under the Joint Statement on Control, Accounting and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials signed at the sixth session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in January 1996, cooperative physical protection projects were extended to the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant.[1] The initial site visit for this facility took place in May 1996.[2] MPC&A upgrades have focused on the following areas: 1) The Central Storage Facility (CSF) for highly enriched uranium (HEU); 2) the HEU processing area; 3) the Central Alarm Station (CAS); 4) monitoring and measurement of nuclear material; 5) NZKhK's radio communication system; and 6) MPC&A sustainability.[3] Fast-track upgrades focused upon the installation of portal monitors and metal detectors as well as upgrades to the HEU storage facilities.[4]
 
Upgrades at the CSF have focused on consolidating HEU into one building.  As of November 2000, the CSF contained 10 metric tons of HEU under safeguards.[5] The HEU processing area is a facility which converts uranium hexaflouride to uranium metal for use in reactor fuel rods. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs has denied Department of Energy personnel access to the existing CAS due to the sensitive nature of the work there. Because of this, the US team agreed to refurbish an existing room to serve as the new CAS.  Monitoring and measurement upgrades have focused on nondestructive assay (NDA) equipment and an automated material accounting system.[3] 
 
Physical Protection upgrades were aimed initially at the CSF and focused on the following areas: the CSF perimeter, access control, sensors and cameras, barriers, hardened response posts, and video surveillance of inside activity.[3]  Overall MPC&A upgrades at NZKhK have focused on the immediate and long term protection and accounting of HEU.
 
For a description of the MPC&A work performed at this site prior to 1997, please see the Department of Energy's December 1997 document, United States/Former Soviet Union Program of Cooperation on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting: Partnership for Nuclear Security.
Sources:
[1] "U.S. Russian Commission On Economic And Technological Cooperation--Report of the Committee on Nuclear Power," January 1996, US Department of Energy Web Site, http://www.eia.doe.gov/gorec/necrpt7.html
[2] Email correspondence with US Department of Energy official, 30 November 2000.
[3] Alexander Ustuygov, "Material Protection, Control, and Accountability Upgrades at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, Novisibirsk, Russia," paper presented at the 40th meeting of the International Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) annual conference, Phoenix, Arizona, 26-29 July, 1999. 
[4] G.M. Fuller, "US/Russian Cooperative Efforts to Enhance Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant," paper presented at the 1997 INMM annual conference, US Department of Energy Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/pubs/inmm97/rciv/rc015.htm.
[5] "Ten Metric Tons of Russian Nuclear Material Secured Consolidation at Novosibirsk Latest Effort to Protect Nuclear Material Against Theft," US Department of Energy press release, 17 November 2000. {Entered 11/30/2000  GD}

LITHIUM HYDRIDE STORAGE FACILITY:
On 16 December 1997, after two years of construction, a storage facility for lithium hydride removed from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons was put into commission at NZKhK.[1] The storage depot, with a capacity of 60 metric tons, is Russia's only storage facility for lithium hydride.[4] (Other sources list the capacity as up to 120 MT.[2])  Lithium, which is not considered radioactive waste and becomes dangerous only when it comes into contact with water, will be stored in hermetically sealed containers in the depot.[1] Multilevel monitoring systems and computer-controlled warning circuits were installed at the facilities.[1] France contributed approximately 400 million francs towards the construction project as part of an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the safe dismantling of Russian weapons, and will also participate in monitoring the material stored in the facility.[2, 3]  Workers from Russia's Siberian Energy Construction and Siberian Energy Installation enterprises built the depot together with French specialists in compliance with international safety and environmental requirements.[1]  The depot is a two-story building with an area of approximately 5,000 square meters.[4]
Sources:
[1] Vesti, 18 December 1997; in "French-Funded Lithium Storage Facility Completed in Russia," FBIS-TAC-97-352.
[2] Vadim Manenkov, ITAR-TASS, 16 December 1997; in "Lithium Hydride Storage Plant Opened in Novosibirsk," FBIS-TAC-97-350.
[3] Viktor Titov, "Frantsiya pomogayet Rossii razoruzhatsya," Segodnya, No. 275, 17 December 1997.
[4]  Vladimir Gubarev, "Piramida dlya atomnoy  bomby," Rossiyskaya gazeta,  28 February 1998, p. 7. {Updated 3/6/98 om, jl}
 
ARCHIVED NZKhK DEVELOPMENTS:

This section is no longer being updated.  For major recent developments, see the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.
 
10/2/2003:  NZKhK HOLDS TRAINING EXERCISES ON CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREPAREDNESS
As reported by Nuclear.ru on 2 October 2003, NZKhK held special tactical training exercises to test the actions of the administration, security services, and early warning and emergency response systems in the event of a chemical accident.  The main goal of the exercise was to test the readiness of special emergency teams and the capabilities of the production support department in the case of an accident in the new acids storage facility.
["Na Novosibirskom zavode khimkontsetratov proshli ucheniya po likvidatsii posledstviy khimicheskoy avarii," Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru, 2 October 2003.] {Entered 10/28/2003}

9/22/2003: HEU FROM ROMANIA ARRIVES AT NZKhK
On 22 September 2003, Nuclear.ru reported that 50 fuel assemblies and 150 individual nuclear fuel rods totaling 14,166.58 grams of uranium isotopes, including 9,703.04 grams of U-235, had arrived at NZKhK from a shut-down research reactor in Romania the previous day for re-fabrication into nuclear reactor fuel.  The operation was conducted at the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency, funded by the US Department of Energy, transported by the Romanian National Commission for Control of Nuclear Activities, and coordinated by the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation.
["Na OAO 'Novosibirskiy zavod khimkontsetratov' dostavleno svezheye yadernoe toplivo iz Rumynii," Nuclear.ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru, 22 September 2003.] {Entered 10/3/2003 DS}

4/21/2003: NZKhK INSTALLS NEW URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE POWDER PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT
TVEL press service told Nuclear.Ru that a new uranium hexafluoride powder production complex was put into operation at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant (NZKhK) on 21 April 2003. NZKhK paid 60% of the cost of the new equipment, while TVEL contributed the remaining 40%. The new complex will allow the use of existing production equipment at full capacity, reduce the production cost of nuclear fuel pellets, and create up to 200 new jobs.
["Na NZKhK vvedena v ekspluatatsiyu novaya ustanovka po proizvodstvu poroshka dioksida urana," Nuclear.Ru Web Site, http://www.nuclear.ru/, 23 April 2003.] {Entered 4/25/2003 DA}

10/22/2002: FIRE AT NZKhK CAUSED NO DAMAGE
On 22 October 2002, a fire broke out at NZKhK due to a short circuit in a power cable when a special melting furnace was being fixed in the mechanical assembly workshop. The fire was extinguished in two hours. According to the Novosibirsk regional department for civil defense and emergency situations, the accident took place far from the main production area and caused no casualties, damage, or interruption in production; no radiation or chemical leaks were recorded.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] Yevgeniy Shalnev, "Pozhar v odnom iz tsekhov Novosibirskogo zavoda khimkontsentratov ne povliyal na izmeneniya radiatsionnogo i khimicheskogo fona v gorode," ITAR-TASS, 23 October 2002; in Integrum online database, http://www.integrum.com/.
[2] "Novosibirsk. Na zavode, proizvodyashchem yadernoye toplivo, proizoshel pozhar," Regions.ru Web Site, http://www.regions.ru/, 22 October 2002; in Integrum online database, http://www.integrum.com/. {Entered 11/11/2002 DA}

8/29/2001: WORKERS ARRESTED FOR STEALING 500KG ZIRCONIUM FROM NZKHK
A group of NZKhK workers was arrested for stealing 500kg of zirconium tubing from NZKhK, NTV reported on 30 August 2001. Zirconium is used in production of nuclear fuel rods. The workers took the zirconium out through the main entrance of the plant. NTV reports that the metal was worth 1.5-2 million rubles ($51,000-$68,000 as of 30 August 2001), but the workers were seeking around $10,000.[1,2] The thieves were arrested when they were negotiating the sale of the stolen metal with undercover police and FSB officials. Authorities have opened criminal cases against the workers and continue to investigate the theft. Stockpiles at the plant are being inventoried to determine if other material has also been diverted.[1]
Sources:
[1] NTV International, 30 August 2001; in "Russian Police Foil Bid to Sell Stolen Zirconium," FBIS Document CEP20010830000256, 30 August 2001.
[2] "Criminals Arrested for Stealing 500kg of Zirconium from Russian Defense Plant," RIA, 29 August 2001; in "Criminals Arrested for Stealing 500kg of Zirconium from Russian Defense Plant," FBIS Document CEP20010829000051, 29 August 2001. {Entered 10/23/01 EC}
 
7/6/2001: NZKHK REPORTS ON 2000 ACTIVITIES
NZKhK Director Vladimir Afanasyev reported on developments at the plant in 2000 at the eighth annual shareholders' meeting, according to Novosti NZKhK. Afanasyev reported that industrial output in 2000 was 3.834 billion rubles ($131.1 million as of 7/6/2001), a 26.4 percent increase over 1999. Profits in 2000 were 1.392 million rubles ($47.7 million). New employment positions were created, and the number of workers employed by NZKhK increased by 542 people. The plant was fully removed from arrears by 1 January 2001, which had resulted primarily from late payment on government orders. Fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants made up the majority of NZKhK exports. Of 15 nuclear power units outside Russia supplied by NZKhK, 11 are in Ukraine. NZKhK continues to supply fuel to the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in Bulgaria, and now supplies fuel to both VVER-1000 and VVER-440 reactors in Bulgaria. NZKhK also exported uranium metal to Canada, Germany, and Indonesia, and increased lithium metal exports to Japan, South Korea, and the US.
[V.A. Nekulkov, "NZKhK v zerkale godovogo cobraniya aktsionerov," Novosti NZKhK, http://www.nccp.ru/ICOE/IIAINOE/KSNews/nccpNews_81.htm.]{Entered 1/24/02 EC}
 
5/31/2001: NZKhK TO COMPETE WITH WESTINGHOUSE FOR MARKETS
The Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant (NZKhK) intends to tender bids in an international competition in 2002 to supply nuclear fuel to reactors in Bulgaria and Ukraine for the following four years.  NZKhK currently supplies fuel to five nuclear power plants (NPP) in the two countries. The results of the competition are extremely important not only for the plant, but also for Novosibirsk Oblast, as 10% of its tax receipts come from NZKhK. According to Petr Lavrenyuk, chairman of NZKhK's board of directors and vice-president of TVEL, over the past two years Minatom and TVEL have financed the construction of production lines for fuel pellets at the plant, enabling NZKhK to manufacture some of the fuel pellets it uses in the production of fuel rods.  The plant now plans to move toward still greater self-sufficiency by manufacturing the powder for the uranium pellets, thereby lowering costs and ensuring higher quality.  The goal is to produce at least half the raw materials needed for fuel rod and assembly manufacturing at NZKhK. Other activities of NZKhK include development of reactor cores for the Bushehr power plant in Iran and the first unit of the new Rostov NPP, and supplying the Novovoronezh NPP with improved fuel assemblies with zirconium cladding.
["Zavod khimkontsentratov v borbe za rynki sbyta," Novosibirskiye novosti, 31 May 2001; in "Novosibirskomu zavodu khimkontsentratov (NZKhK) predstoit vstupit v borbu za rynki sbyta s amerikanskoy kompaniyey 'Westinghouse,'" Novosti-online; in Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy Web Site, www.minatom.ru.] {Entered 10/8/2001 lgm}
 
11/17/2000: MPC&A PROGRAM SECURES 10 METRIC TONS OF WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIAL 
The US Department of Energy's MPC&A program announced on 17 November 2000 that approximately 10 metric tons of "weapons-useable material" had been secured at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant.[1] The material was moved from three separate locations within the plant into an annex of the Central Storage Facility (CSF).[2,3]  MPC&A assistance helped build the annex to the CSF in order to store both HEU and LEU.[3]
Sources:
[1]"Ten Metric Tons of Russian Nuclear Material Secured.  Consolidation at Novosibirsk Latest Effort to Protect Nuclear Material Against Theft," US Department of Energy press release, 17 November 2000.
[2] Alexander Ustuygov, "Material Protection, Control, and Accountability Upgrades at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, Novisibirsk, Russia," paper presented at the 40th meeting of the International Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) annual conference, Phoenix, Arizona, 26-29 July, 1999.
[3] Correspondence with US Department of Energy official, 20 February 2001, RUS010220. {Entered 11/20/2000 GD}
 
6/14/2000: NZKHK TO BOOST FUEL PRODUCTION FOR VVER POWER REACTORS
NZKhK plans to increase the production of fuel for VVER power reactors in 2000.  Plant director Vladimir Afanasyev says that the production increase is tied to the scheduled launching of the first unit of the Rostov-na-Donu nuclear power plant (NPP) in the second half of 2000.  NZKhK also expects increased orders from Ukraine.  According to an agreement with TVEL, the plant will install fuel assemblies for NPPs in Russia (Balakovo, Kalinin, Rostov-na-Donu), Ukraine (Zaporizhzhya, South Ukraine, Khmelnitskiy, Rivne), and Bulgaria (Kolodzuy), and will supply fuel for production reactors at the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk and the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk.  The increased production plans are due in part to a positive performance in 1999, when production grew by nine percent and exports by 17 percent.  Despite a successful year, plant officials are worried about the ability of Russian and Ukrainian NPPs to pay for their fuel orders.
["Budushcheye zavoda Khimkontsentratov zavisit ot eksporta yadernykh materialov," Novosibirskiye novosti, 18 May 2000, p. 3; in WPS Yaderniye Materialy, No. 14, 14 June 2000.] {Entered 06/29/00 YF}
 
12/11/99: NZKHK TO FABRICATE HEU FUEL FOR CONVERTED PLUTONIUM REACTORS
According to industry press reports, Russia plans to fabricate the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the converted cores of the SKhK and GKhK plutonium production reactors at NZKhK instead of at the Machine Building Plant (MSZ), as had been expected. The change may allay US concerns about MPC&A at MSZ, and sidesteps the problem of Russia's refusal to grant US officials access to MSZ's HEU production lines. However, according to the Nuclear Control Institute, a senior DOE official claimed that NZKhK would not meet US MPC&A standards until 2001, although HEU fuel production is scheduled to begin by 2000. Others, however, claim that NZKhK already meets IAEA MPC&A standards. An advantage of using NZKhK is that it is closer to the reactors than MSZ, so the weapons-usable HEU fuel would not have to be transported as far. At present, NZKhK does not have the capacity to manufacture the necessary quantities of HEU fuel. To meet the demand, the factory has purchased new equipment, much of it from foreign sources: rotary presses from Belgium, vitrification furnaces from the United States, and quality control equipment from Germany.[1,2] Plant improvments will triple NZKhK's production capacity, and will be sufficient for the initial reactor loadings and all future reloads.[1]
Sources:
[1] "Novosibirsk Facility to Fabricate HEU Fuel for Converted Pu Reactors," Post-Soviet States & Eastern Europe Monitor, 19 July 1999, p.17.
[2] Gennadiy Voskresenskiy, "Kak uranovaya tabletka zavod izlechila," Vek, No. 44, 12 November 1999, p.8. {Updated 2/21/00 LWB}
 
11/98: RESEARCHER CRITICIZES LAX MPC&A PRACTICES AT NZKHK
In a letter to the editor of Yadernyy Kontrol, Aleksandr Bolsunovskiy, a senior researcher at the Insitute of Biophysics, expressed concern about MPC&A at Russian nuclear facilities.  Bolsunovskiy referred to two accidents, one at VNIIEF and one at NZKhK, as evidence of lax MPC&A practices. In the VNIIEF accident, a scientist was working with 90 percent HEU alone, in direct contradiction to MPC&A guidelines.  Bolsunovskiy argues that the proper procedures were disregarded because of the scientist's status.  At NZKhK, a spontaneous chain reaction occurred in a tank containing dozens of kilograms of 90 percent HEU, though it was designed for uranium sludges containing no more than 36 percent U-235.  Bolsunovskiy stated that this demonstrates a lack of safety culture and poor control and accounting procedures.  He warned that institutes may be lulled into a false sense of security by Minatom's extensive efforts in this area, forgetting that more work needs to be done.
[Aleksandr Bolsunovskiy, "Ob intervyu Yevgeniya Mishina i o probleme sokhrannosti yadernykh materialov," Yadernyy Kontrol, No.6, November-December 1998, p. 70.] {Entered 2/26/99 MS}
 
8/27/98: US DOE TO CONSTRUCT ANNEX TO HEU CENTRAL STORAGE FACILITY
On 27 August 1998, the US Department of Energy (DOE) announced that a ground-breaking ceremony was held at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant's (NZKhK) highly enriched uranium (HEU) central storage facility (CSF). The construction of an annex to the CSF is a part of the DOE's MPC&A program. The annex will increase the capacity of the existing building to store HEU from three other buildings at NZKhK. Consolidation of HEU will enhance security and accounting systems for nuclear material located at the plant.
["Novosibirsk Ground Breaking For Fuel Consolidation Annex," MPC&A-September 1998 News, September 1998, US Department of Energy Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/oldnews/09-98.htm. {Entered 11/30/2000 GD}
 
5/28/98:  CHEMICAL EXPLOSION AT NOVOSIBIRSK CHEMICAL CONCENTRATE PLANT
According to Interfax, a hydrogen-air explosion took place in a storage annex at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant on 28 May 1998.  The explosion did not involve a fuel-production line and no radioactive material was released.  Three people were injured in the blast.  An inquiry into the explosion will be held.
["Novosibirsk Chemical Plant Operational After Explosion," Interfax, 28 May 1998.] {Entered 6/12/98 jl}
 
3/31/98: NEW WASTE PROCESSING DEVICE INSTALLED
Scientists at the Institute of Catalysis, led by Professor Zemfir, have developed a device that neutralizes radioactive waste through flame-free incineration in a catalyzer.  Capable of incinerating 50 metric tons of waste annually, the device was installed today at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant.  According to A. Kostin, the factory's deputy technical director, "the device is based on a catalytic converter that provides low temperatures for the oxidation process," thus reducing the amount of nitrous oxides produced.  Experiments have confirmed the method's efficiency and environmental safety.
["Vesti" newscast, Russian Television Network, 31 March 1998; in "Russian Factory Finds New Method To Destroy Nuclear Waste," FBIS-SOV-98-090, 31 March 1998.] {Entered 8/28/98 LBB}
 
9/97: NOVOSIBIRSK TO INCREASE HEU FUEL PRODUCTION FOR REACTOR CORE CONVERSION
In September 1997, US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin reached an agreement to convert the cores of three Russian plutonium production reactors at Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7) and Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26) to use 90 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. The HEU fuel was previously loaded into the periphery of the plutonium production reactor cores. Following the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, however, the reactors are to use the 90 percent enriched fuel throughout the entire core. The fuel will have a higher burn-up rate, resulting in spent fuel containing 20 percent or more Pu-238 and Pu-240; the fuel will not be reprocessed.  Converting the cores would require increasing the output of HEU fuel at NZKhK to about five metric tons per year. Currently, the plant produces one metric ton of HEU enriched to 90 percent U-235 per year to fuel the reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Some US officials raised concerns about increased HEU production at NZKhK, especially after a May 1997 criticality accident involving HEU sludge wastes. According to a US official, "The accident showed that they don't know how much HEU they have  and where it is in the plant."  This demonstrates the threat of nuclear materials diversion, since HEU could be easily diverted from sludge wastes. The section of the plant affected by the accident remains non-operational, awaiting an inventory of the HEU sludges involved. Originally, the US proposed that Russia use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in the reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.  Russian officials refused this proposal, claiming that using LEU fuel in those reactors would lead to heat conductivity problems and that Russia has no experience with LEU in these reactors.
[Mark Hibbs, "Minatom Might Increase HEU Output At Scene Of 1997 Criticality Accident," NuclearFuel, 20 October 1997,  p. 12.] ( Entered 4/15/98 om)
 
9/97: VVER-440 FUEL DESIGN ENTERS TESTING
In September 1997, Nuclear Engineering International reported that NZKhK has begun testing a VVER-440 fuel design, eliminating the Elektrostal Machine Building Plant's monopoly in VVER-440 fuel production. Previously, NZKhK produced fuel only for VVER-1000s and research reactors. The plant made this decision in response to some countries' ban on purchasing nuclear fuel from only one vendor (e.g. Elektrostal). NZKhK's move was in part prompted by its failure to win a tender for fuel deliveries to the Temelin NPP in the Czech Republic. The plant has won, however, two tenders to supply fuel to the Dukovany facility in the Czech Republic and to Ukrainian reactors. NZKhK has also upgraded its VVER-1000 fuel production line so that it can produce cladding assemblies using zirconium rather than steel.  The resulting assemblies can be used for four years instead of three. Six hundred such assemblies have been tested in reactors in Ukraine and at Novovoronezh NPP.  NZKhK has upgraded fuel pellets by adding gadolinium as an absorber, eliminating the need for special absorber rods.  This change reportedly increases fuel efficiency by 22.7%, simplifies assembly design, and produces less radioactive waste.
["NZK To Enter VVER-440 Fuel Market," Nuclear Engineering International, September 1997,  p. 8.] {Entered 3/9/98 om}
 
5/15/97: NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT NOVOSIBIRSK PLANT
On 15 May at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant, a self-sustaining chain reaction spontaneously started in a tank in workshop No. 1, where fuel for research reactors is made.[1] This incident triggered the emergency system and the staff was evacuated.[1,2] The tank contained 650 liters of 26 percent enriched uranium in solution, intended for research reactor fuel fabrication.[3] According to NuclearFuel, for the past 14 years the container had been used for wastes derived from processing U-235 fuel enriched to 90%. Originally, the container was designed to collect waste water from a fuel production line which discharged enriched uranium scrap. Minatom stated that during last 20 years the plant management carried out engineering changes in the process line that fed the receptacle with sludge wastes.  These changes were not authorized by Gosatomnadzor. According to a Minatom report, the tank, which had not been emptied or inspected since late 1996, contained scores of kilograms of HEU sludge waste.[5]  At one point during the incident, the intensity of the exposure within 0.5 m of the tank reached 100 mSv/hour.[3] In comparison, the DOE radiation dose limit for qualified radiological workers is 50 mSv/year.[4] No casualties resulted from the incident. According to Gosatomnadzor, the incident was brought under control through the use of liquid neutron absorbers. Following this, the exposure level was lowered to 0.07 mSv/hour. No radiation leaks were discovered and apparently no one suffered from exposure to high doses of radiation.[3] According to Vladimir Afanasyev, managing director of the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant, the tank in which the incident occurred has returned to normal. Afanasyev announced that the tank is hermetically sealed and that the facility is functioning normally again. However, workshop No. 1 remains closed. A commission has determined that the facility poses no danger, and all staff who feared adverse health effects have been examined and found unaffected by the incident.[2] Experts from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and Gosatomnadzor have assured people that there was no leakage of radioactive substances from the tank. An investigation into the causes of the incident continues.[1]
Sources:
[1] "Russia: Video report From Novosibirsk Nuclear Accident Plant," Novosti newscast, Russian Public Television Network, 17 May 1997; in FBIS-TEN-97-155.
[2] "Latest Report From Site of Nuclear Accident at Novosibirsk," Segodnya Newscast, NTV, 17 May 1997; in FBIS-TEN-97-005.
[3] Igor Kudrik, "Nuclear incident at Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant," report from the Bellona website, 21 May 1997,  p. 1.
[4] "General Employee Radiological Training at SLAC," Stanford Linear Accelerator Center web site, Environment, Safety, & Health Division, http://www.slac.stanford.edu/esh/.../study_guides.html, 3 March 1997.
[5] Mark Hibbs, "Russian Fuel Plant Also Had Criticality Accident In 1997," NuclearFuel, 6 October 1997,  p. 10. (Updated 3/11/98 om.)


The development section in this file is no longer being updated. For major recent developments, see the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments file.

Comments or questions? Contact Elena Sokova at MIIS CNS: esokovaATmiis.edu


CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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