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 For major recent developments, please
see the
Russia: Foreign Assistance Programs file.
Related information:
Government-To-Government Program
Lab-To-Lab Program
Archived MPC&A DevelopmentsWith the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that Russia inherited approximately 603 metric tons (t) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, not including material in nuclear warheads. This material, located at civilian research centers, naval fuel storage sites, and nuclear weapons laboratories, is considered attractive to thieves, because it is not very radioactive; it can easily be carried by one or two individuals; and physical protection measures at certain facilities are inadequate.[1] Since the early 1990s, the United States has been working with Russia to improve protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials in Russia. US assistance in this effort began in 1992 as the Government-to-Government Program, part of the Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. In 1994, DOE launched a separate, parallel program, the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Program. In 1996, DOE assumed funding responsibilities for future activities in this area, and in February 1997, DOE consolidated its Government-to-Government and Lab-to-Lab Programs into the Material Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Program.[2,3] The MPC&A Program is part of DOE's National Nuclear Security Agency. MPC&A upgrades at NIS sites consist of three components: 1) physical protection systems, such as fences, metal doors, and video surveillance systems; 2) material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material containers that indicate tampering or theft; and 3) material accounting systems, such as inventory systems and computerized databases that allow sites to keep track of the amount and type of nuclear material in specific buildings.[1] Under the MPC&A program, rapid security upgrades are made at a site in conjunction with comprehensive upgrades over the long term.[4] The MPC&A Program has identified 252 buildings at 40 sites in Russia that require MPC&A upgrades. DOE provides funding for the upgrades through direct contracts between US national laboratories and the Russian sites. Teams from the laboratories work with their Russian counterparts to design and install the upgrades. As of February 2001, the MPC&A Program had finished or was in the process of installing security systems in 115 buildings, thus protecting about 192t, or 32%, of the 603t of fissile material identified as being at risk of theft or diversion from Russia. MPC&A upgrades are underway at buildings housing an additional 130t of material. For the status of upgrades in general, see Table I: Status of MPC&A Upgrades in Russia. For information on MPC&A at specific facilities, see Table II: Installed MPC&A Upgrades at Russian Sites and Table III: Installed Upgrades at Individual Buildings at Russian Sites.[1] As of February 2001, the MPC&A Program has yet to install security systems in 104 buildings containing hundreds of metric tons of fissile material because the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) had restricted access for national security reasons. These include 11 buildings at civilian sites and 93 buildings at nuclear weapons laboratories. In February 2001, the MPC&A Program reached a draft agreement with Minatom that will allow MPC&A personnel greater access to these sensitive sites.[1] The MPC&A Program provides on-site long-term assistance for three years or more following installation of MPC&A upgrades. It supports two centers in Obninsk that train personnel on operating the MPC&A systems: the Russian Methodological Training Center, which specializes in material control and accounting training; and the the Interdepartmental Special Training Center, which specializes in physical protection training. It is also working with Minatom and the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) to develop the following: 1) a nuclear material accounting database; 2) regulations to ensure effective operations of the MPC&A systems; and 3) an inspection and enforcement system to ensure that sites comply with regulations. The MPC&A Program is also working to improve trains and trucks that transport nuclear material between and within sites.[1] In 1999, DOE began installing fences, strengthened doors, sensors, access control systems, video surveillance equipment, and radio communication equipment at Russian naval sites where nuclear weapons are stored. According to DOE, 42 sites contain about 260t of nuclear material. As of January 2001, DOE had begun upgrades at 41 of the 42 naval weapons sites.[1] By the end of FY2001, the MPC&A Program will have completed rapid upgrades on 91% and comprehensive upgrades on 17% of the estimated 4,000 at-risk Russian naval nuclear warheads.[4] As part of the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (unveiled in March 1999), the MPC&A Program announced several new initiatives.[4] The Material Conversion and Consolidation Program is designed to reduce the number of sites, buildings, and NIS states where fissile material is located. In addition to closing 50 buildings and five sites by 2010, the initiative will convert 24t of HEU into low-enriched uranium (LEU).[1] The Site Operations and Sustainability Program is designed to make sure that the new MPC&A systems are sustainable over the long term. In addition, new sites, including nuclear cities and Russian naval fresh fuel storage sites, were added to the MPC&A Program.[4] In October 1999, US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov signed a government-to-government agreement that extended US-Russian MPC&A cooperation, established a Joint Coordinating Committee, and authorized the development of alternative measures to resolve issues of access to Russian facilities.[5] In 1995 US officials projected that MPC&A cooperation would eventually be expanded to include work at between 80 to 100 facilities throughout Russia at a total cost of about $800 million through 2002. But by 1999 MPC&A officials realized that they had underestimated the number of facilities that needed MPC&A upgrades.[6,7] Additionally, the MPC&A program did not originally include measures to assist in the protection of naval nuclear reactor fuel. This project, now part of the MPC&A program, has consumed a significant portion of the MPC&A budget. According to a 2001 revision of its MPC&A timeline and budget, DOE estimated that it would complete the installation of MPC&A systems in 2011 and would continue to provide assistance through 2020, at a total cost of $2.2 billion.[1] For more information on the estimated MPC&A budget, see Table IV: MPC&A Funding through 2020: Russia. From FY 1993 through FY 2000, DOE spent $557.9 million on the MPC&A program in Russia. For more information on the MPC&A budget through FY 2000, see Table V: Breakdown of MPC&A Budget through FY 2000: Russia. For FY 2001, approximately $170 million has been allocated to the program.[8] The Bush administration's proposed budget request for FY 2002 is $138.8 million--a $31 million (18%) cut from the 2001 level.[8] MPC&A program components likely to be most affected by the proposed cuts include Russian naval MPC&A activities, the MPC&A program at Mayak Production Association, and the MPC&A sustainability program.[9] In its FY 2002 appropriations bill, the House of Representatives recommends increasing MPC&A funding from 2001 levels by 10% to $190 million. The House recommendation is a 27% increase from the original 2002 Bush budget request. The House bill indicates that funding increases should go towards projects that consolidate nuclear materials at Russian sites. It also directs the DOE to increase the amount of funding that goes to employing Russian workers and purchasing Russian equipment and reduce funding spent in the United States.[10] The FY 2002 Senate appropriations bill recommends decreasing MPC&A funding from 2001 levels by 15% to $143.8 million. The Senate recommendation is a 4% increase over the original Bush budget request. The Senate bill calls for additional material consolidation and control work, an expanded MPC&A program at Russian naval sites, and expanded MPC&A efforts at defense, civilian, and regulatory sites throughout Russia.[11] On 20 September 2001, a House conference was created to begin resolving differences between the House and Senate recommendations.[12] See Table VI: MPC&A Funding by Year: Russia. Sources: Table I: Status of
MPC&A Upgrades in Russia (as of February 2001)
Table II: Installed MPC&A Upgrades at Russian Sites
Table III: Installed Upgrades at Individual Buildings at Russian Sites
Table IV: Estimated
MPC&A Program Costs through 2020: Russia
Table V: Breakdown of MPC&A Budget through FY 2000: Russia
Table VI: MPC&A Funding by Year: Russia
[1] Monterey Institute of International Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: Status Report on Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls, March 1998, No. 5, p. 79. [2] "Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Executive Budget Summary FY 2001," DOE Office of the Chief Financial Officer Web Site, http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/01budget/othernuc/.../nnprolif.pdf. [3] US Department of Energy, "Budget Highlights: Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Request," DOE Web Site, http://www.energy.gov/DOEBudget/Highlght.pdf, p. 51.{Entered 4/9/01 KB} [4] US House of Representatives, Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill and Report, 2002, 107th Congress, H.R. 2311 and H. Report 107-112, 26 June 2001, pp. 127-131; in DOE Web Site, http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/billrept/fy02/index.htm. [5] US Senate, Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill and Report, 2002, 107th Congress, S.R. 1171 and S. Report 107-39, 13 July 2001, pp. 119-121; in DOE Web Site, http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/billrept/fy02/index.htm.{Updated 10/01/2001 KB} [6] "Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials," NTI Web Site, http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp. {Updated 1/31/05 CC} For more information on the MPC&A program in Russia, see the following:
Page last updated 1 February 2005
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Foreign Assistance
