Russia: Foreign Assistance: International Assistance ProgramsRussia: International Assistance Programs
This file includes information on multinational assistance programs to
Russia. For national assistance programs, please click on the individual
country name:
EBRD NUCLEAR
SAFETY ACCOUNT The European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) was established in
January 1993. Contributors to the NSA include Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Finland, Belguim, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the European Union.[4]
Its goal is to fund short-term safety improvements to older nuclear power
plants in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The fund was intended
to supplement the bilateral aid that Russia was receiving from various
countries. The first two major projects were to improve two power plants
in Bulgaria and Lithuania. In June 1995, however, Russia signed an
agreement to accept NSA funds totaling ECU 76 million ($95.7 million) for
upgrades at the
Leningrad,
Novovoronezh,
and Kola nuclear plants[1,3]
Also in that month, an agreement was reached regarding indemnity for work
under contract at those three power plants. In August 1995 President Yeltsin
issued a decree which put that agreement into effect.[3] Of the ECU 76
million, ECU 30.6 million ($38.58 million) was allocated for projects at
the Leningrad plant. Planned projects at the plant included inspection
and monitoring, non-destructive examination, fire protection, and providing
components for emergency core cooling system upgrades. The remaining monies,
a grant of ECU 44.9 million ($55.6 million) was designated to go to Rosenergoatom
for joint projects at the Kola plant and the Novovoronezh plant.
In addition, the EBRD, with the agreement of the
Russian Federation, manages the Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership's (NDEP) nuclear waste projects (click
here for information on the NDEP and the related MNEPR
legal agreements).[4] In November 2002, the NDEP management group, the
Assembly of Contributors, met to establish the Nuclear Operating Committee and
tasked it with identifying, proposing, prioritizing, and assisting with
implementation of projects.[5] The first task of the Nuclear Operating
Committee has been to develop a Strategic Master Plan for Northwest Russia. In
2004 the plan, written in cooperation with the
Institute of Nuclear Energy
Safety (IBRAE), the
Kurchatov Institute, and the
Dollezhal Research and
Development Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET), was completed, though
it is supposed to be continually updated. The initial report was
presented on 5 November 2004 to the Nuclear Operating Committee.[9] The
high priority measures outlined in the plan include spent nuclear fuel management and
physical protection of facilities at
Andreyeva Bay and
Gremikha naval base.[6]
On 30 May 2003, Canada announced its
contribution of €20 million ($14.6 million as of 30 May 2003) to the NDEP
Support Fund. The pledge was made in connection with the country's
commitments to the G8 Global Partnership and makes Canada the first non-European
donor to contribute to the NDEP Support Fund. Additionally, the French
government pledged €40 million (approximately $52 million) to the same fund.
The contributions from both nations bring the total funds available for projects
benefiting Northwest Russia's environment to €160 million (approximately $209
million).[7,8] As of April 2005, the NDEP has yet to launch its first concrete projects. Sources:
[1] Source Book: Soviet Designed
Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 4th edition,
(Washington D.C.: Nuclear Energy Institute, 1996), pp. 90-96.
[2] "EBRD Cancels Too-Long-Delayed
Upgrade Projects in Russia," Nucleonics Week, 15 May 1997, vol.
38, no. 20, pp. 1, 10, 11.
[3] Source Book: Soviet
Designed Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 4th edition,
(Washington D.C.: Nuclear Energy Institute, 1996),
http://www.insc.anl.gov/neisb/NEISB_3.2.html. {Updated 4/5/98 PBI}
[4] "The NDEP's nuclear waste
challenge," Northern Dimension Environmental Project Web Site,
http://www.ndep.org.
[5] "Coordinating Submarine
Dismantlement Assistance in Russia," NTI Web Site,
http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_subs_090104.pdf, September 2004.
[6] Strategic Approaches in
Solving Decommissioning Problems of Retired Russian Nuclear Fleet in the
North-West Region: Executive Summary of Strategic Master Plan, Phase 1
(Moscow 2004), pp. 67-78.
[7] "NDEP
Support Fund welcomes Canada as new contributor," Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership News, http://www.ndep.org, 4 June 2003.
[8] "France joins NDEP Support Fund with €40 million contribution," Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership News, http://www.ndep.org, 30 June 2003.
[9] "Nuclear Operating Committee discusses Strategic Master Plan," NDEP News,
http://www.ndep.org, Issue 6, December
2004.{Entered 2/25/2005 WDP}
EUROPEAN UNION PHARE The PHARE program was originally
established in 1989 to provide aid for Poland and Hungary. Since
then it has expanded to include much of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. In the area of nuclear energy, PHARE concentrates its efforts on
improving the operational safety of nuclear power plants and the training of
their operators. From 1991-2002, €231 million in PHARE funding was
dedicated to nuclear safety. The
2003 PHARE Action Program, however, did not have any funds dedicated to Russia. As of 1996, ECU 87.3 million had been committed
to PHARE projects. In 1994, ECU 5 million of PHARE money was reallocated
to the EBRD Nuclear Safety Account.[1,2,3]
Sources: [1] Source Book: Soviet Designed
Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 4th edition,
(Washington D.C.: Nuclear Energy Institute, 1996), p. 33. [2] "EU Nuclear Safety Programs
in Former USSR," FBIS-TEN-97-246, 3 September 199
[3] Michel Bieth, "Exploiting Links to the TACIS-PHARE Nuclear Safety Programmes,"
Presentation at RC-IE Petten, Networking for Effective R&D, 22-23 September 2003,
http://safelife.jrc.nl/safelife/presentations/15_Bieth_M.pdf.
{Entered 4/17/2005 CC}
TACIS The Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program began in 1991 when the EC allocated ECU 54 million
($68.7 million) to improve nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union. In
1992, the EC allocated ECU 80 million for programs throughout the FSU,
and of that sum, ECU 32 million was allocated for safety upgrades in Russia
and Ukraine. Projects were to be conducted at six Russian power plants:
Kola,
Kalinin,
Beloyarsk,
Smolensk,
Balakovo,
and Leningrad (Sosnovyy
Bor).[5] TACIS has funded projects on safety system upgrades, waste
management, emergency procedures, measurement technology and training at
VVER plants in Russia and Ukraine. TACIS was the principal source of funding
for the upgrading of Leningrad units 1 and 2. Other projects include assistance
in developing a VVER-440 Model V230 simulator, training its staff, and
providing a standard methodology for all operating procedures.[1] In 1997
TACIS provided the Russian state-owned nuclear power company Rosenergoatom
with $24 million for safety enhancement projects at Russian nuclear power
plants.[2]
TACIS has also given ECU 2.6 million for the establishment in Russia of
two public information centers on nuclear energy. One of these centers
is located close to the Balakovo
nuclear power plant in the Saratov region and the other is located in St.
Petersburg at the Minatom Training Center.[3,4] The TACIS program has also
allocated money for the International Science
and Technology Center and the ERBD Nuclear Safety Account.[5]
Most
of the TACIS funding is devoted to nuclear safety and cleanup projects;
disarmament and nonproliferation account for about one to two percent of
TACIS funding. [6]
However in November 1998, a severely critical report concerning TACIS
was presented to the European Parliament, which then began working to redirect
and restructure the TACIS program. The report was written by the
European Court of Auditors and asserts that while a total of $350 million
was to have been spent on TACIS projects in the CIS, only $104 million
actually was spent. Furthermore, the auditors claim that of that
$104 million, $40 million was spent on expert studies that were basically
useless as Russia does not have funds to put the experts' recommendations
into practice.[7] The report also raised concerns that Western consultants
who assessed the safety of nuclear power plants in the CIS were excessively
overpaid for their work and that TACIS administrators had embezzled large
sums of money from the TACIS budget.[7,8] As a result, Izvestiya
reports that the auditors came to the conclusion that there has been no
progress in the field of nuclear safety in the CIS.[8]
The European Commission, in December 1998, adopted a proposal which
drastically revised the TACIS program. Thenceforth the main emphasis
of the TACIS program was to be to promote democracy and stimulate investment
in the NIS. The previous TACIS regulation expired at the end of 1999 and the
European Union planned to allocate ECU 4 billion to the NIS in the
new TACIS program over the period 2000-2006. The new TACIS program
was to include closer cooperation on trade and investment, on democratization
and the rule of law, on border management and on issues such as drug trafficking
and the environment. According to the Brussels Rapid Database, "Assistance
in the field of nuclear safety will focus on three specific objectives,
namely: (i) supporting the reinforcement of the nuclear safety culture
and the application of efficient safeguards, in particular through support
for the regulatory authorities; (ii) contributing to international initiatives,
such as those outlined in the context of the G7; and (iii) supporting spent
fuel and nuclear waste management, notably in Northwest Russia. In addition,
on-site assistance at nuclear power plants shall be continued in the short
term, as necessary."[9] TACIS funding for nuclear safety in 1991-2002 totalled €881
million. The TACIS Action Program for 2003 included €63 million, mainly
for Russia, Ukraine,
Armenia and Kazakhstan.[10] Click here to go to the TACIS
homepage.
Sources: [1] Source Book: Soviet Designed
Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 4th edition,
(Washington D.C.: Nuclear Energy Institute, 1996), pp. 90-96. [2] Interfax, "Interfax Business Report
for 18 July," FBIS-SOV-97-108, 7/17/97. [3] Pekka Skytta, "Mailbox: Nuclear
Clarification, Poodle Bounties, Trash Concerns, and the Language Debate"
The
St. Petersburg Times, 2-8 June 1997. [4] Scientific and Technological Options
Assessment Programme, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament,
"Nuclear Safeguards and Nuclear Safety in the East: Final Report", Luxembourg,
November, 1996, p. 50. [5] Source Book: Soviet Designed
Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 3rd edition,
(Washington D.C.: Nuclear Energy Institute, 1995), pp. 32-33. [6] Annette Schaper, "European Assistance Programmes to Russia
and the Newly Independent States," The Nuclear Legacy of the Former
Soviet Union: Implications for Security and Ecology, BITS Research
Report 97.1, November 1997, p. 84. [7] Anatoly Repin, Trud, 25 November 1998, p.4, in
"Billions Squandered," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,
1998, Vol. 50, No. 48, pp. 21-22. [8] Boris Vinogradov, "Nuclear Money Talks in European Union,"
Izvestiya,
18 November 1998, p.3; in "TACIS FSU Nuclear Safety Funds Embezzled,"
FBIS-SOV-98-324, 20 November 1998. [9] "Democracy and Investment New Focus of EU Assistance
to Russia, Ukraine and Other Newly Independent States,"
Brussels Rapid
Database Online Version,
22 December 1998; in "EU Establishes
New Priorities for Aid to Russia, Ukraine," FBIS-WEU-98-356, 22 December
1998.{Updated 3/3/99, PBI} [10] Michel Bieth, "Exploiting Links to the TACIS-PHARE Nuclear Safety Programmes,"
Presentation at RC-IE Petten, Networking for Effective R&D, 22-23 September 2003,
http://safelife.jrc.nl/safelife/presentations/15_Bieth_M.pdf.
{Entered 4/17/2005 CC} ARCHIVED TACIS DEVELOPMENTS (For more recent
developments, please see the Russia: Foreign Assistance Developments section): 10/31/2003: EU MAY PROVIDE OVER $29
MILLION A YEAR FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DEFENSE PLANTS CONVERSION European Union Research Commissioner Philippe Busquin
has been cited in a 31 October 2003
Interfax report as stating that the European Union (EU) is ready to provide Russia with €25 million(about $29.1 million as of 31 October 2003) a year for conversion programs
at Russian defense plantsin the nuclear field. Busquin noted that
the EU
had been providing €60-80 million (about $69.8-93.1 million) annually to European enterprises
with contracts
to improve safety at Russian NPPs under the TACIS program. The EU'smain concernis RBMK reactor safety. Rosenergoatom, however, holds
that these reactors have been significantly
upgraded and have a high safety level. ["ES gotov
vydelyat 25 mln. evro v god na konversionnyye programmy atomnykh oboronnykh
predpriyatiy RF," Interfax,
31 October 2003.] {Entered 11/7/2003 AV}
1/26/2000: TACIS AID REDUCED IN RESPONSE TO CHECHNYA
CONFLICT In January 2000 the European Union froze €90
million (about $89 million as of 4 February 2000) in TACIS aid to Russia
in response to the continued conflict in Chechnya.[1] On 26 January
2000 Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy
Adamov said that 20% of TACIS aid went into nuclear programs.
According to Adamov, the reduction in TACIS support could harm NPP safety.
However, he said that the TACIS reductions would likely be short-lived.[2]
Leonid Melamed, head of Rosenergoatom,
said that although he did not yet know exactly which programs would be
cut, nuclear safety would not be affected.[3]
Sources: [1] Europe Information Service, 4 February
2000; in "EU Sanctions Threaten Nuclear Safety," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com. [2] "Resheniye ES mozhet otrazitsya
na bezopasnosti AES v Rossii - Ministr Adamov," Interfax, 26 January 2000. [3] "Sokrashcheniye programmy TASIS
dlya rossiyskikh atomshchikov ne stanet 'smertelnym' - Rosenergoatom,"
Interfax, 31 January 2000.{Entered 5/3/2000 CC} 1/99: TACIS FUNDS RECONSTRUCTION OF LENSPETSKOMBINAT Funds from the TACIS program and from the federal
programss
and design nonreusable prve waste containers, a temporary storage
facility for cooled radwaste, and an underground repostiory in blue clay
deposits at Lenspetskombinat Radon. The projects are part of the program
to create the Northwest
Regional Radwaste Treatment Center.
[Yu.N. Popova, "Minatom Has Approved
the Concept to Create a Northwest Regional Radwaste Treatment Center,"
Atompressa,
No. 2, January 1999, p. 3; in "Minatom Approves NW Radwaste Center,"
FBIS Document FTS19990226001071.] {Entered 11/10/99 SK}
JOINT RESEARCH
CENTRE The Joint Research Centre (JRC) is the name given to
the European Commission's research network of seven institutes. Originally
created to conduct nuclear energy research by combining the individual
resources of several states, the center has since begun pursuing other
areas of research.[1] The JRC's stated goals of its nuclear assistance
to Russia include the establishment of an ad-hoc legislative framework,
the creation of an "Independent State Verification Authority," and the
development of technical infrastructure in Russia. As of September
1996, projects with Russia included the education and training of personnel
in nuclear material control and accountancy, the development and implementation
of methodologies and technologies for nuclear material control and accountancy
at specific sites in Russia, and the enhancement of physical protection
measures. As of September 1996, the JRC was planning to aid Russia
in setting up a Metrological Center for Measurements of Nuclear Materials
and to aid Gosatomnadzor (GAN)
in the development and procurement of instrumentation for analytical laboratories.[2]
As of September 1996, the JRC was cooperating with the Russian
Methodological and Training Center at Obinsk on a TACIS
project to create five training courses for nuclear power plant operators
and inspectors.[2]
The JRC also contributes to the activities of the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow.[2] Specifically, on
the ISTC's Project 40, the JRC is working with the United States' Los Alamos
National Laboratory and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute to develop
"destructive and non-destructive analysis, facility accountancy system,
and regional control interaction, inspection planning and evaluation."[2]
Click here to go to the Joint
Research Centre's homepage.
Sources: [1] The Joint Research Centre's homepage, http://www.jrc.cec.eu.int/. [2] Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Programme,
Directorate General for Research, European Parliament, "Nuclear Safeguards
and Nuclear Safety in the East: Final Report," Luxembourg, November 1996,
pp. 21-22.{Entered PBI 4/6/8}
G8 On June 27, 2002, the G8 (the seven major
industrial countries: France, the
United States, Britain, Germany,
Japan, Italy, and
Canada, also known as the
G7, plus Russia) issued a
statement outlining a new initiative, entitled the
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction. It committed the G7 to raising up to $20 billion over the next 10
years to fund nonproliferation projects, principally in Russia. The so-called "10 plus 10 over 10" initiative, agreed to at the
G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, calls for the United States to contribute
$10 billion, and the other original G-7 nations a combined $10 billion.
The $10 billion to be contributed by the United States is largely comprised
of funds needed to carry out existing programs at current levels; on the other
hand, it does represent a new commitment to continue programs for the next
ten years. The agreement allows nations to count monies slated for use but
not yet disbursed, and has a provision for contributions from non-G8
countries should the European nations and Japan fail to produce $10 billion.[1,2]
The joint statement outlines a number of important guidelines for
projects that are to be carried out under the partnership. These guidelines
include:
1.Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency
measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that
cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility
as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds
expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives
to work sites;
2.The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner
and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
3.Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project,
including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the
milestones are not met;
4.The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided
will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will
be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not
be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be
applied to prevent theft or sabotage;
5.All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support
provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be
exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
6.Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance
with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with
national security requirements;
7.All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate
liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided
for donor countries and their
personnel and contractors;
8.Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor
representatives working on
cooperation projects; and
9.Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive
information and intellectual property.
The statement also provides for the establishment of procedures to conduct
annual reviews of project progress,
consultations on priorities, project gaps, and overlaps, other coordinating
measures, and the reporting of findings to
G8 governments.[3,4]
In addition to the discussion of global nonproliferation projects, the G8
statement included a commitment to six
"principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from gaining
access to weapons or materials of mass
destruction." The first principle, to "promote the adoption, universalization,
full implementation and, where
necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international
instruments whose aim is to prevent the
proliferation or illicit acquisition of such items [and to] strengthen the
institutions designed to implement these
instruments." The endorsement of this principle by the Bush administration is
particularly significant, since many of
its previous actions have been viewed by critics as undermining such treaties as
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and Biological Weapons Convention. The other five Global Partnership principles
reflect pledges to maintain
effective physical protection, accounting, border control, and export control
measures with regard to WMD
materials, as well as a promise to strengthen management of WMD materials,
minimizing the stocks of nuclear and
biological materials and eliminating all chemical weapons.[5]
The Russian government reaction to the Global Partnership initiative has been
positive.[6]
Some Russian politicians critical of Putin's foreign policy course, such as
Communist Party leader Gennadiy
Zyuganov and General Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the Academy of
Geopolitical Sciences, predictably
criticized the G8 initiative as highlighting Russia's weakness, threatening to
undermine Russia's defense
capabilities, and preventing Russia from establishing itself as a counterweight
to unilateralist U.S. foreign policy.
Others, however, praised the initiative and the formal recognition of Russia as
a full member of the G8 as a victory
for Putin.[7]
Several Russian experts predicted that implementation of the 10 plus 10 over 10
program would run into
considerable difficulties, due to the conflict between the donor countries'
insistence on maintaining close
supervision of the projects and the Russian government's desire to protect
sensitive information.[8]
In addition to addressing the
concerns that are the subject of existing
programs, partnership projects may expand into areas thus far not addressed. One of the leading proponents of nonproliferation assistance to the
former Soviet states, Senator Richard
Lugar, has proposed expanding assistance to cover cruise missile-armed and
general-purpose nuclear-powered
submarine elimination and dismantling tactical nuclear weapons.[9] Testifying
before the Senate Foreign Relations
committee, Secretary of State Powell also voiced support for expanding
nonproliferation assistance to cover
tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.[10] However, new moneys must be
found if this is to occur.
In many respects these areas correspond closely to the nonproliferation
priorities identified by President Putin, namely chemical weapon and
non-strategic nuclear submarine elimination.[6]
The G8 joint statement also included the concept of exchanging Russian foreign
debt for nonproliferation program financing.
The concept of exchanging Russian debt has been discussed in
various forums in recent years. It was,
for example, suggested in June 2001 by representatives of the
Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory and
Landau
Network-Centro Volta, and has since been discussed at ENCI-related IWG
meetings.[11] [See also Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren and Anthony Wier, "Securing Nuclear
Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action"
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 2002), pp. 74-77, available online at
http://www.nti.org/e_research/
securing_nuclear_weapons_and_materials_May2002.pdf] Servicing Russia's foreign
debt might require up to 40% of
its budget in the near future. In 2003, the peak year for Russian debt payments,
Russia will be required to return
nearly $18 billion to its creditors. Only a relatively small proportion of
Russia's $71.5 billion debt is held by the
United States. Of the $3.8 billion owed to the United States, over $2 billion is
Soviet-era debt. Germany, by comparison, is owed $26 billion, Italy $6.4
billion, and other European states a total of $35 billion.[12]
The concept of debt for nonproliferation exchange envisions a mechanism for
applying forgiven debts toward the
funding of nonproliferation projects, and is similar to "debt for environment"
swaps implemented in other countries.
The Russian government has developed two competing proposals for implementing
debt exchange. Under the terms
of the first proposal, the debt would be exchanged for shares in Russian
enterprises. Under the second proposal,
debt would be exchanged for nonproliferation funding.[11] The Russian
Ministry
of Atomic Energy has estimated
that the cost of defense conversion and job creation efforts in the 10 nuclear
cities may reach $500 million, and the
debt swap project could provide funding for such efforts.[13]
The debt exchange concept has also found support in the United States. The
Security Assistance Act of 2001
(S.1803) Subtitle B (Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act
of 2001) contained language
authorizing the US government to exchange $100 million of Soviet-era debt in
FY 2002 and $200 million of
Soviet-era debt in FY 2003, and to establish a "Russian Nonproliferation
Investment Facility" at the Department of
Treasury.[14]
On 25 July 2002, the US House of Representatives International Relations
Committee held a hearing on discussing
the possibility of using Russian debt cancellation as a means of financing
nonproliferation assistance programs.
Representatives Adam Schiff and Ellen Tauscher are among the co-sponsors of the
Russian Federation Debt
Reduction for Nonproliferation Act (HR. 3836) of 2002 (the companion to S.1803,
discussed above). This legislation, which was introduced several months before
the Kananaskis G8 summit, would replace the debt with new Russian
obligations, to be defined though a
nonproliferation investment agreement and to result in the creation of a
nonproliferation fund. The Russian government would also be required to provide
nonproliferation commitments and transparency measures. The US
government would have the authority to approve nonproliferation programs. The
programs would incorporate many
of the features of current US nonproliferation programs, including US
audits, Russian tax exemptions, and ceilings
on the proportion of funds to be spent outside of Russia. The bill will also
authorize the US government to
encourage other creditor states to pursue similar policies.[15]
Sources:
[1] CNS telephone interview with State Department official, 7 August 2002.
[2] Les
Whittington, "Russia to get $20 billion to dismantle aging nukes; Canada to
contribute $1 billion to keep arsenal from terrorists," Toronto Star,
27 June
2002; in "Canada's $1 Billion for G8 Nonproliferation Plan To Include
Technical Support," FBIS Document EUP20020628000403.
[3] "Transcript: G8 Summit Produced Concrete Results, Administration Says (Bush
administration officials brief at summit conclusion)," 27 June 2002;
in Washington File, US Department of State,
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile/
[4]
"The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction," Statement by the Group of Eight Leaders,
Kananaskis, Canada, 27 June 2002; in Washington File, US
Department of State,
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile/.
[5] "The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction," Kananaskis Summit Web Site,
http://www.g8.gc.ca/kan_docs/globpart-e.asp.
[6] "Vystupleniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii V.V. Putina na press-konferentsii
po okonchanii sammita 'Bolshoy vosmerki' 27 iyunya 2002 goda,
Kananaskis, Kanada," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Web Site,
http://www.mid.ru/, 28 June 2002.
[7] "Russian Politicians Give Mixed Reactions Toward G8 Summit," Xinhua,
28 June 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[8] David R. Sands, "Putin accepts U.S.-backed aid to disarm at G8's meeting,"
Washington Times, 29 June 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic
Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[9] Richard Lugar, "The U.S.-Russian Front Against Terrorism and Weapons
Proliferation," US Foreign Policy Agenda (July 2002),
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0702/ijpe/lugar.htm.
[10] "U.S. Senator Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-DE) Holds Hearing on the Treaty On
Strategic Offensive Reductions (The Moscow Treaty)," US Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 29 July 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[11] Second IWG Meeting Report, Brussels, 25-26 February
2002.
[12] "House Moves to Reduce Russian Debt In Exchange for Securing Nuclear
Material," U.S. Congress Press Release, March 4, 2002.
[13] Paolo Cotta Ramusino, Didier Gambier, Antonino Lambieri, and Maurizio
Martellini, "The European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI), the International
Working Group, and the Debt-for-Security Concept," Carnegie Non-Proliferation
Conference, Washington DC, 18-19 June 2001.
[14] "Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act of 2001"
(S.1803), Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/.
[15] "Hearing of the House International Relations Committee," 25 July 2002; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.{Entered
10/15/2002 CC}
3/11/2003: RUSSIA PRESENTS PLANS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION TO G8
PARTNERS On 11 March 2003, Interfax
reported, with reference to a source in Russia's State Chemical Disarmament
Commission, that Russia is negotiating with G8 partners their
participation in chemical weapons destruction programs. The source said that
Russia suggests the donors fund the following sites: the United States - Shchuchye
(Kurgan Oblast); Germany - Kambarka (Udmurtiya);
Italy - Pochep (Bryansk Oblast);
Canada - Leonidovka (Penza Oblast); Great Britain - Maradykovsky (Kirov Oblast);
and France - transportation of chemical weapons agents from Kizner to Shchuchye. In 2003, the United
States
plans to allocate $167.9 million for
construction of an industrial area in Shchuchye, and about $10 million for the
destruction and demilitarization of former chemical weapons production
facilities in Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk. Germany plans to spend €30 million ($32 million as of March 2003)
at the chemical weapons destruction site at Kambarka. The contributions of
other partners are yet to be
determined. ["Rossiya predlagayet zarubezhnym partneram profinansirovat
stroitelstvo konkretnyoh obyektov po unichtozheniyu khimoruzhiya," Interfax, 11
March 2003.] {Entered 3/13/03 NL} 3/5/2003: G8 OFFICIALS DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
ACCORDS On 5 March 2003, G8 senior officials met in Paris to discuss ways to
implement the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction. The
Russian delegation stressed the importance of translating the Kananaskis political
agreement into specific bilateral projects with Russia in priority areas
(the destruction of chemical weapons and nuclear
submarine dismantlement). The foreign partners agreed on the importance of
beginning practical work by the upcoming Evian summit in June 2003. The partners
also gave their preliminary responses to the Russian project proposals given at
a January 2003 G8 meeting.
Discussions also focused on the legal and organizational hurdles to implementing
disarmament programs in Russia, and the prospects of attracting new donor states
to the partnership. ["O khode vypolneniya dogovoryennosti o Globalnom
Partnerstve protiv rasprostranyeniya oruzhiya i materialov massovogo
unichtozheniya," Informatsionnyy byulleten, 11 March 2003, Russian Foreign
Ministry Web Site, http://www.mid.gov.]
{Entered 3/13/03 NL}
IAEA
TRAINING SEMINARS At a country's request, the IAEA conducts
Assessment of Significant Events Team (ASSET) training seminars designed
to educate nuclear plant operators in the use of the ASSET methodology
to identify safety problems, assess their consequences, and to eliminate
the root causes of probable future accidents. An ASSET seminar was requested
by Minatom in 1991 and was held in Kiev between 12-18 October 1991. ASSET
training missions also visited Balakovo NPP (30 August - 3 September 1993),
Kalinin NPP (15-16 February 1994) and Smolensk NPP (6-10 June 1994).[1]
Please visit the IAEA's
homepage for more information.
Sources: [1] Source Book: Soviet Designed
Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 4th edition,
(Washington D.C.: Nuclear Energy Institute, 1996), pp. 90-96.
MNEPR The
Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)
Framework Agreement was signed in Stockholm on 21 May 2003 after four years
of negotiations. This agreement is the first general framework agreement
covering European nuclear assistance projects in Russia. It was designed to
facilitate projects addressing problems regarding radioactive waste and spent
nuclear fuel, focusing initially on the Northwest region.[1]
The European Commission, nine European countries, Russia, and the United States
negotiated the MNEPR agreement.[2] Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Russia, Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands signed the agreement.[3] The
United States also signed the MNEPR agreement, but declined to sign the "Protocol
on Claims, Legal Proceedings and Indemnification," since the United States
receives greater liability coverage under the existing
Comprehensive Threat
Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement and will conduct MNEPR-relevant
activities under this arrangement.[4]
The MNEPR Agreement addresses the critical legal questions of site access,
tax exemption, and liability issues.[5] Site
access implies access to work sites, principally in order to ensure that
projects are being implemented as agreed. Tax exemption involves full
exemption from taxes, duties, levies, and other charges on assistance,
materials, and remuneration for assistance work. The liability issue is
addressed in a freestanding protocol attached to the agreement that deals with
coverage for nuclear accidents. The biggest problems in the MNEPR negotiations
have been tax issues and the wording (i.e., the scope of coverage) of the
liability provisions. While taxation should no longer prove an obstacle to
international financial assistance for environmental and nuclear programs in
Russia, since Russia dropped its demand that assistance providers initially
pay value-added taxes and receive refunds via a complex process, liability
problems may still arise in some nuclear projects. Russia would like to use
MNEPR as a model for agreements covering most G8 projects.[6]
However, potential Western participants in some of the more complex nuclear
projects, such as the project to build a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel plant in
Russia, are insisting on third-party nuclear liability coverage equivalent to
that provided under the CTR Framework Agreement, which goes beyond MNEPR
provisions.[7]
The MNEPR agreement was concluded to facilitate work in three main areas:
radioactive waste management, spent nuclear fuel security, and reactor safety.
The latter will allow, among other things, the enhancement of security at the
Leningrad and
Kola nuclear power plants.[8] The agreement
will allow the release of funding for several international programs dealing
with these issues. Roughly NKr 1 billion ($144 million as of May 23, 2003) has
been allocated for the reconstruction and improvement of radioactive waste
storage sites on the Kola Peninsula.[9] In July
2002, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and the EU
Commission pledged through the EBRD's
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) to provide €110 million
($123 million as of May 23, 2003), of which €62 million is earmarked for
radioactive waste clean up on the Kola Peninsula and for upgrading safety at
Russian nuclear power plants. At a later date, Germany and Belgium pledged to
make contributions as well.[10] During the
signing ceremony, France also announced that it will make a significant
contribution. While the MNEPR is focused on environmental
issues, not proliferation concerns, the MNEPR framework agreement notes that it
"may also apply to projects or any other form of cooperation in other areas of
nuclear activities... if so agreed by the Parties concerned," opening the way
for additional projects envisioned under the Global Partnership
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
[For the text of the
MNEPR agreement, and the
MNEPR liability protocol in English, or the
MNEPR agreement and
MNEPR liability protocol in Russian, please click on the links.]
Sources: [1] Anna Lindh, Minister of the Swedish Foreign
Affairs, speech at the Signing of the MNEPR, Stockholm, May 21, 2003, http://www.regeringen.se/galactica/service=irnews/owner=sys/
action=obj_show?c_obj_id=51842.
[2] Morten Bremer Maerli, "Strengthening
Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia - The Norwegian Experience,"
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Working Paper no. 633, December
2002, p. 25. [3] NTB, "Historisk atomavtale undertegnet,"
Aftenposten online edition, 21 May 2003,
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/
politikk/article.jhtml?articleID=549975.
[4] Charles Digges and Igor Kudrik "MNEPR Accord
Signed in Stockholm Wednesday," Bellona Website, May 21, 2003,
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/
co/operation/29654.html.
For additional details, please see R. Douglas Brubaker and Leonard S. Spector,
Liability and Western Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia: Time for a Fresh
Look?The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp.
1-39. [5] "Foreign Minister Anna Lindh's Speech at the
Signing of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian
Federation (MNEPR) Agreement in Stockholm 21 May 2003," Swedish Government
Website, http://www.regeringen.se/galactica/service=irnews/owner=sys/
action=obj_show?c_obj_id=51842.
[6] See comments by Minister of Foreign Affairs
Igor Ivanov and other Foreign Ministry insiders, sited in Sergey Strokan, "V
Stokgolm so svoimi otkhodami," Kommersant, May 22, 2003; in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. [7] Ann MacLachlan, "West Seeks Strong Liability
Clause for Russian MOX Plant Program," NuclearFuel, April 14, 2003; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. [8] "Foreign Minister Anna Lindh's Speech at
the Signing of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian
Federation (MNEPR) Agreement in Stockholm 21 May 2003." [9] Henrik Width, "Avtale skal sikre sanering
på Kola," Aftenposten online edition, May 22, 2003,
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/
article.jhtml?articleID=550452.
[10] "Agreement on nuclear safety in Russia to
be signed in Stockholm on 21 May," The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.ud.se/inenglish/frontpage/MNEPR.htm. {Entered 6/5/2003 ET}
Page last updated 19 April 2005
Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS
CNS: Cristina.ChuenATmiis.edu.
