This section of the NIS Nuclear Profiles database covers facilities that are directly engaged in the design, manufacture, and dismantlement of nuclear warheads.  Facilities that develop delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, and research facilities with a primarily non-weapons profile are covered in other sections of the database.

The Soviet nuclear weapons complex was developed during the last years of World War II and the early years of the Cold War. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia inherited almost all of the nuclear weapons complex. (See the table "USSR's Nuclear Weapons Production Complex in the Mid-1980s.") The core facilities of the nuclear warhead production complex are concentrated in 10 closed nuclear cities. Nuclear warheads R&D, manufacture, periodic maintenance, and dismantlement facilities fall under the supervision of the Ministry of the Atomic Energy (Minatom). The Ministry of Defense controls and monitors weapons-related operations at these facilities and assumes full control over warheads once they leave Minatom facilities.[3] (For more information on the role of the Ministry of Defense see the Nuclear Weapons Security and Safety Overview.) 

During the 1990s, the scale of defense production in the Russian nuclear weapons complex sharply decreased. Many facilities that are still a part of the nuclear military infrastructure are no longer engaged in defense programs, yet they retain the equipment and expertise crucial to nuclear weapons production. The facilities of the Russian nuclear warhead production complex are grouped into four major categories: research and development facilities, fissile material production facilities, serial warhead production facilities, and testing sites. This overview takes into account both historical and current activities of the individual facilities. 

NUCLEAR WARHEAD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The research and development sector of the Russian nuclear weapons complex consists of two major design centers: the All Russian Scientific Research Institute for Experimental Physics  (VNIIEF) in  Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16) and the All Russian Scientific Research Institute for Technical Physics  (VNIITF) in Snezhinsk (formerly Chelyabinsk-70); and three research institutes:  the All Russian Research Institute of Automatics (VNIIA) in Moscow, the Research Institute of Measuring Systems (NIIIS) in Nizhniy Novgorod, the Research Institute of Pulse Technology (NIIPT) in Moscow; and the Design Bureau of Automotive Transport Equipment in Mytishchi-7, Moscow Oblast.[1,6] These institutes fall under the supervision of the Ministry of Atomic Energy's Directorate of Nuclear Warhead Design and Testing.

There are a number of related research institutes outside of the Minatom system that have also been involved in nuclear weapons research and design, including the Russian Ministry of Defense Fourth Central Scientific Research Institute of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which has broad expertise in the areas of weaponization, weapons effects, and delivery vehicle development, and the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Mathematical Modeling, which was involved in computer modeling of nuclear explosions.

WEAPONS-GRADE FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION 

Plutonium/HEU production
By the early 1980s, weapons-grade fissile materials production was concentrated at five Minatom facilities. Weapons-grade plutonium has been produced at the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65), the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26), and the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk (Tomsk-7), and weapons-grade HEU has been produced at the Siberian Chemical Combine,  the Electrochemical Plant in Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45), and the Urals Electrochemical Combine in Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk-44). (For more information on the production of HEU and plutonium, please see the Fissile Materials section of the database.) In 1989, the Soviet Union announced that it had stopped uranium enrichment for weapons.  Production of plutonium dropped sharply from its Cold War levels when 10 out of 13 plutonium-production reactors were shut down by 1992. Plutonium production still continues as a part of spent fuel reprocessing at Mayak and as a by-product of the operation of three production reactors at Zheleznogorsk (one reactor) and Seversk (two reactors) that produce heat and electricity for nearby cities. In 1994, the Russian government declared that the newly produced plutonium would no longer be used in nuclear weapons. (For more information, please see the Plutonium Production Overview.) Each of the HEU and plutonium production facilities, with the exception of Zheleznogorsk, is actively participating in the downblending of highly enriched uranium for sale to the United States under the US-Russia HEU Deal.[3,6]

Other radioactive materials
Tritium, used in thermonuclear weapons, is produced at the Mayak Production Association (PO Mayak) in Ozersk. Lithium-6, a radioactive isotope that is usually compounded with deuterium as a thermonuclear fuel constituent and also a source for tritium production, is produced at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant. The Novosibirsk plant is also the location of the central storage site for lithium hydride components from dismantled warheads.[4]

Fissile material storage and disposition
PO Mayak in Ozersk and the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) in Seversk are actively involved in the storage and disposition of fissile materials. These two facilities are the principal storage sites for HEU and plutonium recovered from dismantlement weapons. PO Mayak has been designated as the site for a central storage facility for fissile materials from weapons which is being built with US assistance (see the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility).  Under the US-Russia HEU Deal, SKhK converts HEU metal to purified uranium oxide, which is then shipped to the Urals Electrochemical Combine in Novouralsk and the Electrochemical Plant in Zelenogorsk for fluorination to uranium hexaflouride and blending down for delivery to the United States.[3] (For more details, see the HEU Deal Overview and the HEU Deal Developments sections.) 

Unlike weapons-grade uranium, plutonium cannot be blended with other materials to make it unusable in weapons.  Under the US-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement of 1 September 2000, each party agreed to dispose of at least 34 metric tons (t) of weapons-grade plutonium by irradiating it as fuel in reactors or by immobilizing it. Both Russia and the United States will construct new industrial-scale facilities for converting the plutonium and its fabrication into MOX fuel and begin operation of these industrial-scale facilities by 2007.  (For more information on plutonium disposition, please see the Plutonium Disposition Overview, Plutonium Disposition Developments, and MOX Fuel Developments sections in the database.)

For more information on HEU and plutonium production, use, and disposition, see the Weapons-Grade Fissile Material Cycle Overview and Chart.

SERIAL PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS 

Fissile material component manufacturing
Chemical and metallurgical plants designed to process HEU and plutonium and to fabricate fissile material components for warheads are located in PO Mayak (Ozersk) and the Siberian Chemical Combine (Seversk). These facilities are equipped to convert fissile material compounds into metal, purify and process it in metallurgical operations, and fabricate it into weapons components.[3,6] Until recently, both facilities were involved in the manufacturing, disassembly, and remanufacturing of plutonium and HEU pits. As of April 2001, only Mayak is involved in the manufacturing of new pits.[7] First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev announced in April 2001 that by 2003 only one plant involved in production of HEU and plutonium pits would remain operational.[8]

Assembly/Disassembly
Assembly of warheads took place at four serial production plants: the Avangard Electromechanical Plant in Sarov, the Elektrokhimpribor Combine in Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45),  the Instrument-Making Plant in Trekhgornyy (Zlatoust-36), and the Start Production Association in Zarechnyy (Penza-19). The same four serial production facilities carry out dismantlement of warheads. According to Cochran, et al., the first three plants handled the final assembly, while the Zarechnyy facility was involved in partial assembly.[2] According to Bukharin, only two plants--Avangard in Sarov and Elektrokhimpribor in Lesnoy--handled production and dismantlement of subassemblies with fissile material components.[3,6] By 2000, Russia halted weapons assembly lines at Avangard and Start; Minatom plans to end dismantling activities at these two plants by 2003.[5] 

Non-nuclear components
Production of warhead casings; automatic, electronic, and electrical components and devices; and support equipment for nuclear warheads also takes place at Molniya Production Association (Moscow), Sever Production Association (Novosibirsk), the Urals Electrical and Mechanical Plant (Yekaterinburg), and at the Mechanical Engineering Plant (Nizhnyaya Tura, Sverdlovsk Oblast).[4,6] 

TESTING

Nuclear weapons testing was conducted by the Soviet Union at several test sites. After the 1963 signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, testing was concentrated at two nuclear test sites:  Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and Novaya Zemlya in Russia. Since 1990, Russia has not conducted a nuclear test. In May 2000, Russia ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Russia conducts subcritical tests at the country's only remaining internal test site--Novaya Zemlya.

NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION COMPLEX DEVELOPMENTS

The Russian nuclear complex, despite its decline over the last decade, remains oversized. An overview of Minatom's programs in downsizing and optimizing the complex, problems and challenges in this process, and an analysis of the possible future composition of the complex are portrayed in detail in the report "Downsizing Russia's Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure" by Oleg Bukharin, published in the Spring 2001 issue of the Nonproliferation Review. 

For information on general developments of the Russian nuclear warhead production complex and closed cities refer to the Closed Cities and Warhead Facilities General Developments. Please also check the Foreign Assistance section for the programs designed to reduce the threat of proliferation of nuclear material and know-how from Russia.

Sources:
[1] Nikolay Voloshin, "Russian Nuclear Armament Complex," Military Parade, No. 2, 2000, p.46-48.
[2] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 34.
[3] Oleg Bukharin, "Security of Fissile Materials in Russia," Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, No. 21, 1996, pp. 467-96.
[4] Pavel Podvig, ed., Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzheniye Rossii (Moscow, IzdAT, 1998), pp. 64-91.
[5] Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson, Frank von Hippel, and Sharon K. Weiner, Helping Russia Downsize its Nuclear Complex: A Focus on the Closed Nuclear Cities. (Princeton: Center of International Studies and Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Prinston University, June 2000), p. 14; http://www.princeton.edu/~cees/arms. 
[6] Oleg Bukharin, "Downsizing Russia's Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure,"  Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp.116-130.  
[7] NISNP Staff Interview with Russian scientist, April 2001. 
[8] "The State Duma Discussed the Problem of Maintain Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex", The Duma and Arms Control Newsletter, PIR Center, Moscow, April-May 2001. {Entered 12 April 2001, ES}{Revised 8/16/2001 ES}