Overview
	Technical Background
	The Threat
	Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials
Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling   Second Line of Defense   Export Control & Border Security   International Counterproliferation   WMD Proliferation Prevention   International Interdiction Efforts
	Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel
	Monitoring Stockpiles
	Ending Further Production
	Reducing Stockpiles

 

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Previous Publications
	Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends February2007 Readthe Full Report (1.5M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb 2006 The latest report in our series, from May 2006, finds that even though the gap between the threat of nuclear terrorism and the response has narrowed in recent years, there remains an unacceptable danger that terrorists might succeed in their quest to get and use a nuclear bomb, turning a modern city into a smoking ruin. Offering concrete steps to confront that danger, the report calls for world leaders to launch a fast-paced global coalition against nuclear terrorism focused on locking down all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide as rapidly as possible. Read the Executive Summary (379K PDF) or the Full Report (1.7M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives Our May 2005 report finds that while the United States and other countries laid important foundations for an accelerated effort to prevent nuclear terrorism in the last year, sustained presidential leadership will be needed to win the race to lock down the world’s nuclear stockpiles before terrorists and thieves can get to them. Read the Executive Summary (281 K) or the Full Report (1.9M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action Building on the previous years' reports, this 2004 NTI-commissioned report grades current efforts and recommends new actions to more effectively prevent nuclear terrorism. It finds that programs to reduce this danger are making progress, but there remains a potentially deadly gap between the urgency of the threat and the scope and pace of efforts to address it. Download the Full Report (1.2 M PDF) Выписки из доклада по-русски (423K PDF)
	Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan 2003 report published by Harvard and NTI measures the progress made in keeping nuclear weapons and materials out of terrorist hands, and outlines a comprehensive plan to reduce the danger. Download the Full Report (2.7M PDF)
	Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action 2002 report co-published by Harvard and NTI outlines seven urgent steps to reduce the threat of stolen nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists or hostile states. Read the Full Report (516K PDF)

Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling

Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance

Status

Of all the efforts by the U.S. Government to improve the ability of countries to interdict nuclear smuggling, the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program has the broadest set of mission goals. It is concerned with halting illicit trafficking of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as dual-use goods and related technologies useful for WMD production. Compare this goal to the Department of Defense (DOD) International Counterproliferation Program, which focuses almost exclusively on improving enforcement capabilities to counter WMD smuggling, and the Department of Energy' Second Line of Defense, which focuses only on smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials.

The program pursues its broad goal by assisting countries in four main activities:

• establishing "the necessary legal and regulatory basis for effective export controls;"

• developing "appropriate export authorization [i.e., licensing]procedures and practices;"
  
  
• establishing and enhancing "effective enforcement capabilities and procedures, including through the provision of WMD detection and interdiction equipment and training;" and,
  
  
• promoting "effective interaction between governments and industry on export controls."[1]

The EXBS program does not address these objectives by itself, but rather works with, and in most cases provides funding to, other U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Customs Service, the Commerce Department, the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and other offices within the State Department to implement the effort.[2] The office in the State Department’s Nonproliferation Bureau that administers the EXBS program also plays an important interagency role in coordinating the government’s counter-WMD smuggling and export control efforts.

In addition to its broad substantive mission, EXBS has a broad geographic scope, reaching beyond the former Soviet Union to countries all around the world, including East Asia, all of Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Early in fiscal year (FY) 2002, the program planned on carrying out specific programs in 31 countries, as well as supporting regional advisors and efforts involving additional countries.[3] In FY 2003, program officials anticipated activity in as many as 43 countries.[4]

Typical Pattern of Cooperation. The EXBS program has developed a typical set of procedures it follows in developing an assistance program with another program. It begins with an interagency team visit to assess the capabilities and the political will of the recipient country.[5] Following their return and report, EXBS officials work with partner agencies to develop a formal country proposal for assistance that covers both a short-term set of actions and longer-term goals. If appropriate, the program works to place a permanent export control advisor, as discussed below, in the country. The program then obtains agreement with the recipient country to the final assistance plan. Finally, implementation by the State Department and its partnering agencies begins, based on the availability of program funds.

Beginning in summer 2001, EXBS officials began to apply a standard set of criteria for what a recipient country's export control system should look like to evaluate how each country is doing.[6] These "standards" consist of a long list of questions on the characteristics of a given country under the headings above: legal/regulatory regime; licensing procedures and practices; quality of enforcement; interagency collaboration; and industry cooperation. To assess each country's characteristics with respect to the standards, EXBS program officials sent out the standards to collaborating agencies, embassies in recipient countries, and certainly to the in-country export control advisors. EXBS program managers themselves admit that initially EXBS program officials were too reliant on the in-country advisors for their evaluation of countries' status on the many questions, and that in turn the advisors were too reliant on recipient countries.[7] The keys now are to broaden the sources that drive the evaluation and to build an effective database that records progress on the standards from year to year to allow program managers to gain a better understanding about the patterns of implementation and to target their assistance to the most needed areas.

The standards exist to provide a guide to determine which aspects of a country’s ability to control dangerous exports and interdict WMD smuggling need to be improved – and when enough has been accomplished that the country should "graduate" from the program.[8] In concordance with the results of the standards, officials expect to reduce assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in FY 2004, and anticipate the Baltic nations graduating in FY 2005.[9]

To reach the desired end-state described in the standards, State Department officials work with several U.S. agencies with domestic export control to implement the EXBS program overseas.

U.S. Customs Service. Similar to its cooperation with the Department of Defense's International Counterproliferation program, the Customs Service works with the State Department to provide training and equipment to enhance investigative and enforcement capabilities. Equipment includes radiation detection equipment, such as hand-held "pagers" and isotope identifiers to identify nuclear material. In addition, the EXBS program also provides in certain cases law enforcement equipment, such as fiber optic scopes and probes to allow searches of containers in which contraband may be hidden, and mirrors, with which customs officials can quickly and effectively search the undersides of vehicles. Sometimes, the program even provides simple basic equipment such as winter clothing and gear for effective action in mountainous areas. Additionally, off-road pickup trucks have been provided, primarily to ten states in and around Central Asia, to patrol the long and porous "green borders," that is, the stretches of easily passable, often entirely unmarked stretches of national border between discrete official border crossing points.[10]

Training includes courses on basic and more advanced interdiction techniques using the equipment provided, incident investigation, and sting and targeting techniques (see the International Counterproliferation program for additional descriptions of the Customs Service training activities).[11] Most of the training is done in the recipient country itself, while some training occurs in the United States. EXBS officials work with the Customs Service to determine the range of officials to be invited for a particular course, and then communicate that to the recipient country. The overseas export control advisors discussed below are responsible to ensure that the participants selected by the country meet the requirements of the course.[12] EXBS program officials admit that there is currently a "crying need" to track the alumni of training courses, to ensure that the people receiving training are in fact carrying out the missions for which they have been trained, rather than moving on to other jobs.[13] The EXBS program is currently attempting to fill that gap by working with the in-country export control advisors to develop a database to keep tabs on training participants.

Overseas Advisors. The Customs Service is the primary agency collaborating with the EXBS program (the Commerce Department and Coast Guard have also participated) to station nonproliferation export control advisors in 15 countries, with the responsibility of overseeing implementation of State-funded programs in-country, and coordinating implementation of all U.S. smuggling interdiction efforts, in over 25 countries.[14] Some advisors cover a single country, while others are responsible for whole regions. Generally, these advisors are retired Customs Service officials who bring experience of U.S. export control practices.[15] In the words of a May 2002 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the advisors also

"…seek to ensure that the appropriate foreign officials attend training courses; track the assistance that countries receive from various programs to avoid duplication of equipment; meet with government ministries in the recipient countries; and inventory equipment and determine how it is being used, including assessing its effectiveness."[16]

State-funded advisors have provided an important avenue for coordination with the Departments of Energy and Defense programs when adequate coordination back in Washington has often been lacking; officials from all three agencies have praised the practice.[17] However, some officials have reported that turnover among the advisors is too high. They suggest that because the advisors are generally retired domestic U.S. officials who are placed in sometimes difficult overseas locations without a great deal of initial training, those advisors do not stay in their posts long enough before having to be replaced.[18]

Other Agencies and Offices. The EXBS program works with other agencies and offices, as well. It supports work by the Commerce Department that focuses on goals of the EXBS program other than enforcement, such as helping countries create legal and regulatory structures to control exports, implementing licensing procedures to carry out those law and regulations, and promoting efforts by governments to educate and collaborate with private industry to comply with export regulations. Cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard is similar to that with the Customs Service, except that the Coast Guard applies its specific maritime expertise in the provision of training and equipment, including some light patrol boats.[19] Support also goes to the Department of Energy's International Export Control Program (an office separate from the Second Line of Defense program) to assist countries in developing appropriate nuclear export control lists (Commerce Department efforts focus on other WMD and dual-use items), enhancing industry compliance, and in educating border officials about how to recognize nuclear-related export material that requires an export license.[20] In addition, through FY 2002, the EXBS program received funding appropriated under the auspices of the FREEDOM Support Act, by the Department of State's Bureau of Eurasian and European Affairs, to pay for some of its activities in Russia and the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. The Bush administration’s budget for FY 2003 proposed moving most of this funding into a single account that goes directly to the EXBS program (although funding for the separate program of Georgia Border Security, in which EXBS officials collaborate closely with the European and Eurasian Bureau to carry out goals similar to that of the EXBS program in Georgia, stayed in the FREEDOM Support Act account).[21]

Interagency Coordination. The EXBS program office also tries to coordinate the other U.S. efforts to interdict nuclear and other WMD smuggling. They lead an on-going interagency coordinating committee on export control assistance, which, according to a State Department representative, "coordinates not only the activities implemented with State program funds, but also assistance provided by the other agencies related to export controls."[22] However, opinion is mixed among other agency officials on whether this committee effective in coordinating non-State funded assistance; indeed, the GAO concluded that this effort has been "inadequate."[23] Ultimately, other agency officials do not report to the State Department, but to their own hierarchy, the White House, and their own congressional oversight committees. Largely in response to the May 2002 GAO report, and as discussed on the page dealing the goal of Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling, the National Security Council staff is now taking a direct role in leading an interagency effort to develop a government-wide strategic plan for WMD smuggling interdiction assistance. Based on responses to congressional inquiries at a July 2002 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, it appears that the State Department will be the lead agency responsible for overseeing implementation of that strategic plan, though the Department of Defense representative argued that the National Security Council, not the State Department, should be in charge of coordinating implementation of the strategic plan.[24]

As an additional response to the GAO's criticism of lack of coordination, the State Department is leading an International Nuclear Detection Interagency Working Group to develop "an integrated approach to detection and interdiction of special nuclear or radiological materials overseas."[25] The group is seen as a specialized subset to the larger export control assistance coordination group. The purpose of the group is to develop a unified set of program goals, and determine participating agencies' roles and responsibilities, determine overall program costs, time frames for program execution, performance measures, strategies to maintain equipment, and an exit strategy. Meetings of the working group are planned to occur every month to six weeks, but at a minimum every quarter.[26] In addition, the Department of Energy and the Intelligence Community are drafting a global nuclear smuggling threat assessment.[27]

Budget

See budget table

The EXBS program has budgeted $146 million, beginning in FY 1998 through FY 2002 to assist countries in interdicting nuclear and other WMD smuggling in and around the countries of the Former Soviet Union, where the greatest threat from unsecured nuclear warheads and materials resides.[28] Included in this total is $24.7 million the EXBS program ultimately received from the FY 2002 Emergency Response Fund created by Congress in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, added to the regular appropriations of $40.7 million directed towards EXBS activities in the countries of the Former Soviet Union.[29] In FY 2003, the Bush administration requested $35.37 million for export control and border security assistance, $17.37 million going to the EXBS program directly and $18 million in the FREEDOM Support Act for the European and Eurasian Bureau's Georgia Border Security program.[30] This is $32.7 million below the final FY 2002 amount.[31]

In addition to the funding for work in the former Soviet Union and nearby transit states, in FY 2002, the EXBS program received an additional $13.8 million for non-NIS activities; in FY 2001, an additional $14.1 million; in FY 2000, an additional $7.5 million; an additional $4 million taken out of the Economic Support Fund in FY 1999; in FY 1998, $1.1 million.[32] The FY 2003 Bush administration's budget requests an additional $18.6 million, about the $17.4 million devoted to former Soviet states.[33] From FY 1998 to FY 2002, $182.5 million has been budgeted for the Export Control and Border Security program worldwide, with $36.5 million going for activities outside the countries

Key Issues and Recommendations

Strategic Planning and Performance Measurement. The EXBS program has made some important progress with the standard set of goals for each country that it has developed, which give the program a consistent means of judging the results of its efforts.

• Recommendation: The EXBS program should distribute their evaluations of countries’ progress on their standards in connection with their annual budget requests. By measuring progress on the program's goals from year to year in an open way, program managers will gain greater insight on what is being gained for each dollar spent, and help legislators share in that insight. With such consistent goals, U.S. programs can go beyond pointing out that nuclear smuggling is a problem and that programs are needed to address it to actually assessing how well the programs are working in reducing the threat.
  
  
• Recommendation: Other programs focusing on interdicting nuclear and WMD smuggling should put in place a similar set of consistent goals for assessing progress. The effectiveness of different programs can then be judged on a consistent basis, and additional budget allocations directed toward those efforts that are demonstrably more effective in interdicting nuclear smuggling.

Overlap with Other Programs. The activities of the EXBS program are very similar to the goals stated by the Department of Defense's (DOD) proposed WMD Proliferation Prevention program. The EXBS program concerns itself with more than just discrete border points; it is also worried about the "green" land border and the "deep blue" sea borders of recipient countries. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the Department of Defense will receive funding for the WMD Proliferation Prevention program. Thus, it is imperative that DOD and the State Department clearly delineate and separate their spheres of activities as these two programs move forward.

• Recommendation: The new DOD program should clearly delineate how its scope of activity will differ from activities already funded under the current EXBS program. The two efforts should work out a clear division of labor to avoid duplication.

Interagency Coordination. The State Department has long been responsible for coordinating export control assistance by the U.S. Government. Nevertheless, GAO concluded in May 2002 that U.S. assistance to address nuclear smuggling "is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall government-wide plan to guide it."[34] Following the GAO report, in 2002, the National Security Council staff stepped in to address that criticism by leading creation of a new strategic plan to delineate various agencies' roles and responsibilities with respect to nuclear smuggling.

• Recommendation: The National Security Council (NSC), in collaboration with the White House Office of Management and Budget, must enforce the roles and responsibilities agreed to in the strategic plan being formed in fall 2002.

Timely administration of funding. Activities funded by the EXBS program have not always been able to keep pace with the level of funding available to it, leaving a backlog of funding.[35] While money should not be spent just to get it out the door, carrying large unobligated balances means that those funds are not available to spend somewhere else right now.

• Recommendation: As a general rule, funding that has been provided to a partnering agency and has not been spent within 18 months should be reallocated to more urgent tasks than can be accomplished quickly, though there should be flexibility for cases in which a good case can be made that a particular logjam is about to be overcome, and the funds will then be needed.

Tracking participants and equipment. Effectively tracking the alumni of training programs is essential to the long-term health of the program. It is reasonable to believe that a qualified border official receiving training from the United States will have a greater likelihood of advancing to higher positions in the organization. Thus, that training may not be directly applied at the level it was originally intended. Maintaining close ties with an alumni will be useful to promulgate further cooperation with that country's border control organization. Moreover, alumni from various countries can be brought together to develop cooperation across their own borders.

• Recommendation: The State Department EXBS program should take the lead on developing a database to track smuggling interdiction assistance alumni for all the U.S. programs in this area. Information on every participant at any U.S. training should go in that database, and consistent resources should be dedicated not only to maintaining that database but also to developing an on-going communication program to and among the alumni.

Collaboration with other anti-smuggling efforts. EXBS program officials report that they have begun a process of communicating with other State Department anti-trafficking efforts dealing for example with illicit drugs, small arms and other conventional weapons, terrorists, illicit financial flows, and even human beings themselves.[36] This is an important first step, but more needs to be done to look at common lessons to be drawn from the government’s counter-smuggling efforts in different areas.

• Recommendation: The U.S. government should undertake an examination of lessons learned (particularly what approaches work and what approaches do not) across the spectrum of counter-smuggling programs, including identifying areas for increased cooperation among these efforts. The examination should seek to identify best practices for assisting countries in halting smuggling, and propose strategies to unify the response to the underlying problem of porous borders (important in many foreign policy areas, from terrorism to immigration to drugs)

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