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Monitoring Stockpiles
Warhead Dismantlement Transparency
Status
![[ click here for larger photo ]](../../../images/cnwmphoto_dismantle1_sm.jpg) Demonstrating technology for monitoring warhead materials. |
To date, arms control agreements have not included requirements to dismantle nuclear warheads, and have not included requirements for verifying warhead dismantlement.[1] If future agreements called for reductions in warhead stockpiles, means to build confidence that warhead dismantlement was taking place would likely be needed. But monitoring of warhead dismantlement is extraordinarily sensitive, as virtually everything about the design of nuclear warheads is secret as are many of the maintenance and production activities that also take place at nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facilities. Thus verification or transparency measures that could confirm dismantlement without unduly compromising sensitive information, and without unduly intruding on continued maintenance of the nuclear stockpile, would be needed.[2] |
Since the mid-1990s, U.S. and Russian experts have made considerable progress in developing technologies and procedures that could be used to confirm the dismantlement of nuclear warheads without revealing classified warhead design information. No arms control measures calling for monitored warhead dismantlement are currently in place or being negotiated, however.
Formal warhead dismantlement transparency negotiations. The idea of some form of monitoring of the dismantlement of nuclear warheads has been discussed, in one form or another, for decades but has never been included in a formal negotiated arms agreement.[3] In the Bush-Gorbachev unilateral-reciprocal initiatives of 1991 (confirmed and supplemented by Russian President Yeltsin shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed, in January 1992), the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) committed themselves to dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads but no verification of these commitments was included.
From early in the 1990s, there were suggestions of the possibility of exchanging visits to dismantlement facilities; the United States offered to allow Russian experts to visit the Pantex warhead assembly and disassembly facility, if Russia would allow a reciprocal U.S. visit to a comparable Russian facility. This offer never went anywhere, as Russian officials made clear that the warhead assembly and disassembly facilities known in Russia as the "serial production facilities" were the most sensitive of all the nuclear facilities in Russia. Despite their name, the "Safe Secure Dismantlement" (SSD) talks of the early 1990s never addressed warhead dismantlement directly. Similarly, warhead dismantlement transparency was not a major focus of the "Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility" (STI) talks of the mid-1990s, though in a paper outlining the U.S. concept for the overall direction of transparency efforts tabled in December 1994, U.S. negotiators suggested that unspecified measures to confirm warhead dismantlement should be developed and applied.
At their Helsinki summit in March 1997, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed that a third Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START III) should include "measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads." This was widely hailed as the beginning of a new era in arms control, which would move beyond addressing only the delivery vehicles and launchers missiles, bombers, and submarines to focus on the nuclear weapons themselves. Because of disputes over the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, serious negotiations on START III took some time to get underway. The U.S. proposal tabled in early 2000 included obligations to declare how many warheads were being dismantled, and in the same time period the U.S. negotiators made suggestions for experimental demonstrations of approaches to confirming warhead dismantlement.[4] These proposals never went anywhere before the Clinton administration came to an end.
The Bush administration has expressed no interest either in dismantling the U.S. warheads to be reduced under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (nearly all of which, instead, are to be kept in reserve), or in extensive arrangements for verifying arms reductions which Bush administration officials argue are unnecessary given the new political relationship between the United States and Russia. Russia, however, concerned over the possibility that the U.S. could rapidly return reduced warheads in its reserve stockpile to missiles, switched course in 2000-2002 to support verified dismantlement of the warheads to be reduced.[5] Russia had few cards to play to bring the Bush administration along, however, and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed in May 2002 included no verification measures at all. No further formal negotiations related to warhead dismantlement transparency are underway or planned.
Lab-to-lab warhead dismantlement transparency technology development. Since the mid-1990s, a U.S.-Russian lab-to-lab effort has been underway to develop technologies and procedures that would make it possible to confirm warhead dismantlement while protecting information that it was agreed should not be disclosed. The goal of this effort is, in effect, to expand the arms control toolbox, without making any policy decisions, by jointly developing approaches that would be available should negotiators decide such technical options were needed for some future agreement. In addition to warhead dismantlement transparency, the program also supports other U.S.-Russian transparency initiatives, including transparency for the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, HEU Purchase Agreement transparency, the Trilateral Initiative, and monitoring of the plutonium production reactor shut-down agreement.[6]
In recent years, this effort has gone forward under the U.S.-Russian Warhead Safety and Security Exchange (WSSX) agreement. Since the WSSX working group is led by senior officials of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), who personally oversee and approve the progress of the effort, the laboratory scientists have strong political "cover" for moving forward. (The MINATOM representative, for example, is the head of MINATOM's nuclear weapons department, who also participates in the major technical meetings.) Some 70% of all the funding that goes to this effort is spent in Russia rather than in the United States (in part because the equivalent efforts on the U.S. side have funding from other parts of the Departments of Energy and Defense). In general, the two sides have a major technical interchange meeting once each year, usually at a Russian nuclear weapons laboratory. In February 2002, for example, the meeting was held at Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16), home of one of Russia's principal nuclear weapons design laboratories, and 12 different Russian transparency technologies were demonstrated (including radiation monitoring, explosives detection, and "information barriers," discussed more below). Over 150 Russian experts participated, representing all of Russia's weapons laboratories, and the nuclear weapon assembly and disassembly facilities as well.[7]
Because of the need to protect sensitive warhead design information, most concepts for confirming warhead dismantlement do not involve monitoring while the dismantlement is actually taking place, but rather checks before and after. For example, monitors might check warheads as they entered a room within a dismantlement facility where they were going to be dismantled, and then check the containers leaving the room that contained plutonium and HEU components. Alternatively, monitors might draw back to the boundary of the dismantlement facility and count the number of warheads going in, and the number of warheads and containers of nuclear material components coming out so-called perimeter-portal monitoring. Another approach, which has been advocated by the author but has received little official examination, would involve using one technology both to permanently disable the warheads pending dismantlement, and to confirm their dismantlement.[8]
Much of the work in the warhead dismantlement transparency effort has focused on questions relating to identification: how could monitors confirm that an object going into a facility that was declared to be a nuclear warhead really was a nuclear warhead? And how could they confirm that a container said to hold a plutonium or HEU weapon component from a dismantled warhead really did contain such a component? A range of approaches has been considered, most of which fall into two categories verifying "templates" or verifying "attributes."[9]
In a "template" approach, measurement equipment would seek to confirm whether an object matched the unique signature of a particular type of warhead or component. For example, as a warhead was first being removed from a particular type of missile (so that there was high confidence that object really was the warhead type for that missile), measurements could be taken on that warhead (or more likely a selection of several such warheads) to create the original template. Then, when warheads arrived at a monitored dismantlement facility and were declared to be warheads of that type, measurements would be taken and compared to the template to see whether there was a match or not. (The same approach could be taken for plutonium and HEU components, in principle.)
In the "attribute" approach, a series of attributes that define the object being looked for would be agreed for example, "a warhead of the type of interest contains high explosives; contains a component at the front that has at least a minimum mass of weapon-grade plutonium; that component is made of metal, not oxide; that component is roughly symmetrical; and the weapon also contains a component in the rear that contains HEU." Then agreed measures would be developed to confirm presence of explosives, presence of weapon-grade plutonium, presence of at least the threshold mass of plutonium, presence of plutonium metal and absence of oxide, symmetry of the plutonium component, and presence of HEU.
In both the attribute and template approaches, an "information barrier" could be used, so that the monitors do not see the actual results of the measurements taken by the monitoring equipment, but just a "yes" or "no" it matches the template or has all the attributes, or it does not. That then requires means for "authentication" of the equipment convincing the monitors that the measures being taken that result in a "yes" or "no" are the measures that have been agreed. Much of the difficult technical work that has been done in recent years in this lab-to-lab program has focused on information barriers and authentication how to convince the monitors that the measurements are legitimate while convincing security officials there is no chance that sensitive information will be revealed.
The "template" approach comes closer to verifying conclusively that the object being looked at is a real warhead. But it raises more difficult problems for authenticating the template without revealing sensitive information. The "attribute" approach can only confirm that the object has many of the attributes of a warhead, but approaches to authenticating that the measures being taken are real, using unclassified objects that should pass or fail particular tests, are easier to design. Which approach is better depends in large part on the objectives envisioned for the particular monitoring regime and the degree of suspicion the regime must be able to dispel. (Most of the focus of the lab-to-lab effort in recent years has been on attributes, not templates.) Between parties between whom the level of suspicion was modest such as Russia and the United States today an attributes approach would easily be sufficient, particularly if the monitoring regime was supposed to confirm the dismantlement of thousands of warheads rather than just a few: while one could easily imagine one side or the other mocking up a small number of objects that were not warheads but did have all the attributes of warheads if there was a strong enough motivation to do so, making several thousand of these without detection would be difficult and expensive, and it is difficult to imagine what the value to the cheater in doing so would be.
As noted earlier, toward the end of the Clinton administration, sufficient progress had been made that DOE hoped to implement some actual demonstrations of such approaches at real dismantlement facilities, using real warheads. (Such demonstrations have in fact been carried out by U.S. experts on U.S. warhead dismantlement activities, but not with Russian monitors present.) Agreement to carry out such demonstrations was never reached, however, and the Bush administration has expressed little interest in monitored warhead dismantlement. Hence, the focus of the lab-to-lab effort has shifted toward development of a range of technological tools that can be applied in a variety of transparency contexts including support for other U.S.-Russian transparency initiatives, as noted above. Despite the Bush administration's lack of interest in monitored warhead dismantlement, the program was recognized in the Bush administration's review of threat reduction programs with Russia as a highly successful effort providing tools for a variety of purposes, and received an increase in funding. Since September 11, the U.S. and Russian experts working in the effort have been jointly developing counter-terror technologies applying some of the approaches to detection of explosives and of nuclear materials they had developed for transparency to this new mission.[10]
Budget
See
budget table
The Warhead Dismantlement and Fissile Material Transparency program has received $33.15 million since its inception through FY 2003, and is slated for a budget of $16.141 million in fiscal year (FY) 2004.[11] Additional funds from DOE's Verification and Nonproliferation Technology Development program and from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's programs to develop technologies for future inspections have supported related efforts, but data on exactly how much of these funds has gone to efforts related to warhead dismantlement transparency has not been made publicly available.
Key Issues and Recommendations
Little progress toward actual monitoring of warhead dismantlement. Currently, as noted in the main text, there are no formal negotiations toward monitored warhead dismantlement, and the informal lab-to-lab technology development effort has de-emphasized further development and demonstration of approaches designed for this purpose, given the lack of political support for them in the Bush administration. Progress toward actual implementation of measures to confirm warhead dismantlement is only likely in the context of an arrangement that both the United States and Russia saw as addressing some of their principal concerns security of Russia's nuclear warheads, particularly the tactical stockpile, for the United States, and, for Russia, the ongoing cost of warhead dismantlement and the size of the reserve stockpile that could rapidly be returned to missiles.
- Recommendation: President Bush has an opportunity to improve on the reciprocal-unilateral nuclear reduction initiatives his father launched in 1991, focusing another round of such reciprocal efforts on the warheads that pose the greatest danger to the United States, and adding monitoring to confirm that they are being implemented. Specifically, it is time for a new initiative to secure, monitor, and dismantle thousands of the most dangerous warheads including specifically all warheads not equipped with modern, difficult-to-bypass versions of electronic locks to prevent unauthorized use, and many of Russia's readily portable tactical warheads. Under such an initiative: (a) thousands of U.S. and Russian warheads (both strategic and tactical), including specifically all warheads not equipped with modern electronic locks to prevent unauthorized use, would be declared excess to military needs and placed in secure storage facilities open to monitoring by the other side; (b) both sides would commit that these warheads would be verifiably dismantled as soon as appropriate procedures to do so while protecting classified information were agreed; (c) both sides would commit to place the plutonium and HEU from dismantling these warheads in secure, monitored storage, pending efforts to eliminate these materials; and (d) the United States would offer to provide Nunn-Lugar assistance in implementing these agreed steps.[12] For even higher confidence in securing these warheads in the near term, they could be permanently and verifiably disabled.[13] With such an accord, in a matter of months thousands of the most dangerous warheads could be under jointly monitored lock and key, and committed to eventual dismantlement a substantial step forward for U.S. security. Russia's incentive to agree would be both the financial assistance for warhead dismantlement (which U.S. legislation says can only be provided if there are measures to confirm the dismantlement is actually taking place), and a U.S. willingness to include a large fraction of the reserve warhead stockpile that has been the focus of Russian concern.[14]
- Recommendation: In support of such initiatives, the United States and Russia should begin carrying out, in a step-by-step approach, a series of demonstrations of approaches to confirming the removal of warheads from launchers, the storage of those warheads, the dismantlement of those warheads, and the secure storage of the nuclear material they contain.[15]
Little emphasis on developing the broader elements of a warhead and fissile material transparency regime. To date, the lab-to-lab transparency development efforts have focused primarily on the task of confirming how many warheads are being dismantled a difficult but manageable technical task. Relatively modest attention has been devoted to the more difficult task of outlining all the means that might be used to build confidence in understanding the baseline how many total warheads, or warheads of particular types, remain. Building such confidence is only likely to be accomplished through a step-by-step process over time, but is ultimately likely to require exchanging a wide range of data and production records covering the whole nuclear warhead life cycle, including stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials as well (see Stockpile Declarations).
- Recommendation: U.S. and Russian experts should devote substantial attention to developing a wide range of approaches to building confidence in the accuracy of declarations of total warhead and nuclear material stockpiles.
Links
| Key Resources | |
 |
Steve Fetter, A Comprehensive Transparency Regime for Warheads and Fissile Materials, Arms Control Today (January/February 1999). |
| Provides a useful overview
of what a complete regime of declarations and monitoring
for all nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear
materials would look like, and what purposes it would
serve. Fetter has another useful paper, similar in some
respects to the Arms Control Today article: Verifying
Deep Reductions in Nuclear Forces, in Harold Feiveson,
ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep
Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999). |
|
|
Richard L. Garwin, "Technologies and Procedures to Verify Warhead Status and Dismantlement" (paper presented to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Workshop on Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency, July 6, 2001). |
| This paper provides a description of how a combination of various technologies, including detailed declarations, tags, seals, and radiation measurements, could be used to verify an agreement limiting the total number of warheads and requiring that specified warheads be dismantled. Provides useful technical details in particular on "template" measurements to confirm that objects declared to be warheads are in fact warheads. | |
|
Oleg Bukharin and Kenneth Luongo, U.S.-Russian Warhead Dismantlement Transparency: The Status, Problems, and Proposals, PU/CEES Report No. 314 (Princeton, N.J.: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, April 1999). |
| This report gives a good overview of U.S.-Russian transparency efforts related to warhead dismantlement, with recommendations for next steps. Unfortunately, although this paper was published in 1999, it is only modestly out of date, as there has been little progress in formal U.S.-Russian transparency negotiations since then. | |
|
Tom Z. Collina and Jon B. Wolfsthal, "Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia," Arms Control Today (April 2002). |
| This article makes the case for a negotiated U.S.-Russian agreement on verified dismantlement of thousands of warheads on each side, in part to reduce risks of nuclear terrorism. | |
|
"Verifiable Elimination of Nuclear Warheads: What Lies Behind Russian Proposals?" (Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, May 2002). |
| This web page provides a variety of sources (in Russian and English) on why Russia proposed (unsuccessfully) that verification of the dismantlement of reduced warheads should be included in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in May 2002. | |
 |
Eric R. Gerdes, Roger G. Johnston, and James E. Doyle, "A Proposed Approach for Monitoring Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement," Science & Global Security, vol. 9 (2001). Download 1.5M PDF |
| This article outlines a specific technical approach to confirming warhead dismantlement, using a remote monitoring arrangement involving cameras, seals, and tags, as well as a related system for monitoring storage of warheads and fissile materials. | |
|
Federation of American Scientists, "Conclusions from the Russian-U.S. Workshop on Dismantlement Transparency," November 9-10, 1998. |
| This document, reporting the results of a workshop on warhead dismantlement transparency held in 1998, summarizes the main policy issues and obstacles facing such efforts at that time which remain, in general, the key issues today. | |
|
Matthew Bunn, "'Pit-Stuffing': How to Disable Thousands of Warheads and Easily Verify Their Dismantlement," F.A.S. Public Interest Report (March/April 1998). |
| This short article describes an approach to "stuffing" the inside of the hollow spheres of nuclear material that make up the core of modern thermonuclear weapons, preventing them from being detonated and how this approach to disablement could also be used to confirm that the warheads had later been dismantled. | |
|
Matthew Bunn, "Act Now, Mr. President," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 2 (March/April 1998). |
| This short article proposes a reciprocal-unilateral initiative to place thousands of U.S. and Russian warheads in secure, monitored storage, and commit them to monitored dismantlement once appropriate monitoring procedures have been agreed. | |
|
Los Alamos Applied Monitoring Technology Laboratory, Electronic Library |
| The Applied Monitoring Technology Laboratory has a substantial number of publications related to various aspects of warhead dismantlement transparency, including templates, attributes, authentication, and information barriers, as well as broader policy issues. | |
|
Andrew J. Bieniawski and Paul B. Irwin, "Overview of the U.S.-Russian Laboratory-to-Laboratory Warhead Dismantlement Transparency Program: A U.S. Perspective," in Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2000). Download 77K PDF |
| Bieniawski and Irwin, Department of Energy officials, summarize the purposes and accomplishments of the lab-to-lab warhead dismantlement transparency program. | |
|
Robert Gromoll, "A Nuclear Warhead Control and Elimination Regime: Problems and Prospects," in Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 1997). Download 41K PDF |
| In a paper written shortly after the Clinton-Yeltsin Helsinki framework had envisioned transparency for warhead inventories and dismantlement as part of START III, Gromoll (an official of the now-defunct U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) lays out the reasons why warhead dismantlement had not been monitored in the past, but should be in the future. | |
| Agreements and Documents | |
|
Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, Helsinki, Finland, March 21, 1997. |
| A section of this joint statement focuses on START III negotiations, but also notes the importance of transparency in the dismantlement of warheads: Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials. | |
| FOOTNOTES | |
| [1] | The arrangements to remove nuclear warheads from Ukraine in the 1990s, under which Russia agreed to allow Ukrainian experts (who had been Soviet nuclear weapons experts, with Soviet security clearances) to confirm the dismantlement of the warheads removed from Ukraine, are the only exception to date. |
| [2] | In U.S. government parlance, "verification" refers to measures to confirm that agreed reductions are being carried out, while "transparency" refers to less formal measures designed to build confidence that agreed measures are being implemented. In reality, there is no black and white distinction; rather, the two represent nearby (and sometimes overlapping) regions on a spectrum of confidence. |
| [3] | The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1988 required destroying the airframes (or reentry vehicles) surrounding the warheads, but placed no controls on the warheads themselves. |
| [4] | The best available public discussion of the U.S. proposal is in Nikolai Sokov, Recent Developments in Nuclear Weapons Verification, in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., The Verification Yearbook 2002 (London: Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre, 2002). Inclusion of demonstrations of warhead dismantlement transparency is from interviews with Department of Energy officials, 2000. For an official discussion outlining concepts for such demonstrations dating from shortly before these proposals were made, see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security, Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency Program Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: DOE, May 1999). |
| [5] | For a useful summary, see "Verifiable Elimination of Nuclear Warheads: What Lies Behind Russian Proposals?" (Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, May 2002). |
| [6] | For a useful summary of this effort's activities in support of several different transparency initiatives, and plans for the future as of 1999, see Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency Program: Strategic Plan, op. cit. |
| [7] | Interview with DOE official, February 2003. |
| [8] | The nuclear explosion in a modern "boosted" thermonuclear weapon begins when explosives crush down a hollow sphere of plutonium or HEU (or both), known as the "primary" or "pit." The primary has a small tube going into the hollow sphere to allow the sphere to be filled with tritium for the boosting. If the insider of the sphere is filled with metal wire by inserting a wire through this tube, the weapon can no longer detonate. This is referred to as "pit stuffing." Monitors could observe workers from the inspected party inserting such wires while warheads were in storage before dismantlement, and then not monitor dismantlement at all. Once the inspected party informed the other side that the warheads had been dismantled, monitors could return and take measurements on the containers holding the pits from the dismantled weapons, to confirm that they were roughly symmetrical objects made of plutonium, containing a tangle of wire. In some cases, it might be useful to add a small amount of a material not normally found in nuclear weapons that emitted a very penetrating gamma ray to the wire, so that this material could be easily detected from outside the canisters. The advantages of this approach are that (a) thousands of warheads could be verifiably disabled much more rapidly than they could actually be dismantled; and (b) verification of dismantlement could be accomplished without requiring monitors at the dismantlement facilities themselves. The disadvantage is the potentially high sensitivity of actually inserting physical objects into warheads. See Matthew Bunn, "Pit-Stuffing': How to Disable Thousands of Warheads and Easily Verify Their Dismantlement," F.A.S. Public Interest Report (March/April 1998) |
| [9] | See, for example, W.R. Kane et al., "On Attributes and Templates for Identification of Nuclear Weapons in Arms Control," in Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2000). For a discussion that strongly argues for the template approach over the attribute method, see Richard L. Garwin, "Technologies and Procedures to Verify Warhead Status and Dismantlement" (paper presented to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Workshop on Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency, July 6, 2001). |
| [10] | This is mentioned, for example, in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), FY 2004 Detailed Budget Justifications—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (Washington, D.C.: DOE, February 2003), p. 586, p. 600, and p. 604. |
| [11] | See our budget database, and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), FY 2004 Detailed Budget Justifications—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation(Washington, D.C.: DOE, February 2003) |
| [12] | For example, providing $90 million per year for a dismantlement rate of 3,000 warheads per year would come to $30,000 per warhead, defraying a substantial part of Russia's dismantlement cost at relatively modest cost to the United States, given the potential security benefits. |
| [13] | See Bunn, "Pit-Stuffing': How to Disable Thousands of Warheads and Easily Verify Their Dismantlement," op. cit. |
| [14] | For descriptions of earlier variants of this proposal, see Matthew Bunn, "Act Now, Mr. President," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 2 (March/April 1998), and Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Materials (Washington, D.C.: Harvard Project on Managing the Atom and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000). For a somewhat similar proposal applying to active-duty strategic forces, see Admiral Stansfield Turner, Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997). See also Committee on Nuclear Policy, Jump-START: Retaking the Initiative to Reduce Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, February 1999). |
| [15] | For an excellent recent discussion of such an approach, with detailed suggestions for each step, see Oleg Bukharin and James Doyle, "Transparency and Predictability Measures for U.S. and Russian Strategic Arms Reductions, " Nonproliferation Review 9, no. 2 (Summer 2002). |
Written by Matthew Bunn.
Last updated by Anthony Wier on February 17, 2003.
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