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Issue Brief
Elena Sokova, Research Associate
CNS NIS Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
July 2002
Issue Introduction
With the Cold War behind them, the United States and Russia pledged to eliminate excess weapons-grade plutonium in order to prevent its theft or diversion for illegal nuclear programs and to prevent its reincorporation into their weapons programs. From a nonproliferation standpoint, plutonium is of the greatest concern because only 8 kilograms are needed to make a nuclear bomb. The United States and Russia each declared 50 metric tons of plutonium to be surplus to their security needs. In September 2000, both countries formally agreed to transform 34 metric tons each of excess military plutonium into a proliferation-resistant form over the course of 20 years. Russia intends to irradiate all 34 metric tons of its plutonium in commercial nuclear power reactors, utilizing the so-called MOX fuel option. According to the 2000 agreement, the United States also planned to irradiate the majority of its surplus plutonium as MOX fuel. The rest of the U.S. plutonium was planned to be immobilized with highly radioactive waste for subsequent deep-earth disposal. In early 2002, due to steep increases of the U.S. disposition program costs, the U.S. administration announced its decision to concentrate on the MOX option solely, canceling the immobilization track.
Plutonium disposition programs in both countries are still in early stages. The start-up costs of plutonium disposition are extremely high, as neither Russia nor the United States has industrial-scale MOX fuel production facilities. The Russian program is currently estimated at $2 billion, and the U.S. program at $3.8 billion. However, international funding for the Russian program has not yet been secured. In addition to remaining financial uncertainties about the Russian program, other implementation issues, including verification, monitoring, licensing and others, must be resolved before the program in both countries can move forward. Given these challenges, the year 2007, initially agreed in the September 2000 agreement as the start date for plutonium irradiation, seems unrealistic.
Issue Brief
The Plutonium Surplus
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union
produced about 90 and 120-165 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium,
respectively.[1] Nuclear arms reduction efforts in the late 1980s and
1990s slated thousands of nuclear weapons in the United States and
Russia for dismantling and elimination. These nuclear weapon reductions,
with their indisputable benefits for global security, also meant that
the two countries no longer needed large stocks of weapons materials for
their arsenals and that existing stocks would increase even further as
nuclear materials were removed from warheads.
In 1995, the United States announced that it possessed more than 50 metric tons of plutonium in excess of national security needs; in 1997, Russia followed suit and declared 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium surplus to its defense program. Both countries pledged to take steps to ensure that this material would never again be used for weapons or fall into the wrong hands.
Dismantling a Nuclear Weapon
Why Dispose of Plutonium?
Producing
fissile materials
is the major obstacle to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons by
proliferant states and terrorists. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) estimates that only 8 kilograms of plutonium is sufficient
to make a bomb with a yield equal to that of the device used on
Nagasaki. Thus, elimination of surpluses of military plutonium would
greatly reduce the risk that it could be stolen or diverted to illegal
nuclear programs, and also ensures that neither the United States nor
Russia will reincorporate it into warheads in the future. In addition,
disposition of plutonium would reduce storage costs of plutonium, which
are very high over the long term.
Plutonium Disposition Options
Unlike weapons-grade uranium, which can be rendered unusable for
nuclear weapons by blending it with lower-grade uranium (a blend that
can then be used as fuel in nuclear power plants), plutonium cannot be
blended with other materials or diluted to make it unusable in weapons.
However, steps can be taken to greatly complicate the use of plutonium
for nuclear arms. Spent nuclear fuel for commercial power reactors, for
example, contains roughly 1% plutonium, but it is bound up with highly
radioactive material, thus, creating a high-radiation barrier. In
addition, the process of separating plutonium and uranium from spent
fuel is technically difficult and expensive. Consequently, plutonium in
spent fuel is considered to have relatively modest proliferation risk.
For the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium, specialists have sought
to devise methods based on these properties of spent fuel to make
weapons-grade plutonium inaccessible for weapons use, a goal commonly
known as the “spent fuel standard.” (For details, see
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
by the National Academy of Sciences.)
During the early 1990s, U.S. and Russian technical and government committees considered several plutonium disposition options. In the end, two options were identified as meeting the two states’ nonproliferation objectives: (1) irradiating plutonium as nuclear power reactor fuel; and (2) immobilizing it with high-level radioactive waste in an inert matrix (such as glass or ceramic), and then disposing of the material in a geologic repository, where other nuclear wastes will also be stored.
The irradiation option involves the production of special fuel consisting of both plutonium and uranium oxides, which is called mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel. Russia considers plutonium a valuable energy source and insists on using its surplus plutonium as fuel rather than immobilizing it. Moreover, because irradiation of MOX in nuclear power plants transforms weapons-grade plutonium into lesser quality “reactor grade” plutonium (while immobilized plutonium remains weapons-grade), Russia insisted that the United States adopt the MOX option as well for the bulk of its surplus plutonium. Russia argued that if the United States merely immobilized its surplus plutonium, the United States might some day re-separate the weapons-grade material and reuse it for nuclear arms.
The MOX fuel will be burned in commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States and Russia, primarily in light water reactors. Russia also intends to use its fast neutron reactor for burning MOX fuel. The use of Canadian and European reactors for the Russian material is also being considered as one possible means for accelerating the disposition program.
Fissile Material Containers: The U.S., through
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, provided
Russia with over 26,000 such containers that will be
used for transportation and storage of fissile
material from dismantled nuclear weapons.
U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement
On September 1, 2000, the United States and Russia signed the
Plutonium Disposition Agreement. According to the agreement, both
countries must dispose of at least 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium. The United States agreed to dispose of 25.5 metric tons as
MOX fuel and to immobilize 8.5 metric tons; the Russian Federation
agreed to dispose of all 34 tons as MOX fuel. Both countries agreed to
begin disposition by the end of 2007 at the rate of at least 2 metric
tons per year, although it now appears that the first disposition of
plutonium will be delayed for several years.
The agreement bans each party from separating plutonium from irradiated MOX fuel (“reprocessing”) until that party has disposed of all 34 metric tons of plutonium subject to the agreement. Any additional plutonium designated in the future by either country as excess to defense needs can be disposed of under the terms and conditions of the September 2000 agreement. Initial cost estimates were more than $1.7 billion for the Russian program and $4 billion for the U.S. program.
In addition, the parties will each have to take special precautions
to ensure the security of plutonium and MOX fuel processed under the
agreement against possible theft or diversion.
To ensure that
plutonium subject to disposition is irreversibly removed from use in
nuclear weapons, the September 2000 agreement specified the two sides
would implement monitoring and inspection activities. The agreement also
provides for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification once
appropriate agreements with the IAEA are concluded.
Implementation Issues
The plutonium disposition programs in both countries are still
in their early stages. Before implementation begins, both countries need
to put the appropriate infrastructures in place. For the MOX fuel
option, facilities for plutonium conversion, MOX fuel fabrication, and
storage must be constructed. In addition, existing nuclear power
reactors must be modified to burn MOX fuel. The disposition of plutonium
is an expensive undertaking. The projected costs have already
significantly increased since 2000: The Russian program cost estimates
have increased to at least $2 billion, while the U.S. program costs, if
both the immobilization and MOX fuel options were employed, might reach
$6 billion. Russia does not have the resources to implement this program
on its own. The United States and other leading Western economic powers
(G-8 countries) agreed to provide financial support for the Russian part
of the program.
Opponents of the MOX burning option assert that immobilization of plutonium is safer, faster, and cheaper. They also argue that channeling weapons-grade plutonium into the civilian nuclear fuel cycle would increase, rather than decrease, the risk of diversion of the material. In addition, burning MOX fuel in reactors would reduce—but not completely eliminate—military plutonium in the resulting spent fuel. Thus, after years of “cooling” the irradiated fuel elements, the two countries would have to decide what to do with the spent fuel, which would still contain plutonium, although at significantly lower level than fresh MOX fuel. The United States plans to dispose of its spent MOX fuel in a geologic repository, along with conventional spent fuel from nuclear power plants. Russia’s plans are uncertain, but it has reserved the right to reprocess its spent MOX fuel once all 34 metric tons of plutonium are irradiated—that is, to separate plutonium from the spent MOX fuel for reuse in “second generation” MOX fuel for nuclear power plants.
When the Bush administration came to office, it ordered a review of all nonproliferation programs with Russia, including the plutonium disposition program. The administration was doubtful about the feasibility and nonproliferation value of the plutonium disposition due to its high costs and implementation uncertainties. In the end, the National Security Council review, completed in December 2001, recommended to continue the program but emphasized the need for the current plutonium disposition program to be less costly and more efficient.
In January 2002, the United States announced the decision to cancel the immobilization option and concentrate exclusively on the MOX fuel track. The Department of Energy (DOE) reported that canceling the immobilization option would save the United States $2 billion in total program costs and accelerate closure of former nuclear weapons complex sites. The DOE has also initiated the authorization process to construct a MOX fuel plant at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The transportation of plutonium to South Carolina faces strong resistance from the local communities and the governor of that state.
The total cost of the U.S. surplus plutonium disposition through the MOX option is anticipated to be about $3.8 billion over 20 years. The FY2002 appropriation for the U.S. fissile material disposition program is $241.4 million, of which approximately three-quarters (about $181 million) is designated for plutonium disposition. The Bush administration is seeking roughly $230 million for the U.S. plutonium disposition program in FY2003.[2]
The U.S. Congress appropriations for the Russian plutonium disposition program were $61 million in FY2002; the FY2003 request is for $98 million, but $64 million of this would be drawn from the 1999 appropriations of $200 million set aside for this purpose in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of that year. An additional $200 million was pledged for the Russian plutonium disposition program by the United States. However, the Western European countries and Japan have been slow in committing significant amounts to the program. Total international pledges, including the U.S. commitment, amount to $600 million–well below the mark. The U.S. program, in turn, is contingent upon the parallel Russian effort moving forward. In the near term, with the future funding of the Russian program uncertain, some nonproliferation specialists have argued that the United States should not advance its plutonium disposition efforts. Others argue that without concrete progress in the United States, the Russian disposition program may never start in earnest. The Department of Energy has chosen to pursue planning and plant design activities, but does not intend to break ground for new plutonium disposition facilities until the Russian program is at a roughly comparable stage.
Inspection and monitoring procedures for plutonium disposition activities and associated IAEA verification measures are additional unresolved issues. Russia insists that only measurements that cannot disclose classified information about certain attributes of its weapons plutonium be employed. Although new technical approaches have been designed to meet this challenge, a number of issues in this area remain under negotiation.
Once each country disposes of 34 tons of plutonium as described in the September 2000 agreement, the United States will still have 16 tons of excess military plutonium in various waste and fuel forms, while Russia will retain at least 16 tons of weapons-grade plutonium that it has declared in excess of its defense program. Furthermore, when both countries start dismantling their nuclear arsenals under to the new nuclear arms reduction treaty signed at the May 2002 Bush-Putin summit, U.S. and Russian plutonium surpluses will grow even larger.
Meanwhile, a high-security fissile material storage facility that will store plutonium from the dismantled Russian warheads is nearing completion at the Mayak site in Ozersk, Chelyabinsk Oblast. The facility is being built with U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar Program and will store up to 50 metric tons of plutonium removed from nuclear warheads. It is anticipated that a portion of the plutonium stored here will be gradually moved through the disposition process. Additional plutonium from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons might also be transferred to this facility.
Sources:
[1] David Albright, Frans Berkhout, William
Walker,
Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities
and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1997), pp. 40,
58.
[2] “Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation,”
Department of Energy’s FY 2003 Budget Request to Congress,
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/03budget/content/
defnn/nuclnonp.pdf.
Relevant Resources
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Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Russia: Plutonium Disposition Developments,” updated January 2002. |
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Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Russia: Plutonium Disposition Overview,” updated October 2001. |
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Dr. Adam Bernstein, “Introduction to Plutonium Disposition,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Database, November 1997. |
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Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, Amended Record of Decision, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, April 19, 2002. |
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Secretary Abraham Announces Administration Plan to Proceed with Plutonium Disposition & Reduce Proliferation Concerns, Department of Energy Press Release, January 23, 2002. |
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Fact Sheet on the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement, distributed by the White House, June 4, 2000. |
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Joint U.S.-Russian Statement Concerning Management and Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium, distributed by the White House, June 4, 2000. |
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Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes, September 2, 1998. |
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Final Report of the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, June 1, 1997. |
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Kevin O’Neill, editor, “Addressing Excess Stocks of Civil and Military Plutonium,” Panel: U.S. and Russian Military Plutonium Disposition Programs, proceedings of the December 10, 2001 ISIS Conference. |
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Frank von Hippel, “Recommendations for Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,” FAS Public Interest Report, November/December 2001, Vol. 54, No. 6. |
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Frank N. von Hippel, “Plutonium and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Science, Vol. 293, No. 5539, Issue of September 28, 2001, pp. 2397-2398. |
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Allison Macfarlane, Frank von Hippel, Jungmin Kang, and Robert Nelson, “Plutonium Disposal, the Third Way,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May/June 2001, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 53-57. |
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Arjun Makhijani, “Plutonium End Game: Stop Reprocessing, Start Immobilizing,” Science for Democratic Action, Vol. 9, No. 3, February 2001. |
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Arjun Makhijani, “Plutonium End Game: Managing Global Stocks of Separated Weapons-Usable Commercial and Surplus Nuclear Weapons Plutonium,” January 2001. |
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Christopher Ficek, “Plutonium Disposition Update,” Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), July 22, 2000. |
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F. Reshetnikov, Nekotoryye aspekty problemy utilizatsii izbytochnogo oruzheynogo plutoniya v Rossii, (Some aspects of disposition of excess plutonium in Russia), Vestnik Rossiyskoy Akademii nauk, Vol. 70, No. 2, 2000, pp. 117-128. |
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Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley, “The Plutonium Fallacy: An Update,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1999, Vol. 6, No. 3. |
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Kory W. Budlong Sylvester, “Alternative Approaches to Russian Plutonium Disposition,” The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1999, Vol. 6, No. 2. |
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Alexandra von Meier, Jennifer Lynn Miller, and Ann C. Keller, “The Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: A Comparison of Three Narrative Contexts,” The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1998, Vol. 5, No. 2. |
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A. Diakov and Ye. Sharov, “Ekonomika utilizatsii oruzheynogo plutoniya v yadernykh reaktorakh,” (Economy of plutonium disposition in nuclear reactors), January 1998. |
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Adam Bernstein, “Getting Burnt by Weapons Plutonium: Security Implications of U.S. Disposition Options,” The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1997, Vol. 4, No. 2. |
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Matthew Bunn and John Holdren, “Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union,” Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 1997, Vol. 22, pp. 403-486. |
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Steven Dolley, “Burn It or Bury It? Burying Warhead Plutonium as Waste is Safer and Cheaper Than Burning it in Reactors,” Nuclear Control Institute, March 28, 1997. |
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Charles N. Van Doren, “Getting to Burn Weapons Plutonium: Principal Issues and Obstacles,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1996, Vol. 4, No. 1. |
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Betsy Perabo, “The Disposition of Fissile Materials: An Extended Interview with Oleg Bukharin, Thomas Cochran, and Wolfgang Panofsky,” The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1994, Vol. 1, No. 2. |
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Arjun Makhijani and Annie Makhijani,
Fissile Materials in a Glass, Darkly
(selected chapters), (IEER Press, 1995; also available in Russian). |
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Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995). |
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Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994). |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
