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Issue Brief
Cristina Chuen, Senior Research Associate
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of of International Studies
February 2003
Issue Introduction
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy plans to commercially import, temporarily store, reprocess, and repatriate spent nuclear fuel (material that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, or SNF). Illegal until July 2001, opponents continue to protest against the project, and fight to amend Russian laws yet again. Minatom avers that it needs SNF import profits to fund domestic SNF reprocessing and environmental remediation, while arguing that the project will help it promote its other exports as well as decrease global proliferation risks. Opponents counter that Russia will be unable to handle the additional SNF safely, may store the material indefinitely instead of reprocess it, will not reap the profits it claims or spent them on the environment, and would instead increase proliferation risks. Russia’s plans hinge in large part upon U.S. decisions, as the United States controls some 80 percent of the world’s SNF. At present, the U.S. administration has stated that authorization of U.S.-origin SNF exports to Russia hinge upon the cancellation of Russian nuclear projects in Iran. Nonproliferation experts have argued that the considerable U.S. leverage in this matter should be used to insist upon several other Russian concessions as well, including some degree of control over the spending of SNF import profits.
Issue Brief
For much of the last decade, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom)
has promoted the idea of importing, temporarily storing, reprocessing,
and repatriating spent nuclear fuel (material that has been withdrawn
from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, or SNF) as a means for
generating revenue. However, Article 50 of the Russian Environmental
Protection Law of 1991[1] prohibited the “import for storing or burying
of radioactive waste and materials from abroad....” Although Russian law
allowed the import of such materials for reprocessing, Government Decree
No. 773 of 29 July 1995 obligated Minatom to send back the radioactive
waste resulting from the reprocessing of SNF to its country of origin
within thirty days.[2] The only exception was the fulfillment of
contracts that predated the environmental protection law for the
repatriation of SNF from nuclear power plants (NPPs) that the Soviet
Union helped construct, in countries such as Ukraine, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. Most of
these contracts expired in the mid-1990s. Minatom continued to push for
amendments to legislation and promoted its spent fuel import plan, while
environmentalists in particular fought against any legal changes. Spent
fuel imports were finally legalized in July 2001.
Current Legislation
On 10 July 2001, President Putin signed a package of laws that would allow
the import of irradiated spent fuel into Russia for “technical storage” and
“reprocessing.” Article 50 (Section 3) of the Environment Protection Law was
amended so as to differentiate between SNF and radioactive waste.[3] Minatom had
argued that spent fuel is a valuable energy resource.[4] It also cited the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, passed in Vienna in September 1998 and signed by
the Russian Federation on 27 January 1999, which distinguishes between “spent
nuclear fuel” and “radioactive waste.”[5]
This legal change was much fought over, and may still be amended. Large
demonstrations have been held protesting against SNF imports, most recently in
November 2002.[6] In 2000, some 200 organizations gathered signatures to force a
referendum on the issue. Although 2,561,000 signatures were submitted to
regional election commissions on 25 October 2000, the Russian courts found that
800,000 were invalid (2 million signatures are required), many for
technicalities such as “incorrect” street abbreviations.[7,8] The Yabloko
political party in particular has made subsequent efforts to gather signatures
and hold a referendum, but to date no referendum has been held. In addition,
Yabloko deputy Sergey Mitrokhin has pushed for an investigation into the
feasibility study Minatom presented to the Duma when it was considering the
laws. According to Mitrokhin, reprocessing costs were understated and returns
wildly overstated.[9] Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of Russia’s Federal
Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor), has pointed out
other oversights in Minatom’s analysis, including “incorrect” assessments of
transport problems, the failure of transport containers to meet international
standards, and the unsuitability of Mayak for imported SNF storage.[10]
Some Russian papers have also suggested that the current National Security
Concept, adopted in January 2000, might lead to alterations in the laws on SNF
imports, since it identifies the main environmental danger to Russia as “a trend
toward the use of Russian territory as a place for reprocessing and burying
environmentally dangerous materials and substances.” However, there is no
indication at present that a new edition of the security concept will expand
upon this statement or that the Russian government intends to stop Minatom’s SNF
import plans for security reasons.[11]
Minatom Arguments for Importing SNF
In its argument to the Duma in support of the legal change, Minatom laid out
six benefits:
- First, Minatom emphasized profits, maintaining that Russia has the capacity
to import up to 20,000t of SNF before 2020,[3] and could earn up to $1 billion a
year for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing.[12] The ministry argued that it needed
these funds for several important activities, including environmental
remediation. Indeed, the law On Special Environmental Programs for the
Rehabilitation of Radiation-Contaminated Regions of the Territory,[13]
adopted as part of the package of laws allowing SNF imports, was based on a
financial assessment that predicted Russia would earn over $20 billion during
2000-2010 from SNF management services.[14] In addition to spending $7 billion
on environmental programs, supporters proposed that SNF profits could be
distributed to the federal budget ($3.5 billion), renovation of nuclear
enterprises ($2.5 billion), and investment in new storage and reprocessing
technologies ($7 billion).[15]
- Minatom also argued it needed the profits to fund reprocessing of domestic
SNF. Reprocessing results in new fissionable material which could be used in a
nuclear reactor (or weapon) and large quantities of radioactive waste. While
U.S. industry has found reprocessing to be uneconomical, and nonproliferation
experts see reprocessing as a proliferation hazard, Minatom has argued against
any plan to permanently get rid of SNF (through vitrification, burial, etc.),
arguing that technology may improve in the future, making the “closed fuel
cycle” (where spent fuel is reprocessed and reused) profitable. Russia has
approximately 15,000t of spent fuel, much of it in temporary storage at
NPPs.[16,17] By 2025, this amount is expected to grow to 35,000t.[18] At present
there are two reprocessing facilities in Russia: the aged RT-1 plant (at Mayak)
in Chelyabinsk and the incomplete RT-2 in Zheleznogorsk (formerly
Krasnoyarsk-26). Completion of RT-2 would cost some $1.5-2 billion (some sources
say $6 billion).[5,16] With RT-2, Russia’s reprocessing capacity would be
boosted to 1,940 tons a year.[19] Earnings from the storage and reprocessing of
foreign SNF could fund the reprocessing of Russia’s own SNF, as well as Russia’s
fast reactor program.[5] Minatom intends to require 100-percent prepayment for
storage services, and store the SNF for 40 to 60 years before reprocessing
it.[12,20] This intermediate storage would facilitate reprocessing because the
greater portion of the hazardous radioactive elements will decay over a period
of 50 years.[20]
- Third, the ministry maintains that the SNF import project will help the
ministry deal with environmental problems, by funding the development of
environmentally friendly technologies, as well as funding environmental
remediation.[12]
- Fourth, Minatom argues that the reprocessing of SNF will be necessary in the
future to create a new nuclear fuel source. The ministry estimates that supplies
of natural uranium will be largely used up in the next 100 years, and predicts
that the reprocessing of spent fuel will be the most important source of fuel
for NPPs.[16]
- Fifth, Russia’s other nuclear exports, according to the ministry, hinge on
importing SNF. According to Kurchatov Institute president Yevgeniy Velikhov,
Russia will get profitable orders for the construction of NPPs abroad
(especially in China, India and Pakistan) if it is willing to import spent fuel,
because clients are interested in sending their SNF back to Russia.[21]
- Finally, Minatom argued that concentrating SNF reprocessing and storage in
one country would decrease proliferation risks.[12] In 1999, then Minister of
Atomic Energy Adamov said that Minatom was ready to store and reprocess SNF
under international control.[22] In September 2002, Russian participants at the
annual Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Management conference promoted the idea of an
international SNF storage facility in Russia.[23]
Arguments Against SNF Imports
The political party Yabloko, environmentalists, and others opposed to
spent fuel imports have voiced the following concerns:
- Russia has already accumulated its own spent fuel in huge quantities, and
lacks storage facilities to safely house its own waste.[24] There is not enough
space to store domestic SNF at Mayak’s RT-1 plant, even with the completion of
current plans to increase the capacity of the spent fuel storage facility at
RT-1 from 6,000t to 9,000t by the end of 2004.[25] Indeed, because it has
continued to dump radioactive waste, RT-1’s license, which expired on 31
December 2002, had yet to be renewed as of 10 February 2003 [negotiations over a
renewal are ongoing]. RT-2, in Zheleznogorsk, can store up to 6,000t of SNF, or
12,000 spent fuel assemblies,[26,27] but is already half full.[28] According to
First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov, RT-2 could be expanded
to store up to 9,000t, or 18,000 spent fuel assemblies.[27,29] However, RT-2 is
a wet storage facility (the fuel rods are stored in large water filled pools). A
dry storage facility (where the SNF is housed in specialized containers), which
U.S. officials argue is both more proliferation-resistant and avoids much of the
fuel degradation that occurs in a wet environment, is expected to be put into
operation at Zheleznogorsk by 2005, but it has already been designated the site
where 6,100t of SNF from the Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk NPPs will be stored.
Environmentalists worry that the storage of additional nuclear fuel will
increase the risk of an environmental disaster in an area where the
environmental situation is already alarming.[28] The United States is pushing
Russia instead to develop a geologic repository, like the U.S. Yucca Mountain
facility, for long-term storage. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defines a
geologic repository as a “system for disposing of radioactive waste in excavated
geologic media, including surface and subsurface areas of operation, and the
adjacent part of the geologic setting that provides isolation of the radioactive
waste in the controlled area.”[30] The DOE has assisted Russia in locating a
site for such a facility. However, housing imported spent fuel in a geologic
repository conflicts with Minatom’s reprocessing plans and the argument that the
imported spent fuel is only going to be stored in Russia temporarily.
- Minatom will face difficulties reprocessing the waste. The capacity of
Russia’s single reprocessing plant, Mayak, is limited, and the facility uses
obsolete technology. Besides, Mayak can not reprocess foreign SNF, only spent
fuel from Russian VVER-440, BN-350, BN-600, research, and naval propulsion
reactors.[ 31,32,33] It will take an estimated 25 years to introduce any new
technology.[34] In addition, reprocessing SNF would create large volumes of
radioactive waste, and Russia will have to build facilities to handle that
waste. That, however, will prove politically difficult, as local populations and
environmentalists are sure to object to the siting of new storage facilities.
- The SNF may end up stored in Russia indefinitely, despite Minatom’s
statements regarding reprocessing and repatriation. According to current
legislation, the owner of the SNF continues to hold the title for the
radioactive waste obtained after reprocessing, and has the right to repatriate
this waste. The ownership of SNF as well as nuclear materials obtained from
reprocessing is to be determined by international agreement and valid
contracts.[35] The law does not explicitly prohibit the unlimited
storage and burial of the SNF in Russia, however, and on 7 October 1999,
Adamov actually said that the waste from reprocessing should stay in Russia.[36]
- Safety concerns are high on the list of arguments against the import of SNF.
Minatom has proven unable to ensure the safety of its own personnel employed in
SNF reprocessing. In addition, the poor condition of Russian railways increases
the danger of transporting large quantities of SNF.[17] Although Minatom argues
that it already transports large amounts of radioactive materials, there have
been incidents in the past, such as inadequate packaging of SNF and a dangerous
railroad accident during SNF transit from Bulgaria.[6] Experts concerned that
nuclear materials might be terrorist targets point out that such materials are
most vulnerable when in transit.
- Minatom would not be able to earn enough from SNF imports to ensure
environmental safety. Indeed, some Russian politicians question both Minatom’s
numbers and whether SNF earnings will actually be spent the way Minatom has
promised. Yabloko’s Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, for instance, said that “The money will
be stolen, and no one will know where it ends up, but the nuclear waste will
remain” (Деньги будут разворованы, они исчезнут в неизвестном направлении, а
ядерные отходы останутся.)[37]
- Opinion polls indicate that the majority of the Russian population oppose
SNF imports.[24]
- Other countries involved in reprocessing repatriate the reprocessed waste.
- If Minatom begins importing SNF it increases the market incentives for Russia to develop a closed fuel cycle, and create more of the nuclear materials the destruction of which SNF imports are supposed to fund. Some experts are concerned that SNF imports will open the door to an uncontrollable trade in fissile materials. Besides, it will be difficult accurately to account for fissile materials once they are traded, moved, or altered, increasing the likelihood that some will end up in the hands of potential or real proliferators.[38]
Import Plans
Although Minatom
has yet to begin importing spent fuel from NPPs it did
not help construct, it has been negotiating with
potential customers for some time. On 17 September 1998,
Minatom subsidiary Tekhsnabeksport signed its first
letter of intent, with Internexco (a Tekhsnabeksport
subsidiary, in Germany)[39] and the Swiss company Suisse
Utilities, on the import of over 2,000 tons of SNF for
reprocessing and subsequent repatriation between 2000
and 2030.[37] The following year contacts were made with
the nuclear industries of Switzerland, Germany, Spain,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.[40]
However,
some 80 percent of the non-Russian origin nuclear fuel
in the world is of U.S. origin, and as such remains
under U.S. control. Other countries cannot send
U.S.-origin SNF for storage or reprocessing to third
nations without U.S. consent, and under the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act, the United States must negotiate a Section
123 agreement for nuclear cooperation in order to give
such permission. Minatom is very aware of this issue,
and has been trying to persuade the U.S. Department of
Energy to begin such negotiations. On 23 December 1998,
Adamov sent a letter to then U.S. Energy Secretary Bill
Richardson proposing a joint study of options for the
temporary storage and subsequent reprocessing of U.S.
spent nuclear fuel in Russia, both with and without its
eventual repatriation to the United States.[41,42]
Although Richardson declined this initial proposal, he
did say that the United States was looking forward to
further discussions.[42]
The U.S. government has yet to agree to the Russian SNF import plan,
objecting to Minatom’s reprocessing plans due to plutonium proliferation
concerns as well as to Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. In April 2000,
Minatom reportedly suggested that a 20-year long moratorium on reprocessing of
nuclear spent fuel should be established in exchange for U.S. assistance in the
construction of a dry storage facility.[43] In any event, Minatom has no plans
to begin reprocessing for the first 40-60 years, as noted above.
Nevertheless, Russia has continued to construct nuclear power reactors in
Iran, despite U.S. objections, and is even considering bidding for a contract to
construct additional reactors after the completion of Bushehr.[44] In October
2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton said that the U.S. had proposed a deal
in which “if the Russians end their sensitive cooperation with Iran...we would
be prepared to favorably consider” transfers to Russia of U.S.-origin spent fuel
held in third countries for long-term storage.[45] In “Securing Nuclear Weapons
and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,” Matthew Bunn, John Holdren and
Anthony Wier point out that the United States should not use all of its
considerable leverage on the Iran issue. They suggest insisting that a portion
of the revenues be spent on securing and destroying WMD stockpiles. In addition,
they argue that effective arrangements (including independent regulation) of the
entire operation, the elimination of excess plutonium stockpiles, and a
democratic process whereby those most affected by the project might have their
concerns effectively addressed, should also be criteria for determining if the
project contributes to international security and deserves support.[46]
The Nonproliferation Trust: SNF Imports for Nonproliferation
Tom Cochran, a physicist at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C., developed the idea of establishing a non-profit trust located outside of Russia that would control the spent fuel profits, assist in the creation of a safe geologic repository for SNF in Russia, and make sure that all additional profits are spent on securing fissile material, environmental remediation, and the provision of alternative jobs for nuclear workers as well as support for pensioners and orphans, while no funds would be spent on reprocessing plants.[47] A trust, named the Nonproliferation Trust (NPT) Inc., was then established,[48] and on 5 May 1999 Minatom and NPT signed a memorandum, according to which NPT would hold title to the fuel in storage.[47] An additional agreement, signed on 25 October 1999, also mentions the receipt and disposal of radioactive wastes. That agreement specifies that after 40 years, the spent fuel could be removed to another “duly authorized location” or transferred to Minatom for ultimate disposition, at NPT II’s sole discretion. According to the second agreement, the spent fuel would never be converted for weapons use or be reprocessed, even were its ownership transferred to Minatom. The spent fuel would be stored in accordance with Russian and IAEA safety requirements and the storage facility under Gosatomnadzor review.[49] [For more information on NPT, see the Spent Fuel Imports Overview in the NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.]
Some nuclear industry sources have reportedly questioned who will accept
liability for the operations and how the money will be raised up-front. Foreign
utilities, they argued, would be unlikely to commit large sums of money unless
they could send their fuel for permanent disposal. At a conference in September
2002, Kurchatov Institute Deputy Director Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy voiced his
opposition to the project because at the end of the project the long-term
interim cask storage facility would remain the property of the trust, the
foreign SNF would remain in Russia, and the project would not have paid for
construction of a final repository, he said. Reportedly USEC, Inc., the managers
of the U.S.-Russian “Megawatts to Megatons” program, also known as the HEU-LEU
deal, have also indicated their interest in involvement in SNF imports, which
might be modeled after the HEU deal.[50] Others have questioned whether Russia
would agree to have all profits devoted to the purposes NPT proposed. Russian
environmentalists and even the Duma Environmental Committee have worried about
the plan to hold the funds earned in accounts outside Russia, and thus outside
the control of both Minatom and the Russian government.[42] Environmentalists
often argue that the import plan could be a Western plot to dump its waste in
Russia and leave it there, and that the Russian government would have little
recourse. While this objection should be dealt with, the project offers the
transparency and clarity of purpose (and ability to audit funds) that the United
States has the leverage to insist upon.
Conclusion
If Russia can come to an accommodation with the United States regarding
Russia’s nuclear reactor projects in Iran, the United States has suggested it
would conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia and authorize the
export of U.S.-origin SNF to Russia. Although Minatom statements regarding the
possible profits resulting from SNF import plans far exceed the revenues from
constructing reactors in Iran (particularly since the construction projects are
all funded from cheap loans offered by Russia itself), Russia has yet to
indicate that it might consider dropping its Iran projects. However, it seems
likely that an agreement will eventually be concluded. If the United States
accedes to something less than cancellation of Russia’s projects in Iran, it
should push for further transparency of the Iranian program, and ask Russia to
demand that Iran sign the Additional Protocol that would make spot inspections
by the IAEA possible.
The SNF import project has been touted as a possible
source of funding for plutonium disposition and safer storage of Russian SNF.
However, Minatom never agreed to use these funds for plutonium disposition, and
instead expects international assistance to turn plutonium into MOX fuel.
Otherwise, Minatom plans to maintain its surplus plutonium stocks. If Minatom
can be persuaded to dispose of excess plutonium, it is unclear why the ministry
should be required to fund plutonium disposal itself (in much of the world, the
defense industry doesn’t fund itself and polluters aren’t required to fund
clean-up projects by earning money handling additional waste).
On the negative side, the SNF import plans create a market for spent fuel and radioactive waste. Kazakhstan has already proposed its own SNF import plans, while Minatom is likely to argue for the import of radioactive wastes if the level of SNF imports is less than expected. In addition, the plan promotes a closed fuel cycle market and the attendant increase in materials of proliferation concern. Finally, the United States is putting itself at political risk by allowing the import of U.S.-origin fuel, even if it is able to control much of the earnings (through an arrangement such as the Non-Proliferation Trust) and assists in the construction of safe storage facilities and helps insure the safety of SNF transport. The United States is likely to be blamed in the event of any accident with U.S.-origin or other spent fuel, unless the process is opened up to local and national politicians, and there is oversight by Gosatomnadzor and Russian citizens. The Russian public will surely blame a new influx of SNF for stressing their SNF storage system to the brink of collapse, and argue that the storage of imported SNF in “safe” storage facilities takes up space that may otherwise have been used for Russian material (even if the facility might not have been built without SNF import money). While opening up the process with have no affect on legal liability, it will make a great difference in public opinion, and thus increase the likelihood that an accident would affect U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation in other areas. Without democratic involvement, it will be difficult to control Minatom, while other Russian organizations are unlikely to promote project success, help alleviate project problems, or shoulder the responsibility for dealing with Russia’s own legacy of spent nuclear fuel.
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[1] Russian Federation Law No. 2060-1,
On Environmental Protection, 19 December 1991.
[2] “Ob itogakh
deyantelnosti Departamenta yaderno-toplivnogo tsikla v 2002 godu,” Minatom
Website,
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[3] “Russia May Make $10 Bln Processing Used Nuclear Fuel,” Interfax, 23 June
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[4] “Zampred komiteta Dumy po ekologii protiv popravki, razreshayushchey
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[9] TVS, Moscow, 9 August 2002; in BBC Worldwide Monitoring;
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[10] Charles Digges,
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[11] See Paul Webster, “The Grab for Trash,” Bulletin of the
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[12] Gennadiy Voskresenskiy,
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[36]
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[37] TVTs, 21 April 2001; in
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[38] Andrey Galkin, RIA Novosti, 26 April
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[40] “Russia Seeks To Reprocess the World’s Spent Fuel,” Nuclear Weapons &
Materials Monitor, 1 February 1999, p. 3.
[41] “Richardson Tells Russia ‘No Thanks’ on Reprocessing But Offers Vague
Support for Work on Storage,” SpentFuel, Vol. 6, No. 252, 19 April 1999,
pp. 3-4.
[42] Letter “O nedopustimosti naznacheniya Ministrom Rossiyskoy Federatsii
po atomnoy energii E.O. Adamova” to acting Prime Minister V.V.Putin from the
Chairwoman of the Russian State Duma Committee on the Environment
T.V.Zlotnikova, 16 August 1999.
[43] P. Brown, “Ecology and the Human
Rights,” The Guardian; in “Nam vse eshche navyazyvayut chuzhiye RAO,”
Zelenyy mir, No. 19-20, September 2000.
[44] Angela Charlton, “Russia
Expands Nuke Ties With Iran,” Associated Press, 26 July 2002.
[45] Ann
MacLachlan, “Bushehr Spent Fuel Accord Said to be Advancing as U.S. Seeks
Russian Exit,”
NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 22 (28 October 2002), p. 3.
[46] Matthew
Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Weir, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and
Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,” Harvard University, May 2002,
http://www.bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/ SevenSteps.pdf,
pp. 77-78.
[47] “Russia Considers International Waste Stores,” Nuclear
Engineering International, July 1999, p. 23
[48] FAQ, NPT Website,
http://www.nptinternational.com/questions.htm.
[49] Non-Proliferation Trust II, Long-Term Fissile Materials Safeguards and
Security Project, Unpublished Draft, 25 October 1999.
[50] Ann MacLachlan, “Moscow Conference Vets Key Hurdles to Any Russian
Spent-Fuel Import Deal,” NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 19 (16 September
2002), p.1.
Relevant Resources
 |
Greenpeace Russia, “Radioaktivnyye otkhody i problema vvoza, khraneniya i pererabotki v Rossii otrabotavshego yadernogo topliva iz-za rubezha.” |
|
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Igor Kudrik, “Import of Spent Nuclear Fuel to Russia,” Bellona Website, 6 December 2002. |
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Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, Allison Macfarlane et al, Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Safe, Flexible, and Cost-Effective Near-Term Approach to Spent Fuel Management, A Joint Report from the Harvard University Project on Managing the Atom and the University of Tokyo Project on Sociotechnics of Nuclear Energy, June 2001. |
|
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Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Weir, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,” Harvard University, May 2002, pp. 77-78. |
|
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Paul Webster, “The Grab for Trash,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org, Volume 58, No. 5 (September-October 2002). |
|
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“Spent Fuel Import Project Overview,” NIS Nuclear Profiles Database. |
|
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“OYAT – Syrye dlya energetiki budushchego,” Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy Website,
http://www.minatom.ru/presscenter |
|
|
For information on U.S. assistance in Russia, particularly regarding plutonium disposition and the search for a geologic repository, see Preventing Nuclear Proliferation: The Post-Cold War Challenge, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Website, http://www.llnl.gov/str/Dunlop2.html. |
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For general information on spent fuel and information on spent fuel storage in the United States, see the “Materials in Inventory Spent Nuclear Fuel Report - Executive Summary,” Department of Energy Website, http://www.em.doe.gov/takstock/appxbi.html. |
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On the Insertion of Additions to the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy. |
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Dr. Thomas Cochran, Director, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, “The Non-Proliferation Trust: An Update,”presentation at a Proliferation Roundtable at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 November 1999, available at http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/cochran.htm. |
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Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Management conference, 8-12 September 2002, Moscow. Participant statements (in Russian) available at: “Obrashcheniye s obluchennym yadernym toplivom 2002: Novyye initsiativy Rossii,” http://www.tenex.ru/digest/elbiul.html. |
|
|
Bellona Website, Spent Fuel Imports News,
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/ |
|
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Greenpeace Mayak Website, http://archive.greenpeace.org/mayak/index.html. |
|
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Minatom Website, http://www.minatom.ru. |
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NIS Profiles Database, “Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste
Developments,”
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs.russia/ |
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PIR Center Website, http://www.pircenter.org. |
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Russian Nuclear Nonproliferation Website, http://www.nuclearno.com. |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
