Issue Brief

Cristina Chuen, Senior Research Associate
Center for Nonproliferation
Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
July 2004
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Issue
Introduction
Issue
Brief
Relevant
Resources
Issue Introduction
Although “dirty bombs,” or radioactive dispersal devices (RDDs), are not weapons of mass destruction, in the past few years terrorists have indicated their interest in acquiring such weapons. RDDs disperse highly radioactive material by using conventional explosives or other means. There are only a few radioactive sources that can be used effectively in an RDD. The greatest security risk is posed by Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, Iridium-192, Strontium-90, Americium-241, Californium-252, and Plutonium-238.

A radiothermal generator shielded and contained inside a
typical
assembly. Source: IAEA
In Russia, the radioisotope thermoelectric generators using Strontium-90 that power lighthouses are a particularly acute problem, and have even been stolen by children. The number of orphaned sources (lost, abandoned or stolen radiological sources) in Russia has diminished in the past several years, but remains an issue. The physical protection of radiological sources, at medical facilities, food irradiation enterprises, and disposal sites, continues to raise concerns as well. In addition, Russia is facing difficulties disposing of these sources: the disposal site in Northwest Russia reached capacity and has already been closed; most of the nations’ other disposal sites will reach full capacity in the next half decade. Without increased disposal capacity, the likelihood that sources will not be properly guarded increases.
The final problem Russia faces is in accounting for and monitoring its radioactive sources. Less than half of Russia’s regions have functioning regional informational and analytical centers, the government bodies that are supposed to account for radiological sources. Russia’s nuclear monitoring body, formerly known as Gosatomnadzor, is undergoing structural changes—the distribution of functions between Federal Atomic Energy Agency and the monitoring body remain unclear. Even before restructuring, Gosatomnadzor had difficulty monitoring and protecting radioactive sources that were used by military units that have been disbanded, as well as monitoring military radioactive waste disposal sites in disbanded units, and did not have the computing and administrative capacity to fully utilize the data it collected from other users of radiological sources.
Issue
Introduction
Issue
Brief
Relevant
Resources
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
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