Available evidence suggests that there were two key variables that affected
the emergence of the new nuclear doctrine. First, a perception of acute external
threat (especially in the mid-1990s and in 1999, when Russia anticipated that
NATO might threaten to use force on a limited scale to achieve limited political
goals in a manner similar to wars in the Balkans). Second, acute sense of the
weakness of Russia’s conventional forces vis-à-vis the prospect of a limited
conventional war, especially a limited war with both numerically and
qualitatively superior NATO forces. From the perspective of the Russian
military, reliance on nuclear weapons was a logical response to the glaring
inadequacy of conventional forces premised on the perception that nuclear
weapons had greater utility than deterrence of a large-scale nuclear attack.
Official documents suggest, however, that reliance on nuclear weapons is seen as
a temporary “fix” intended to provide for security until conventional forces are
sufficiently modernized and strengthened.
Following terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the
perceived tension in U.S.-Russian relations has diminished; both governments
have proclaimed that they are allies in the fight against international
terrorism, and even the disagreement over the war in Iraq in 2003 proved to be
only temporary. Variation of political relations has not, however, had a visible
effect on the nuclear doctrine. On the one hand, it is not directed solely
against the United States, although concern about the overwhelming American
military power persists, especially among the military. On the other hand,
changes in foreign policy are always regarded as transitory whereas military and
economic capability as a constant. It is not inconceivable that relations might
worsen, and then Russia will again need a viable deterrence vis-à-vis the United
States, according to this line of thinking.
This section reviews key pieces of data on the Russian nuclear doctrine since
1999. These include:
-- the
National Security Concept (2000);
-- the Military Doctrine
(2000);
-- an overview of a major
debate on the future of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, which took place
in 2000-2002;
-- the so-called
“White Paper” published by the Ministry of Defense in the fall of 2003; and
-- an overview of significant
military maneuvers in 1999-2004, which yield important bits and pieces of
data that complement official pronouncements with regard to the missions, the
modes of use, and the targets assigned with nuclear weapons.
Back to Top
Russia’s 2000 National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle
On 10 January 2000, Acting President of Russia Vladimir Putin (he was
elected president in March 2000) signed the new National Security
Concept of the Russian Federation.[1] Officially, the new document was
classified as a “revision” of the previous, 1997 concept; this status
was probably intended to emphasize the continuity of policy between the
Yeltsin and Putin administrations. The work on the new version of the
National Security Concept began, apparently, soon after the appointment
of Putin as secretary of the Security Council in the early 1999. An
earlier draft was published on 5 October 1999.[2]
By its nature, the Concept establishes only broad guidelines for national
security policy, and thus addresses nuclear strategy only briefly and in
general terms. These guidelines are developed and detailed in the
Military Doctrine, which was approved four months later.[3]
The key articles of the new Concept pertaining to nuclear weapons are the
following:
-
“The most important task of the Russian Federation
is to implement deterrence in the interests of preventing aggression on any
scale, including with the use of nuclear weapons, against Russia and its
allies.”
-
“The Russian Federation should possess nuclear
weapons capable of guaranteeing infliction of predetermined damage to any
aggressor state or coalition of states under any circumstances.”
-
“The use of all forces and means at its disposal,
including nuclear weapons, in case [Russia] needs to repel an armed
aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have
been exhausted or proved ineffective.”
The first two provisions repeat without changes the language of the 1997
National Security Concept, but the third one read differently. In 1997 it said:
“Russia reserves the right to use all forces and means at its disposal,
including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a threat to the
very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.”[4]
The new language effectively assigned a new mission
to the country’s nuclear arsenal. Whereas under the 1997 document, nuclear
weapons were reserved solely to deter a large-scale attack, which was not
feasible neither then, nor later, the 2000 concept allowed for the use of
nuclear weapons as a deterrence to smaller-scale wars that do not necessarily
threaten Russia’s existence and sovereignty. The new mission also implies
limited use of nuclear weapons in contrast to the all-out nuclear strike in
response to a massive attack.
The introduction of a new mission clearly relates to
the assessment of threats to Russia, which include, according to the Concept,
“the desire of some states and interstate groups to diminish the role of the
existing mechanisms of providing for international security, first of all the
United Nations and the OSCE;” “the strengthening of military-political blocs and
alliances, first of all the eastward enlargement of NATO,” “the possibility that
foreign military bases and large groups of armed forces appear in the immediate
vicinity of Russian borders;” and “the transition of NATO toward the practice of
military actions outside its area of responsibility without the authorization of
the UN Security Council.”
The document recognizes the inadequacy of Russian
conventional forces vis-à-vis those of leading political and military powers in
the world and talks about “the growing technological gap with some leading
powers and the growth of their capability to create new-generation weapons and
equipment” that allow “a fundamental change in the forms and methods of combat.”
Under these conditions, reliance on nuclear weapons when “all other measures of
resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted” looks logical and easily
predictable.
The revision of nuclear strategy was apparently
launched at a meeting
of the Security Council in April 1999 shortly after the beginning of the war
in Kosovo. That war vastly reinforced earlier concerns that the United States
and NATO might threaten limited military action against Russia (or actually
start a limited military action) to achieve certain political gains, such as,
for example, force it to withdraw from certain new independent states or stop
the war in Chechnya. Even as early as in the spring of 1999 it was clear that
that war would resume in the near future. It began in the fall of 1999 in
response to the incursion of Chechen militants into the neighboring republic of
Dagestan.
The text of the Concept, however, creates a clear
impression that reliance on nuclear weapons is intended to be a temporary “fix”
until conventional forces are reformed and modernized. While provisions
pertaining to the nuclear doctrine are limited to barely two paragraphs, the
document concentrates primarily on conventional modernization. Arguably, when
this task is implemented, reliance on nuclear weapons could be reduced.
Arms control continues to occupy an important place in
Russia’s national security policy, especially nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as of the means of their
delivery. Proliferation is included as a separate plank in the list of threats
to national security, which is hardly surprising because many potential
proliferants are located close to Russia and also because proliferation of
nuclear weapons is likely to undercut Russia’s special status in the
international system as one of only five officially recognized nuclear powers.
The concept also lists among priorities “measures to ensure international
control over the export of military and dual-use products, technologies, and
services.”
The concept confirms Russia’s intention to implement arms
control agreements, but the attitude toward new agreements has changed. The 1997
Concept simply postulated that Russia would “participate in the process of
negotiations on reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, as well as control
over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their
delivery.” The new document modifies this goal quite considerably. Now, Russia
intends to “adapt the existing arms control and disarmament agreements to the
new conditions in international relations, as well as develop, as necessary, new
agreements, first of all with respect to confidence and security building
measures.”
The new provision might indicate a new attitude toward
arms control. The agreements concluded during or immediately after the Cold War
were adequate for a superpower, but are uncomfortable for Russia: some elements
are too restrictive while other do not sufficiently restrict other countries.
The START process, although it is not mentioned specifically in the concept, is
one example: the ban on MIRVed ICBMs is, some suggest, no longer deemed in
Russia’s interest, and reportedly it seeks to revise it in START III. There is
an ongoing debate about acceptability of the self-imposed restrictions on
tactical nuclear weapons. Of all arms control agreements which Russia is party
to, only the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention enjoyed
a positive note. Furthermore, the “old,” highly prescriptive, detailed
agreements are no longer needed in a world that is no longer dominated by
intense superpower rivalry. The new attitude is similar to the one espoused by
the United States under the George W. Bush administration. The
2002
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) illustrates that approach: the
treaty is effectively a confidence-building measure, and Russia apparently
insisted on the legally binding form to somewhat enhance its predictability.
Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine
The Military Doctrine, which President Vladimir Putin approved on
April 21, 2000, was a culmination of several years of work and countless
revisions.[5] This long-awaited document, which was promised
several times since early 1997, replaced the earlier document “Main
Provisions of the Military Doctrine,” which Boris Yeltsin approved in
November 1993.[6]
The new Doctrine elaborated the provisions pertaining to the limited
use of nuclear weapons that were set out four months earlier in the
National Security Concept and in this regard marks a qualitatively new
stage in the development of the Russian nuclear doctrine. The first
post-Soviet innovation in nuclear policy was introduced in the 1993
Doctrine, which allowed for first use of nuclear weapons. (Until then,
the official Soviet policy, which was set in the 1970s and confirmed in
1982, allowed for the use of nuclear weapons only in response to a
nuclear attack.) That document, however, assigned only one mission to
the nuclear arsenal--deterrence of a large-scale attack that threatened
the sovereignty and the very survival of the country. The situation
remained unchanged despite a flurry of proposals in 1996-97 to increase
reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of the first phase of NATO
enlargement. The 1997 National Security Concept retained the plank about
reserving “the right to use all forces and means at its disposal,
including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a threat
to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent
sovereign state.”[7] In a review of an unpublished early draft of the
Military Doctrine, which was produced in 1997, two officers of the
General Staff noted that “some ‘specialists’ ... attempted to introduce
into the documents language that would toughen nuclear policy,” but
emphasized that these proposals were rejected by the Interagency Working
Group [on the new doctrine]. It was decided, they said, to retain the
1993 language, “which passed the test of time and was supported by the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”[8]
At that time the Russian government adopted a
series of documents, which confirmed earlier policy and laid out development and
deployment plans based on the assumption that the sole mission of nuclear
weapons was deterrence of a large-scale attack. limited missions to nuclear
weapons. Several decrees signed by Boris Yeltsin in 1997 and 1998[9] provided
for deep reductions of the Russian nuclear arsenal, in accordance with the
expiration of their planned service lives, and limited modernization programs.
Still, the debate over NATO enlargement had important consequences as it
propelled nuclear weapons into the center of attention and created a perception
that they could be usable in a broader array of scenarios.
A
meeting of the
Security Council in April 1999 (the first chaired by Vladimir Putin as the
newly appointed Secretary), coming on the heels of NATO military operation in
Kosovo, apparently directed the military to revisit nuclear doctrine and develop
ways to deter the limited use of force against Russia similar to that war. New
approaches were developed in a very short time, suggesting that the military had
been thinking along these lines for some time, and deterrence of a limited
conventional attack was tested for the first time during the
Zapad-99 (West-99) maneuvers in May-June 1999. A draft of the new
Doctrine was published in the fall of 1999,[10] but the ensuing discussion did
not lead to significant changes, including in the parts pertaining to nuclear
weapons.
The scale and the direction of the evolution of
views with regard to the utility and the methods of employment of nuclear
weapons could be gleaned from a comparison of the relevant provisions of the
1993 and the 2000 doctrines.
The 1993 document defined the mission of nuclear
weapons as “the removal of the danger of a nuclear war by means of deterring
[other states] from unleashing an aggression against the Russian
Federation and its allies.” They were supposed to be used only under conditions
of a large-scale (global) war that put sovereignty and the very existence of
Russia at risk. The Doctrine, however, contained two important warnings: first,
that even a limited conflict could escalate into a global war and, second, that
any use of nuclear weapons was fraught with an all-out, unrestrained
nuclear exchange. This represented, in essence, deterrence of any (including
limited) conflict by threat of world annihilation. Obviously, the credibility of
such a threat was limited.
The Doctrine, further, contained important
limitations on the use of nuclear weapons, which repeated Russia’s obligations
under the negative security assurances under the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Specifically, the document postulated that Russia
will not use its nuclear weapons against any
member state of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1
July 1968 that does not possess nuclear weapons unless (a) such a state, if
it has an alliance agreement with a nuclear-weapons state, engages in an
armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and
other troops, or its allies; (b) such a state acts jointly with a
nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or supporting an invasion or an armed
attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other
troops, or its allies.
The right to use nuclear weapons first was not
spelled out, but, rather, was introduced “by default,” i.e., by not mentioning
the previously traditional no-first-use plank.
Although the 2000 language sounds similar, it
contains certain subtle, but important changes:
The Russian Federation regards nuclear
weapons as a means of deterrence of an aggression, of ensuring the military
security of the Russian Federation and its allies, and of maintaining
international stability and peace.
The Russian Federation reserves the right to use
nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons
of mass destruction against itself or its allies and also in response to
large-scale aggression involving conventional weapons in situations that are
critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies.
The Russian Federation will not use nuclear
weapons against member states of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons that do not possess nuclear weapons except in the case of an
invasion or any other attack against the Russian Federation, its territory,
its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or a state toward which it has
obligations with respect to security, unless that attack is conducted or
supported by such a non-nuclear-weapons state together with a
nuclear-weapons state or under alliance obligations with a nuclear-weapons
state .
First, the mission of deterrence is expanded to
include “military security” of Russia and “international stability and peace.”
The language is extremely vague, but probably implies a broader political role
of nuclear weapons, including in circumstances that do not constitute a direct
threat of attack against Russia.
Second, the right to use nuclear weapons first in
response to a conventional attack is clearly spelled out.
Third, the 2000 Doctrine allows for the use of
nuclear weapons in response to the use of other weapons of mass destruction (the
provision is similar to the one adopted by the United States).
Perhaps the most important
innovation is the broadening of conflict scenarios under which nuclear weapons
could be used. The Doctrine distinguished between four types of warfare:
·
armed conflict (primarily ethnic or religious in
origin, waged inside the country; other states might be involved indirectly);
·
local war (one or several other states as
opponents; the scope and goals of the conflict are limited);
·
regional war (attack by a state or a coalition of
states pursuing significant political goals); and
·
global war (attack by a coalition of states;
survival and sovereignty of Russia are at stake).
The use of nuclear weapons is
associated with the last two types of conflict in contrast to the 1993 Doctrine,
which associated nuclear weapons only with a global war. This new feature
clearly reflects concerns about a large-scale conventional attack, which Russian
Armed Forces are unable to defeat without resort to nuclear weapons and,
consequently, are unable to deter - effectively, the Kosovo scenario. An article
in the leading military journal Voyennaya mysl in 1999 developed a notion
that nuclear weapons could be used for the purposes of “de-escalation” of a
regional war:[11] even a limited use of nuclear weapons should increase the
costs to the attacker sufficiently to outweigh expected political and economic
benefits, and consequently the attacker would prefer to terminate the conflict
on the basis of status quo ante. Accordingly, the threat to use nuclear
weapons should be able to deter the attack by changing the cost-benefit
calculation in the mind of the potential attacker. In the end of 1999 the chief
of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Vladimir Yakovlev, coined the term
“expanded deterrence” to denote the mission of “de-escalation” of limited
conflicts.
Same as in the 1993 document,
the 2000 Doctrine warned about escalation of conflicts. According to a
publication of the Academy of Strategic Rocket Forces,[12] the most likely
escalation path is from the first directly to the third type of conflict. This
view signaled that major foreign interference with the “antiterrorism
operation” in Chechnya (the Doctrine was finalized against the background of the
second war) could precipitate the use of nuclear weapons. In late 1999,
Boris Yeltsin explicitly referred to nuclear weapons during an Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit to prevent external involvement
in the second war in Chechnya.
The Doctrine is rather moot on the guidelines for
modernization and size of the nuclear arsenal. It only says that Russia’s
nuclear capability “should be able to guarantee the infliction of predetermined
damage to any aggressor (a state or a coalition of states) under any
circumstances.” The use of the notion “predetermined (zadannyi) damage”
instead of a more customary “unacceptable damage” is probably related to the
concept of limited nuclear use, that is, damage from the strike should not be
necessarily unacceptable to the attacker, but just sufficient to ensure that
expected costs to the attacker exceed expected benefits. The term
“predetermined,” however, was also used in earlier documents - the 1993 Doctrine
and the 1997 National Security Concept.
According to the Doctrine, strategic nuclear forces
will remain the backbone of Russia’s nuclear capability (it should be noted
that Tu-22M3 medium bombers, which area not classified as strategic under
international agreements, are customarily included into the strategic arsenal
according to the internal classification). The doctrine lists among the priority
areas of defense acquisition “the qualitative improvement of the strategic
weapons complex,” but fails to mention other classes of nuclear weapons, such as
tactical nuclear weapons. This suggests that limited use missions will probably
be entrusted to strategic delivery vehicles.
Since its adoption in 2000, the Military Doctrine
has remained the main guidance for Russia’s defense policy, including with
regard to its nuclear strategy and posture and so far there have been no
indication of work on its new version. A
2003
“White Paper” published by the Ministry of Defense is limited to an
elaboration and limited development of various provisions of the 2000 document.
The Nuclear Debate of Summer 2000
The summer of 2000 witnessed an intense struggle within the Russian military
establishment, which directly affected the country’s strategic posture, the
relative influence of various military services, and the fate of high-level
commanders of the Russian Armed Forces. In just two months, decades-old
traditions of the supremacy of the Strategic Rocket Force (SRF), which controls
land-based strategic missiles (ICBMs), was shattered and the severely weakened
SRF had to share its place in the strategic triad with the Navy and eventually
move to the second, if not the third place. Only two years later the situation
was partially reversed with land-based strategic systems restored to their
dominant place within the triad, even though the SRF did not fully recover the
administrative status it once had.
The events of the summer 2000 were centered around a long-simmering
conflict between Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev and Chief of the
General Staff Anatoliyy Kvashnin. At a meeting of the Collegium of the
Ministry of Defense on July 12, 2000 (the Collegium is an assembly of
the top figures of the ministry), that conflict became public as
Kvashnin unveiled his plan to reorganize the SRF.
Reportedly, this plan included reduction of the number of ICBM divisions from
19 to just two and the number of IBCMs to 150 by 2003 (some sources indicated
that a revised version of his plan foresaw a more drawn-out reduction) with the
overall strategic force reduced to 1,500 or even less.[13] Deployment of the new
ICBM, Topol-M, was to be cut to only two or three per year whereas
earlier plans foresaw the deployment of no less than 10 Topol-Ms per year
with an eventual increase to 20. Savings generated by these reductions were to
be channeled into the modernization of conventional forces, so that by 2016
Russia could create the “foundation” for a “future conventional deterrent
capability.” In the meantime, the SRF was to be eliminated as an independent
component of the Armed Forces (“vid,” according to Russian military
terminology) and transformed into a command (“rod”), either independent
or within the Air Force. [14] Minister of Defense Sergeyev objected to these
proposals, and discussion was again concealed behind closed doors. Following the
Collegium, Sergeyev threatened to resign if Kvashnin’s plan was adopted.
The fact that Kvashnin so boldly announced his views hinted that he had been
able to obtain Putin’s endorsement. Indeed, according to many reports, the
“denucleraization” proposals were based on a report, which Kvashnin had sent to
Vladimir Putin in April 2000, shortly after the adoption of the
Military Doctrine, and which
was supposed to provide guidelines for its implementation.[15]
In the face of an acrimonious conflict between the two highest figures in the
military hierarchy, the Collegium was unable to reach a decision. Proposals
presented by Kvashnin were sent back for additional discussion, although the
balance seemed to be tilting toward an outcome unfavorable for the SRF.[17] With
the conflict public knowledge, Putin called both Sergeyev and Kvashnin to the
southern Russian resort at Sochi to discuss the conflict (initially only
Sergeyev was supposed to come, but later Putin additionally invited Kvashnin and
Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Ivanov [18]). That meeting ended
inconclusively [19] and it was decided to continue the discussion at a meeting
of the Security Council the end of July. (The meeting took place two weeks
later, on August 11, probably as a result of serious bureaucratic and political
infighting.)
Kvashnin’s statement at the Collegium shocked the Moscow military and
political establishment, as well as independent observers because it presupposed
a radical change of the Russian military posture--not just a deep reduction of
the nuclear arsenal, but a radical shift of emphasis within the nuclear triad
from the SRF to the Navy with the Air Force probably taking second place. The
proposed changed were clearly directed against Igor Sergeyev, himself a former
Chief of the SRF, and were widely interpreted as Kvashnin’s claim for the
position of the minister.
In terms of personal politics, this was clearly a competition for the
position of the minister under the new administration (Vladimir Putin had been
elected president only months before these events, in April). Kvashnin’s star
was quickly rising, as suggested by his rapid advancement in both the
official and the unofficial hierarchy. By 2000, the General Staff had firmly
consolidated operational control of all Armed Forces, partly due the initial
success of the second military campaign in Chechnya, which was widely credited
to Kvashnin’s leadership. In June of 2000, he was made full member of the
Security Council (previously the Ministry of Defense was represented only be the
minister, who was the ex officio full member of that body). In contrast,
SRF Chief Vladimir Yakovlev, who was widely rumored to be Sergeyev’s candidate
for the minister of defense, did not receive a promotion at the same time as
other service chiefs (he was promoted to army general only in June, months later
than the others). In fact, Yakovlev sounded resigned to his defeat in the
intra-agency struggle and as early as a week before the Collegium pinned all his
hopes on Putin’s wisdom and statesmanship.[16]
On a deeper level, the personal rivalry between Sergeyev and Kvashnin was but
a reflection of a deeper division over the future of the Russian Armed Forces.
Many Russian observers suggested that the conflict was essentially between the
entrenched “missile mafia,” the military and industrial leaders associated with
nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the increasingly influential group of
“Chechen generals,” who led Russian troops during the first and especially the
second military campaigns in Chechnya and who emphasized development of
conventional capabilities. While the
National Security Concept and the Military
Doctrine foresaw the gradual shift of emphasis from nuclear to conventional
weapons, the manner and the pace of that shift remained undefined. Kvashnin, who
himself had made his career in Ground Forces, was a prominent commander during
the first war in Chechnya and effectively commanded troops during the second
war. He led the assault, advocating an accelerated revision of funding
priorities.
To a certain extent, the joint offensive of Kvashnin, the Ground Forces, and
the Navy was a response to an earlier plan by Sergeyev to merge all nuclear
weapons into a single command--the Strategic Deterrence Forces, which was
supposed to unite the SRF and the nuclear components of the Navy and the Air
Force. The plan was announced in October 1998 on the heels of the just-completed
merger of the SRF and Space Forces.[20] This plan generated extremely strong
opposition, including on the part of the Navy, which had been reeling from
vastly inadequate funding and, after the “change of guard” in the Kremlin,
seemed well positioned for a more prominent place in the Armed Forces due to a
close personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and Chief of the Navy
Vladimir Kuroyedov. (Putin even attended the defense of Kuroyedov’s doctoral
dissertation, which subsequently was transformed in the the Naval Doctrine of
Russia.)
Another important element of the political “game,” which extended beyond the
intra-service rivalry, was the future of the military organization as a whole.
Reportedly, Putin’s plans included delineation of responsibilities of the
Ministry of Defense and the General Staff in a manner roughly similar to the
United States. Such a move was to be capped by the appointment of a civilian as
minister of defense. In this context, the appointment of Kvashnin as a member of
the Security Council was part of a broader process rather than just a reflection
of his personal fortunes.
Kvashnin’s plan carried with it profound consequences for Russia’s foreign
and defense policy. On the surface, it looked like an attempt by several leading
members of the Russian military to radically reduce the nuclear arsenal and,
implicitly, reliance on nuclear weapons, which could be classified as a positive
development. In fact, consequences could be far less straightforward. Sea-based
strategic weapons--both submarines (SSBNs) and submarine-launched missiles
(SLBMs)--were nearing the end of their service lives. Development of a new SLBM
was still in very early stages. It would have been necessary to radically
increase the funding for the naval leg of the triad to maintain the strategic
arsenal even at the proposed 1,500 warheads level. In the meantime, Russia was
destined to lose its new ICBM, Topol-M, since production at the rate of
two per year was simply uneconomical. In effect, the radical change in the
strategic posture would have left even less money for conventional modernization
than under Sergeyev’s original plan.[21] Ultimately, the effect could be
even greater and longer-term reliance on the diminishing and aging nuclear
arsenal and possibly even the lowering of the nuclear threshold.
The plan also undermined the complicated “web of incentives” created by the
Russian military to prevent the United States from deploying a national missile
defense (NMD). Prior to 2000, the deep reductions of strategic weapons,
including the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs (land-based strategic missiles with
multiple warheads) under the START II Treaty, were closely linked to the
confirmation by the United States of the 1972 ABM Treaty [see the CNS report “START
II Ratification: There is More Than Meets the Eye”]; in case the
United States would deploy an NMD, the Russian military promised “a material
response,” which could be understood as a refusal to reduce strategic arms and a
limited modernization effort. The plan unveiled by Kvashnin removed both the
incentive and the “punishment:” strategic weapons would have been sharply
reduced regardless of what the United States did, including all or almost all
MIRVed ICBMs.
The meeting of the Security Council on August 11 did not produce a sensation.
As one Russian observer correctly predicted, both Kvashnin and his leading
opponent, Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev, lost to President Vladimir Putin’s
preference for caution.[22] Although decisions of the Security Council were
classified, the gist can be deduced from leaks and reports in the media.[23]
Apparently, the meeting confirmed that the Russian strategic arsenal will
eventually be reduced to 1,500 warheads. This reduction, however, was supposed
to be gradual and linked to the expiration of the service life of individual
weapons systems (in contrast to Kvashnin’s proposal about expedited reduction).
Reductions and restructuring were also linked to the outcome of arms control
talks and to U.S. plans to deploy an NMD.
One major organizational change was the reduction in the status of the SRF,
which was downgraded from a branch (“vid” in Russian terminology), on par
with the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the United States, to the status of a
command (“rod”); it was also planned to fold the SRF into the Air Force
by 2006 (that decision was subsequently revised). The structure of the SRF was
supposed to be simplified: intermediate army-level commands were to be
abolished, and all SRF divisions made directly subordinate to the Main Staff of
the SRF. The number of divisions, however, was set higher than in Kvashnin’s
proposals: 10-11 instead of two or three. The Space Forces, which in 1998 were
merged into the SRF, were again to become independent. The deployment rate of
Topol-M ICBMs was set higher than that proposed by Kvashnin (two per year),
but still lower than what had been projected by the SRF; starting in 2000
deployment has consistently been six per year instead of 10, an increase to 20,
as the SRF originally planned, seems highly unlikely.
The August 11 meeting effectively ended the debate over the nuclear posture,
although discussion of military reform in general continued and even
intensified. There were additional Security Council meetings in September and
November 2000, but these did not affect nuclear forces. The final decisions were
made only in January 2001, when Putin finally approved “The Plan of Reforms of
the Armed Forces in 2001-2005.” At that moment the first revisions of the August
11 decisions were made; reportedly, these revisions were initiated by Putin
personally.[24] The long-awaited retirement of Igor Sergeyev, which had been the
subject of many rumors since the spring of 2000, however, only happened in late
March of 2001. He was replaced with Sergeiy Ivanov, a close confidant of
Vladimir Putin and the erstwhile secretary of the Security Council, who oversaw
the final stage of development of the Military Doctrine, as well as the tortuous
process of laying out plans for military reform. It could be said that Anatoliy
Kvashnin failed to achieve his widely reported goal of becoming minister of
defense. In 2004 Sergeiy Ivanov managed to downgrade the General Staff, having
stripped it of operational control of the Armed Forces and control of the
defense budget and in July 2004 Kvashnin was forced to retire from military
service.
The plans, which Anatoliy Kvashnin advanced in the spring and summer of 2000
and which were subsequently cut by the Security Council, were revised again in
2002 following the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The SRF were again
accorded the status of the primary element of the triad, even though its formal
place in the Armed Forces was not restored to a branch (“vid”). [25]
Reportedly, the decision was formalized at a meeting in the Kremlin between
Vladimir Putin, Sergeiy Ivanov, and Anatoliy Kvashnin in June 2002, immediately
after the formal U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on June 13.[26] Kvashnin,
referring to that withdrawal, emphasized that Russia’s security vis-à-vis the
NMD was guaranteed by strategic forces, first and foremost heavy ICBMs; [27]
that attitude was, of course, the exact opposite of the views he had espoused
two years earlier.
In August 2002 Sergeiy Ivanov slightly modified the argument and declared
that the decision to retain MIRVed ICBMs was not a response to the American
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, but that existing ICBMs would be retained and
that, specifically, heavy SS-18 ICBMs would remain in service until 2016.[28]
This decision presupposes additional extension of these missiles’ service lives
and in this regard represents a further revision of the August 2000 decisions,
which foresaw that ICBMs would be eliminated as their service lives expired. He
also called the SRF “the most important military-political factor of deterring
aggressive intentions toward Russia and our allies,” effectively restoring that
branch to its de facto leading status in the nuclear triad.[29]
The new chief of SRF, Nikolai Solovtsov, expanded on the minister’s remarks,
and openly stated that “this year plans on [the SRF] reforms have been changed
by the President.” According to Solovtsov, it was decided to retain at least two
divisions of heavy SS-18 ICBMs and a feasibility study with regard to keeping a
third division was underway. The government funded the extension of service
lives of SS-18 ICBMs. Furthermore, it was also decided, he said, to retain one
out of three divisions of rail-mobile ICBMs SS-24. (Keeping all three divisions
was impossible anyway as service lives of solid-fuel ICBMs cannot be extended as
easily.)[30] In December 2002, Solovtsov noted, with some satisfaction, that the
SRF was not “fading away:” as before, its structure consisted of armies and
divisions (meaning that the original plan of eliminating the intermediate chain
of command had been dropped as well) and that it planned to retain, by 2020,
10-12 divisions of ICBMs organized into two armies. He also made it clear that
the reduction of the SRF was primarily determined by the expiration of service
lives. For example, it was planned to eventually completely remove solid-fuel
SS-24 from service because their service lives could not be extended, but
10-year service lives of liquid-fuel ICBMs, including heavy SS-18s, could be
extended to 25-30 years. He also discussed continued deployment of Topol-M
ICBMs and further modernization of these missiles.[31]
In hindsight, the “nuclear debate” of 2000 might look like a temporary
deviation from a steady course that had been set in 1999-early 2000 and
reflected in the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine. After all,
proposals for deep reductions were motivated primarily by struggle for power and
influence and were not rational from political, military, or financial
perspectives. They were partially revised in a matter of months, and two years
later almost completely reversed.
Nevertheless, that debate had some tangible consequences for Russia’s nuclear
policy. In the broad scheme of things, that debate helped to limit the extent of
reliance on nuclear weapons in Russia’s security policy and, perhaps even more
important, limited the political and military role of strategic weapons in the
nuclear arsenal. The original plans of Igor Sergeyev held the potential of
giving excessive weight to the strategic triad: his 1998 plan to create the
Strategic Deterrence Forces and, reportedly, to steer Chief of SRF Vladimir
Yakovlev to the ministerial chair could have given permanent prominence to
nuclear weapons in general, as well as to the strategic arsenal and to the
mission of deterring the United States. After two turbulent years, strategic
forces remain an important, but nevertheless subsidiary element of the Armed
Forces and, moreover, reliance on nuclear weapons is still regarded as a
temporary “fix” until conventional forces are modernized (the probability of
genuine military reform and modernization of conventional forces is outside the
scope of this paper). Barring an unexpected deterioration of Russia’s security
environment in the near future, there is a fair chance that in the end
modernization of conventional forces will advance sufficiently to enable a
decrease in reliance on nuclear weapons.
The partial “nuclear revival” of 2002 should not be accorded excessive
significance. The high profile of nuclear weapons in defense policy, retention
of old, Soviet-time ICBMs, and continued ICBM modernization are rational from
the perspective of the Russian political and military establishment and could
not have been avoided under any circumstances. The withdrawal of the United
States from the ABM Treaty, continued eastward enlargement of NATO, and the
establishment of American military bases in Central Asia are all viewed in
Russia as a potential threat, and would not have been left without a response
(including, first and foremost, higher profile for nuclear weapons). Of greater
importance is the fact that under the leadership of Igor Sergeyev and his allies
in the SRF, the Russian response could have been more forceful and large-scale.
A broader consequence of the “nuclear debate” is the stronger political
control over military affairs and the appointment of a civilian (a former
intelligence general, to be sure, but nevertheless an outsider from a
professional military point of view) as Minister of Defense. The split within
the military establishment, which was triggered by Anatoliy Kvashnin, gave
Vladimir Putin the role of ultimate referee, who could choose one or the other
side and enforce his own preferences. Such a line was always more difficult when
Boris Yeltsin (or, before him, Soviet leadership) had to face a “united front”
of uniformed military. The situation is far from genuine civilian control over
the Ministry of Defense, but nevertheless represents an important departure from
the Soviet tradition of military dominating military affairs.
Russian Ministry of Defense 2003 Policy Paper:
The Nuclear Angle
At an October 2, 2003 meeting at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in the
presence of President Vladimir Putin, the top military leaders,
legislators, and a plethora of other dignitaries, Minister of Defense
Sergey Ivanov unveiled a report “Immediate Tasks of Development of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,”[32] which some news services
have dubbed the “White Paper.” The report formally represents only the
views of the MOD, but its implications are broader: in effect it
develops and details the 2000 Military Doctrine.[33] Where nuclear
weapons are concerned, the report provides important insights into
nuclear posture planning in the aftermath of the summer-fall 2000 debate
on the future of Russia’s strategic forces.[34]
The report did not contain many novel ideas. Probably the only serious
innovation was the proposition that the MOD “can no longer completely
rule out preventive use of force if demanded by the interests of Russia
or its alliance commitments.”[35] This statement did not specifically
refer to nuclear weapons, but given their overall role in Russia’s
defense policy, it might imply that threat too.
Deterrence and De-escalation
Like the 2000 Military Doctrine, the “White Paper” postulates two missions
for nuclear weapons: deterrence of a large-scale attack against Russia and
de-escalation of a limited conflict in case deterrence fails. In contrast to the
earlier document, the new guidance elaborates on these missions in considerable
detail.
During the Cold War, the notion of deterrence mostly applied to a large-scale
nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union - a war that
could not be won and would have meant the end of the world. Now global war is
considered a low probability, almost a theoretical event. The Russian military
is much more preoccupied with preventing the threat that force could be used
against Russia for political purposes (“silovoe davlenie” - compellence
by force) and with deterrence of limited attacks. Both scenarios are deterred by
the threat that Russia might use nuclear weapons. The document states,
specifically:
The main goal of the Russian Federation’s policy in the area of strategic
deterrence is to rule out any type of force pressure and aggression against
Russia or its allies and, in the case aggression takes place, assured defense of
sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests of Russia
or its allies.[36]
De-escalation and, implicitly, deterrence of limited conflicts is based on
the notion that Russia should be able to inflict just the right amount of damage
to the attacker to make sure that aggression is not worthwhile. The central
tenet of this policy is the notion of “pre-determined damage,” which in the 2000
National Security Concept and Military Doctrine was one of very few indications
that Russia was considering limited use of nuclear weapons. In the White Paper,
references to limited use are explicit and detailed. Predetermined damage is
defined as “damage, subjectively unacceptable to the enemy, which exceeds the
benefits the aggressor expects to gain as a result of the use of military
force.”[37]
At the same time, the document emphasizes that in the context of limited
conflicts nuclear deterrence requires modern and capable conventional forces;
“only in that case will the threat of nuclear use in response to an attack be
credible.”[38] (This postulate brings to mind one of the seminal documents in
U.S. nuclear policy from the 1950s, NSC-68.)
Guidance for Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons
Although the main threats to Russia listed in the report are international
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), military
planning is geared toward the capability to fight any potential enemy,
and this means the ability to defend against an attack by economically,
technologically, and militarily advanced states (including, by default, the
United States as the most powerful state in the world). Given the weakness of
Russia’s conventional forces today, the MOD document implicitly suggests that
Russia cannot face a militarily advanced state or a coalition of states without
engaging its nuclear capability. It also appears that the document assumes that
an army that can fight the United States and NATO can fight any other enemy. The
wisdom of this assumption seems dubious, however.
The White Paper’s guidance on strategies for fighting regional and local wars
suggests ways in which nuclear weapons might be utilized for the purposes of
de-escalation. The section on the “nature of contemporary wars and armed
conflicts” emphasizes that at the early stage of wars in the 1990s, the central
role belonged to long-range strike weapons, including airborne delivery systems.
It also notes that domination at the early stage of conflict ensured
victory.[39] This means that, according to the Russian military’s analysis, U.S.
victories in a string of conflicts in the 1990s were ensured primarily by
delivery vehicles operating outside the immediate theater of war.
Accordingly, the new document postulates “the utmost necessity of having the
capability to strike military assets of the enemy (long-range high-precision
weapons, long-range Air Force) outside the immediate area of conflict. To
achieve this, [we] need both our own long-range high-precision strike capability
and other assets that enable [us] to transfer hostilities directly to enemy
territory.”[40]
These guidelines fit well with a pattern of a series of military exercises
starting with the “Zapad-99”
maneuvers. A more recent example is the
2003 exercise in the Indian Ocean in the wake of the war
in Iraq that involved the use of long-range air-launched cruise missiles against
naval and land targets in the Indian Ocean. It is a fair guess that the Russian
Air Force simulated strikes against U.S. naval vessels carrying sea-launched
cruise missiles and the U.S. base at Diego Garcia. These assets were used during
the war in Iraq and might be used in a hypothetical U.S. military action against
Russia or its neighbors.
Response to the Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Policy
The MOD report, along with some earlier official statements, indicates how
Russia might react to the anticipated changes in U.S. policy toward nuclear
weapons. The U.S. policy shift began with the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and
became more visible recently with discussions about the development of a new,
low-yield nuclear weapon.
The MOD document notes efforts by unnamed parties “to restore nuclear weapons
as an acceptable military instrument by using ‘breakthrough’ scientific and
technical developments, which are supposed to turn nuclear weapons into a
relatively ‘clean’ weapon from the point of view of the consequences of its
use.” Following that assertion, the document somewhat cryptically declares that
“the lowering of the nuclear threshold will demand that Russia revise the system
of command and control of troops and its approaches to deterrence of threats of
various levels.”[41]
The oral statement of Sergey Ivanov at the October meeting offered additional
details. He said that developments in U.S. nuclear policy were “undermining
global and regional stability” and that he had directed his subordinates to
closely monitor these trends. “Even miniscule” lowering of the nuclear
threshold, he stated, might trigger a revision of the existing guidance on the
employment of nuclear weapons.[42]
This statement closely correlates with an earlier remark of President Putin:
speaking at Sarov, one of Russia’s two nuclear laboratories, on July 31, 2003,
he emphasized that Russia would continue to refrain from nuclear testing “under
certain obligatory conditions, one of the most important of which is a similar
attitude on the part of other nuclear states toward obligations they had
undertaken.”[43] In effect, this meant that Russia would not resume testing
until other states do. This represented a partial change in the standard Russian
position. Previously, Russian officials usually emphasized that Russia had
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and hoped that the treaty would
enter into force soon. Now the emphasis has shifted to conditions under which
Russia might withdraw from the moratorium. Putin’s statement did not specify
other possible conditions for termination of the moratorium.
The Future of the Nuclear Triad
The new document contains an overview of plans with regard to Russia’s
strategic nuclear posture. Information is scanty, but nevertheless the document
offers useful insights into what has been a volatile issue since 2000. In summer
and fall 2000,
a series of
meetings of Russia’s Security Council
revised earlier decisions with regard
to the nuclear triad, providing for a radical reduction of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, the land-based leg of the triad and shifting priority to the naval leg.
Apparently, these decisions were partially revised in early 2002 following the
U.S. notification of its intent to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (the withdrawal became final in June 2002). Reportedly, the main change
was the decision to keep old types of land-based missiles, inter-continental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), to the very end of their service lives, including
all possible extensions (in 2000 the General Staff wanted to reduce them at a
much faster pace).
The White Paper reveals that by 2007-2008, Strategic Rocket Forces will
consist of 10 missile divisions (reduced from the current 19) in line with the
decision of the Security Council on August 11, 2000, but contrary to the
original plans of the General Staff.[44] These divisions will consist primarily
of old types of ICBMs, whose service lives will be extended; gradually these
ICBMs will be replaced with “prospective missile complexes.”
As an illustration, President Putin, in his closing statement at the
conference, mentioned UR-100NUTTKh ICBMs (known in the United States as
SS-19’s). He said that dozens of those have been kept in so-called “dry storage”
(i.e., missiles were not filled with fuel) and could be put into silos for
combat duty.[45] Subsequently, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluevski
added that these missiles could last as long as until 2030,[46] indirectly
indicating that the projected pace of deployment of modern ICBMs will be rather
slow. Sergey Ivanov explained a few days later that at the moment Russia did not
have plans to transfer SS-19s from dry storage to combat duty and that Putin’s
statement was only intended to make Russia’s ability to do so known “both to
domestic and international audiences.”[47]
Some commentators hastened to declare that Putin’s words at the October 2 MOD
meeting explained his reference in the State of the Nation address to the
Federal Assembly last spring to some unnamed “new strategic weapon,”[48] but
such speculations do not make sense - SS-19s are old, late 1970s-early 1980s
weapons. Other commentators also called these missiles “heavy,” which is
incorrect since only SS-18’s (the R-36 family of ICBMs, including R-36UTTKh and
R-26M2 currently deployed) are officially classified as heavy ICBMs. A few
months later it became clear that Putin meant a maneuvering ICBM front section,
which was tested during large-scale maneuvers in February
2004.
The air-based component of the strategic forces will emphasize modernization
of the Tu-160 heavy bomber, which should be able to carry high-precision cruise
missiles with both nuclear and conventional warheads, as well as gravity bombs
(including a Russian analogue to American Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs)
and support a variety of other missions. This is little news: for years now the
Russian Air Force has concentrated its efforts on developing new weapons for the
existing fleet of long-range aircraft as well as on modernizing these aircraft
by adding new avionics, communications equipment, targeting capabilities, etc.
The Air Force approach seems the most cost-effective and the most stable
compared to the unending rivalries and often waste in other two legs of the
triad.
The discussion of the naval leg of the strategic triad simply mentioned what
is well known already: Russia plans to complete development of a new
sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and of a new submarine to carry this new
missile. Clearly, the new SLBM mentioned in the document is Bulava, a new
missile reportedly capable of carrying up to 10 warheads. The Bulava
should also be deployable on land. The new nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine is the Borey class. The first submarine in that class, Yuri
Dolgoruky, was launched in mid-1990s, but was then put on hold to wait for a
new missile.
The MOD document and in particular Putin in his closing remarks confirmed
that Russia intended to utilize the flexibility accorded to it by the
Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002 (also known as the Moscow Treaty) in
drafting its plans for the future composition and size of the nuclear triad.
Conclusion
In the end, the new document published by the Ministry of Defense
demonstrates that Russia’s nuclear policy has stabilized after the somewhat
tumultuous first two years of Putin’s presidency. Missions assigned to nuclear
weapons have been confirmed and detailed; the future shape of the nuclear
posture does not seem to hold any surprises. One remaining element of
uncertainty is related to future U.S. policy on nuclear weapons: if the United
States proceeds with the development of a new, more “usable” nuclear weapon and
especially if it resumes nuclear testing as many expect, then Russian nuclear
policy might begin to change and Russia will strive to acquire similar
capabilities. Official U.S. position remains, however, that there has been no
decision to resume testing.
Although the new document lists proliferation of WMD and international
terrorism as the gravest threats to Russia’s security, the military still
regards U.S. military capability and the ability to repel a hypothetical attack
by the United States as benchmarks for planning. On the one hand, this
orientation reflects a simple (maybe even simplistic) premise: an army that can
fight the United States can fight any other state or coalition of states. At a
different level, however, it betrays deeply seated concerns about the future of
Russia’s relations with the United States and the feeling of vulnerability
vis-à-vis the most powerful state in the world. In the end, the Ministry of
Defense seems to believe that nothing but military power can guarantee Russia’s
security and interests, especially given the suspected propensity of the United
States for unilateral, often not fully logical military escapades. Partnership
is one thing, guaranteed security is another. Nothing can reliably contain
political and military pressure, much less the use of force, except nuclear
weapons.
Significant
Military Maneuvers
Inevitably, key doctrinal documents, such as the
National Security Concept, the
Military Doctrine, or the
October 2003 “White
Paper” issued by the Ministry
of Defense, are of very general nature. They provide broad guidelines on
military posture and the use of force, but are usually short on details.
As a rule, additional information could be gleaned from military
maneuvers, whose patterns offer important insights into the anticipated
conflict scenarios and the planned responses to different types of
attack.
During the 1990s, Russian military maneuvers (or, at least, the
publicly available information about them) yielded little useful
information because maneuvers were few and small-scale. When the use of
nuclear weapons was simulated, this usually happened independently of
general purpose forces and without relationship to specific scenarios.
In addition, the shaping of views on possible future conflicts and the
ways of fighting them takes time. The situation began to change in 1999.
On the one hand, a string of conflicts in the Balkans, especially the
war in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, provided the likely scenarios that
the Russian military deemed most dangerous. On the other hand, the
defense budget began to grow as Russia began to emerge from the 1998
financial meltdown and the general economic situation started to
improve. Significant reduction of the Armed Forces allowed the
reallocation of funds from personnel support to training.
Since 1999, the Russian military has regularly conducted large-scale
maneuvers that played out several conflict scenarios, including those that
involved the use of nuclear weapons. As a result, many maneuvers held in the
last five years allow important insights into the doctrinal and operational
details that are absent from key documents. Below is a brief review of the more
important exercises conducted since 1999. Their typical features could be
summarized as follows.
- Every scenario that involved the use of nuclear weapons (at least, every
scenario that reconstructed from open sources) played out a variation of a
“regional war” (according to the classification of the
Military Doctrine) - the
lowest-level conflict to allow the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently all of
them assumed participation of nuclear-weapons state(s), first and foremost
the United States (in one case nuclear-capable long-range aircraft was used
in Central Asia, but whether they simulated the use of nuclear or
conventional weapons remained unclear). Early maneuvers (1999-2002)
concentrated on air attacks following U.S. military campaigns in the
Balkans, especially in Kosovo in 1999; recent maneuvers added the experience
of the war in Iraq in 2003. No later than in 2001 defense against tactical
ballistic missiles was introduced as well. In many instances Russian forces
trained for disruption of enemy satellite links to break down
communications, coordination, and targeting (this element was probably
present in all or the majority of maneuvers, but went unreported). Since
2002 scenarios have included simulations of large-scale attack by enemy
ground forces; in these cases defense included a call-up of reserves and
transfer of ground troops between theaters of operations.
- The use of nuclear weapons usually took place at a relatively late stage
of maneuvers and was associated with two situations. First, several days
after an intense air defense campaign, when, according to the scenario,
Russian troops exhausted their ability to withstand the assault. The second
situation involved a large-scale combined air and ground attack, which
required the call-up of reserves (fitting the definition of a “regional war”
- the standing army is insufficient for defense and a transfer of troops
from other military districts becomes necessary); nuclear weapons entered
the picture also after several days of fighting with conventional forces.
Call-up of reserves can be regarded as a reliable indicator of when the
nuclear threshold is about to be crossed; in the case of an exclusively air
campaign the threshold was less clear.
- The weapon of choice for limited use of nuclear weapons was in all cases
heavy and medium bombers (Tu-95MS, Tu-160, and Tu-22M3) using long-range
cruise missiles and short-range weapons. In recent years, the same platforms
were used to deliver both nuclear and precision-guided conventional weapons.
The apparent number of nuclear weapons used in each case was small - less
than ten. The usual choice of targets was the following: (1) airbases and
other military installations in European NATO countries involved in the
simulated attack against Russia and, in at least one case, in Japan; (2)
undisclosed targets in the continental United States (launched either from
the vicinity of Iceland or from the North-East of Russia); (3) naval targets
- aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic Sea, as well
as in the Indian Ocean and the Black Sea, once each; (4) in 2003 one other
class of ground targets was added - those in the Indian Ocean (presumably,
the U.S. base on Diego Garcia).
- Land- and sea-based strategic missiles participated in most, but not every
large-scale exercise. It has remained unclear whether they were integrated
into scenarios or maneuvers were simply used as a backdrop for training
launches. It appears that in some cases they were probably an integral part
and were intended to simulate limited strikes, perhaps against targets in
the continental United States.
A fairly stable pattern of maneuvers during the period of 1999-2004
demonstrated that limited use of nuclear weapons is now firmly integrated into a
rather broad range of scenarios of possible conflicts. Virtually any large-scale
attack by forces that are numerically and qualitatively superior to the Russian
Armed Forces risks crossing the nuclear threshold. A broader view suggests
several more important observations, however:
- Russian Armed Forces apparently ceased training for a global war that
involves a massive exchange with nuclear strikes - a scenario common during
the Cold War. Implicitly, the capability for a large-scale strike remains an
available option, but, true to all the doctrinal documents since 1993, such
conflict is regarded as a very low probability;
- the United States is considered the most dangerous opponent and apparently
the likelihood that the United States might threaten - whether openly or
indirectly - to use force against Russia to achieve certain political goals
is still regarded as high, especially among the military;
- There has been a remarkably low emphasis on low-intensity conflicts that
involve diffuse fighting against paramilitary and guerilla forces. It is
possible that the Russian military simply does not see this kind of training
necessary in the view of the ongoing war in Chechnya. Regardless, the skew
toward “regional wars” appears an important drawback, especially since
dependence on nuclear weapons inadvertently increases.
Summer 1999: West-99 (Zapad-99)
Maneuvers
West-99 maneuvers were conducted a few months after a crucial
April 1999
meeting of the Security Council. Held shortly after the beginning of the war
in Kosovo, that meeting apparently initiated the development of a new military
doctrine designed to deter limited use of force against Russia. By all
indications, the West-99 maneuvers were designed to test a doctrinal innovation
- limited use of nuclear weapons for the purposes of deterring a limited
conventional attack or, if deterrence failed, for deescalating the conflict and
returning the status quo ante.
From the start, official Russian military representatives claimed that the
West-99 maneuvers had no relationship to the war in Kosovo (they had been
planned well before that war, in late 1998) and that they did not involve
simulated use of nuclear weapons.[49] Only after the end of the maneuvers
Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev admitted that the intention was, indeed, to
test defense against an attack against Russia that was similar in style and
scale to the war in Kosovo and that an important element of these maneuvers was
demonstration of the ability and the willingness to use nuclear weapons
under conditions when “all means of resistance have been exhausted,” i.e., when
conventional forces are unable to repel the attack on their own.[50]
The scenario included three stages. In the first stage (June 21-22), the
alert status of troops in all Western military districts was enhanced and troops
in Leningrad military district were transferred to full combat mode. In the
second stage (June 22-25), Russian troops and the Baltic fleet together with the
Byelorussian army defended against an attack from the West. That attack included
a strike with 450 aircraft and 120 cruise missiles against the territory of
Belarus and with 110 aircraft and 40 cruise missiles against Kaliningrad oblast.
In the final stage (June 25-26), Russian troops repelled the attack and returned
the situation to the status quo ante; that stage included simulated
use of nuclear weapons. Primary attention was paid to Kaliningrad exclave - a
piece of Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania widely considered
Russia’s “Achille’s heel” as it is the part of the country most difficult to
defend. According to the scenario, troops in Kaliningrad oblast and the Baltic
fleet were supposed to repel the attack without reinforcements.[51]
The “nuclear component” included simulated strikes with air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs) from heavy bombers from “around the corner” - a Russian Air
Force slang, which denotes a flight toward the northern tip of Norway and then a
turn left toward the north Atlantic, and represented a typical training and
combat mission in Soviet times. Two Tu-95MS heavy bombers undertook a 15-hour
flight “around the corner” toward Iceland, where they simulated the launch of
ALCMs against U.S. territory. Simultaneously, two Tu-160 heavy bombers took a
similar route, but simulated ALCM launches against continental Europe from near
the northern tip of Norway. According to newspaper reports, their targets were
airbases in Poland and the Baltic states (it was assumed that the territory of
these countries was used by NATO), Norway, as well as aircraft carrier groups in
the Barents Sea. Upon their return to the Russian territory, heavy bombers
conducted live launches against test ranges in southern Russia.[52]
Following the end of the West-99 maneuvers,
deputy chief of the General Staff, Yuriyy Baluyevski, told reporters that
not only aggressors, but also countries, whose territory is used for an
aggression would become potential targets [53] in a clear reference to the
relevant provision of the Military Doctrine that allows the use of nuclear
weapons not only against nuclear states and their allies, but also states that
attack Russia “in concert with” nuclear states.
In September 1999, smaller-scale maneuvers were conducted in the Far East.
The main purpose of these maneuvers was compatible with West-99: the Pacific
fleet and the Long-Range Air Force simulated defense from and strikes against
aircraft carrier groups.[54]
April 2000
April 2000 Air Force maneuvers were relatively small-scale. They simulated
defense against strikes by land- and carrier-based aircraft. These maneuvers
were conducted in the southwest of Russia between the Black and the Caspian seas
and included strikes against land and sea targets. In addition to tactical
aircraft, Tu-22M3 medium bombers (classified in Russia as long-range or
strategic) played a prominent role, as well as Tu-95MS and Tu-160 heavy bombers,
which for the first time conducted launches of conventional long-range Kh-101
ALCMs. Maneuvers also included the use of S-300 anti-aircraft and tactical
anti-missile systems.[55,56,57,58,59]
September 2000
In early September 2000, the Russian strategic Air Force participated in a
large air defense exercise that included armies of Central Asian states,
Armenia, and Belarus. Tu-95MS, Tu-160 and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers flew
miss
