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Updated February 2009
Introduction
From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Argentina's nuclear program and missile activities aroused concern that the country was seeking to develop nuclear weapons and possibly aid other countries in developing and delivering them. Argentina has since eschewed nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons but retains an ambitious nuclear energy program. It dismantled its ballistic missile program in the early 1990s.
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Nuclear
Argentina has never produced nuclear weapons. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, however, Argentina pursued an ambitious program of nuclear energy and technological development, which included construction of an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility. Buenos Aires also refused to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into legal force. When democratic rule returned in 1983, the new president placed the nuclear program under civilian control and initiated a process of nuclear confidence building and cooperation with neighboring Brazil. In the early 1990s, the two countries established a bilateral inspection agency to verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. Argentina acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on February 10, 1995 but has not signed the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement to allow the IAEA expanded access to undeclared nuclear sites.
Argentina has significant heavy water infrastructure facilities, including research and development, heavy water production, fuel manufacture, and supply of certain components. In July 2006, Argentina announced the successful transfer of 3.7 kg of weapons-grade uranium from an inactive research reactor near Buenos Aires to a storage facility in the United States. Argentina is the first South American country to use nuclear energy. It has two operational nuclear plants, Atucha I and Embalse which supply 7% of the country’s electricity, and one unfinished plant, Atucha II. In August 2006, Buenos Aires announced a major nuclear initiative worth $3.5 billion over eight years to extend the life of existing nuclear plants, finish its third nuclear reactor plant (Atucha II) by 2010, and possibly resume uranium mining The plan also calls for revival of uranium enrichment and feasibility studies for the construction of a fourth nuclear power unit. Argentina expects the Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant to be able to meet the needs of its two reactors in operation (Embalse and Atucha I) and one under construction (Atucha II) beginning in 2010. [1]
Argentina has an active export business. The Argentine nuclear engineering firm Invap sold research reactors to Australia, Libya and Egypt, and CNEA (National Atomic Energy Commission) supplies fuel for those reactors. Another possible market for Invap reactors is Jordan, with which Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008. [2]
In 2008, Argentina also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Brazil, envisaging the development of a nuclear reactor to provide energy for both countries and the creation of a new bi-national company to produce enriched uranium on an industrial scale. [3] Since both countries use different enrichment technology (Argentina uses gas diffusion while Brazil uses centrifuge technology) and different enrichment levels for use in their reactors, it is not clear what the practical aspects of this cooperation will be. The agreement specifies clearly that there will be no transfer of Brazilian centrifuge technology to Argentina. [4]
Argentina participates in the U.S. "Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors" program, which seeks to prevent depleted radioactive fuel in various countries from being used for military purposes, and all its operating research reactors now use low-enriched uranium (under 20 percent enrichment). [5]
[1] Mark Hibbs, "Argentina, Brazil Negotiating Future Enrichment Joint Venture," Nuclear Fuel, Volume 33, Number 20, October 6, 2008, p. 6-7.
[2] "La Argentina firmó un acuerdo nuclear con Jordania", Clarin, 23 October 2008, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2008/10/23/um/m-01787689.htm
[3] Eleonora Gosman, "Argentina y Brasil Producirán Juntos Uranio Enriquecido", Clarin, 23 February 2008, www.clarin.com/diario/2008/02/23/elpais/p-00402.htm; Mylena Fiori, "Brasil e Argentina Vão Negociar Constituição de Empresa Para Enriquecimento de Urânio", Agência Brasil, 22 February 2008 www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2008/02/22/materia.2008-02-22.6178582469/view
[4] "Marinha Descarta Repassar Tecnologia Nuclear", Agência Estado, 28 September 2008 http://www.estadao.com.br/geral/not_ger249674,0.htm.
[5] "No Highly-Enriched Uranium Reactors Left", Telam, 27 January 2009, OSC document LAP20090127061001
Biological
There are no indications to suggest that Argentina has ever possessed or sought to acquire biological weapons. It is a state party of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), having ratified it in November 1979. In September 1991, Argentina, together with Brazil and Chile, signed the Mendoza Accord, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transfer—directly or indirectly—chemical or biological weapons. Argentina further strengthened its nonproliferation credentials when, in 1992, it became a member of the Australia Group, a voluntary system of export controls on chemical and biological agents, precursors, and equipment.
Chemical
There is no evidence that Argentina has ever had a chemical warfare program. Argentina has been active in CW nonproliferation efforts. In 1992, Argentina became a member of the Australia Group and, in October 1995, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even before participation in these bodies, Argentina engaged in regional nonproliferation efforts; for example, Argentina signed the Mendoza Accord in 1991, which prohibits both chemical and biological warfare agents.
Missile
Argentina dismantled its medium-range ballistic missile program, the Cóndor II, in the early 1990s. The Cóndor missile program received technical support from a consortium of European firms and funding from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq. Argentina’s intent was to develop the Cóndor II not only for its own use—which was largely motivated by its loss in the Falklands/Malvinas War with Great Britain—but for export as well. Concerns that missile technology was reaching the Middle East caused the United States to pressure Argentina to end the program, which it did in 1992. Argentina became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1993.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2009 by MIIS.
