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Updated January 2009
Introduction
Brazil has abjured nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and curtailed its ballistic missile program in the early 1990s. From the 1970s to the early 1990s, however, Brazil’s nuclear program aroused concern that the country was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. The international community—and Washington in particular—raised additional concerns that technology from Brazil’s space launch vehicle program would be used for production of ballistic missiles. Brasilia is now a member of all key international nonproliferation regimes.
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Nuclear
From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Brazil pursued an ambitious program of nuclear energy and technological development, which included construction of an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility under Navy direction. However, Brazil has since disavowed nuclear weapons, become a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and, with Argentina, established a bilateral inspection agency to verify both countries' pledges to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. Currently, Brazil mines uranium and ships it to Canada for conversion and to Europe for enrichment. When it returns in the form of gas, it is fabricated in Resende (in the state of Rio de Janeiro) into fuel for its two nuclear power reactors. When completed, a uranium enrichment plant under construction in Resende will allow the country to make its own low-enriched uranium fuel for its nuclear power industry. The plant initially will produce 60 percent of the nuclear fuel used by Brazil's two operational nuclear power reactors (Angra 1 and Angra 2). The government conducted an unveiling ceremony of the uranium enrichment plant in early May 2006 and expects that by 2012 the plant will be able to meet 100% of the needs for the two units and by 2014 it will be able to supply all the reactors, including a third nuclear plant under construction (Angra 3). Brazil has not signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA which would allow for more intrusive inspections of the country's facilities that use nuclear material.
In February 2008 Brazil and Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation agreement that envisages a joint project of a nuclear reactor and the creation of a bi-national company to enrich uranium. Because both countries use different enrichment technology (Argentina uses gas diffusion while Brazil uses gas centrifuge technology) Argentina and Brazil will initially work on uranium enrichment independently.[1]
In September 2008, the Brazilian Navy activated the General Coordination Program for the Development of a Nuclear-Powered Submarine (COGESN) with the objective of having the first nuclear submarine operational by 2020.[2] The non-nuclear parts of the submarine will be built in partnership with France's DCNS (Direction des Constructions Navales Services) through a technology transfer agreement signed on 23 December 2008. The agreement provides for the transfer of technology for the construction of four conventional submarines Scorpene and the hull of a fifth submarine to be equipped with nuclear propulsion. It also includes construction of a new shipyard where the submarines will be built and a new naval base in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The nuclear reactor and its fuel will be provided by Brazil's nuclear program being developed at the Navy's Aramar Technological Center in São Paulo. [3]
[1] Mark Hibbs, "Argentina, Brazil negotiating future enrichment joint venture", Nuclear Fuel, Volume 33, number 20, 6 October 2008, p.6.
[2] "Marinha Ativa a Coordenadoria-Geral do Programa de Desenvolvimento do Submarino de Propulsão Nuclear", Brazilian Navy website, 25 September 2008, www.mar.mil.br/ menu_h/ noticias/ imprensa/ nota1_260908.pdf; Vitor Abdala, " Marinha brasileira cria órgão para gerenciar o desenvolvimento de submarino nuclear", Agência Brazil, 26 September 2008, www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/ noticias/ 2008/09/25/ materia. 2008-09-25.0618821252/ view
[3] "Acordo com França prevê construção de cinco submarinos e 50 helicópteros no Brasil", Folha de S. Paulo, 22 December 2008, www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u482425.shtml; "Marinha do Brasil Assina Contrato de Submarinos", Ministry of Defense, 23 December 2008, https://www.defesa.gov.br/mostra_materia.php?ID_MATERIA=32697; Vladimir Platonow, " Nova base de submarinos será na Baía de Sepetiba, confirma comandante da Marinha", Agência Brazil, 26 September 2008, www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2008/09/26/materia.2008-09-26.1243084153/view
Biological
There is no evidence that Brazil has ever developed or produced biological weapons. It ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1973 and signed the Mendoza Declaration in 1991, which prohibits biological as well as chemical agents. Brazil's opposition to biological weapons is evident from reports that senior government officials oppose using biological agents even to control coca production in neighboring Colombia. Brazil does have the capacity to produce biological agents; for example, it has one of the world’s largest crops of the castor bean (which naturally produces the toxin ricin) and is proficient in advanced biological techniques such as gene sequencing. However, there is no indication that Brazil presents a biological weapons threat; it is, in fact, a staunch proponent of biological weapons nonproliferation.
Chemical
There is no evidence that Brazil has ever embarked on a chemical warfare (CW) program; to the contrary, Brazil is an extremely active participant in CW nonproliferation efforts. Even before the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into existence, Brazil engaged in regional nonproliferation efforts. For example, in September 1991, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile signed the Mendoza Declaration, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transfer—directly or indirectly—chemical or biological weapons. Brazil participated actively in the negotiations for the CWC and ratified it in March 1996, thereby becoming a charter member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). By the end of 2000, Brazil had hosted five OPCW inspections of its chemical industry sites, as well as the first simulation of a challenge inspection of private industry.
Missile
Brazil curtailed the military potential of its space launch vehicle (SLV) program in the early 1990s and joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Previously, however, military control over the SLV program and an ambitious export program of short-range rockets had raised concerns that Brazil might develop ballistic missiles and supply other countries with them.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2009 by MIIS.
